King v. Turley

Full title: Hawatha King v. Caitlin M. Turley et al

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Sep 15, 2016

HHDCV146053997S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 15, 2016)

Opinion

HHDCV146053997S

09-15-2016

Hawatha King v. Caitlin M. Turley et al

Constance L. Epstein, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR ADDITUR

Constance L. Epstein, J.

In this automobile-accident case, the defendant admitted liability and, consequently, the jury determination was limited to causation of plaintiff's claimed injuries and damages therefor. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff and awarded him economic damages in the amount of $5, 799.00, the amount of plaintiff's medical bills, but did not award non-economic damages.

It had long been believed that the rule in Connecticut was that an award of economic damages, without an award of noneconomic damages, was inadequate as a matter of law. Johnson v. Franklin, 112 Conn. 228, 152 A. 64 (1930). In Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 663 A.2d 398 (1995), however, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that " the common law of this state does not recognize the principle that awards limited to economic damages are inadequate as a matter of law and must be set side." Id., 121. In Childs the plaintiff had been awarded only approximately 19% of the claimed economic damages, with no noneconomic damages, and the " cause, nature, and extent" of the plaintiff's injuries was " hotly contested" at trial. Id., 118-19. The Childs court did not directly overrule the Johnson decision, but it did hold that the trial court was not required to award an additur.

The economic/noneconomic damages issue was revisited in Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 745 A.2d 789 (2000). Although liability had been admitted, the parties again " hotly contested" the extent of plaintiff's injuries and there was evidence that that plaintiff had suffered from preexisting conditions. The jury awarded the plaintiff the exact amount of his claimed economic damages, $3, 377, but no noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a motion for additur. On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the dilemma then facing litigants and trial court judges:

We agree with the defendant that the departure in Childs from what was perceived to be the Johnson per se rule, has left trial judges in some confusion, and that to attempt to harmonize the decisions would require this court to establish an arbitrary demarcation of what percentage of a full economic damage recovery mandates an award of noneconomic damages. Any such attempt to engage in arbitrary line making is both unnecessary and unwise. We conclude that Johnson should be overruled explicitly, and that a case-specific standard should apply to the instance in which a party seeks to have a verdict set aside on the basis that it is legally inadequate.

Id., 181.

Wichers instructs us that mere doubt about the adequacy of the amount awarded is an insufficient basis for disturbing a jury's verdict. Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 187. Similarly a judge's conclusion that the jury merely exercised poor judgment is insufficient for the court to intervene. Id., 187. The most notable limitation on the trial court in considering motions to disturb a jury's verdict is a litigant's constitutional right to have factual issues decided by a jury. Id., 188. The Wichers court held:

The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.

Id., 187

Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue. That decision should be made not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do . . .

The evidential underpinnings of the verdict itself must be examined. 'Upon issues regarding which, on the evidence, there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonably, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial court and this court be that a different result should have been reached."

Id., 188-89, citing Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 464, 11 A.2d 846 (1940).

In Wichers, the high court reversed the trial court's order for an additur and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment on the jury's verdict, an award of only economic damages. The Wichers court concluded:

the jury could have accepted the evidence that it was advisable for the plaintiff to see his chiropractor more frequently than usual following the accident, but that the accident did not cause him actually to suffer greater pain than he already had experienced as a result of his preexisting condition . . . the jury reasonably could have found that the accident had not aggravated the plaintiff's condition, and that his pain was the same as what he had experienced before . . .

Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 189-90.

In Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 789 A.2d 459 (2002), plaintiff claimed injuries as a result of having hit his head on a door frame that was one foot lower than other door frames in the restaurant to which he was making a delivery. The jury found liability on the part of the defendant, but forty-nine percent comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff. The jury found economic damages in the amount of $750, 400, but no noneconomic damages. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, but the Supreme Court held this to be error, reasoning:

Unlike the plaintiff in Wichers, however, the plaintiff in the present case underwent invasive spinal surgery. The jury reasonably could not have initially found the defendant liable for the expense of the surgery but not responsible for any pain or disability attendant to such surgery. This is in stark contrast to the facts of Wichers, wherein the plaintiff, as a result of his injury, merely underwent additional chiropractic treatment for an aggravation of a preexisting injury . . .

Id., 333.

The above review of applicable law reveals that there is no bright-line test for determining whether a jury's decision to award economic but not noneconomic damages warrants judicial intervention. In this case, plaintiff had not suffered previous injuries and, although the damage issue was in place, one cannot accurately describe it as " hotly contested." In this case, plaintiff testified that on the morning after the accident he began to experience back pain and went to the Manchester Memorial Hospital emergency room at which he was diagnosed as having experienced a sprain. He further testified, unsolicited, that he did not see his primary care physician after that because he did not have insurance, but he was able to arrange treatment with the Shaw Chiropractic a couple of days later because that entity was willing to see him despite his lack of health care coverage. Plaintiff underwent chiropractic care of heat, massage and adjustments from October 2013, through January 2014. He also was seen at Hartford Orthopedic Medicine once in November and once in December of 2013, and was diagnosed as having suffered cervical, thoracic and lumbar sprains, improving with chiropractic treatment.

The fact that the court may have awarded monetary damages for the claimed strains and accompanying pain is not the standard. Instead, the ultimate test is whether the verdict falls within necessarily uncertain limits or shocks the sense of justice compelling a contrary conclusion. Wichers v Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 187. Having reviewed the evidence in this case, the court does not believe that there is a basis under the law for awarding an additur.

Plaintiff's motion is denied.