Opinion
No. 6106.
May 9, 1934.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for Lemhi County. Hon. Guy Stevens, Judge.
Action to set aside decree of the district court quieting title to certain lands in respondents. Affirmed.
F.E. Tydeman and Lot L. Feltham, for Appellant.
The appearance by motion of appellant's counsel, in case No. 2, asking that the default be set aside and he be permitted to answer, was a special appearance only and did not bring the appellant under the jurisdiction of the court, and did not become res adjudicata on the matter of service of summons in that case. ( Central Deep Creek Orchard Co. v. C. C. Taft Co., 34 Idaho 458, 202 P. 1062; Elliott Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho 797, 198 P. 757.)
E.W. Whitcomb, for Respondents.
Former adjudication or res adjudicata precludes appellant from any recovery in this action. ( Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho 150, 96 P. 579, 128 Am. St. 48; Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 585, 186 P. 710; Wood River power Co. v. Arkoosh, 37 Idaho 348, 215 P. 975; Marshall v. Underwood, 38 Idaho 464, 221 Pac. 1105.)
The preliminary transactions of this controversy fully appear in Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.2d 323, respondents here, appellants there being stalemated because the proper action was not brought, the real issue being whether an instrument given respondents by appellant was a deed or mortgage and if the former whether fraudulently obtained.
Thereafter respondents brought an action to quiet title, wherein appellant sought to have his default set aside urging no service had been made, and in his proffered answer again set up fraud and that the instrument was a mortgage and not a deed. The court refused to set aside the default and appellant's appeal was dismissed ( Richardson v. king, 53 Idaho 134, 22 P.2d 134), because of failure to have the sureties on his appeal bond justify, which dismissal in effect resulted in the affirmance of the judgment quieting title in respondents herein on the theory that the instrument in question was a deed not a mortgage, thus becoming res adjudicata not only of this phase of the controversy ( Bernhard v. Idaho Bank Trust Co., 21 Idaho 598, 123 P. 481, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 120; Kelley v. Sakai, 72 Wn. 364, 130 P. 503; 34 C. J. 891; 15 R. C. L. 987; Chezum v. Claypool, 22 Wn. 498, 61 P. 157, 79 Am. St. 955; Seattle Nat. Bank v. School Dist. No. 40, 20 Wn. 368, 55 P. 317; Spokane Merchants' Assn. v. First Nat. Bank, 86 Wn. 367, 150 Pac. 434, L.R.A. 1918A, 323; J. W. Copeland Yards v. Sheridan, 136 Or. 37, 296 P. 838, 297 P. 837; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683, 15 Sup. Ct. 733, 39 L. ed. 859), but also of all connected questions which could ( Joyce v. Murphy Land etc. Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 P. 241; South Boise Water Co. v. McDonald, 50 Idaho 409, 296 P. 591; Judish v. Rovig Lumber Co., 128 Wn. 287, 222 P. 898; St. John Irr. Co. v. Danforth, 50 Idaho 513, 298 P. 365; 34 C. J. 781, 818, 909; United States v. County Court of Knox County, 122 U.S. 306, 7 Sup. Ct. 1171, 30 L. ed. 1152; In re Bell's Estate, 153 Cal. 331, 95 P. 372; Allen v. Allen, 159 Cal. 197, 113 P. 160; Bushnell v. Larimer Weld Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 92, 136 P. 1017; Hare Mining Milling Co. v. Keys, 120 Okl. 217, 251 P. 77; Cooley v. Snake River District Imp. Co., 78 Or. 384, 152 P. 1190; Fischer v. Hammons, 32 Ariz. 423, 259 P. 676; Armijo v. Mountain Elec. Co., 11 N.M. 235, 67 Pac. 726; Hawkins v. Reber, 81 Wn. 79, 142 P. 432; State v. Glover, 165 Wn. 567, 5 P.2d 1014), or should have been raised in such action. ( Joyce v. Murphy Land etc. Co., supra; South Boise Water Co. v. McDonald, supra; Judish v. Rovig, supra; State v. Glover, supra; 34 C. J. 780, 818, 909; 15 R. C. L. 962; First Nat. Bank v. Schruben, 125 Kan. 417, 265 Pac. 53; Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield, 183 Cal. 199, 190 Pac. 801; Smith v. Braley, 76 Okl. 220, 184 P. 586; Cook v. Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824.)
This action therefore is not maintainable because appellant has heretofore had his opportunity for defense and attack, and an adverse judgment determining all these matters, both actually and potentially has become res adjudicata thereof. ( Bernhard v. Idaho Bank Trust Co., supra; Kelley v. Sakai, supra; Architectural Decorating Co. v. Nicklason, 72 Wn. 415, 130 P. 506; Chezum v. Claypool, supra; Meisenheimer v. Meisenheimer, 55 Wn. 32, 104 P. 159, 133 Am. St. 1005; Flueck v. Pedigo, 55 Wn. 646, 104 P. 1119; Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 P. 246; 34 C. J. 891; 15 R. C. L. 987; Smith v. Smith, 76 Colo. 119, 230 P. 597; McDuffie v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 41 Okl. 488, 138 P. 1029; Thompson v. Connell, 31 Or. 231, 48 P. 467, 65 Am. St. 818; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., supra; United States v. County Court of Knox County, supra; Warford Corp. v. Bryan Screw Mach. Products Co., 44 Fed. (2d) 713; Atlantic Dredging Const. Co. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 57 Fed. (2d) 519.)
Judgment affirmed; costs awarded to respondents.
Budge, C.J., and Morgan, Holden and Wernette, JJ., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied.