Opinion
CV 00-11178 FMC (CWx)
June 11, 2001
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on March 29, 2001, by County Supervisors Burke, Knabe, Molina, Yaroslavsky, and Antonovich (collectively, "the County Supervisors"), as well as by Sheriff Baca and Richard Moak, the supervisor of Los Angeles Jail County Medical Services. For the reasons and in the manner stated herein, the Defendants' Motion is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
A. Factual Allegations
As alleged in the Complaint filed on October 20, 2000, Plaintiff's claims center on his treatment while incarcerated on two separate occasions in the Los Angeles County Jail. Plaintiff was incarcerated from September 18, 1999, through October 22, 1999, and again from November 9, 1999, through December 23, 1999.
Plaintiff suffers from a seizure disorder that is controlled by medication if taken on a regular basis. Plaintiff alleges that Los Angeles County Jail employees ("the employees") denied him his medication on numerous occasions, that they over-medicated him, and that they improperly medicated him. These actions led to Plaintiff suffering numerous, severe, uncontrollable seizures.
On November 12 or 13, 1999, during one of these seizures, unknown Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputies ("the Deputies") used excessive force in subduing Plaintiff, causing injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not given medical treatment for these injuries and was instead placed under behavioral observation until examined and released by a psychiatrist.
B. Plaintiff's Claims Against the County Supervisors
Plaintiff's first, fifth, and sixth causes of action assert claims against all Defendants, including the County Supervisors. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and seeks injunctive relief with respect to certain policies of the Los Angeles County Jail regarding the dispensing of prescription medications to inmates. Plaintiffs fifth cause of action asserts a claim based on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff's sixth cause of action asserts a claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
C. Plaintiff's Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the Jail's policies regarding prescription medications are unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering that these policies be discontinued.
II. Standard Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
The Motion to Dismiss requires the Court to determine whether Plaintiff's Complaint states claims upon which relief may be granted. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court will not dismiss Plaintiff's claims for relief unless he cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998). In limiting its inquiry to the content of the Complaint, the Court must take the allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Western Reserve Oil Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985). Additionally, the Court "is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot be reasonably drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1994).
III. The County Supervisors' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue that the County Supervisors are absolutely immune from Plaintiff's claims because their actions are legislative in nature. Plaintiff argues that the County Supervisors are not entitled to absolute immunity because of their policy regarding indemnifying deputy sheriffs when punitive damages are awarded against those deputy sheriffs for their unconstitutional actions. Plaintiff argues that the County Supervisors' actions in indemnifying deputy sheriffs are not legislative acts, and therefore the County Supervisors are not entitled to absolute immunity.
Plaintiff argues that Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trevino I), supports his contention that absolute immunity is improper in this instance. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that Trevino has not survived the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 118 S.Ct. 966 (1998).
In Trevino I, the Ninth Circuit held that city council members who voted to indemnify police officers for punitive damages awards were not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions because the members' actions were executive rather than legislative in nature. After Trevino I, however, the Supreme Court decided Bogan v. Scott-Harris, in which the Court held that local legislators who voted to eliminate a department of local government were absolutely immune for their actions, notwithstanding that their votes were allegedly due to their racially discriminatory animus and desire to retaliate against the department head for her exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court noted that the legislators' actions were legislative in nature, and rejected the lower courts' reasoning that the measure passed by the city council was an individually targeted administrative act, rather than a legislative elimination of a position. The Court concluded that whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than the motive of the actor. Bogan is neither dispositive nor instructive regarding what constitutes a legislative act; as the Court reads Bogan, the Supreme Court neither expanded nor contracted the scope of what is properly considered a legislative act in deciding Bogan.
Accordingly, the holding of Trevino I has survived the Supreme Court's decision in Bogan. Because Trevino I controls, this Court holds that the County Supervisors are not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in voting to indemnify awards of punitive damages against police officers.
Defendants also argues that the County Supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities because they were not personally involved in the events that gave rise to Plaintiff's claims. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 when it is alleged that their voting to indemnify awards of punitive damages against police officers was carried out in bad faith. Navarro v. Block, No. 99-55623, 2001 WL 498270 (9th Cir., May 11, 2001) (designated for publication) (holding that county supervisors are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity where there is an issue of fact as to whether they acted in bad faith in voting to indemnify police officers subject to awards of punitive damages); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that summary judgment in favor of city council members should have been granted as to § 1983 claim based on council members' past indemnification of punitive damages awards, and relying on evidence that established that the city council's actions were taken in good faith); Hawkins v. Baca, 114 F. Supp.2d 987 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that county supervisors acted in bad faith). See also W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting only in their individual capacities) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985)); Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College Dist., 4 F. Supp.2d 893 (1997) ("Qualified immunity is limited to actions for damages against a government official in his individual capacity; it is not available when an official is sued in his official capacity. . . ."); Timothy v. Bradshaw, 772 F. Supp. 501 (D. Nev. 1991) ("Qualified immunity is only available to defendants in their individual capacities."); accord, Thornburg v. Dora, 677 F. Supp. 581 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to assert that the County Supervisors are sued in their individual capacities. However, the First Amended Complaint states:
5. Each and every defendant why is a natural person is sued in both his/her individual/personal capacity, as well as in his/her official capacity if he/she had any policy making duties, functions, or responsibilities with respect to the matters alleged herein.
(FAC ¶ 5). Therefore, Plaintiff asserted a claim against the County Supervisors in their individual capacities.
IV. Sheriff Baca's and Defendant Moak's Motion to Dismiss
A. Plaintiff's Standing to Pursue Injunctive Relief
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief because he is no longer incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail, and therefore, is not subject to the Jail's policy that results in delayed medication of inmates.
Plaintiff alleges that there is a policy throughout the Los Angeles County Jail system of failing to properly medicate inmates. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges there is no system to transfer the record of an inmate's medication needs when a prisoner is transferred so that the inmate may continue his medication without delay.
In the context of injunctive relief, a plaintiff has standing only when the possibility of future injury is particular and concrete. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 676-677 (1974). "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. at 495-496. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983) (holding that plaintiff once subject to police stranglehold lacked standing to seek injunctive relief without showing likely future injury from police brutality); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that motorists who were stopped near the United States/Mexico border allegedly due to their Hispanic appearance had no standing to pursue injunctive relief against officials of the United States Border Patrol; the fact that the motorists had each been stopped only one time in approximately ten years established that it was unlikely they would be stopped again).
Plaintiff argues that he has standing, and argues that courts in this circuit have granted broad injunctions based on violations of the United States Constitution, most notably the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff relies on a number of cases that are not binding or instructive because they involve class actions. See Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1140 (1999); Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (1992); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); Von Colln v. County of Ventura, 189 F.R.D. 583 (C.D.Cal. 1999).
Plaintiff also relies on a case in which injunctive relief was appropriate because the plaintiff alleged that he faced a real and immediate threat of serious injury or death at the hands of the now-infamous LAPD Rampart Division CRASH officers. Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp.2d 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Plaintiff's allegations do not reveal such a real and immediate threat of recurrent injury.
Plaintiff also relies on Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816, 111 S.Ct. 59 (1990). However, in Conner, the injunction at issue related to only one family. Here, Plaintiff seeks a broad injunction that would apply to all those affected by the Jail's policy. Moreover, the injunction was never challenged on standing grounds, as it is here; rather, the injunction was challenged as too vague, and as impermissibly encroaching on police power to make warrantless searches.
One case cited by Plaintiff, however, merits closer scrutiny. In Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting California Highway Patrol Officers from stopping any motorcyclists for suspicion of a violation of a provision of California's helmet law unless certain conditions applied. The Ninth Circuit upheld this injunction notwithstanding that there were only fifteen plaintiffs in the action, reasoning that although injunctive relief should generally be limited only to named plaintiffs where there is no class certification, an injunction is not overbroad when it is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled. Id. at 1501-02 (citing Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1987)). Without statewide relief, the plaintiffs would not receive the complete relief to which they were entitled — the freedom from unconstitutional stops for suspected violations of the helmet law. Implicit in this rationale is a conclusion that plaintiffs rode motorcycles on California highways with regularity and therefore were subject to recurrent injury.
Relying on Easyriders, a district court granted a temporary restraining order against the City of Los Angeles, enjoining the City from continuing alleged harassment of the homeless population in downtown Los Angeles. Justin v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 012352 LGB (AIJx), 2000 WL 1808426 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The court cited Easyriders and Bresgal and concluded that the injunction could not be limited to the named plaintiffs; rather, the court concluded, the injunction must apply to the City's treatment of all homeless persons in order to give the plaintiffs the relief to which they were entitled. As in Easyriders, the Court could reasonably assume that the plaintiffs in Justin would remain homeless and would, absent an injunction, continue to be subject to repeated arrest.
In Bresgal, migrant agricultural workers sought an injunction requiring the Department of Labor to enforce the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("the Act") with regard to forestry workers in order to protect the workers from exploitation at the hands of independent labor contractors who recruit seasonal workers for the forestry industry. The Department of Labor ("the DOL"), which was charged with the enforcement of this Act, took the position that the Act did not apply to forestry workers. The district court found that the Act applied to forestry workers and issued an injunction ordering the DOL to enforce the Act with respect to the forestry industry. The injunction was not limited to the named plaintiffs, nor was the injunction limited in its geographical scope. On appeal, the DOL challenged the scope of the injunction.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the DOL's argument that the injunction was overbroad because it would affect a much larger group than just the plaintiffs in the action, noting that "[t]here is no general requirement that an injunction affect only the parties in the suit." Id. at 1169. The court noted that the main concern in other cases that rejected nationwide relief — the concern that the persons not before the court would be affected by the injunction — was not present in Bresgal because the injunction was directed solely at the DOL, which was a party before the Court.
The Ninth Circuit also noted the general rule that an injunction is not necessarily overbroad by extending benefits or protection to persons other than prevailing parties if such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled. Applying this general rule, the court concluded that a nationwide injunction was necessary because, as a practical measure, enforcement of the Act could not be limited to the named plaintiffs or those contractors with whom the plaintiffs dealt. This difficulty would be exacerbated by the migrant nature of the seasonal workers, who traveled to other parts of the country under the supervision of the labor contractors. Therefore, the court concluded, nationwide enforcement of the Act by the DOL was necessary in order to accord the named plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled.
The Bresgal case, as well as Easyriders and Justin, are distinguishable from the present case. Plaintiff cannot escape the requirement that he has standing only when the possibility of future injury to him is particular and concrete. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-497. That others may be currently affected by the Jail's policy is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not shown that the possibility of future injury is particular and concrete. See LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1156 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme Court and our circuit have generally found a lack of standing in cases where plaintiffs would not be subject to the challenged law unless they violated an unchallenged law.") (citing Nelson v. king County, 895 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1990)). His situation is more like those in Lyons and Hodgers-Durgin than those in the cases he cites. Therefore, Plaintiff has no standing to seek the injunctive relief he requests.
B. Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief is premature prior to an adjudication that the Jail's policy violates the Eighth Amendment. Defendant's argument is itself premature. The Court will address Defendants arguments when and if Plaintiff seeks such declaratory relief.
V. Conclusion
The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied as to Plaintiff's fifth and sixth causes of action, and is hereby granted with respect to Plaintiff's first cause of action to the extent that cause of action seeks injunctive relief.
IT IS SO ORDER.