Opinion
June 30, 1937.
1. QUIETING TITLE: Action: Possession. In an action to determine title in two counts, where the prayer to the first count makes it one on the equity side of the court and the general verdict intending to cover both counts found that "plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the land," it may be inferred that the jury intended that plaintiff was entitled to possession.
2. TRIALS: Irregular Verdict. Where a jury attempts to interpolate something in a verdict about which the jury has no concern the interpolated matter may be treated as surplusage.
But in an action to determine title in two counts one in equity, one in law, both submitted to a jury which returned a verdict as follows: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is owner and entitled to the following lands, etc., . . . or such portions, if any, as you may find from the evidence plaintiff is entitled to," it cannot be said that from the verdict the jury intended to find that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the land described in the petition.
Neither can it be said in reason that that portion of the verdict stating that such portion, if any, as may be found from the evidence plaintiff was entitled to is about a matter which did not concern the jury so as to fall under the head of surplusage.
Since the first count of the petition was a count in equity as appears from the prayer it was the duty of the court to determine all the issues raised therein, including the ownership.
But it was the duty of the jury and their province, since the case was tried as one at law, to find who was entitled to possession under the second count, although the answer raised equitable issues to the whole case, including the second count, it was for the court to determine them.
But since the matter was submitted to the jury and tried as a law case as to both counts, it will be so considered on appeal.
Since the verdict does not have that clear sense of expression that should obtain in verdicts the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
Appeal from Atchison Circuit Court. — Hon. Thomas A. Cummins, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Varro E. Tyler and Clayton W. Allen for appellant.
(1) In jury cases, the verdict must strictly follow and conform to the verdict. Newton v. Railroad Co., 168 Mo. App. 199, 153 S.W. 495; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 288, 50 S.W. 824; Haumueller v. Ackerman, 130 Mo. App. 387, 109 S.W. 857. (2) An ambiguous or uncertain verdict is fatal to the judgment based thereon. Newton v. Railroad Co., 168 Mo. App. 199, 153 S.W. 495; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 228, 50 S.W. 824; Haumueller v. Ackerman, 130 Mo. App. 387, 109 S.W. 857. (3) Where a judgment is based upon an ambiguous or uncertain verdict, such error is apparent on the face of the record and will be reviewed on appeal whether exceptions are taken or not; and in such cases motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment are unnecessary to preserve the error for review. Sec. 1063, R.S. 1929; Newton v. Railroad Co., 168 Mo. App. 199, 153 S.W. 495; Hannibal St. Joseph Railroad Co. v. Hamoney, 42 Mo. 467; Nordmanser v. Hitchcock, 40 Mo. 178; Showles v. Freeman, 81 Mo. 540; Ryan v. Growney, 125 Mo. 474, 28 S.W. 189; Frowein v. Poage, 132 S.W. 241, 231 Mo. 82; Lindstrom v. K.C.S. Ry. Co., 202 Mo. App. 399, 218 S.W. 936; Roden v. Helm, 90 S.W. 798, 192 Mo. 71. (4) In ejectment cases (or suits to quiet title), the verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff must be selfdemonstrating, and unless the description of the real estate therein is such that it will, without aid, show the land to be restored to the plaintiff, the error is fatal. Benne v. Miller, 50 S.W. 824, 149 Mo. 228.
W.L. Mulvania and A.H. Harvey for respondent.
(1) It is not contended by appellant that there is anything in his record to justify awarding any part of the land in question to appellant. The pleadings show that if respondent is entitled to the land he is entitled to all of it. If appellant was entitled to it he was entitled to all of it. There does not appear to be any controversy as to any part or parts of it. 22 Enc. Pleading Practice, sec. 5, p. 986. (2) When a jury after making a proper finding and so reciting in their verdict go outside of their province and outside of the issue submitted and say in effect to the court "such part or portion as you find" such cannot be construed as any part of the verdict and is properly stricken out by the court when rendering the judgment. Buttron v. Bridell, 228 Mo. 633; Roman v. King, 268 S.W. 416. (3) Where the verdict of the jury was a finding for plaintiff, the description of the land found is sufficient, the verdict on its face shows that the additional words which follow are mere surplusage inserted by clerical error, the court properly ignored them in rendering judgment. Such was not error. St. Louis v. Senter Comm. Co., 102 S.W.2d 111; Holmes v. Braidwood, 82 Mo. 618; State v. Bohle, 182 Mo. 68; State ex rel. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Becker, 66 S.W.2d 145; Buttron v. Bridell, 228 Mo. 634; Ranney v. Bader, 48 Mo. 539; State ex rel. Webster v. Knight, 46 Mo. 83; Bredel v. Parker Russell Min. Mfg. Co., 21 S.W.2d 936; Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 26; Gaugh v. Hines, 229 S.W. 222.
Plaintiff, respondent here, filed petition in two counts to determine interest in and quiet title to (under Sec. 1520, R.S. 1929, Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 1520, p. 1682) the lands described, and in ejectment. Defendant, by his answer, claimed to be "the owner in fee simple of all the lands described" in plaintiff's petition, and denied that plaintiff had any interest in said lands. The reply was a general denial. The cause was submitted to a jury, and the verdict was for plaintiff. Failing to get new trial on motion, defendant appealed. No bill of exceptions was filed, and there is nothing here, except the record proper, and there is no complaint on any part of the record proper, except the verdict and the judgment.
It is the contention of defendant that the verdict is not sufficient to support a valid judgment, and that the judgment is therefore void. The verdict is as follows: "We the jury find for the plaintiff, and that plaintiff is owner and entitled to the following lands situated in Atchison County, Mo. (Here follows description), or such part or portion, if any, as you may find from the evidence plaintiff is entitled to." (Italics ours.) The trial court, it would appear, in rendering judgment, treated the italicized portion of the verdict as mere surplusage, ignored it, and entered judgment as though such portion had not been in the verdict. The judgment, description omitted, is as follows: "Now on this 30th day of November, 1935, the same being the ____ day of the regular November, 1935, term of the Circuit Court of Atchison County. Missouri, this cause having been tried by a jury, the jury after having heard this evidence, received the instructions of the court and the argument of counsel, retired to deliberate on their verdict, and having by their verdict, found the issues for plaintiff, it is therefore by the court ordered and adjudged that plaintiff is the owner of lands described as: (description here), and that the defendant has no right, title, claim or interest in or to said above described lands; and it is further by the court ordered and adjudged that plaintiff have execution against said defendant for the recovery of said lands and the possession thereof, and have and recover his costs in this behalf expended."
An action to determine interest and quiet title under Section 1520. Revised Statutes 1929, may be legal or equitable, according to the pleadings and the character of relief sought, either by plaintiff or defendant. [Ebbs v. Neff, 325 Mo. 1182, 30 S.W.2d 616, l.c. 620, and cases there cited.] In the prayer to the first count of the petition, plaintiff in addition to asking that the title be determined and quieted, further asked "that said defendant be forever enjoined, restrained, barred and prohibited from setting up, claiming or asserting any right, title, claim or interest in or to said real estate or any part thereof and from removing therefrom any fence, fences or improvements" on the described lands. And the answer to the first count denies that plaintiff had any interest in the land; alleges that defendant is the fee simple owner, entitled to possession and in possession, and "that defendant and those through whom his title and possession of said real estate are derived have more than ten years prior to the commencement of this action been" in adverse possession, "and have made lasting and valuable improvements thereon; and that the defendant's title and right to the possession of said real estate are based upon such adverse possession;" that plaintiff "during all of said period of time" knew that defendant and those through whom he claimed were in possession and claimed title, and knew that the improvements were being made; that notwithstanding this knowledge plaintiff did not assert any claim, and for these reasons, defendants allege that plaintiff is estopped to assert title. Further answering the first count, defendant alleges that early in the fall of 1933, defendant advised plaintiff that he (defendant) was about to purchase the land from one Leseberg who was then in possession and claimed ownership; and that plaintiff advised defendant to purchase and promised, upon defendant's purchase, to quitclaim to defendant whatever interest plaintiff had, and that in reliance upon this promise, defendant purchased from Leseberg, but that defendant failed to quitclaim as promised.
Defendant further alleges "that the lands described in plaintiff's petition are located in the Missouri River; that said lands were formed as islands in said river; that at and for a long time after the first formation or appearance of said lands as islands they were entirely surrounded by the water of said river and that for many years the water flowed between said lands and the Missouri bank of the Missouri River; that there were accretions to said islands from time to time until they became a large body of land and said accretions continued to enlarge the said islands until they were connected with each other and until the water which was previously between the said islands and the mainland on the Missouri side of said river was entirely displaced by the said accretions and the said islands were thereby connected to the high bank on the Missouri side of said river; that the said accretions which connected the said islands to the said high bank of said river were accretions to the said islands and not accretions to the mainland." The answer to the second count is similar to the answer to the first count.
We think that the prayer to the first count of the petition makes that count on the equity side of the court, although the judgment decrees no relief of an equity nature. The verdict was general and apparently was intended to cover both counts, since it was found that "plaintiff is the owner and entitled" to the lands. It might be inferred that by the use of the word entitled, the jury intended to find that plaintiff was entitled to the possession.
Numerous cases are cited by both parties involving irregularities in verdicts, but no case cited discloses a verdict like or similar to the one here, and our research has not discovered such a case.
Among the cases cited by plaintiff where irregularities in verdicts have not been held to be fatal are the following:
Buttron et al. v. Bridell et al., 228 Mo. 622, 129 S.W. 12. This case was an action to recover damages for alleged negligence in maintaining in a public street an obstruction, viz., a lime pit filled with hot lime, into which the young son of plaintiffs fell and was scalded to death. The verdict returned was as follows: "We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause, find the issues herein joined, in favor of the plaintiffs and assess their damages at the sum of Seventeen hundred dollars ($1700) to be paid in equal amounts of $850 by defendants." When the verdict was returned by the jury, the court said: "Gentlemen, your verdict is not in proper form; you will use one of the forms given you by the court." Thereupon, the papers were handed to the foreman and he, in open court, the jury not retiring, erased the words, "to be paid in equal amounts of $850 by defendants." The verdict as modified, was accepted by the court and judgment entered thereon. It was held that the stricken part of the verdict was mere surplusage, and that the court did not err in permitting the amendment to be made.
Roman v. King (Mo. App.), 268 S.W. 414, was an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff while passing down steps. The jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury in the above cause, find in favor of plaintiff on the issues herein joined, and assess her damages at the sum of $2500 and attorneys' fee." The court told the jury that the verdict so returned could not be accepted and for them to return to their room and read the instructions and return a verdict in accordance with the instructions. The first verdict was destroyed and the jury retired and thereafter returned the following verdict: "We, the jury in the above cause, find in favor of the plaintiff on the issues herein joined and assess her damages at the sum of $5,000." It was held that the court erred in rejecting the verdict which the jury first returned and in accepting the second verdict; that the provision for attorneys' fees in the first verdict was mere surplusage and did not vitiate that verdiet.
In State ex rel. Webster v. Knight, 46 Mo. 83, the verdict was: "We, the jury, find a verdict for defendants, they to pay costs of this suit." The court refused to receive the verdict and the jury was discharged. Mandamus was brought to compel the court to receive the verdict. The court said: "The jury found for the defendant; the verdict was good and complete. The matter of costs was not in issue and was not submitted to them. That part of their verdict, therefore, was merely void and should have been disregarded as surplusage."
Bredel v. Parker-Russell Mining Mfg. Co. (Mo. App.), 21 S.W.2d 932, was an action to recover the amount alleged to be due and unpaid to plaintiff under a contract of employment. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $2000, "with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from the 19th day of March, 1926, to date, amounting to ____ dollars, aggregating ____ dollars." The court received the verdict as returned; did not compute the interest, but entered a judgment for $2000 only. It was held that such action by the court was proper; that the interest provision as appeared in the verdict was mere surplusage.
The following are among the cases relied upon by appellant to support his contention that the judgment is wholly void because of the verdict:
In Newton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co., 168 Mo. App. 199, 153 S.W. 495, the verdict was: "We, the jury, find the issues for the plaintiff and assess his damages at the sum of Thirty-five (3500) dollars." The appeal in the case was wholly on the record proper, no bill of exceptions having been filed, the same as the situation in the appeal at bar. The trial court entered judgment in the sum of $3500 on the above verdict. The railroad company appealed. Of this verdict the Court of Appeals said: "The verdict is ambiguous. It may mean one thing and it may mean another, hence, it is no verdict at all, since a verdict must be certain and definite."
Benne v. Miller et al., 149 Mo. 228, 50 S.W. 824, was in ejectment. Speaking of the verdict in that case the court said: "A verdict should so describe the land intended to be recovered that the description copied into the writ will of itself show the sheriff the land he is to take from defendant and restore to plaintiff. There can be no other description of the recovery in the judgment of the court than that in the verdict, and there can be no other description in the return. If that is not sufficient, it cannot be aided as was attempted in this case, by having a county surveyor decide what the jury may have intended, but failed to express."
In all the cases that we have found or to which our attention has been directed concerning irregularities in verdicts, it has been generally held that where a jury attempts to interpolate something in the verdict about which the jury has no concern, the interpolated matter has been held to be mere surplusage and not fatal to a judgment based upon the verdict. But in the present case it cannot be said from the verdict that the jury intended to find that the plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the possession of the lands described in the petition. Neither can it be said in reason that the portion of the verdict, which we have italicized, is about a matter which did not concern the jury, so as to fall under the head of surplusage. Under the first count of the petition, since it was a count in equity, at least, it so appears from the prayer therein, it was the duty of the court to determine all issues raised therein, including ownership, but it was certainly the duty of the jury and their province (since the case was tried as one at law) to find who was entitled to possession under the second count. We might say however, that the answer also raised equitable issues so that the whole case, including the second count, was for the court to determine, but since the matter was submitted to the jury and tried as a law case as to both counts, we so consider it here.
This verdict does not have that clear sense of expression that should obtain in verdicts of this character and it is our conclusion that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded, and it is so ordered. Ferguson and Hyde, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by BRADLEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.