Opinion
97-CV-484 (LEK/RFT)
March 17, 2003
Joseph Hein, Esq., OFFICE OF JOSEPH HEIN, Altamont, NY, for Plaintiff
Dawn Ann Foshee, Esq. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, New York, NY, for Defendant
MEMORANDUM — DECISION AND ORDER
I. Background
On April 9, 1997, Plaintiff Joseph Kilcullen ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint alleging that Defendant New York State Department of Labor ("Defendant") discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. Plaintiff originally asserted three causes of action: the first was brought under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117; the second was brought pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); and the third alleged a violation of N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(d).
Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of the third cause of action (Docket No. 9). On January 19, 1999, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the remaining two causes of action, holding that Defendant was immune from suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Kilcullen v. New York State Dept of Labor, 33 F. Supp.2d 133, 152, (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (Kilcullen I). The Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that states are not immune from suit under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Kilcullen v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (Kilcullen II). On remand to this Court, trial was stayed pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that states are immune from suits by private individuals seeking monetary damages under Title I of the ADA. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). In Garcia v. SUNY Health Sciences Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held that New York was immune from the plaintiff's suit for monetary damages under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 114-15. Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's ADA claim should be dismissed under Garrett and that his Rehabilitation Act claim should be dismissed under Garcia. Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of his ADA claim, but does oppose dismissal of his Rehabilitation Act claim.
II Discussion
A. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard
"The test for evaluating a 12(c) motion is the same as that applicable to a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6)." Irish Lesbian Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998). Defendant's motion must be denied "`unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Court must "assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and . . . view all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Dangler v. New York City Off Track Betting Corp., 193 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Consideration is limited to the complaint, written instruments that are attached to the complaint as exhibits, statements or documents that are incorporated in the complaint by reference, and documents on which the complaint heavily relies. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
B. Rehabilitation Act Claim
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Congress included an abrogation provision in the Rehabilitation Act, which states: "A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity "when it both unequivocally intends to do so and `act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.'" Garcia, 280 F.3d at 108 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). It is clear that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 is aimed at abrogating Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In Kilcullen II, the Second Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act was validly enacted by Congress pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kilcullen II, 205 F.3d at 82. However, as the Second Circuit recognized in Garcia, Kilcullen II was implicitly abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett. See Garcia, 280 F.3d at 113 n. 3. Accordingly, in Garcia, the Second Circuit held that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act exceeds Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 113.
The Second Circuit determined that § 504 was enacted under the Spending Clause of Article I. Id. It then found that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 "constitutes a clear expression of Congress's intent to condition acceptance of federal funds on a state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. However, a state's acceptance of federal funds waives the state's sovereign immunity only if the state understands that the acceptance of federal funds will have this result.Id. at 114. In Garcia, the Second Circuit was "unable to conclude that New York in fact waived its sovereign immunity against suit under § 504 when it accepted federal funds for SUNY." Id. at 114. The Court explained that at the time that the defendant allegedly violated plaintiff's rights, September 1993 to August 1995, New York could have reasonably concluded that Congress had abrogated New York's sovereign immunity under Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Id. New York could not have understood that its acceptance of federal funds would result in its waiver of sovereign immunity "since by all reasonable appearances state sovereign immunity had already been lost." Id. (citing Kilcullen II, 205 F.3d at 82).
In a footnote, the Second Circuit recognized that a party might argue that New York's acceptance of federal funds could be deemed a knowing waiver of sovereign immunity "if there is a colorable basis for the state to suspect that an express congressional abrogation is invalid." Id. at 114 n. 4. The Court continued:
Even supposing such an argument to have merit, we would still conclude that New York did not waive its sovereign immunity here. This is because throughout the entire period involved in this dispute during which SUNY was accepting federal funds — September 1993 until August 1995 — even the most studied scholar of constitutional law would have had little reason to doubt the validity of Congress's asserted abrogation of New York's sovereign immunity as to private damage suits under Title II [of the ADA].Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that this case is distinguishable from Garcia because the alleged discrimination in this case took place from March 1995 to April 1997. Plaintiff maintains that "[b]y this time the 11th Amendment immunity law was already changing and the State would at least suspect, if not conclude, that ADA abrogation was invalid and that by accepting federal funds, it was consenting to suit." Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1. The Court disagrees. Notwithstanding this Court's decision in Kilcullen I, New York could not have been on notice that the Rehabilitation Act exceeded Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment until the Supreme Court announced its decision in Garrett. Accordingly, New York did not waive its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court for a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when it accepted federal funds from 1995 to 1997. Defendant is therefore immune from this suit.
Other courts have suggested that New York could not have knowingly waived its sovereign immunity until Garcia was decided. See Denmeade v. King, 2002 WL 31018148, at *2 (holding that New York did not knowingly waive sovereign immunity from suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act until Garcia was decided); Harris v. New York State Dept. of Health, 202 F. Supp.2d 143, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that New York did not waive sovereign immunity from suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when it accepted funds through 2000, more than one year before Garcia was decided). However, after Garrett, New York could not have reasonably concluded that Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court notes that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits seeking injunctive relief from a state. See McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982)). Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Garcia on the grounds that he, unlike the plaintiff in Garcia, is seeking injunctive relief is therefore without force.
III Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this order on all parties by regular mail.
IT IS SO ORDERED.