Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV 475136.
Kline, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Mohammed A. Khan and Mohammed I. Hussain appeal from an order of the San Mateo Superior Court denying their petition for writ of mandate by which they sought to overturn the determination of the board of directors (Board) of the religious organization Fiji Jamaat-Ul Islam of America (Fiji Jamaat) expelling them from membership in the organization and to compel the Board to reinstate them. The trial court determined that there was no violation of appellants’ due process rights, and that the Board made a fundamentally religious, ecclesiastical decision which absolutely precluded the court from examining the reasons for the expulsion. Appellants contend that the court erred in denying the writ petition without examining whether the stated reasons for expulsion presented a fundamentally religious question, in failing to find that they were denied procedural due process in the procedures used to expel them, and in failing to consider whether the actions prompting their expulsion were privileged under Civil Code section 47.
We shall affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fiji Jamaat is a congregational religious nonprofit organization located in San Mateo County, its affairs controlled by the organization’s members and the Board. It maintains bylaws which, among other things, proscribe certain conduct by members and establish a procedure for removal. Appellants were duly recognized Life Members of Fiji Jamaat from the time of its formation in 1976 until their expulsions in late June and early July of 2008.
Following a court-ordered election in 2007 that resulted in new members taking control of the Board, tension arose between appellants and the new Board. Hussain filed a petition for writ of mandate on January 17, 2008, seeking inspection of Fiji Jamaat’s records, and he was suspended from the organization immediately thereafter. The trial court restored him to membership based on Fiji Jamaat’s failure to follow the bylaws in their decision to suspend him.
The record is sparse on the details of this earlier proceeding.
On May 30, 2008, the Board notified appellants that meetings had been scheduled for June 8, 2008, to determine their membership status. The Board accused Khan of misappropriating funds, engaging an attorney to act on behalf of Fiji Jamaat without authorization, leading an effort to set aside the court decision regarding the election, and obstructing the General Assembly Meeting and election. The stated intent of the meeting was to provide an opportunity for Khan to be heard. The letter stated that Khan would not be permitted to bring an attorney, call witnesses, or invite guests. Fiji Jamaat rescheduled the meeting for June 21, 2008. On June 16, 2008, Khan protested what he referred to as limitations on his ability to present a full defense and that denied him his right to counsel. He asked that the Board appoint a committee pursuant to the bylaws to adjudicate the matter, and to postpone the hearing until July 12th so that he would have an opportunity to make arrangements for his defense.
Article III, Section VI of the bylaws, which appellants reference, states that the Board “shall appoint various committees, managers, agents, officers, etc. as needed to advance and facilitate the purposes and objectives of the Jamaat....” This section does not refer to termination procedures in any way, and certainly does not require the Board to appoint a committee to resolve membership issues.
Khan subsequently met with the Board on June 21, 2008. In a declaration submitted to the trial court, Khan stated that he attempted to ask questions of the Board, but was not given an opportunity to speak other than to answer questions posed by the Board. Mohammed Asan Khan, the President of Fiji Jamaat, stated in a declaration that appellant Khan was told that he would have 30 minutes to address the Board, but that Khan refused to answer questions or engage in discussion, insisting instead upon reading a statement. Khan left the meeting without answering the Board’s questions. The Board voted unanimously to expel Khan from Fiji Jamaat for the reasons stated in the May 30th letter, and so informed him in a letter dated June 24, 2008.
The Board accused Hussain of distributing disparaging and libelous materials about the Board to the general membership, causing disruption and division among the general membership, and of making slanderous remarks about the Board. Hussain was also informed that he could not bring an attorney, witnesses, or guests to the meeting. The meeting was rescheduled for June 21, 2008. On June 16, 2008, Hussain asked the Board to allow him to bring counsel and witnesses to the meeting, and asked that the meeting be postponed until July 12th so he could prepare his defense. Hussain’s meeting was postponed until July 3, 2008, to allow him additional time to recover from recent shoulder surgery. Hussain stated in a declaration that he requested a further postponement because he felt that the pain medication he was taking for his shoulder would affect his ability to meaningfully participate at the meeting. However, his request was denied. Hussain did not attend the July 3rd meeting, and was informed by a letter dated July 4th of the Board’s unanimous decision to expel him as a member for the reasons given in the May 30th letter.
Abdul Khalid, the vice president of Fiji Jamaat, stated in a declaration that he observed Hussain at a wedding on July 5th, two days after the scheduled meeting, moving about normally and seemingly unrestricted. When Hussain noticed Khalid, the former allegedly took on the appearance of being in pain and began to put ice on his shoulder.
The Board and members of Fiji Jamaat are governed by the organization’s bylaws, as amended on January 21, 1989. The bylaws outline Fiji Jamaat’s organization and objectives. They set forth membership qualifications, Board terms, and election procedures, among other things. The bylaws state that Life Members are those who donated $1,000.00 during the organization’s first twelve months, and that these individuals “shall be Active Members for Life.”
The bylaws also include a process for terminating membership. This section grants the directors “the power... to suspend or expel any member whose conduct shall have been determined by the Board to be improper, unbecoming, or likely to endanger the interest or reputation of the Jamaat or who willfully commits a breach of the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of the Jamaat.” The bylaws provide that no expulsion or suspension will take place without notice of the charge against the member and “an opportunity to be heard by the Directors at a meeting called for that purpose.” A member who has been suspended or expelled retains the opportunity for reconsideration before the Annual General Meeting if such reconsideration is requested within 30 days before that meeting. An expelled or suspended member may be reinstated by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present at the Annual General Meeting.
According to the bylaws, a General Assembly Meeting will be held each year at a time and place designated by the Board in order to outline the policies of the Jamaat. The bylaws may be amended by a simple majority of the active members who are present for a vote. The bylaws state that the Board shall manage the affairs of the Jamaat, acting in accordance with traditional Islamic Sharia and consistent with the articles of incorporation and the bylaws.
On July 31, 2008, appellants filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking reinstatement of their membership in Fiji Jamaat. Appellants moved to compel deposition testimony from a member of Fiji Jamaat. On July 10, 2009, the trial court (the Honorable John Grandsaert) filed an order denying appellants’ motion on the ground it related to a religious organization’s actions in expelling members that did not involve a vested property right, that were conducted by a tribunal vested to take action by the bylaws, and that were conducted with substantial compliance with the procedures set forth in the bylaws. On September 3, 2009, Fiji Jamaat requested the court to take judicial notice of that discovery order in connection with its consideration of appellants’ writ petition.
At a September 18, 2009 hearing on appellant’s petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court (Hon. Steven L. Dylina) granted Fiji Jamaat’s request for judicial notice and denied appellants’ petition. The trial court denied the writ petition because it sought to reverse a religious organization’s decision to expel members, the dispute did not involve vested property rights, and the proceedings were conducted by the tribunal vested to take action by the bylaws. The court stated that Fiji Jamaat’s evidence “established that the expulsion decisions were the result of a deliberative process, religious in nature, since it involved the consideration of what, in [Fiji Jamaat’s] religious tradition and beliefs, is improper, unbecoming, or likely to endanger the interest of the Jamaat.” The court stated that it was empowered to review the due process issues, but found nothing defective in the notice, the process, or the opportunity to be heard. Having found no violation of due process, the court concluded that it was bound by the case Erickson v. Gospel Foundation of Calif. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 581 (Erickson), which precluded it from making further inquiry into a fundamentally religious, ecclesiastical decision.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A trial court’s determination to apply the “ecclesiastical rule” when refraining from examining an internal action by a religious organization presents a question of law that we review de novo. (Concord Christian Center v. Open Bible Standard Churches (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1407-1408 (Concord Christian Center).) However, this is not the only standard we apply in this case. Appellants also contend that the due process they were afforded was insufficient. As recognized by our Supreme Court in Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 587, a religious organization such as Fiji Jamaat, “need not adhere to the strict requirements imposed in legal proceedings, and the form of procedure used is immaterial if there has been substantial compliance with the rules of the group and the accused member has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.” (Id. at p. 587.) Although a lower court’s interpretation of an organization’s bylaws based solely on the terms of that document is reviewed de novo (Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1293), the application of a governing document to a disputed set of circumstances relies on the evidence presented to a trial court. (Concord Christian Center, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.) There was a genuine question of fact as to whether appellants were given an opportunity to be heard in this case. The parties offered conflicting evidence as to whether Khan was given a chance to speak at the meeting to determine his membership status. There was also conflicting evidence as to whether Hussain was physically able to attend his meeting. The trial court found that respondent’s evidence established that appellants had received adequate due process. Where material facts are disputed, this court applies the substantial evidence standard to those facts. “[W]e must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing parties, giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1408-1409.)
II. Civil Court Involvement in Decisions of Religious Organizations
The role of civil courts in litigation involving religious institutions is “severely circumscribed” by constitutional restrictions protecting freedom of religion. (New v. Kroeger (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 800, 801, citing Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 595, 602.) It has long been held that “the judgments of religious associations, bearing on their own members, are not examinable [by a civil court].” (Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679, 730-731; see also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 710 (Serbian Orthodox); Rosicrucian Fellow. v. Rosicrucian Etc. Ch. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 121, 131 (Rosicrucian).) “Ecclesiastical decisions are not reviewable by the secular courts.” (Maxwell v. Brougher (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 824, 826.)
“The prohibition against civil court participation in sectarian disputes extends to issues involving membership, clergy credentials and discipline, as well as religious entity governance and administration. (Jones [v. Wolf], supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 602, 603-604; Concord Christian Center, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411.)” (New v. Kroeger, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 815.) “ ‘[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.’ [Citation.]” (Serbian Orthodox, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 710.) This court applied a similar approach when dealing with a congregational church in Singh v. Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275, stating that “courts cannot intrude into a religious organization’s determination of religious or ecclesiastical matters such as theological doctrine, church discipline, or the conformity of members to standards of faith and morality.” “[N]o matter whether the religious organization is hierarchical or congregational, it is clear that the decisions of the highest religious tribunal on questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law must be accepted. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1280.)
A religious organization may create a tribunal vested with the power to decide internal controversies concerning church discipline or conformity of church members to the standard of morals required of them. (Maxwell v. Brougher, supra, 99 Cal.App.2d at p. 826.) An expulsion from a religious organization is intimately tied to questions of membership, conformity to standards of morality, and discipline, questions which the courts view as primarily ecclesiastical. “[I]t has been commonly held that the expulsion of a member by a proper tribunal of such an association will not be reviewed where no property right is involved.” (Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 585; see also Owen v. Board of Directors (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d at p. 117.)
As indicated above, the general rule “has always been qualified by the rule that civil and property rights would be adjudicated.” (Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131.) This holds true even when some ecclesiastical matters are incidentally involved. (Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Ct. (1952) 40 Cal.2d 55, 61.) “The essential problem... is to ascertain from the acts, dealings and usages of the parties where the various rights rest in order to determine the ownership of civil and property rights.” (Id. at p. 133.) Membership in a religious organization alone does not constitute a vested property interest (see Owen v. Board of Directors, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d 112), and appellants do not claim that they have been deprived of property rights. Rather, they argue that they were deprived of their “civil rights, ” and that the court was empowered to step in to adjudicate those rights. Appellants urge that Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 581, in which the Supreme Court refused to inquire into the motivations behind the membership determinations of the religious organization where no property rights were involved, failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court’s previous decision in Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d 121, identifying matters into which courts could inquire to include not only property rights but also civil rights. As the lower court observed, Erickson is still good law and we are bound by it. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court simply ignored its decision of two years earlier in Rosicrucian when it stated in Erickson that a civil court may consider an expulsion by a religious organization only if it involves property rights. (See Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 585.) Rather, as we shall discuss hereafter, any inconsistency appears to lie with appellants’ definition of “civil rights, ” which is not consistent with that described in Rosicrucian and the cases that use the term in this context.
In Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d 581, the appellant’s membership in a religious organization consisting of three members was cancelled as a result of a vote held according to the bylaws of the organization. (Id. at p. 583.) The bylaws stated that each member had a single vote, but could gain additional votes for every contribution of $1,000 that the individual made to the organization. (Id. at p. 584.) Another member, Mary Liddecoat, had previously donated $2,000 to the organization. (Id. at pp. 583-584.) Liddecoat, alarmed by appellant’s conduct, called a special meeting to consider annulment of his membership. (Id. at p. 584.) Using her three votes, she voted to cancel appellant’s membership. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded that the process appellant was provided met the requirements of the organization’s bylaws, and that the trial court could have reasonably concluded based on the evidence that the cancellation of membership was made in good faith. (Id. at pp. 587-588.)
The two cases may be reconciled on another basis as well. In Rosicrucian Fellowship, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131 the court stated that a civil court could resolve church issues involving not only property rights, but also civil rights. Erickson does not contradict this holding. Erickson stated only that property rights must be involved in order for a court to review expulsion. (Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 585, italics added.) It said nothing about the Court’s ability to review other church actions based on an alleged violation of civil rights. An expulsion from a religious organization is likely to be too intimately tied to ecclesiastical questions for a civil court to examine it unless it jeopardizes property rights or is conducted in a manner that violates the former member’s rights as set forth in the organization’s bylaws or similar documents.
The “civil rights” at issue here “depend essentially on the contracts of the parties as evinced by the rules, regulations, practices and customs accepted and followed.” (Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131.) “ ‘A person who joins a church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits which result from such a union he will submit to its control and to be governed by its laws, usages and customs....’ ” (Id. at p. 132; see also Serbian Orthodox, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 715.)
Appellants appear to use the term “civil rights” more broadly, to encompass their claims that they could not be expelled for conduct that was subject to the “litigation privilege” of Civil Code section 47, subdivisions (b) and (c); that their right to due process included the right to call witnesses and to obtain the assistance of counsel at the hearing, and to the right to postpone the hearing due to surgery; and that they had the right to be treated no differently from members of any other voluntary nonprofit association before a civil court. We address this last contention first.
A. Status of religious organizations before the court.
Appellants contend that the members of a religious nonprofit organization should be treated no differently than members of any other voluntary association before a civil court. As such, appellants reason, cases involving secular organizations should be binding on this court when considering cases involving religious organizations, whether or not property rights are involved. There is no support for this position in the case law.
Appellants draw on Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. at p. 714, as quoted in Episcopal Church Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th 467, 478 (Episcopal Cases), which states: “ ‘Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights or property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.’ ” Appellants then cite Bernstein v. Alameda etc. Med. Assn. (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 241, 253 (Bernstein), involving expulsion of a physician from a county medical association for, among other things, disparaging a predecessor physician in a report prepared for use by a litigant in a judicial proceeding. The appellate court held the evidence did not show a violation of the county association rule. In so holding, the court opined that the litigation privilege covered the report and that basing expulsion on statements made in such report would violate public policy. (Id. at pp. 246-248.) Appellants contend that Watson v. Jones and Episcopal Cases support the proposition that if courts may review membership decisions in nonprofit organizations to establish that such decisions were made in good faith and were not based upon conduct that was either privileged under Civil Code section 47 or otherwise in violation of public policy, courts may also make such inquiries in cases involving expulsions from religious organizations. This bootstrap argument must fail. First, both Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 679, 681 and Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th 467, involved disputes over property rights, and appellants acknowledge none were involved in this case.
In Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476, a local church disaffiliated itself from the Episcopal Church and a dispute arose as to the ownership of the local church building. The Supreme Court observed that secular courts may resolve internal church disputes over the ownership of property, and cited the proposition quoted above, and relied upon by appellants. The court then acknowledged that “[w]hen called on to resolve church property disputes, secular courts must not entangle themselves in disputes over church doctrine or infringe on the right to free exercise of religion.” (Id. at p. 478, italics added.) The court pointed out that the First Amendment bars courts from resolving even property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine or practice. (Id. at p. 479.)
Civil courts must afford the internal decisions of religious organizations greater deference than they would the decisions of other associations. This principle, based on the First Amendment, has been firmly established. (See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602; Erickson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 585; New v. Kroeger, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Singh v. Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275.) As the Court recognized in Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 478-479, the First Amendment distinguishes religious organizations from secular organizations, and sharply curtails the legal options available to those expelled from religious organizations. It is clear that a trial court may refrain from examining the actions of a religious organization if it determines those actions were based on ecclesiastical reasons. Secular organizations enjoy no similar First Amendment protections. Accordingly, appellants’ claim that religious and secular organizations are treated no differently is clearly inaccurate, unless the dispute involves property rights and may be resolved without entangling the courts in doctrinal or other ecclesiastical determinations.
Appellants assert that the Supreme Court has adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach to determining whether a court has authority to adjudicate a case involving a religious body and has rejected the “hierarchical/government” approach. According to neutral principles of law, courts should consider neutral sources of law such as the church’s articles of incorporation, constitution, canons, and rules in resolving disputes within these organizations, while the hierarchical/government approach defers to the decisions of a religious organization’s highest governing body. In Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th 467, the basis for appellants’ claim, the Supreme Court adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach for resolution of property disputes. The Supreme Court has not held that this approach extends to cases where, as here, property is not involved. As earlier noted, courts have shown a greater willingness to examine cases that implicate property rights than those which implicate other, non-property interests.
B. Litigation Privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subds. (b) and (c)).
Appellants contend that the expulsion in this case did not raise ecclesiastical concerns because the expulsions were unjustifiably based on actions they took that were privileged as a matter of law under Civil Code section 47 (the “litigation privilege”). Appellants urge this court to adopt the position that, because the court can resolve the issue of whether appellants’ actions were privileged without entertaining questions of religious doctrine or conduct, it may also consider whether the Board’s actions were justified. We take a different view.
“The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’ made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241; accord, Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1485.) “ ‘The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241, italics added.) No authority cited to us by appellants indicates that the litigation privilege immunizes members of religious organizations from ecclesiastical discipline or prevents a religious organization from disciplining or expelling a member for actions that would be protected from civil tort liability by the privilege. Moreover, as we observed in Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates, supra, at p. 1486, “[t]he litigation privilege ‘is generally described as one that precludes liability in tort, not liability for breach of contract. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” A fortiori, the privilege does not immunize appellants from discipline or expulsion here, where appellants do not seek to use the privilege as a shield from tort liability, or even from liability for a breach of contract.
In this case, Fiji Jamaat’s bylaws clearly indicate the types of action that may result in expulsion. The bylaws invest the Board with the power “to suspend or expel any member whose conduct shall have been determined by the Board to be improper, unbecoming, or likely to endanger the interest or reputation of the Jamaat or who willfully commits a breach of the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of the Jamaat.” The Board of Directors is the highest religious tribunal of Fiji Jamaat. The expulsion criteria described by the bylaws are fundamentally ecclesiastical. The Board voted unanimously to expel appellants. We will not - indeed we cannot - consider whether the actions of appellants in allegedly misappropriating funds, engaging an attorney on behalf of Fiji Jamaat without authorization, leading efforts to set aside an election, or making allegedly slanderous and libelous statements were improper, unbecoming, or likely to endanger the interests or reputation of Fiji Jamaat. To do so would involve this court in questions of faith and practice that are protected by the First Amendment and lie beyond the scope of our permitted inquiry. Even if the actions that prompted expulsion were in fact privileged, this court could not entertain such a contention where the case turns on whether appellants’ behavior was improper or unbecoming from the perspective of a religious organization.
The inapplicability of appellants’ privilege argument to religious organizations is exemplified by their contention that Hussain’s actions could not be grounds for expulsion because they comprised “communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, [ ] by one who is also interested....” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (c).) Applying this logic to the membership decisions of religious organizations makes no sense. In such a scenario, a church tribunal could not terminate the membership of an individual who told other members that he did not believe in the tenets of the religion and attempted to persuade them to join him in a different doctrinal interpretation or in practices that were anathema to the particular religion. We doubt that any member of a religious organization, including appellants, would support this scenario, yet this is precisely the approach that appellants propose.
C. Due process rights.
Appellants contend that the expulsion violated their civil rights, including their right to due process of law, arguing that the expulsion procedures denied them the right to call witnesses, to obtain the assistance of counsel, or to postpone the hearing due to surgery. These arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of “civil rights” in this case. In the context of discipline or expulsion proceedings by religious organizations, the “civil rights” described in the cases that use the term are either essentially property rights or the rights outlined in the bylaws of the organization.
The civil and property rights in this case, as in cases involving religious organizations generally, “depend essentially on the contracts of the parties as evinced by rules, regulations, practices and customs accepted and followed.” (Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 131.) “ ‘A person who joins a church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits which result from such a union he will submit to its control and be governed by its laws, usages and customs....’ ” (Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 132; see also Serbian Orthodox, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 715.) “[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.” (Serbian Orthodox, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 714-715, footnote omitted.)
The Court in Rosicrucian identified several of the rights to which its holding applies. The court noted that the civil and property rights involved in the case include the right to use the name “The Rosicrucian Fellowship, ” rights to make use of property, rights to the publication and sale of copyrighted books and documents, and access to mailing lists. These are more accurately described as rights established by contract or a species of property rights.
An individual who joins a religious organization agrees to be bound by the laws of that organization, in essence creating a contractual relationship between the member and the organization. The civil rights guaranteed to a member of a religious organization are those rights which have been established by the organization through this contractual relationship. They do not extend to those rights that an individual would have before a civil court. In this case, the bylaws constitute the contract that establishes appellants’ “civil rights.” Fiji Jamaat’s bylaws establish only a few rights in connection with termination of membership. A member of Fiji Jamaat is entitled to notice of the charge or complaint against him, and is entitled to an opportunity to be heard. Expelled or suspended members may also request a review by the full membership. Appellants are entitled to the due process rights provided for in the bylaws. They are not, however, entitled to the range of civil and due process rights established by secular laws, including application of the litigation privilege protections, to shield them from discipline or expulsion. They have no expectation of those rights in the course of their dealings with the organization, nor should they. To subject the decisions of religious tribunals to the panoply of civil and due process rights protected by federal, state, and local law would be tantamount to eliminating the long-standing religious protections provided by the First Amendment. Under such a standard, virtually any decision by a religious organization would be subject to scrutiny by the courts. Civil courts may consider whether a religious organization has violated the civil rights it establishes in its bylaws or constitution, and may make factual findings as to whether the organization actually carried out the processes provided for in the bylaws, but this is where the inquiry must end.
In Owen v. Board of Directors, supra, 173 Cal.App.2d 112, members were expelled from respondent organization upon making a written demand for inspection of membership records. (Id. at p. 114.) The members were granted a hearing before the board of directors, which voted to expel them. (Id. at p. 115.) In denying the members’ petition for writ of mandate, the court held they had no property interests in the church, they were nonetheless entitled to a hearing according to the organization’s bylaws, they had received such a hearing, and they had no further grounds for complaint. (Id. at p. 117.) The present case is analogous.
Here, the lower court found that Fiji Jamaat’s evidence established a deliberative process that was religious in nature. Specifically, the court found that the decision to expel appellants was based on a consideration of whether appellants’ conduct was improper, unbecoming, or likely to endanger the interest of Fiji Jamaat based upon the religious beliefs of the organization. This presents an ecclesiastical question, and the court correctly refused to consider appellants’ contentions pertaining to the reasons for expulsion in greater depth. The trial court stated that Fiji Jamaat abided by the terms of the bylaws for termination of membership, provided adequate notice of the charges brought against appellants, and afforded them an opportunity to be heard. When a trial court applies a governing document of a religious organization to a certain set of circumstances, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. (Concord Christian Center, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1408-1409.) Viewed thus, respondent’s evidence is sufficient to establish that appellants were given a fair opportunity to be heard according to the bylaws.
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court denying appellants’ petition for writ of mandate is affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, J., Richman, J.