Opinion
Civil File No. 00-1275 (MJD/JGL)
May 9, 2001
Paul J. Lukas, Nichols, Kaster Anderson, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Mary M.L. O'Brien, Amy J. Swedberg, Meagher Geer, P.L.L.P., on behalf of Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination suit alleging reprisal discrimination, sexual harassment, and wage discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and sex discrimination under Title VII. Based on a review of all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claim of reprisal discrimination. The Court DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
Background
Defendant Larson Implement, Inc. ("Larson") is a small farm machinery dealership in Northfield, Minnesota. Defendant Minnesota AG Group, Inc. ("MAGI") owns Larson and three other dealerships in the state. Plaintiff Michelle Keske ("Keske") was employed by Defendants from May 12, 1995 to February 16, 1999. Although she was initially hired as a part-time receptionist, her duties expanded to cover much of the office administration, including some aspects of payroll, accounts payable, accounts receivable, fleet management, title transfer, staff training, support and other duties. Keske received an hourly wage, starting at $8/hour and topping out at $12.50/hour. She worked an average of 32 hours per week, and received overtime pay if she worked more than 40 hours in a week. In 1999 she received a $1,000 bonus to reflect her additional duties and good performance.
Defendants are collectively referred to as "MAGI".
Keske worked along side two male employees, Jeff Telstad and Allen Krueger. Telstad, MAGI's Warranty Administrator, received $37,000/year salary in 1999. Krueger, MAGI's Parts manager, received $40,000/year salary in 1999.
Plaintiff asserts that in January, 1999, her supervisor, Doug Johnson, initiated a conversation regarding his personal problems and then requested that she give him a hug. She declined, and left the room immediately when the accounting manager walked in the door.
Keske also alleges that Johnson continually pried into her personal life, inquiring about her relationship with her husband and her pregnancies. She says he made suggestive comments about her, pulled loose hairs off her clothes (including, on one occasion, pulling a hair off her buttock) and leered at her. On one occasion he made a joke about reading fortune cookie messages and ending the message with the phrase "between the sheets." She also charges that he winked at her once during a job performance appraisal.
A few weeks after the request for a hug, Plaintiff informed Johnson that she had received an offer for employment as a financial analyst at another company, at a higher salary. Johnson asked if he could think about the matter for one hour, and maybe offer her more money to stay. He called back in one hour and asked for one more day to consult with the management about a raise. Plaintiff agreed. Johnson called Plaintiff the next day, Saturday, at home, and offered her a $1.00 per hour raise. Plaintiff was insulted by the offer because it was no more than the standard annual increase she was due to receive that month. She turned down the offer and tendered her two week notice.
Plaintiff did not complete her two week notice term, instead leaving after two days. She wrote a letter to one of MAGI's owners, stating that she was not leaving for personal reasons, as Johnson was telling the other employees, but because of how Johnson handled her salary negotiation. She wrote that she had been ignored over the last few days and it had been "hard on [her] emotionally." She also wrote to Johnson, saying the last few days had been "emotionally difficult and awkward". She wrote that she felt "hurt that you couldn't take enough time out of your schedule to try and meet what I needed to stay on board." She felt "under-appreciated," and ended by stating: "All I asked for is to be compensated in the same manner my colleagues were."
Plaintiff then filed this complaint, alleging sexual harassment, wage discrimination and retaliatory discharge under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and sexual discrimination under Title VII.
Standard
Summary judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-250 (1986). A fact is material if resolving disputes concerning that fact affects the outcome of the case. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. See id. at 252. On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id., 477 U.S. at 250. The moving party carries the burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Analysis Retaliatory Discharge/Reprisal Discrimination
The Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") prohibits an employer from intentionally retaliating against a person who opposed a discriminatory practice. Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd.7. The three-part McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting procedure applies to retaliation claims under the MHRA as well as Title VII suits. See Hasnudeen v. Onan Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 556-57 (Minn. 1996). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the employer meets this burden, the employee then must show that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. See id. To establish a prima facie claim of reprisal, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) adverse employment action was taken against her; and 3) a causal connection exists between the two. See Zellmer v. Koch Refining Co., 1997 WL 405484, *6 (D.Minn. 1997). In this case, Keske is unable to establish a prima facie claim of reprisal. While her rejection of Johnson's advances could be deemed statutorily protected conduct under Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd.7(1), Keske has not demonstrated that any adverse employment action taken against her was causally related to that rejection.
Keske argues that the adverse employment action was her constructive discharge after she rejected Johnson's advances. Constructive discharge occurs "when an employer deliberately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus forces [her] to quit [her] job." Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1460 (8th Cir. 1994). If the employee reasonably believes there is no chance for fair treatment, there has been a constructive discharge. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 1997). The standard is an objective, "reasonable person" one. See Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). An employee must give an employer a reasonable amount of time to resolve a problem before quitting. See West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff asserts that she was "constructively discharged" because her working environment became so intolerable that she believed there was no chance for fair treatment. For support she points to Johnson's alleged sexual advances, the differential between her pay and that of her male office mates, and her employer's failure to match her outside job offer.
The Court notes first that Keske has not demonstrated that MAGI's action were taken with the intention of forcing her to quit. See Bunny Bread, 646 F.2d at 1256 (holding that constructive discharge requires proof of intentional conduct by employer). If the protected conduct was the rejection of the sexual advances, then the only action taken by MAGI which occurred after that was the failure to offer Keske enough money to induce her to stay. Keske has offered no proof that this failure was an attempt by MAGI to force her to quit.
Even if the Court assumes, without deciding, that there was a constructive discharge, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a causal relationship between the rejection of Johnson's advances and MAGI's failure to offer her enough money to induce her to stay. Keske has presented no evidence that anyone at the company other than Johnson knew of the rejected advances. She has not contested Defendant's assertions that the counteroffer was authorized by MAGI, not Johnson. MAGI did, the Court notes, offer her more than she was making at the time, although not as much as Plaintiff felt she deserved. As to the temporal connection between the two events, the Court notes that Plaintiff initiated the second event when she informed MAGI that she had received a better job offer. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that MAGI's failure to offer her a sufficiently large raise to match that offer was connected to Johnson's request for a hug.
Because Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on this claim.
Sexual Harassment, Wage Discrimination
Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment and wage discrimination. The Court finds that issues of material fact remain which preclude an award of summary judgment on these claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim of reprisal discrimination is GRANTED;
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining claims is DENIED.