Summary
determining district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims for false arrest and false imprisonment where the record lacked evidence establishing that defendant intelligence analysts were investigative or law enforcement officers, as defined by § 2680(h)
Summary of this case from Lyndon v. United StatesOpinion
No. 07-15769.
Argued and Submitted November 20, 2008 San Francisco, California.
January 28, 2009.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding.D.C. No. CV-04-01937-NVW.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The United States of America appeals from the district court's judgment after a bench trial imposing liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for damages resulting from Scott Kerns's mistaken arrest and imprisonment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions and review for clear error its factual findings, see Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999), and we reverse.
The FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity for certain torts, but exempts any claim arising out of torts which include false arrest or false imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The statute contains an exception allowing claims arising out of false arrest or false imprisonment that involve" acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government." Id. No evidence in the record establishes that the intelligence analyst defendants were" empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law," as required by section 2680(h). Accordingly, a plain reading of the statutory definition of" investigative or law enforcement officer" indicates that the intelligence analyst defendants are not such officers. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that a claim of false arrest and imprisonment based on the conduct of the intelligence analyst defendants is plainly foreclosed under section 2680(h).
We conclude that the district court erred in permitting Kerns to proceed on his alternative theory based on the Arizona tort of gross negligence by an investigator. We have specifically held that a plaintiff" cannot sidestep the FTCA's exclusion of false imprisonment claims by suing for the damage of false imprisonment under the label of negligence," Snow-Erlin v. United States, 470 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 2006), as this" would permit evasion of the substance of § 2680(h)'s exclusion of liability," id. at 808 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The gravamen of Kerns's claim is clearly the injury and damages resulting from his false arrest and imprisonment. Therefore, his claim is barred under section 2680(h) as arising out of a false arrest or false imprisonment. Id. at 809. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment in favor of Kerns and remand for dismissal of this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
REVERSED and REMANDED.