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determining that plaintiff's filing of opposition papers five days late was not an excessive delay, nor prejudicial
Summary of this case from U.S. v. YakubovaOpinion
00 CV 5154 (SJ).
May 25, 2004
POLLACK KOTLER, Mineola, New York, By: Ruth M. Pollack, Esq., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, New York, By: Joseph Baumgarten, Esq., Michael J. Lebowich, Esq., Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Jeffrey Kendall ("Kendall" or "Plaintiff") filed the present action against William J. Fisse ("Fisse"), Laurie Ledford ("Ledford"), Gilbert Sutcliffe ("Sutcliffe"), Lawrence Phillips ("Phillips"), Citibank, N.A. ("Citibank"), Citigroup, Inc., and Citicorp, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") for (1) employment discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq; New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. McKinney's Exec. Law § 296; and New York City Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), New York City Admin. Code § 8-107; (2) breach of employment contract; and (3) improper termination to avoid providing employee benefits as provided in § 510 of ERISA ( 29 U.S.C. § 1140). Before this Court are Defendants' motions for (a) summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (b) attorney's fees and costs, and (c) sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Plaintiff's letter request (which this Court construes as a motion) for sanctions against Defendants and/or their counsel. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and their motion for attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is also DENIED.
BACKGROUND
After numerous extensions, this Court ordered due on March 28, 2003 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion ("Opposition Brief") and Plaintiff's Rule 56.1(b) Statement. It is disputed whether Plaintiff submitted its 40 page Opposition Brief and its Rule 56.1(b) Statement on that date or on April 2, 2003.
Defendants ask this Court to strike Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion because of Plaintiff's (1) alleged late filing (on April 2, 2003) of his response, and (2) disregard for the Court's individual practices, which limit opposition briefs to 25 pages. (See Letter from Joseph Baumgarten to Judge Johnson of 4/3/03.)
Even if Plaintiff did submit his opposition papers five days late, this delay was not excessive and did not result in great prejudice to Defendants. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995). Similarly, Plaintiff's misconduct in submitting an opposition brief that exceeds this Court's page limit by fifteen pages does not justify this Court striking the brief in its entirety. See Abu-Nassar v. Elders Furniture, Inc., et. al., No. 88 CIV 7906, 1994 WL 445638, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1994). This Court will therefore not strike Plaintiff's opposition papers; however, it cautions Plaintiff that a party's failure to comply with Court rules can result in a range of penalties, from striking the entire brief to imposing sanctions.See Id., McConnell v. Costigan, No. 00 CIV 4598, 2002 WL 313528, at * 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
In April 1997, Plaintiff was transferred to the Long Island Region of NYCB, where he worked in the position of Generalist. In August 1997, Fisse was formally transferred out of NYCB and did not thereafter supervise Kendall. Kerry Piercy served as Fisse's interim replacement until February 1998, when Laurie Ledford was appointed as Director of Human Resources for NYCB. In approximately September 1998, NYCB's Long Island and Queens business regions were consolidated and one Generalist position (Plaintiff's) was eliminated. In November 1998, Plaintiff received a notice of job discontinuance and was terminated.
Plaintiff claims that this transfer constituted a demotion. (Compl. ¶ 53.)
Plaintiff remained in his position during a "notice period" through February 5, 1999. After that date, he was placed on salary continuation and received his full salary and medical insurance coverage for six months (through August 6, 1999). Plaintiff never applied for disability benefits, even though he was eligible to do so through February 5, 1999.
On August 18, 1999, Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI"), stating in his application that he "became unable to work because of [his] disabling condition on November 15, 1998." (Decl. of Joseph Baumgarten ("Baumgarten Decl.") Ex. 15.) Plaintiff also stated that he "worked from 1984 through November, 1998 when [he] was laid-off rather than be placed on disability leave." (Id.) After evaluating his disability claim, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that Plaintiff had become disabled under SSA rules on November 15, 1998 and was eligible for SSDI benefits beginning May 1999. (Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 16.) SSA thereafter began to pay Plaintiff disability benefits.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court's function is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but only to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986);Eastman Mach. Co. v. United States, 841 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1988). It is well-established that "summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases." Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993 (2001); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995). Once the movant has made a showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be tried, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to raise triable issues of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Mere conclusory allegations will not suffice. Instead, the nonmoving party must present "significant probative supporting evidence" that a factual dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
A genuine issue for trial exists if, based on the record as a whole, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. In conducting its analysis, the court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all ambiguities in the nonmoving party's favor, and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-255; Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995). However, the court should grant summary judgment where the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, speculative, or not significantly probative. See Parker v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
II. Plaintiff's ADA Claims
A Plaintiff seeking to bring an action under the ADA in New York State must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2004). See also Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Pres. and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993). The statute of limitations begins to run when the employee receives notice of an allegedly discriminatory decision — not when the employee is actually impacted by it. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Miller v. ITT Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff received a job discontinuance notice sometime in November 1998, and that Plaintiff believed that he would not be offered another job at Citibank. (Baumgarten Decl., Ex. 4 at 47-48, 71-72, 709-10.) Plaintiff's EEOC charge was not filed until November 5, 1999, well beyond the 300 day statute of limitations. (See Baumgarten Decl., Ex. 2.) Therefore, Plaintiff's ADA claims are time-barred and must be dismissed in their entirety.
III. Plaintiff's State and City Claims
A. Jurisdiction
When Plaintiff commenced this action on August 25, 2000, he was a domiciliary of California. (See Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 3, ¶ 1.) Thus, this Court continues to have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims by virtue of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
B. Timeliness
A cause of action brought under NYSHRL and NYCHRL is subject to a three year statute of limitations. See N.Y. CPLR § 214(2) (2004); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d) (2001); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the instant action was filed on August 25, 2000, any incidents of discrimination alleged to have occurred prior to August 25, 1997 would ordinarily be time-barred, unless Plaintiff was subjected to a 'continuing violation' of such a character as to extend the limitations period.
"The continuing-violation exception 'extends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under an ongoing policy of discrimination even if those acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the statute of limitations.'"Quinn, 159 F.3d at 765 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). However, multiple and even similar discriminatory acts that are not the result of a discriminatory policy do not amount to a continuing violation. Id. A continuing violation may be found to exist, however, where a plaintiff can prove that the employer has permitted 1) related and 2) repeated instances of discrimination to continue unremedied so as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice, and 3) the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was not obligated to have sued earlier.Berry v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983); Quinn, 159 F.3d at 765; Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 891 F. Supp. 155, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Dodson v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 97 CIV 3838, 1998 WL 702277, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998); McKenney v. Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Riedenger v. D'Amicantino, 974 F. Supp. 322, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint points to similar acts of discrimination occurring with sufficient frequency to satisfy the first two prongs of the Berry test. For example, Plaintiff alleges that from September 1996, when he informed Fisse of his health problems, to November 1998, the date of his termination, Plaintiff's supervisors at NYCB continually made inappropriate comments and asked unduly probing questions with respect to his disability; distanced themselves personally and professionally from Plaintiff; spoke inappropriately about Plaintiff's health condition with his clients; "chastised" Plaintiff for "acting strange and for discussing his health" with co-workers; demoted Plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint Plaintiff made about mistreatment; and eventually terminated Plaintiff on the basis of his disability. (Compl. ¶¶ 33-36, 41-47, 50, 53-58, 61-62, 65, 67-70, 75.)
The Court notes that even if the "bulk of Kendall's complaints" relate to Fisse's conduct toward him, such conduct, if discriminatory, will fall within the continuing violation doctrine if Plaintiff's subsequent supervisors engaged in behavior that contributed to an ongoing policy of discrimination or that could amount to a discriminatory policy or practice. (See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Sum. Judg. ("Defs.' Mot." at 9.)
As to the final prong of the Berry test, however, this Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the circumstances surrounding this alleged discrimination were such that a "reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have sued earlier." Johnson, 891 F. Supp. at 165. Here, Plaintiff alleges that in April 1997, "Fisse demoted Plaintiff from Lead Human Resources Consultant to Generalist in only the Long Island region of the bank." (Pl.'s Rule 56.1(b) Statement ¶ 8.) Such an overt act, in combination with the alleged discriminatory statements and conduct described above, would have been sufficient to warrant the commencement of litigation. See Johnson, 891 F. Supp. at 166. No reason has been advanced as to why Plaintiff's claims of discrimination were not asserted until August 2000. Accordingly, this Court holds that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply, and that Plaintiff's complaints relating to Fisse's conduct toward him before August 1997 are time-barred. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's claim that he was unlawfully terminated is timely under NYSHRL and NYCHRL.
C. Plaintiff's Discriminatory Termination Claim
To make out a prima facie case of unlawful termination under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, Plaintiff must establish: (1) that Defendants are subject to NYSHRL and NYCHRL; (2) that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of NYSHRL and NYCHRL; (3) that he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) that Defendants took adverse employment action against him because of his disability. See Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 747 (2d Cir. 2001); Woolley v. Broadview Networks, Inc., No. 01 CIV 2526, 2003 WL 554754, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2003);Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998); Torrico v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., No. 01 CIV 841, 2004 WL 439493, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2004). Defendants do not dispute that they are subject to the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, nor, for purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff suffers from a disability within the meaning of NYSHRL and NYCHRL. (Defs.' Mot. at 10-11.) Moreover, it is beyond dispute that Defendants' discharge of Plaintiff constitutes an adverse employment action. The principal issues for the Court to decide are whether Plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and, if so, whether Defendants discharged Plaintiff because of his disability rather than on account of some nondiscriminatory reason.
Although Defendants do not dispute that they are subject to NYSHRL or NYCHRL, they assert that there is no basis for asserting a claim under NYSHRL or NYCHRL against Fisse, Phillips, or Sutcliffe because no evidence exists that these individuals "engaged in any form of actionable discriminatory practice." (Defs.' Mot. at 19.) The Court agrees with Defendants with respect to Fisse, since Plaintiff's claims against Fisse are time-barred. With respect to Sutcliffe and Phillips, Plaintiff's only mention of either defendant in his Opposition Brief is contained in paragraph 78, where he states: "Kendall's allegations in his complaint . . . properly included acts of . . . Phillips . . . and Sutcliff [sic] by identifying acts or omissions on the part of each defendant. . . ." (Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 78.) In fact, Plaintiff makes no specific allegations of discriminatory conduct on the part of Sutcliffe or Phillips in his Complaint.
Plaintiff's Complaint contains only the following references to Sutcliffe: "From on or about September 1996 through August 14, 1999 Sutcliff [sic] was Executive Vice President for Citibank Human Resources in New York" (Compl. ¶ 10); "Fisse . . . disparage[d] [Plaintiff] to Gilbert Sutcliff [sic] and Laurie Ledford, who at that time controlled the careers of all HR professionals at Citibank" (Compl. ¶ 68); and "[a]s a result of the actions of . . . Gilbert Sutcliff [sic] . . . in abruptly discontinuing Kendall's employment, Kendall could not apply for short or long term disability benefits through company and he is now without the benefits that he desperately requires to live." (Compl. ¶ 82.)
Plaintiff's Complaint makes even fewer references to Phillips: "From on or about September 1994 through August 14, 1999 Phillips was Chief Personnel officer for Citibank in New York" (Compl. ¶ 11), and "Plaintiff's performance was so exemplary that . . . he was asked by the company to attend an event for high potential/performers' to meet Senior Vice President of Human Resources, Larry Phillips." (Compl. ¶ 31.) Although Plaintiff did not allege specific discriminatory conduct with respect to Sutcliffe and Phillips in his Complaint and Opposition Brief, the Court declines to dismiss the claims against Sutcliffe and Phillips. If Sutcliffe and Phillips were Plaintiff's supervisors at Citibank, they could be found to be individually liable under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, even though the Complaint failed to specify their role in allegedly discriminatory termination. See Tomka v. Seiler, 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995); Bonner v. Guccione, No. 94 CIV 7735, 1997 WL 362311, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1997); Sacay v. Research Found. of City Univ. of N.Y., 44 F. Supp.2d 496, 503-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Plaintiff's third cause of action asserts that even if Plaintiff was not actually disabled, he was discriminated against because he was regarded as having a disability. (See Compl. ¶¶ 108-115.) First, the Court finds that Plaintiff is, as he asserts, "an individual with a disability under Title I of the ADA." (Compl. ¶ 102.) Second, even if Plaintiff could show that Defendants regarded him as disabled, see Giordano, 274 F.3d at 748, Plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, as discussed infra.
Plaintiff claims that he also suffered an adverse employment action when he was denied the opportunity to apply for and receive Citibank disability leave and benefits. (Compl. ¶¶ 64, 82, 104.) The Court discusses Plaintiff's requested disability leave infra. With respect to the issue of benefits, any claim that Plaintiff was improperly denied benefits under Citibank's disability policy should have been asserted under ERISA. In any event, Plaintiff fails to put forward any evidence that he attempted to apply for benefits, much less that he was denied the right to seek benefits because of a disability. Defendants persuasively argue that Plaintiff remained eligible for disability benefits after he received his job discontinuance notice, but simply failed to apply. (Defs.' Mot. at 15.) The Big Book, Citibank's guide to employee benefits, clearly states that the only way an employee can receive benefits is by "[c]all[ing] the Citibank Managed Disability Unit" associated with Citibank's disability administrator. (Id.; Pl.'s Ex. I, 1997 Big Book at 91, 1998 Big Book at 95.) The disability administrator — not the employee's manager — investigates the claim and makes a determination as to whether the employee is entitled to disability benefits. (Id.) In this case, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to show that he attempted to apply for benefits by following the Big Book procedure, or that his supervisors ever thwarted his efforts to do so.
Defendants also assert that "[t]here is no question that Kendall knew or should have known about his continued eligibility. He had a copy of both The Big Book and the Management Guide to U.S. Human Resources Policy and, as a Human Resources Generalist, he frequently referred to them in counseling other employees." (Defs.' Mot. at 15.) Indeed, Plaintiff readily admitted as much in deposition testimony. (See Baumgarten Decl., Ex. 4 at 369-70.) Plaintiff responds that three versions of the Big Book manual were published by Citibank between 1996 and 1999, and therefore "[w]hat books, if any, were provided to Kendall is an issue for the jury." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 18.) This Court disagrees with Plaintiff. Plaintiff includes in his Exhibit I two versions of The Big Book, one from 1997 and one from 1998. (Pl.'s Ex. I, 1997 Big Book at 91, 1998 Big Book at 95.) The text of the "Claiming Benefits" section is nearly identical in the two versions. The primary difference is that Citibank's disability administrator in 1997 was Aetna; in 1998 it was CNA. Both versions clearly state that the disability administrator is responsible for determining a claimant's eligibility for benefits and the duration of the individual's disability. (Id.) The issue of which disability administrator would have made a decision with respect to Plaintiff's application for benefits is irrelevant.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that, with respect to Plaintiff's claim that he was discriminatorily denied the opportunity to apply for and receive Citibank disability benefits, Plaintiff has failed to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
1. Plaintiff's Qualification to Perform the Essential Functions of His Job With or Without Reasonable Accommodation
Defendants argue that Plaintiff "has repeatedly stated in sworn testimony that, given his alleged condition, he was incapable of performing as a human resources professional at the time of his job discontinuance." (Defs.' Mot. at 11.) Defendants also contend that Plaintiff "readily admitted that there was no reasonable accommodation that would allow him to perform his job." (Id. at 12.) To support these propositions, Defendants cite to several statements made by Plaintiff in depositions in 2001, e.g.:
Q: Do you believe you can't work?
A: Yeah.
* * *
Q: At any time since you received the job discontinuance from Citibank, have you felt well enough to be able to work?
A: No.
* * *
Q: . . . [A]t any time since you left Citibank, . . . have you ever felt that you might be well enough, mentally and physically, to work if you were provided with an accommodation, that is being able to work at home or any other kind of accommodation? . . .
A: No.
Q: Sitting here today, can you think of any kind of accommodation, whether it is working at home or any special assistance, with which you could feel that you could work?
A: No, because if you can't remember, I mean, how do you perform?
(Baumgarten Decl., Ex. 4 at 146, 442, 448-49) (emphasis added.)
Defendants' reliance on these statements is misplaced. Plaintiff made all of these statements during two depositions in June 2001, and the statements focus only on the time period following his job termination. Plaintiff's deposition testimony does not indicate that he perceived himself as suffering from physical and/or mental disabilities that made him incapable, even with reasonable accommodation, of performing as a human resources professional at the time of (or any time prior to) his job discontinuance. In fact, his deposition testimony indicates otherwise: ". . . had I gotten an accommodation and/or been able to go out on disability, what kind of condition would I be in today? You never know. I could have gotten different medical treatment." (Id. at 720.) Such a statement indicates that a triable issue remains as to whether or not Plaintiff was qualified to perform his job at NYCB with reasonable accommodation.
Having been classified as disabled by the SSA, however, Plaintiff has the burden, even at the summary judgment stage, of explaining the inconsistency between this classification and the prima facie requirement that he be able to perform the essential functions of his job, at least with a reasonable accommodation.Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 798, 807 (1999); see also Disanto v. McGraw Hill, 220 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1999); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Nodelman v. Gruner Jahr USA Publ'g, No. 98 CIV 1231, 2000 WL 502858, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 2000); Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp.2d 640, 651-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Defendants persuasively argue that Kendall "does not even attempt to offer an explanation. Indeed, he readily conceded that he is and has been totally and completely disabled and unable to work" since November 15, 1998. (Defs.' Mot. at 12.)
Plaintiff asserted in his SSDI application on August 18, 1999 that he was "unable to work because of [his] disabling condition on November 15, 1998," and he affirmed in deposition testimony that SSA classified him as permanently disabled in 1999, dating to November 15, 1998. (Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 15; Ex. 4 at 143-44.) Yet Plaintiff now asserts, without citing to any evidentiary support, that "the facts show that Kendall was qualified for the position for which he was hired and later from which he was discharged." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 34.)
In a letter to Laurie Ledford, Plaintiff's attorney asserted that Plaintiff's physician advised Plaintiff to take a temporary disability leave so that his health condition could be diagnosed. (Pl.'s Ex. C, Letter from Ruth Pollack to Laurie Ledford of 3/5/99.) Plaintiff then indicated in his Complaint, Opposition Brief, and SSDI application that he requested and was denied by NYCB temporary disability leave relating to his disabling health condition. (Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64; Pl.'s Opp'n at 36; Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 15.) Within his voluminous submissions to the Court, Plaintiff cites to no case law and offers no evidence — not even an affidavit from his doctor or himself — to support the proposition that disability leave could have constituted a reasonable accommodation.
Plaintiff has failed to explain this inconsistency between the statements in his SSDI application and his claim that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. Absent such an explanation, there is no basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job at NYCB. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's discriminatory termination claim.
IV. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim
Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that on May 9, 1996, Plaintiff and Citigroup entered into "an agreement" that included an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that Citigroup breached the agreement and covenant by discontinuing Plaintiff's job. (Compl. ¶¶ 95-100.) Under New York law, absent a contrary contractual provision, employment is "presumed to be a hiring at will which may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even for no reason." Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 (1983). No implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing exists with respect to an at-will employment contract. Id. at 304-05. Therefore, under New York law, "absent a constitutionally impermissible purpose, a statutory proscription, or an express limitation in the individual contract of employment, an employer's right at any time to terminate an employment at will remains unimpaired."Id. at 305.
The parties dispute whether such an agreement exists. At Plaintiff's deposition, Plaintiff's counsel clarified that the May 9, 1996 "agreement" referred to in the Complaint is actually the combination of a job offer letter and a verbal agreement with respect to a "standard relocation package." (Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 4 at 193-94.) Plaintiff's counsel specifically stated that "[i]t is not like he got some contract that laid everything out. . . . This [May 9, 1996 letter] appears to encapsulate in sum and substance the agreement between Mr. Kendall and Citibank, but this is not a contract. That is all I have. That is all I know of other than what Mr. Kendall testified about." (Id.) At that same deposition, Defendants' counsel asked Plaintiff whether he received any booklets or packages, in addition to the May 9, 1996 letter, before entering into employment with Citibank. (Id. at 191-93.) Plaintiff responded, "[n]o. I mean I don't remember. The only thing I can tell you is I knew it came with whatever the relocation package said I was going to get. That is the only other type of compensation I can remember was included." (Id. at 193.) In his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff argues, without citing to evidentiary support, that he and Citibank had entered into an "explicit contract." (Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 40.)
As Defendants persuasively argue, the "purported May 9, 1996 'agreement' was simply an offer letter that did not purport to employ Kendall for a definite duration." (Defs.' Mot. at 20.) Additional support for Defendants' argument comes from the Citibank Management Guide to U.S. Human Resources Policy, which expressly preserves the at-will employment relationship with respect to Citibank employees: "[t]his guide should not be construed as a guarantee of continued employment. Employment with the corporation is on an 'at-will' basis. . . ." (Baumgarten Decl. Ex. 5 at i.)
As discussed supra, see n. 7, Plaintiff had a copy of the Management Guide to U.S. Human Resources Policy and, as a Human Resources Generalist, he frequently referred to it in counseling other employees. (Defs.' Mot. at 15.)
The Court agrees with Defendants. Because Plaintiff was an at-will employee, Citibank was entitled to terminate him at any time for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Accordingly, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim must be dismissed.
V. Plaintiff's ERISA Claim
Count Four of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that "[b]y improperly terminating Kendall, Citigroup refused to pay Kendall proper severance, caused him to forfeit his benefits, this action of defendants constituting a violation of ERISA [sic]." (Compl. ¶ 118.) Plaintiff claims that because Defendants violated ERISA, Plaintiff is entitled to "severance, reinstatement in the retirement plan and statutory damages, including attorney's fees, and costs." (Id. ¶ 119.) Although Plaintiff's Complaint is vague, Plaintiff presumably sought to raise a claim under § 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, which prohibits the discharge of a benefit plan participant "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may be entitled under the plan." "To prevail in a claim under § 510 of ERISA, a plaintiff must show that his employer had the specific intent to engage in conduct prohibited by that section; if loss of benefits was merely a consequence of, as opposed to a motivating factor behind, the termination, then plaintiff's claim will fail."Brink v. Union Carbide Corp., 41 F. Supp.2d 406, 416-417 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that he had received proper severance payments. (Baumgarten Decl., Ex. 4 at 444-446.) Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that there was any intent on Defendants' part "1) to deprive [Plaintiff] of benefits, or even 2) that any decision-maker knew where [Plaintiff] stood vis-a-vis retirement benefits, then, or in the future." Brink, 41 F. Supp.2d at 417. Plaintiff must prove more than the simple fact that his termination precluded him from vesting into a pension plan; he must also show that Citibank had an unlawful purpose in firing him. Id., Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988). Because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's ERISA claim, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's assertion in his Opposition Brief that he never received an exit interview or severance package is of no avail. (See Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 72.) Even if this assertion is in fact true (and Plaintiff's deposition testimony indicates it is not), this does not demonstrate that Citibank had the "specific intent" to engage in conduct prohibited by § 510 of ERISA. See Brink, 41 F. Supp.2d at 406.
VI. Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Sanctions
Defendants claim that they are entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978), as Plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable and groundless." (emphasis in original) (Defs.' Mot. at 23.) Additionally, they claim that attorney's fees are an appropriate sanction, since Plaintiff and his attorney have acted in bad faith, engaged in deceitful conduct, and demonstrated disdain for the judicial process. (Defs.' Mot. at 23-25.) Plaintiff, in turn, asserts that this Court should sanction Defendants and/or their counsel for dishonest conduct. (Letter from Ruth Pollack to Judge Johnson of 4/9/03 at 3).
This Court finds that neither attorney's fees, costs, nor sanctions are appropriate in this case. Plaintiff's action was not sufficiently "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" to merit the award of attorney's fees and costs to Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 or Christianburg. Additionally, neither party has sufficiently demonstrated that the other "has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons'" that would warrant the imposition of a sanction. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991). The specific acts misconduct alleged by both parties did not result in a substantially increased expenditure of time and services, nor was it of much relevance to the legal and factual issues before this Court. Cf. Rybner v. Cannon Design, Inc., 1996 WL 470668, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1996); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 1474, 1486 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Accordingly, Defendants' application for attorney's fees and costs, and Defendants' and Plaintiff's applications for sanctions, are DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and their motion for attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.