Opinion
No. 3-04-CV-1267-D.
June 7, 2005
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Ruha'mah Stadtlander ("Stadtlander"), appearing pro se, has submitted a letter requesting unspecified relief from the September 28, 2004 order dismissing this civil action without prejudice. The court should construe the letter as a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate final judgment and deny such relief.
I.
Eugenio Antonio Ken, also known as Timothy Paul Stephenson ("Timothy"), was born to Paulino Hilmar Ken and Louredes Areli Lino (the "Kens") in Progresso Village, District of Corozal, Belize, on June 13, 1994. When Timothy was seven-weeks old, he was brought to the United States by Stadtlander, founder of the Belize Children's Medical Foundation ("BCMF"), for medical treatment not available in Belize. Stadtlander purported to act as the legal representative of Timothy's birth parents, whom she describes as "[s]imple, trusting, uneducated, Mayan Indians[.]" (Stadtlander Ltr. at 2). On July 31, 1994, Stadtlander placed Timothy in the home of a host family, Kevin and Melissa Stephenson (the "Stephensons") of Ovilla, Texas. The Stephensons have supported Timothy since that date, coordinating his medical care through doctors and hospitals in Dallas.
At birth, Timothy suffered from numerous medical problems, including congestive heart failure and bilateral cleft lip and palate. He also is profoundly deaf. While in the United States, Timothy has had several surgeries to correct his cleft lip and palate and has received a cochlear implant.
Shortly after his placement with the Stephensons, Stadtlander, acting on behalf of the Kens, inquired as to their interest in adopting Timothy. These discussions continued until February 1997, when Stadtlander abruptly changed her mind and embarked on a campaign to have Timothy relocated to a BCMF facility in Florida. The Stephensons hired an attorney, who filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in Texas state court. Substituted service was effected on the Kens through an attorney retained by Stadtlander to defend the action. When the Kens failed to appear, a default judgment was entered against them. Thereafter, the Stephensons filed a motion to terminate the Kens' parental rights, which was granted on January 5, 1998. The Stephensons formally adopted Timothy on March 23, 1998. He became a United States citizen on July 29, 2003.
On June 10, 2004, the Kens filed this action in federal district court under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention") and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11601, et seq., for the return of Timothy. The court scheduled a prompt evidentiary hearing for September 27, 2004. On the day of the hearing, attorneys for both sides advised the court that a settlement was imminent and requested additional time to complete negotiations. A settlement was announced the following day. By order dated September 28, 2004, the court dismissed the case without prejudice in accordance with the stipulation of dismissal filed by the parties.
On April 26, 2005, Stadtlander submitted a letter to the court complaining about the terms of the settlement and seeking "accountability, at State and Federal levels, for the crimes committed against this innocent child and his family." (Stadtlander Ltr. at 2). Liberally construed, it appears that Stadtlander wants the court to set aside the order dismissing this case so she can challenge the validity of Timothy's adoption by the Stephensons. ( See id. at 9). The court therefore treats the letter as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from final judgment.
A.
A district court may grant relief from a final judgment "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). These terms include: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) a void judgment; or (5) a judgment that has been reversed or otherwise vacated. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)-(5). The court also may set aside a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). However, relief under this "catch-all" provision is available "only if extraordinary circumstances are present." Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002), quoting Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 829, 111 S.Ct. 89, 112 L.Ed.2d 61 (1990).
B.
By its express terms, Rule 60(b) provides relief only to "a party or a party's legal representative." Stadtlander was not a party to the underlying action. Therefore, her standing to seek Rule 60(b) relief depends on her status as "party's legal representative."
A legal representative is "one who stands in the place and stead of another, such as an heir at law." Matter of El Paso Refinery, L.P., 37 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1994). Stated differently, "only those individuals who were in a position tantamount to that of a party or whose legal rights were otherwise so intimately bound up with the parties that their rights were directly affected by the final judgment" qualify as "legal representatives" for purposes of Rule 60(b). Id., citing Kem Mfg. Corp. v. Wilder, 817 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1987). Despite the fact that the Kens may have given Stadtlander a "full Power Of Attorney" to file any lawsuits and institute any actions necessary to bring Timothy back to Belize, the instant motion is not filed by Stadtlander on behalf of the Kens. Instead, her 17-page missive is nothing more than a litany of complaints as to why Stadtlander was harmed by the settlement between the Kens and the Stephensons. That Stadtlander feels great sympathy for the Kens and "devoted seven years of her life" to securing Timothy's return does not mean that her rights were "so intimately bound up with the parties" as to be directly affected by the judgment. See El Paso Refinery, 37 F.3d at 234. The court therefore concludes that Stadtlander lacks standing to challenge the order of dismissal under Rule 60(b).
By way of example, Stadtlander complains that the attorney who represented the Kens in the underlying action "cheated, abused, deceived and betrayed M/M Ken, as well as myself. He has personally caused me enormous mental anguish, pain and suffering." (Stadtlander Ltr. at 12). Stadtlander further alleges that counsel "committed some `very grave atrocities' against his clients, the Ken's, as well as against my own self. . . . [Counsel] lied to me, in the presence of his clients, repeatedly `deceiving' the three of us. . . . I feel that [he] not only abused the Ken's but myself as well." ( Id. at 15).
C.
Even if Stadtlander has standing to bring a Rule 60(b) motion, she has failed to establish any grounds for vacating the order of dismissal. In her letter, Stadtlander complains that counsel for the Kens did not allow her to participate in settlement negotiations or approve the final settlement agreement, committed numerous acts of professional misconduct, and failed to effectively represent the Kens. ( See Stadtlander Ltr. at 9, 12-13, 15). However, such conduct, if proved, does not establish mistake or surprise, constitute newly discovered evidence, or implicate the validity of the judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (2), (4). Nor does such conduct support a claim of fraud or misconduct by an adverse party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).
To the extent Stadtlander claims "fraud on the court," there is no evidence of "an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision." Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978), quoting England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960). See also First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Lustig, 96 F.3d 1554, 1573 (5th Cir. 1996) (fraud implies egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a court official or fabrication of evidence, that prevents full and fair litigation of case). Stadtlander also fails to allege, much less prove, "extraordinary circumstances" for setting aside the judgment. See Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) ("To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), . . . petitioner must show that his lawyer abandoned the case and prevented the client from being heard[.]"). Although Stadtlander may be dissatisfied with the outcome of the underlying action, it cannot be said that counsel abandoned the Kens. To the contrary, counsel prosecuted the case with diligence — conducting discovery, filing appropriate motions and pre-trial materials, and appearing for the evidentiary hearing. For these reasons, as well as public policy considerations favoring the expeditious resolution of disputes and the finality of judgments, the court should decline to vacate the order of dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
Stadtlander's letter should be construed as a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate final judgment and dismissed for lack of standing. Alternatively, the motion should be denied.
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party may file written objections to the recommendation within 10 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). The failure to file written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).