Opinion
CV100-070
December 14, 2000
ORDER
Before the Court in the captioned case is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons given below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a black male. Plaintiff has sued Defendant for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2000e-17. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's predecessor corporation refused to promote him because of his race and retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination.The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. Defendant acquired Western Auto Supply Company ("Western") in October 1998. (Finley Aff. ¶ 3.) On October 15, 1996, Western hired Plaintiff to manage one of its Western Auto Parts America stores in Augusta, Georgia. (Id. ¶ 2.) On June 17, 1997, Western transferred Plaintiff to another store in Augusta to serve as a store manager there. (Kelly Dep. at 56-57.) Plaintiff's new superior was Duane Lewis ("Lewis"), the store's general manager. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 4.) Along with Plaintiff, Lewis and district manager Ron Richardson ("Richardson") are the most important dramatis personae in this dispute.
In February 1998, Lewis completed a performance appraisal for Plaintiff. Western's performance appraisal used both subjective and objective criteria. (Id. ¶ 5.) In over half of the subjective categories, Lewis gave Plaintiff a "four" on a scale of one to nine. (Ex. 8 to Kelly Dep.) A "four" meant that Plaintiff met the company's expectations, but just barely. (Id.) Lewis gave this same rating to Plaintiff in six of the eight objective categories. Among these objective factors were measurements like gross profit, employee retention, inventory control, sales as a percentage of the budget, and salary expenses as a percentage of the budget. (Id.)
By combining these objective and subjective ratings in a weighted formula, Lewis gave Plaintiff a total performance rating of 4.54. (Id.) This formula attributed three quarters of the performance rating to the subjective factors and one quarter to the objective measurements. (Id.) On a scale of one to nine, a rating between four and six indicates that an employee "meets expectations." (Id.) A rating of one to three indicates that an employee "does not meet expectations," and a rating of seven to nine indicates that he or she "exceeds expectations." (Id.)
The appraisal also assigned Plaintiff a "current status" designation. The four possible designations are "promotable," "developing," "at level," and "expectations not met." (Id. According to Lewis, this designation reflects whether an employee is suited for promotion. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 6.) Lewis indicated that Plaintiff was "at level," meaning that Plaintiff was appropriately employed as a store manager. (Id. ¶ 6.) Western's territory managers used these "current status" designations to identify those employees best qualified for promotions. (Mackrell Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.) A designation of "at level" typically forecloses the possibility of a promotion. (Id. ¶ 8.) Lewis felt that he could not recommend Plaintiff for promotion. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 6.)
Lewis submitted the performance appraisal for district manager Ron Richardson's review. (Id. ¶ 8.) Richardson reviewed the appraisal and returned it to Lewis. (Id.) Richardson signed the appraisal, but there is no indication that he contributed to its content. (See Ex. 8 to Kelly Dep.) Richardson says that he signed the performance appraisal based on his observations of Plaintiff. (Richardson Aff. ¶ 8.)
On February 20, 1998, Lewis met with Plaintiff to discuss his performance appraisal and his annual raise. Lewis told Plaintiff that Plaintiff's performance was inconsistent and that Plaintiff was not dependable. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 9.) Lewis said that Plaintiff might have the potential to be a good manager but that he would have to avoid distractions outside of work. (Id.) Lewis told Plaintiff that he would receive a two percent raise. (Id.) This raise was equal to the average annual pay raise for managers that year. (Id.) Plaintiff complained about the raise and stormed out of Lewis's office. (Id.)
Shortly afterwards, Plaintiff began arguing with another store manager, Steve Dudley ("Dudley"). (Id. ¶ 10.) According to Plaintiff, Dudley wrongfully assigned a returned part to another employee's sales associate number, thereby penalizing that other employee. (Kelly Dep. at 113-14.) Lewis heard them bickering. (Lewis Aff. ¶ 10.) Concerned that customers might overhear their argument, Lewis immediately told them to stop arguing. (Id.) Dudley later telephoned Richardson and told him that Plaintiff started the argument and was "loud and abusive." (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly called Dudley a "faggot." (Id.) Lewis asserts that another employee corroborated Dudley's account. (Id.) Plaintiff denies that he called Dudley a faggot. (Kelly Dep. at 106.)
Three days later, Richardson met with Plaintiff. (Richardson Aff. ¶ 10.) Richardson warned Plaintiff in writing that if he lost his composure again, he would be fired. (Ex. 9 to Kelly Dep.) Plaintiff acknowledged in writing that he received the notice. (Id.) The written form included space for Plaintiff's comments. (Id.) Plaintiff did not write any comments on the form. (Kelly Dep. at 111.) Plaintiff knew that the company has a procedure for employees to complain about treatment that is discriminatory or otherwise unfair but did not contest Richardson's action. (Id. at 37, 74-75, 110-12.) Dudley, who is white, was also "written up." (Id. at 113.)
In May 1998, three general managers resigned, and vacancies for their positions arose. Each general manager is in charge of a store, and store managers like Plaintiff are his assistants. (Mackrell Aff. ¶ 5.) Territory manager Tim Mackrell ("Mackrell") was in charge of filling these positions. Defendant typically fills management vacancies by promoting from within. (Id. ¶ 7; Kelly Dep. at 59.) Typically the district manager — in this case, Richardson — prepares a list of store managers in the district. (Mackrell Aff. ¶ 7.) This list includes a summary of each store manager's most recent performance appraisal, including each one's performance rating. (Id.) According to Mackrell, he considers the recommendations of district managers like Richardson, store general managers like Lewis, and the needs of a particular store. (Id. ¶ 9.) Mackrell will sometimes even speak to individual candidates. (Id.) As a general rule, Mackrell does not promote candidates like Plaintiff who have not earned a designation of "developing" or "promotable." (Id. ¶ 8.) Mackrell swears in his affidavit that he generally excludes candidates with a performance rating less than five. (Id.) Defendant has not referred to any published materials or company documents that require a performance rating of five. Mackrell insists, predictably, that race does not influence his decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 10-14.) Because it needed to fill vacancies quickly, Western typically did not advertise vacancies or solicit applications. (Id. ¶ 6.)
When these three vacancies arose, there were sixteen store managers and management trainees in the district. Six were minimally qualified in that they had received ratings over five and had been designated as "developing" or "promotable." (Finley Aff. ¶ 11.) Ten had performance ratings higher than Plaintiff's. (Id. ¶ 9.) of these ten with higher performance ratings, six, including five white males, did not receive promotions. (Id.) Seven store managers had been designated as "developing." (Id. ¶ 10.) Three of these — all white males — did not receive promotions. (Id.)
Of the six qualified candidates, Richardson recommended three for promotions. (Richardson Aff. ¶ 12.) Defendant contends that these three people were selected based on their performance history, their fitness for promotion, and the unique requirements of the stores with vacancies. Mackrell apparently approved these recommendations. (See Mackrell Aff. ¶¶ 10-11.) Mackrell explains that Plaintiff was not considered because he had not received a designation of "developing" or "promotable" and because there were several other candidates who had received higher performance ratings. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's performance rating of 4.54 was lower than the rating of five identified by Mackrell as minimally necessary.
The three individuals promoted were Steve Dudley, Ben Turner, and Ricky Carter. (See Attachment 1 to Mackrell Aff.) All had performance ratings higher than Plaintiff's. Turner had received a performance rating of five, and his supervisor designated him as "developing." (Attachment 4 to Finley Aff.) Carter had received a performance rating of 5.6, and his supervisor designated him as "developing" and "promotable in the near future." (Id.) Carter "exceeded expectations" in four categories relating to store administration. Although Dudley received a reprimand for his altercation with Plaintiff, he had received a performance rating of 5.15, and Lewis designated him as "developing." (Id.) Dudley received high marks in the categories of work ethic, motivating staff, and handling stressful situations. (Id.) According to Defendant, these skills particularly served the needs of the high-traffic Warner Robins store.
On May 12, 1998, Plaintiff visited the Augusta Human Relations Commission ("the HRC"), a local fair employment practices agency. There Plaintiff completed an intake affidavit. (Ex. 11 to Kelly Dep.) On June 16, 1998, Plaintiff filed a formal charge of discrimination with the HRC. (Ex. 12 to Kelly Dep.) Plaintiff accused Western of overlooking him for promotions on account of his race and his age. (Id.)
Plaintiff complains that his charge precipitated several adverse actions. First, in the summer of 1998, Western promoted Teddie Crase ("Crase"), a store manager, to be a general manager in Albany, Georgia. (Mackrell Aff. ¶ 12.) Crase's supervisor rated him as "developing," and Crase had received a performance rating of 5.13. (Attachment 5 to Finely Aff.) Western apparently did not consider Plaintiff for this promotion. At the time, Plaintiff's performance had purportedly "declined." (Richardson Aff. ¶ 16.)
Second, Richardson wrote another disciplinary warning on November 24, 1998 following Plaintiff's alleged confrontation with Stacy Whittington ("Whittington"). Whittington, whom Western employed at another store, came to Plaintiff's store to pick up a carburetor. (Whittington Aff. ¶ 3.) Whittington's version of the story is that he interrupted Plaintiff while he was talking on the telephone. (Id.) Thirty minutes later, Whittington interrupted him again. (Id.) Resentful of the interruptions, Plaintiff allegedly told Whittington "to get the hell out of [my] store." (Id.) When he learned that he was a Western employee, Plaintiff reportedly told him, "[y]ou're a nobody" because he was not in management. (Id.) On a form for disciplinary action, Richardson warned that Plaintiff would lose his job if he failed to improve his management skills. (Richardson Aff. ¶ 18; Lewis Aff. ¶ 12; Ex. 15 to Kelly Dep.) Under oath, Plaintiff disavowed any knowledge of the event. (Kelly Dep. at 160-62.) Plaintiff's signature is not on the written warning that Richardson issued. (Ex. 15 to Kelly Dep.)
On March 12, 1999 — nine months after he filed his charge of discrimination, Plaintiff received his performance appraisal for the year 1998. (Ex. 16 to Kelly Dep.) Lewis was absent, and Richardson completed the performance appraisal in his absence. Richardson designated Plaintiff as "not meeting expectations." (Id.) Plaintiff received a 4.18 out of nine. (Id.) This time, the formula attributed half of the performance rating to the objective measures and half to the subjective measures. (Id.) Richardson gave Plaintiff an average of 4.36 points for each subjective category; Lewis had given Plaintiff an average of 4.64 points for each subjective category. (Exs. 8, 16 to Kelly Dep.) Plaintiff thought that the performance appraisal was "unfair" but did not challenge it in any formal way. (Kelly Dep. at 164-65.)
Plaintiff's troubles on the job persisted. On March 19, 1999, Richardson discovered an $85 shortage in the cash register. (Ex. 17 to Kelly Dep.) Richardson also observed car battery "cores" lying on the floor behind the parts counter. (Id.) Richardson spoke with Plaintiff. (Kelly Dep. at 168-69.) Plaintiff denied any wrongdoing and attributed various problems to another manager, one of Western's white employees. (Id.) Richardson cited both for violations of company policy. (Id. at 169.)
In July 1999, Defendant completed its absorption of Western. (Finley Aff. ¶ 12.) Defendant closed several Western locations, including the store where Plaintiff worked. (Id.; Kelly Dep. at 171-72.) Defendant retained some employees and terminated others. Richardson's replacement, division manager Larry Wood ("Wood"), reviewed the roster of employees at Plaintiff's store. (Wood Aff. ¶ 5.) In Wood's division, there was only one opening for an assistant manager. (Id.) Wood considered Plaintiff and another black employee named Charles Davis ("Davis") for the position. (Id. ¶ 6.) Wood chose Davis to fill the position. (Id.) Wood asserts that he made this decision based on Plaintiff's performance record, his conflicts with other employees, and his observations of the two candidates. (Id.) Wood also judged Davis's job skills to be superior to Plaintiff's. (Id.) It is undisputed that when Wood made this decision, he was unaware that Plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination over a year earlier. (Id. ¶ 7.)
Wood decided to fire Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant's Assistant Vice President for Human Resources instructed Wood and another manager to try to find a position for Plaintiff. (Finley Aff. ¶ 14.) After Defendant fired an assistant manager in Thomson, Georgia, Wood transferred Plaintiff to be the assistant store manager there. (Wood Aff. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff's salary remained the same. (Kelly Dep. at 173.)
Difficulties followed Plaintiff to his new job. On September 6, Plaintiff's new supervisor spoke to him about allegations that Plaintiff had spent the previous day working on his car in the store parking lot. (Id. at 175.) She told Plaintiff that "that wasn't going to cut it" in Thomson. (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned. (Id. at 174.) Plaintiff said that he quit because the commute to Thomson was too far. (Id. at 175.)
II. Requirements for Summary Judgment
The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences in [its] favor," United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, that party "must show that, on all the essential elements of its case, . . . no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1438. On the other hand, if thenon-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways — by negating an essential element of the nonmovant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991) (explainingAdickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Before the Court can evaluate the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
If — and only if — the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Id. Again, how to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. If the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by coming forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carries its initial burden. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1116-17. The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) Rather, the non-movant must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The Clerk has given the non-moving party notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default. (Doc. No. 20.) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motions are ripe for consideration.
III. Analysis
The Complaint alleges that Defendant refused to promote Plaintiff because of his race and retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-21.) The Complaint seeks relief under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Complaint asserts no allegations of age discrimination. On October 26, 2000, Defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff's § 1981 claims proceed under the same analytical framework that governs his Title VII claims. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff's promotion discrimination claims and retaliation claims will now be analyzed in turn.
Plaintiff timely responded on November 15, 2000. Plaintiff submitted a brief memorandum arguing that although the underlying facts are largely uncontroverted, certain statements by Richardson preclude summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22.)
A. Plaintiff's Promotion Discrimination Claims
On summary judgment, Plaintiff can establish his case in one of two ways. One is by direct evidence. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999). An obvious example of direct evidence is a statement by the decision-maker that he refused to promote an employee because of his race. Id. at 1295. The other method of proof is circumstantial evidence — what is typically called the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Id. at 1293. Plaintiff has referred to no direct evidence of discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case of promotion discrimination, Plaintiff must show that:
(1) he is a member of a protected class;
(2) he was qualified for and available for the promotions;
(3) Defendant rejected him in spite of his qualifications; and
(4) Defendant sought other applicants or promoted someone outside the protected class.Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1186-93 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a prima facie case does not require proof that other applicants were equally or less qualified). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff does not have to show that he applied for any of the vacant managerial positions. Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133-34 (11th Cir. 1984).
Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decisions not to promote Plaintiff. Id. at 1184. If Defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, Plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only by presenting evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case. Defendant contends that the undisputed evidence shows that candidates for promotion needed to have at least a performance rating of five and an assessment of "developing" or "promotable." (See Mackrell Aff. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has not referred to any particular evidence or made any argument in opposition to Defendant's contention that he was not qualified.
Even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. By arguing that Plaintiff was not qualified and that it promoted better qualified candidates, Defendant articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decisions not to promote Plaintiff. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 644 (11th Cir. 1998). To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must refer to evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that this explanation is a pretext for. discrimination.
Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient. Plaintiff's only evidence of discrimination consists of an alleged conversation with Richardson. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that
Mr. Richardson made some comments to me about being black and about him being from Alabama and a lot of other comments. He has made a lot of comments to me negative towards me. As a matter of fact, he made statements that he was from Alabama and he knew black people. And he made a lot of comments negative to me. He did . . . .
Specifically he said that he was from Alabama and he had grew [sic] up with black people and he felt like he understood them or something. And he went through this thing. And I told him, I said, Mr. Richardson, you just don't understand. And we went through this conversation. We had a conversation about this, and I personally took it as — you know, as an affront to me being black, you know, for him to say that he understood how I felt or that he had done things for blacks or something. You know I just — the conversation just didn't seem appropriate to me. And I told him that, too. I made him aware of that, too.
(Kelly Dep. at 79-80.) This alleged conversation is not direct evidence of discrimination. Carter, 132 F.3d at 642. Nor does it create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.
There are several problems with Plaintiff's reliance on Richardson's alleged statements. First, Richardson was not the decision-maker. Mackrell, who was Richardson's superior, made the 1998 decisions about which Plaintiff is complaining. Even if the alleged conversation reflects racial animus on Richardson's part, Plaintiff has offered no reason to impute Richardson's attitude to Mackrell. See Wright, 187 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that statements by people other than a decision-maker generally have no probative value); Gunter v. Coca-Cola Co., 843 F.2d 482, 484 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming the trial court's factual finding that a lower manager's racial prejudice did not affect the decision of a higher manager). In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that Mackrell based his decisions on the relative qualifications of the store managers in the district. (See Mackrell Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.) There is no evidence that racial animus tainted any of the performance ratings on which Mackrell relied. Comparing the candidates' performance ratings and qualifications was an objective means of evaluating the candidates. Plaintiff has referred to no evidence that Mackrell ever uttered any racial insults or ever acted in any racially discriminatory manner. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's evidence does not justify judicial review of Mackrell's decisions. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Second, what excluded Plaintiff from consideration for the 1998 promotions was not any bias attributable to Richardson. Instead, what excluded Plaintiff was the performance appraisal completed by Lewis. Plaintiff has not referred to any evidence that disputes Lewis's assessments. Plaintiff has referred to no objective evidence that Lewis evaluated him in a racially discriminatory manner. Plaintiff insists otherwise, but he offers no more than his own personal belief that Lewis and Richardson intentionally used the performance appraisals to exclude him from promotions. (See Kelly Dep. at 85-86.) An excerpt from Plaintiff's deposition exposes the absence of evidence to support his claims:
Q: Do you have any objective basis for believing that during this evaluation that he made more negative comments or gave you a lower evaluation because of your race?
A: No.
Q: That's just your own feeling?
A: (Witness nods head affirmatively.)
(Id. at 96.) Plaintiff's subjective belief and conclusory allegations are not evidence of discrimination. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not shown that the performance ratings on which Mackrell based his 1998 decisions were racially discriminatory.
Third, as a matter of law, Richardson's attempt at empathy, however inappropriate, is not evidence of discriminatory animus. In Price v. Lockheed Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff tried to prove discriminatory intent with evidence that her supervisor told her that he had black friends, some of whom had eaten in his house, and that he had been brought up on welfare. The Eleventh Circuit held that reasonable minds could infer no racial animus from these statements. 856 F.2d at 1507. Likewise, Richardson's alleged statements do not create an issue of fact for trial.
In 1999, Wood recommended the promotion of Charles Davis instead of Plaintiff. The undisputed evidence shows that Wood chose Davis, who is black, because his "customer service skills and people skills were greater than those displayed by (Plaintiff]." (Wood Aff. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has referred to no evidence calling this explanation into question. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's promotion discrimination claims.
B. Plaintiff's retaliation Claims
Plaintiff also contends that Defendant retaliated against him because he filed a charge of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show:
(1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity;
(2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) that there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000),petition for cert. filed, No. 00-726 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2000). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). If Defendant satisfies this burden, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence that Defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Id.
Plaintiff's charge of discrimination filed on July 16, 1998 is statutorily protected activity. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998). The Complaint suggests that decisions made by Mackrell and Wood were acts of retaliation. Plaintiff complains that Mackrell overlooked him for a promotion after he filed his charge of discrimination. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Mackrell asserts that he promoted Teddie Crase in August 1998 because he was more qualified than Plaintiff. (Mackrell Aff. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff has referred to no evidence that Mackrell's decision was retaliatory.
Wood made two decisions at issue in this dispute. First, Wood promoted Charles Davis instead of Plaintiff. Wood felt that Davis's job skills were superior to Plaintiff's. Then Wood decided to transfer Plaintiff to a store farther from Plaintiff's home. This transfer did not affect Plaintiff's pay or his responsibilities. (Wood Aff. ¶¶ 8-9.) There is no causal connection between Wood's decisions and Plaintiff's charge of discrimination. When Wood made these decisions, he was unaware that Plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination. (Id. ¶ 7.) Furthermore, Wood made these decisions over a year after Plaintiff filed his charge of discrimination. These decisions are far too removed in time to permit an inference of retaliation. See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing time gaps in retaliation cases). Because Plaintiff has shown no causal connection and because Plaintiff has referred to no evidence challenging Defendant's nondiscriminatory explanations, these allegations fail to establish a retaliation claim. Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590-91. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's retaliation claims.
IV. Conclusion
Upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case and to enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant. Costs are taxed against Plaintiff.