Opinion
No. 7016/04.
10-02-2017
Edward KELLEy a/k/a Adarsi Das, The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. and The Governing Body Commission of the International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Plaintiffs, v. Aruna GARUdA a/k/a Aruna Devi Das, Viswa Garuda a/k/a Viswa Prana Dasa, and Vijay Shaw, Defendants.
La Reddola, Lester & Associates, LLP, Garden City, for the Plaintiff, Edward Kelley. Stepanovich Law PLC, Nanuet, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs, The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. and The Governing Body Commission of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell & Associates, New York, Attorneys for the Defendant, Viswa Garuda.
La Reddola, Lester & Associates, LLP, Garden City, for the Plaintiff, Edward Kelley.
Stepanovich Law PLC, Nanuet, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs, The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. and The Governing Body Commission of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness.
Law Offices of G. Oliver Koppell & Associates, New York, Attorneys for the Defendant, Viswa Garuda.
RANDY SUE MARBER, J.
| Papers | Submitted: |
|---|---|
| Order to Show Cause (Mot.Seq.25) | x |
| Affirmation in Opposition | x |
| Notice of Motion (Mot.Seq.26) | x |
| Affirmation in Opposition | x |
| Reply Affirmation | x |
| Transcript of Inquest | x |
| Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law | x |
The Defendant, NIKHIL GUPTA ("Gupta") filed a motion (Mot.Seq.25), seeking an Order pursuant to CPLR § 5015, vacating the default judgment entered against him and dismissing the action, and the Plaintiffs, EDWARD KELLEY a/k/a ADARSI DAS ("Kelley"), THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. ("ISKCON") and THE GOVERNING BODY COMMISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS ("GBC") filed a motion (Mot.Seq.26), seeking an Order pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130.1, and the Order of Hon. Daniel Palmieri, J.S.C. dated June 8, 2015, imposing sanctions against the Defendant, GUPTA. An Inquest was held in this matter on December 1, 2016, December 13, 2016 and December 14, 2016. Upon conclusion of the Inquest, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were submitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel. A number of conferences were subsequently held as the parties sought to resolve the matter. After the resolution attempts proved unsuccessful, the parties' respective motions and the Plaintiffs' post-Inquest submissions were fully submitted in May 2017.
The Plaintiffs originally commenced this action by the filing of a Summons and Complaint on May 21, 2004 against various defendants (See Summons and Verified Complaint annexed to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "1"). The Defendant, Gupta, was not a named party in the original Complaint. A companion action was commenced in 2007, naming additional parties as defendants, including Gupta (See Summons and Verified Complaint annexed to the Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "6").
Subsequently, the Court issued an Order dated March 13, 2008 joining the Defendant, Gupta, as a named Defendant in this action (See Order of the Hon. Roy S. Mahon dated March 13, 2008 annexed to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "3"). The Defendant, Gupta, filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint which was denied per the Order of Special Referee Frank Schellace dated May 4, 2010 (See Order of Special Referee Frank Schellace annexed to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "4").
On December 17, 2013, the Court issued an Order certifying both cases for trial and directing the Plaintiffs to file a Note of Issue (See Order of the Hon. Daniel Palmieri annexed to Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "10").
Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied by the Order of Justice Palmieri dated December 23, 2015 (See Order of the Hon. Daniel Palmieri annexed to the Defendant's Order to Show Cause as Exhibit "14"). In rejecting the procedural arguments made by Gupta in his opposition papers, the Court found: "If [the defendants] have not served their own answers in this action or have not adopted the answer already served on behalf of the original defendants in this action as their own, then they are in default herein."
The matter was first assigned to this Part for trial in November, 2016 following a decade-long history litigated before at least four other Justices of this Court. Upon first appearing in this Part when the matter was scheduled for trial, the Court learned that the Defendant had not served an Answer or adopted the Answer on behalf of the original defendants. The Defendant, Gupta, admitted in open Court that he had elected not to adopt the Answer on behalf of the original Defendants, and had not filed an Answer on his own behalf. Nor had Gupta undertaken any efforts to challenge the prior Order finding him in default. Consistent with Justice Palmieri's prior Order declaring any such Defendants in default, this Court set the matter down for an Inquest. Gupta's motion to vacate the default followed.
In support of his motion to vacate the default, Gupta argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against him pursuant to CPLR § 5015(a)(4). He further contends that the trial court lacked the authority to sua sponte hold Gupta in default, and thus, the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. Additionally, Gupta claims that, pursuant to CPLR § 3211(f), his time to respond to the Complaint was never triggered because he was allegedly never served with Notice of Entry of the decision adding him as a named Defendant in this action.
Further, Gupta maintains that assuming arguendo that his time to answer the Complaint did begin to run, the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR § 3215(c), and such failure requires vacatur of the default and dismissal of the action. Finally, Gupta contends that the Plaintiffs failed to comply with CPLR § 3215(g)(1) by not providing him with the required notice of an application to hold him in default.
In opposition, counsel for the Plaintiffs contends that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Gupta in that he was added as a named Defendant by prior Order in March 2008. Counsel for the Plaintiffs further notes that Gupta was thereafter served with a Summons and a copy of the Complaint. Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that assuming arguendo that Gupta's default was a sua sponte determination by the Court, Gupta fails to establish that the Court erred in its finding.
According to the Plaintiffs, the cases proffered by Gupta stand for the proposition that the entry of a default judgment is improper only when a defendant is deprived of notice and the opportunity to lay bare his proof. The Plaintiffs contend that, conversely, here, this Court provided the Defendant with multiple opportunities to cure his default but Gupta refused to do so.
The Plaintiffs argue that applicable case law requires the underlying default from failing to answer remains undisturbed. Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that Gupta's attempt to vacate the default is part of a consistent pattern of dilatory conduct as evidenced by Gupta's repeated efforts to evade litigation and create confusion since the commencement of this action over a decade ago.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs contend that they will suffer prejudice if the default is vacated as it would unnecessarily extend this nearly 13–year litigation and will impose an additional financial burden on the Plaintiffs.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs posit that the Complaint is not subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR § 3215(c). The Plaintiffs' counsel argues that they have been actively litigating this action for over a decade and have neither abandoned the Complaint nor lulled the Defendant into believing that they have done so. This is evidenced by the fact that Gupta has participated in the action, when the circumstances are convenient for him.
Notably, Gupta contends that he was not required to proffer proof of a reasonable excuse for the default or a meritorious defense pursuant to CPLR § 5015(a)(4) on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction. In support, Gupta relies on the Second Department case Paulus v. Christopher Vacira, Inc., 128 AD3d 116 (2d Dept.2015).
The Defendant's reliance on Paulus is misplaced. In Paulus, while the Court held that the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant proper notice of the motion for default judgment, the Court found that this defect did not, standing alone, entitle the appellant to be relieved of the underlying default upon which judgment was sought. The Appellate Division further held that since the appellant failed to establish a basis to be relieved from his underlying default in failing to answer, that underlying default remained intact. Id.
Gupta's claim that his time to answer the complaint has not been triggered because he was not served with Notice of Entry of the decision adding him as a named Defendant is not a reasonable excuse to vacate the default. In HSBC Bank USA, Nat. Ass'n v. Miller, 121 AD3d 1044, (2d Dept.2014), the Court held that the defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his default in failing to appear or answer the complaint, since the only excuse he offered was that he was not served with process.
Here, Gupta is claiming that he has not answered the complaint and is not in default because he has not been served with Notice of Entry. However, the Plaintiffs' counsel proffered a copy of such Notice in their papers.
As to Gupta's request for dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Complaint, this Court disagrees that CPLR § 3215(c) requires dismissal. In Gilmore v. Gilmore, 286 A.D.2d 416 (2d Dept.2001), the Court held that the plaintiff established a reasonable excuse for failing to timely move for a default judgment against the defendant. The Court found that the plaintiff continued to proceed with the action and did not abandon her complaint. Additionally, the Court found that the defendant's conduct, which included involvement in the action, acted as a waiver of any right he may have had to dismissal of the complaint.
Here, this matter has been litigated well after Gupta's default, and with the participation of Gupta and his counsel. Moreover, the Order of a Justice of coordinate jurisdiction cannot be overturned and the Defendant failed to undertake any efforts to appeal Justice Palmieri's Order. Gupta has failed to establish that the default should be vacated or the action dismissed. The motion to vacate the default judgment is DENIED.
In any event, based on the extensive credible evidence presented at the Inquest as reflected in this Court's Decision after Inquest below, vacating Gupta's default would not result in a different outcome.
As to the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for sanctions, the Plaintiffs' counsel argues that Gupta's instant application is his twelfth dispositive motion to dismiss the Complaint. Counsel alleges that Gupta's motion was made in an effort to harass the Plaintiffs and to further delay the resolution of this action.
The Plaintiffs' counsel notes that in Justice Palmieri's Order dated June 8, 2015, Gupta was warned that further applications that repeat and reallege what has been previously raised would result in the imposition of sanctions. The Plaintiffs allege that Gupta's conduct in this regard is frivolous pursuant to Part 130 of the Uniform Rules, as Gupta is engaging in the very conduct against which he was expressly warned.
In addition, the Plaintiffs' counsel argues that Gupta's motion is frivolous in that he has previously raised not answering the Complaint as a procedural defense in opposition to the Plaintiffs' prior summary judgment motion. Gupta is now using his failure to answer the Complaint as a sword in his current motion to dismiss, notwithstanding the fact that this argument was rejected by the Court in its decision on the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
In opposition, counsel for Gupta asserts that the December 13, 2016 Order to Show Cause is a motion to vacate a default, which is not duplicative of any prior motions to dismiss even if a consequence of such vacatur may be a dismissal of the action. He further argues that the application is not repetitive because the grounds for seeking vacatur did not exist until after the denial of the motions to dismiss.
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130.1–1(c)(2), sanctions may be imposed if a party brings frivolous motions. The factors to be considered by the Court are (1) the circumstances under which the conduct took place; and (2) whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party.
In this matter, Gupta was initially found to be in default by Justice Palmieri's Order. However, Gupta learned of the consequences of proceeding with an Inquest when he first appeared for in this Part for trial. Immediately thereafter, Gupta hired new counsel who promptly filed an emergency Order to Show Cause to vacate the default. Under these circumstances, this Court declines to impose additional sanctions upon the Defendant.
Accordingly, the motion and cross-motion filed by the respective parties are DENIED. The Court shall next address its Inquest decision.
Decision After Inquest
The Plaintiffs, Kelley, ISKCON, and the GBC brought this action against the Defendants, Gupta and Viswa Garuda ("Garuda"), essentially alleging three causes of action: (i) trespass; (2) corporate usurpation; and (3) declaratory judgment requiring the Defendants to return control of ISKCON, Inc. to the Plaintiffs and to vacate and surrender the temple located at 197 South Ocean Avenue, Freeport, New York ("Freeport Temple") [See Complaint, Court Ex. "1"]. The Plaintiffs also request this Court to find that an express or implied trust was established by the Founder in that all member temples, such as the Freeport Temple at issue here, were intended to be for the benefit of ISKCON. Notably, the Plaintiffs withdrew any claim for monetary damages.
The pertinent facts and evidence deduced from the Inquest held on December 1, 2016, December 13, 2016 and December 14, 2016, are set forth below.
Establishment of ISKCON and the GBC:
ISKCON was founded by A.C. Bhaktivedanta, Swami Prabhupada ("the Founder") in New York in 1966 [See Transcript of Inquest ("Tr.") at p. 13]. The Founder first incorporated ISKCON on July 13, 1966 in New York City [See Certificate of Incorporation for ISKCON, Plt. Ex. "1"; Tr. at pp. 26–28]. Thereafter, the Founder incorporated ISKCON in the State of Michigan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of Missouri, Montreal, Canada, and England [See Tr. at pp. 29–31; Plt. Ex. "89" through "93"]. Initially, the Founder managed all aspects of ISKCON and had final decision-making authority [Tr. at p. 32]. In the early years of ISKCON, the Founder organized the local communities by establishing a hierarchy structure consisting of a president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer, all of whom were overseen by the Founder.
References to ISKCON refer to the corporation, ISKCON, Inc., which is part of the larger worldwide ISKCON Society.
Then, in 1970, the Founder created a governing board, the GBC [Id. at 33]. He created a document entitled "Direction of Management", which listed the various Temples he founded, established the GBC, and selected the GBC members that were to succeed him in managing ISKCON after his demise. The GBC was vested with the authority to oversee all operations and management of ISKCON [Tr. at p. 34–35; Plt. Ex. "4"]. In November, 1973, the Founder organized an annual GBC meeting.
The Founder died in November 1977 leaving a Will. Dr. Howard Resnick, a witness who testified on behalf of the Plaintiffs at the Inquest, was named an Executor of the Founder's Will [Tr. at p. 37; Plt. Ex. "5"]. The first page of the Founder's Will, in pertinent part, reads:
The Governing Body Commission (GBC) shall be the Trustees of the whole International Society for Krishna Consciousness. Each temple will be managed under three Trustees. Each temple will be a Trust property. The system of management will go on as it is now. There is no need of changing.
Any properties which are in my name belong to ISKCON.
Article 1 of the Founder's Will reads as follows:
The Governing Body Commission (GBC) will be the ultimate managing authority of the entire International Society for Krishna Consciousness.
Moreover, the Founder set forth the management structure for ISKCON's temples and specifically appointed directors to manage each temple. The Founder further attested in his Will that, upon the death of a director, a new director may be appointed "provided the new director is my initiated disciple following strictly all the rules and regulations of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness as detailed in my books Significantly, Article 5 of the Will reads:
Properties outside of India in principle should never be mortgaged, borrowed against, sold, transferred or in any way encumbered, disposed of, or alienated, but if the need arises, they may be mortgaged, borrowed against, sold, etc., with the consent of the GBC committee members associated with the particular property.
[Plt. Ex. "5" (emphasis added) ].
In sum, the purpose of the Will was to ensure that the GBC was and would remain the ultimate managing authority for ISKCON and its member temples [Tr. at p. 38].
ISKCON's Bylaws
ISKCON's Bylaws were initially adopted by authorized voters of ISKCON in 1982. [Tr. at p. 120; see also Plt. Ex. "65"]. The 1982 Bylaws reflected the authority of the GBC over ISKCON, reciting that the GBC was the highest ecclesiastical authority within worldwide ISKCON Society and providing that the GBC was vested with the power to remove directors of the corporation. The 1982 Bylaws of ISKCON placed several restrictions on voting and corporate governance, including, inter alia, that: (i) only initiated devotees could vote for members of the Board of Directors; (ii) only initiated devotees could serve on the Board of Directors; and (iii) the Board of Directors must be comprised of six trustees. [Id. ]
Due to a changes in corporate structure that had occurred within ISKCON in the 1980's, including the sale of all the New York ISKCON properties (except the Freeport Temple), and the fact that initiated devotees formerly at the Freeport Temple had vacated, the leadership sought to appoint new Trustees and amend the Bylaws to ensure effective management of the corporation. As a result, the Trustees amended the Bylaws of ISKCON by adopting a new set of Bylaws in 1989 at a scheduled meeting of the corporation [Tr. at pp. 123–124; see also Plt. Ex. "63" and "64"].
On November 15, 1989, ISKCON adopted revised Bylaws which were effective as of that date and operative during the relevant time period in this action. [Plt. Ex. "63" and "64"]. Specifically, Articles III, VII, and IX therein evidence that the properties of ISKCON are held in trust for the benefit of the worldwide ISKCON Society and that the GBC is the ecclesiastical head of ISKCON. Pursuant to Article III, the GBC establishes ecclesiastical policy guidelines for the world-wide association of temples called ISKCON; and shall not conduct itself in any way contrary to the ecclesiastical policies of ISKCON, as established by the GBC [See 1989 By Laws of ISKCON, Inc., Plt. Ex. "64"]. Article VII provides that the Priests or Brahmanas of the Temple shall be in good standing according to the standards established by the GBC, and any other individuals otherwise authorized by the GBC. [Id. ]. Furthermore, Article IX provides that the Board of Directors may appoint such agents and representatives of the Corporation .. as the Board of Directors see fit, so far as may be consistent with these By–Laws, the Articles of Incorporation, and to the extent authorized or permitted by law.
Articles IV and V of the 1989 By Laws provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
ARTICLE IV
MEMBERSHIP
Section 1. MEMBERS: The members of this Corporation are to be known as Congregational Members. However, all voting rights are vested in the Board of Directors of the Corporation only as described in Article V. Congregational Members shall have no voting rights whatsoever, and shall not be required to attend any formal meetings.
ARTICLE V
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Section 1. NUMBER OF DIRECTORS
The Board of Directors shall consist of a minimum of two (2) members and a maximum of five (5) Directors. These limits may be changed by amendment of these by-laws only, and not otherwise. Initially, the actual number of directors which shall serve will be three. This may be changed to another number within the maximum and minimum limits only by resolution of the Board of Directors at the Annual Meeting of the Corporation, such resolution to be considered before the elections of new Board Members begins
Section 2. QUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
A. The Directors shall all be fully qualified as Congregational Members of the Corporation, according to the qualifications mentioned in Article III
B. In addition, at all times a two-thirds majority of the members of the Board of Directors must be initiated devotees
[Plt. Ex. "64"].
A significant amendment in the 1989 Bylaws was voting-the congregation's members were no longer vested with any voting rights.
GBC's Authority:
The witnesses on behalf of the Plaintiffs testified that the GBC was the ultimate managing authority with respect to all aspects of ISKCON, consistent with the Founder's transfer of authority to the GBC and as reflected in ISKCON's Bylaws.
Edward Kelley, a named Plaintiff herein, testified on December 13, 2016, that he was initiated as a member of ISKCON in 1974. [Tr. at p. 106]. As an Officer/Trustee of ISKCON, Mr. Kelley testified that ISKCON is incorporated under the laws of New York State as a not-for-profit corporation. [Id. ]. Mr. Kelley explained the hierarchy of the resolution process within the GBC. In accordance with the Founder's transfer of authority to the GBC, the ISKCON Law Book, and the Bylaws, any disagreements that arise within a local member temple of ISKCON would initially go to the local GBC representative for resolution. Thereafter, any disputes with the local GBC representative's determination would be resolved by the North American GBC Executive Committee (comprised of all the GBCs in North America). [Id. at p. 114]. Lastly, the final level of dispute resolution would be at the annual meeting in Mayapur, India, the location of the worldwide GBC Headquarters. [Id. ]
Mr. Kelley further explained the types of issues that were to be decided by the GBC. Among those were initiating a new disciple; permitting someone to reside at a particular temple; selling and/or purchasing property; major renovations to property; public preaching events; philosophical issues such as the instant dispute between the parties; and permitting someone to become a full-time priest (a/k/a "pujari"). However, certain issues affecting a local member temple would be decided by the Trustees of the property that were selected and/or approved by the GBC. [Tr. at pp. 115–118].
The GBC's authority, hierarchical structure and corporate governance were corroborated by the testimony of Joshua Greene and William Deadwyler, both of whom were initiated as ISKCON members by the Founder in the early 1970's. Messrs. Greene and Deadwyler have been appointed by the GBC to serve as Temple Presidents within ISKCON. [Tr. at pp. 53–56, 80, 89]. Their testimony was consistent in that the Founder vested the ultimate authority to decide ecclesiastical issues to the GBC. [Id. at pp. 64–67, 75–79]. The GBC also has the sole authority to "excommunicate" members from ISKCON, an authority which has been previously exercised. [Id. at pp. 90–91].
Additionally, the Plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Professor Thomas Johns Hopkins. Professor Hopkins opined that ISKCON is a religion with a particular system of beliefs, and a set of religious practices that unite its believers [Tr. at pp. 43–44]. In Professor Hopkins' opinion, ISKCON is a hierarchal religion that has a clear central authority. Professor Hopkins detailed the authoritative lineage within ISKCON, and particularly, the Founder's establishment of the GBC as the ultimate authority within the religion. Professor Hopkins opined that the ecclesiastical authority within ISKCON is the GBC [Id. at p. 45–46]. Consistent with the Founder's Will and ISKCON's Bylaws, Professor Hopkins concluded that the GBC is the highest ecclesiastical authority within ISKCON empowered to decide membership issues within ISKCON and designate the persons to initiate members (i.e.gurus). [Id. at p. 52].
The Plaintiffs' witnesses also testified about ISKCON's Resolve Program in furtherance of the GBC's ultimate authority. The ISKCON Resolve Program is a dispute resolution program within ISKCON where GBC representatives are charged with the responsibility to investigate disputes on the local level, fact-find, and report back the findings and recommendations to the GBC for final determination. [Id. at pp. 56, 70–73].
The Plaintiffs' submitted the ISKCON Law Book comprised of ISKCON's Canon Laws. At its annual meeting held in Mayapur, India, the GBC passes resolutions which essentially become "law" and can be found in the Law Book. The GBC acts officially through its resolutions. The purpose of the ISKCON Law Book is for there to be a uniform understanding of the rules, regulations and procedures of ISKCON that are "binding on all ISKCON members." [Tr. at pp. 81–82, 84; see also Plt. Ex. 19].
Ritvik Philosophy and GBC's Determination with its Practice:
In or about the 1980's, an ideation known as the "Ritvik philosophy" developed. The Plaintiffs' expert, Professor Hopkins, explained the "ritvik concept of initiation within ISKCON", specifically testifying that such initiation does not derive its authority from the GBC. He opined that the ISKCON tradition does not allow for ex post facto or post mortem initiation by proxy initiators in someone else's behalf who is deceased. In essence, the authority to initiate dies with the person, and is only passed onto to those people or a group of people that were designated as qualified initiators. [Id. at p. 49–50]. In this case, the authority to designate individuals who are qualified to initiate disciples was passed onto the GBC, which authority stems from the GBC until the present day.
Professor Hopkins testified that "ritvik" is a technical term from the Hindu tradition which means someone who is qualified to practice religion or perform rituals at the proper time. The Defendants in this case claim that the Founder had established a principle called the "ritvik principle" which allowed them to initiate disciples in the Founder's name after his death.
Mr. Deadwyler similarly testified that Ritvikism is the belief that the Founder is the only real "guru" who may initiate new members, and those who are performing initiating ceremonies are only "religious functionaries" acting directly on the Founder's behalf. This differs from the ISKCON philosophy where there is a direct lineage of successor "gurus" who are charged with the responsibility of initiating new disciples and performing the initiation ceremonies. [Tr. at p. 86].
Mr. Deadwyler described a "guru" to be a "spiritual master", one who is trained and initiated as a guru who is then able to accept disciples. In accepting a new disciple, there is a formal initiating ceremony performed that may only be carried out by a guru duly appointed by the GBC. [Tr. at pp. 88–89].
Professor Hopkins, Mr. Deadwyler and Mr. Ostrowski all testified regarding the GBC's authority to consider the appropriateness of Ritvik practice, the GBC's investigation into the issue, and its ultimate conclusions. Upon study and investigation into the Ritvik philosophy, the GBC concluded that it was an "improper practice" and a "deviation from their doctrine." [Id. at pp. 49, 51]. In 1990, the GBC passed a Resolution finding that the Ritvik philosophy was a "dangerous philosophical deviation" from ISCKON practice, condemned its practice, and outlawed Ritvik practice from ISKCON and the Society at large. [Tr. at pp. 85–86, 175, 200–205; see also 1990 GBC Annual Resolution Plt. Ex. "52"]. The GBC further concluded that the Ritvik philosophy was not supported by tradition or scripture. Nor was it established by the Founder. In 1999, the GBC reconsidered the Ritvik philosophy as it continued to grow, and again passed a resolution essentially reconfirming its original conclusions. The GBC also expelled any proponents of Ritvik practice from ISKCON, while leaving a pathway for reinstatement. [Tr. at pp. 92, 210–212; see also Plt. Ex. "53"].
The Freeport Temple:
With the approval of the GBC, the Plaintiff, Mr. Kelley, established the Freeport Temple located at 197 South Ocean Avenue, Freeport, New York, on February 1, 1980. [Tr. at pp. 107–109; see also, Plt. Ex. "2", Certified Deed to Freeport Temple]. The purchase price for the Freeport Temple was $54,000. To purchase the property, ISKCON contributed funds, Mr. Kelley contributed $35,000, and a mortgage was assumed. [Id. at p. 110.] Through Mr. Kelley's testimony, the Plaintiffs also proffered a Certified Copy of the Nassau County Department of Assessment for the Freeport Temple property, which reflects the full market value of the property is $616,400 as of January, 2016. [Tr. at p. 112; see also Plt. Ex. "3"]. From the time of purchase, the Freeport Temple was owned by ISKCON, the original New York not-for-profit religious corporation that was incorporated by the Founder. Title to the Freeport Temple and its property remains with ISKCON to this day, and it has always existed under the authority of the GBC. [Tr. at pp. 110, 114].
Mr. Kelley testified that in 1983, ISKCON went through a corporate restructuring process to secure local control over the Freeport Temple. In accordance with the process set forth in ISKCON's 1982 Bylaws, and with the approval of the GBC, Mr. Kelley facilitated the appointment of new trustees for the Freeport Temple. [Tr. at pp. 119–121]. The Plaintiffs proffered the Bylaws adopted in 1989 for ISKCON, certified by Mr. Kelley, in his capacity as the Corporate Secretary for ISKCON, as well as the minutes from meeting of the Board of Directors. [Tr. at pp. 122–125; see also Plt. Ex. "63" and "64"]. The 1989 revisions to the Bylaws changed the principal address of ISKCON to the Freeport Temple address; reduced the required number of the Board of Trustees from six to three, naming Mr. Kelley, Nitya Gopal Debnath, and Surajit Debnath as Trustees; and immediately ceased the term of the three trustees who were not initiated devotees, Nirmal Debnath, Nrpendra Dhar and Kevin Nelson. [Tr. at pp. 123–124].
As set forth in detail above, the 1989 Bylaws provided only for the Board of Trustees to vote on congregational matters and not the general membership which was allowed in the original 1982 version of ISKCON's Bylaws. The purpose for requiring voting to be performed by Trustees was to ensure that the "worship in the temple could not be changed by the congregation" to a philosophy that was at odds with ISKCON's philosophical tradition. [Tr. at pp. 131–132]. In sum, the revisions were intended to safeguard the principles established by the Founder. [Id. ]
In or about 1989, due to some financial difficulties ISKCON was experiencing at the time, Mr. Kelley sought approval from the GBC to refinance the Freeport Temple property. [Tr. at pp. 127–128]. Mr. Kelley drafted a petition that was endorsed by the devotees for the Freeport Temple requesting the GBC executive Committee for permission to take a mortgage against the property. [Tr. at p. 133; see also Plt. Ex. 18]. A Consent of Trustees was executed in 1989 allowing the mortgage to be taken against the Freeport Temple property. [Plt. Ex. "17"]. These facts further demonstrate the GBC's control and authority over the Freeport Temple since its inception.
The local GBC representative for the Freeport Temple during the time period relevant attendant to the circumstances surrounding this case is Romapada Swami, who continues to serve as such to the present day. [Tr. at p. 118]. In 1995, Mr. Kelley resigned as Temple President of the Freeport Temple at the behest of Romapada Swami. [Tr. at pp. 134–135]. Romapada Swami then appointed Hari Kirtan (a/k/a Harry Siegel "Mr. Siegel") as the Temple President. In 1996, Mr. Siegel sought to close the Freeport Temple for which he planned to obtain approval from the GBC at the annual meeting held in Mayapur, India that year. In turn, Mr. Kelley undertook efforts to convince the GBC to keep the Freeport Temple open, which efforts ultimately succeeded. [Tr. at pp. 137–139].
In March, 1996, the Worldwide GBC voted to keep the Freeport Temple open. [Tr. at pp. 139; see also Plt. Ex. "81"]. A written communication was provided to Mr. Kelley from a GBC member in India regarding the GBC determination and the GBC's authority over the Freeport Temple, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"If the congregation wants the Long Island temple to be part of ISKCON, there is no problem on the GBC's part. Simply the leaders of the temple have to adhere to GBC guidelines that apply to every ISKCON temple and every ISKCON leader Some of the guidelines that you need to be aware of (these are GBC rules-ecclesiastical guidelines that apply to everyone and will not be applied in a discriminatory fashion) are:
1. The directors, and officers of an ISKCON temple must be of good moral and spiritual character, and based upon these criteria acceptable to the GBC.
2. All real properties owned by ISKCON corporation may not be sold or mortgaged without the approval of the trustees. In other words there must be some legal mechanism in place that stops the encumbrance or sale of a property by the local directors, without the approval of the trustees appointed by the GBC.
3. All officers, directors, GBC men, trustees, ministers, etc. must sign a loyalty oath to the GBC, and must agree to submit any karmi legal system.
4. There must be a member of the GBC assigned to and responsible for each ISKCON project
[Plt. Ex. "81].
In 2000, a member of the GBC proposed Viswa Garuda to be the Temple President of the Freeport Temple. [Plt. Ex. "85]. While Garuda was a former follower of the Ritvik Initiation, he renounced Ritvikism in 1999 and was reinstated as an ISKCON disciple. As a condition of appointment to the Freeport Temple, the GBC required Garuda to take an oath of loyalty to ISKCON and the GBC. [Tr. at pp. 212–213]. Garuda continued to manage the Freeport Temple as an ISKCON member under the authority of the GBC from his arrival in 2000 until early 2004. During this time period, Garuda sent annual reports to the GBC regarding the Freeport Temple, as required by the GBC. [Plt. Ex. 12–14].
While serving as President of the Freeport Temple, Garuda brought individuals into the Temple who espoused the Ritvik philosophy. Among them was the Defendant, Nikhil Gupta. [Tr. at pp. 184–185]. In March 2004, Mr. Kelley learned that Garuda and Gupta were planning to organize an election to be held among the congregation to elect a new Board of Trustees in violation of ISKCON's Bylaws. He also learned that the proposed new trustees were followers of the Ritvik philosophy who had moved into the Freeport Temple. [Id. at pp. 146–147]. In response, Mr. Kelley contacted the New York GBC representative, Romapada Swami, to inform him of Garuda and Gupta's plan.
GBC's Investigation into Freeport Temple Pursuant to its Dispute Resolution Process:
In 2004, Mr. Greene was asked by the GBC to investigate whether the Defendants were indeed practicing a condemned philosophy at the Freeport Temple. [Tr. at p. 69]. He sought to determine whether the Defendants' governing use of the Freeport Temple was consistent with the GBC rules and regulations. He was then to report his findings and recommendations back to the GBC for a final decision. [Id. at pp. 70–73]. As a result of his meetings with Defendant Gupta, among others, Mr. Greene found that there was "no meeting of the minds", that the "differences" between the Defendants and GBC were "firm" and that there was "no willingness" to reconcile with the GBC. [Id. ]. Mr. Greene considered that the Defendant Gupta did not accept the authority of the GBC.
In furtherance of its resolution process, the GBC also sent Christopher Ostrowski to investigate the state of affairs at the Freeport Temple in 2004. Mr. Ostrowski was first initiated as an ISKCON member in 1976; he received a second initiation within ISKCON called Brahmana ("Brahman") in 1978; and in 1981, he advanced to a higher office of celibacy being initiated as a "sannyasi". As a sannyasi, Mr. Ostrowski solely engages in the teaching of ISKCON worship. [Tr. at pp. 170–173].
At the direction of a member of the GBC Executive Committee, Mr. Ostrowski had several meetings with Garuda and Gupta to advise them of the GBC's rules, regulations and directives, and to cease the practice of Ritvik Initiation. [Tr. at p. 179]. Garuda and Gupta declined to comply. At the request of the GBC, Mr. Ostrowski remained at the Freeport Temple to preach the ISKCON philosophy and encourage those following/preaching Ritvikism to abandon their positions. [Tr. at pp. 185–186; see also Letter to Freeport Temple Designating Ostrowski as a Representative of GBC, Plt. Ex. "82"].
The tensions grew between Mr. Ostrowski, Garuda and Gupta, and ultimately, Mr. Ostrowski was ousted from the Freeport Temple. Thereafter, Garuda and Gupta hired guards to bar entry for GBC representatives and other ISKCON followers. [Tr. at pp. 189–190].
Mr. Ostrowski drafted two reports for the GBC detailing the events that transpired at the Freeport Temple, including Garuda and Gupta's improper practice of the Ritvik doctrine. [Tr. at pp. 147, 186; see also Plt. Ex. "58" and "59"].
In March 2005, Garuda and Gupta proceeded with their purported election whereupon Gupta was purportedly "elected" as Temple President. The Plaintiffs maintain that the "election" was inconsistent with ISKCON's bylaws because it was open to any attendee who visited the Freeport Temple in violation of ISKCON's Bylaws. [Plt. Ex. "63" and "64"].
Defendant Gupta's Non–Religious Business Practices at the Freeport Temple:
In addition to taking over the Freeport Temple and refusing to abide by the GBC's directives, the Defendant, Gupta, was running a "for-profit" vitamin/medicinal business by the name of Ayuryoga, Inc. out of the Freeport Temple. [Tr. at p. 151; see also Photographs of Freeport Temple Reflecting Vitamin Business, Plt. Ex. 149]. The Plaintiffs collectively testified regarding their concern over losing the religious property tax exemption granted to the Freeport Temple upon its establishment as a result of Mr. Gupta's improper "for-profit" business being conducted on the property. [Id. at 153–154]. The Plaintiffs proffered the entity information from the New York State Department of State website which revealed that Ayuryoga, Inc. is a domestic business corporation listing Mr. Gupta and the Freeport Temple address for DOS process. [Tr. at pp. 160–162; see also NYS Dept. of State Entity Information, Plt. Ex. "150"]. The Plaintiffs further tendered evidence of the products marketed and sold by Mr. Gupta out of the Freeport Temple through the business's website, including food supplements and massage oils. [Plt. Ex. "151" through "155"]. In fact, it was learned that many of the residents of the Freeport Temple were working for Mr. Gupta in furtherance of his vitamin/medicinal business.
GBC Resolutions Regarding the Defendants and the Freeport Temple:
As a result of the investigations conducted by Mr. Greene and Mr. Ostrowski, the GBC determined that Gupta and Garuda violated ISKCON's 1989 Bylaws when they took legal and physical control over ISKCON in the 2005 "election". They were ordered to promptly return control of the corporation and its Freeport Temple to the GBC to no avail [Tr. at p. 214].
The GBC passed its first official resolution in 2005 informing Garuda that, after a thorough investigation, he has: "embraced and is actively propagating the Ritvik doctrine in the ISKCON Inc. temple located at 197 South Ocean Avenue, Freeport NY"; "been instructed by GBC representatives on numerous occasions to cease and desist such ritvik-related activities on temple premises"; and "openly defied and rejected the instructions of the GBC to cease any further ritvik activity thereon." [See Plt. Ex. "54"]. The resolution further expelled Garuda from ISKCON as a member in good standing, removed him from his position as President of the Freeport Temple, deemed the 2005 "election" null and void, ordered the immediate return of the corporation and its assets to the GBC, and ordered Garuda "and those acting in concert with him in the ritvik-related activities" to vacate the premises within seven (7) days thereof. Garuda and Gupta ignored the GBC's directives in the 2005 resolution.
At the annual meeting the following year, the GBC passed a second resolution with similar directives specifically directed at Gupta. [Tr. at p. 215; see also Plt. Ex. "55"]. Garuda and Gupta continued to ignore the GBC's directives.
The GBC passed a third resolution starkly detailing the various "flagrant" violations by the Defendants and their followers of laws contained in the ISKCON Law Book; expelled Gupta and other "purported board members" of the Freeport Temple from ISKCON; and prohibited them from having any involvement, or serving in any official or unofficial capacity, including, but not limited to, officers or directors of the corporation. [Plt. Ex. "56"]. The GBC then appointed a new board for ISKCON, consisting of Mr. Kelley, Romapada Swami, and Mr. Ostrowski. [Id. ].
Despite the various directives and orders issued by the GBC, Gupta and his followers remain in possession of the Freeport Temple until this day. [Id. at p. 218–219].
At the conclusion of the Inquest, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' request to conform the pleadings to the proof pursuant to CPLR § 3025(c).
Relief Sought:
In addition to the Plaintiffs' causes of action for trespass, corporate usurpation for which their demand for any monetary relief was withdrawn, the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that: (i) ISKCON is a hierarchical religion with the GBC as its ecclesiastical head; (ii) the GBC has the authority to determine membership within ISKCON; (iii) the GBC expelled the Defendants, Garuda and Gupta, as members of ISKCON pursuant to such authority; (iv) the 2005 election conducted by the Defendants was in violation of the 1989 bylaws; (v) the GBC, as the highest ecclesiastical authority of ISKCON, acted within its power to appoint three new Trustees to control the Freeport Temple, to wit, Edward Kelley, Romapada Swami, and Christopher Ostrowski; (vi) ISKCON, Inc. holds the Freeport Temple in trust for the benefit of worldwide ISKCON Society. Lastly, the Plaintiffs seek an Order of ejectment directing the Defendants to vacate the premises.
Relevant Appellate History:
Upon commencement of this action in 2004, the Plaintiffs filed an Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Defendants from selling, mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering the property of ISKCON, Inc., including the Freeport Temple. The Defendants also moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint on the grounds that the causes of action were not justiciable as they involve ecclesiastical issues. The Hon. Roy S. Mahon issued an Order dated October 25, 2004, wherein he denied the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, and granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action for trespass and usurpation of corporate authority. Justice Mahon's Order found that the causes of action were not justiciable in that any action on them would be in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
Upon appeal by the Plaintiffs, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the portions of Justice Mahon's Order which denied the Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action for trespass and corporate usurpation. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in finding that the Plaintiffs' causes of action were not justiciable. In reinstating the Plaintiffs' claims, the Appellate Division noted that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that there are "neutral principles of law" which may be used in all property disputes, and which can be applied without establishing churches to which property is awarded. Relying on this doctrine, the Appellate Division held that the Defendants failed to establish that the Court could not resolve the issues by applying neutral principles of law doctrine to analyze the deed to the property, the certificate of incorporation of ISKCON, the terms of the Bylaws, and the documents submitted by the parties. [See Kelley v. Garuda, 36 AD3d 593 (2007) ].
This Court must now determine whether it may consider the declaratory relief requested, and if so, determine who owns and has authority over the Freeport Temple and its assets, and the right to possession, the GBC and ISKCON, or the Defendants.
Legal Analysis
There are Constitutional restrictions that are binding on courts in the context of litigation involving religious institutions. Because of these restrictions, the role of civil courts is severely circumscribed. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) ; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) ; Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). "Whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of the church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final and binding on them." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 681 (1871) [emphasis added]. The United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment "permits hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters." Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976).
In a hierarchical form of church government, authority is vested in the first instance to the governing body of the local church, but its actions are subject to review and control by a higher church body, in ascending order of authority [ First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110, 114 (1984) ]. In contrast, in a congregational organized system, a local church is independent of higher church authority and is self-governing. Id.
The longstanding rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 1871 is that civil courts must defer to the determinations of a hierarchical religious institution's highest ecclesiastical body. Watson v. Jones involved a religious property dispute over two rival factions who sought control of a church property in Louisville, Kentucky. 80 U.S. at 681. The Supreme Court found that the local congregation was a member of a larger church subject to its authority, and because the superior ecclesiastical tribunal with a general and ultimate power of control decided in the majority faction's favor, the civil court was bound by such determination. The Supreme Court articulated the standard of review now known as the "complete deference" approach, finding that, "where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete [and] whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them ". First Presbyterian, 62 N.Y.2d at 119 quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 722, 727 [emphasis in original].
In Serbian, the Supreme Court considered a case involving a dispute over the control of the American–Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, including its property and assets. The defendant was removed by the Church as the Bishop of the American–Canadian Diocese because of his defiance of the church hierarchy. Serbian at 708. The defendant subsequently brought a civil action in State court challenging the Church's decision. The State Supreme Court found that the proceedings resulting in his removal failed to comply with church laws and regulations. Id. In reversing the State Court's judgment, the United State Supreme Court held that, where hierarchical religious organizations establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and ecclesiastical tribunals decide such disputes, "the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them." Id. at 725. By inquiring into whether the Church had followed its own procedures, the State Supreme Court had "unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of the Church." Id. at 720.
Notwithstanding the "complete deference" standard of review, civil courts may still intercede to decide religious property disputes when confronted with a case involving hierarchical organizations where the use and control of the property can be determined without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Based on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), and its progeny, the "neutral principles of law" analysis may be applied in property disputes without "establishing" churches to which the property is awarded, and thus, not implicating the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment are not implicated. [ First Presbyterian, 62 N.Y.2d at 119, citing Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, at 449) ].
For purposes of the instant dispute, this Court finds instructive the New York Court of Appeals case of First Presbyterian. In that case, a religious dispute arose between the plaintiff First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady (First Church), and its denominational church organization, the defendant, The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA), when the First Church sought to withdraw from the denominational church. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of their independent status and permanent injunction preventing defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the local church property. As to the declaratory judgment, the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that such dispute could not be decided without implicating the First Amendment. However, as to the injunctive relief sought concerning plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the property, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was properly entertained by the court below. [ 62 N.Y.2d at 117–118 ].
While the minority faction was found to be part of a hierarchical body, and that such body determined the property dispute adversely to plaintiffs, the New York Court of Appeals held that it was not bound by the determination "if it proves possible to decide the controversy through application of ‘neutral principles of law’ ".
Guided by the foregoing principles in the instant dispute, we find that ISKCON is a hierarchical religious organization and shall apply the neutral principles of law doctrine to resolve whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to use, control and possession of the Freeport Temple property.
As to its hierarchical structure, ISKCON has a long history of a top-down government structure with a clearly defined ecclesiastical head, the GBC. The Founder ensured the lineage succession of ISKCON before his demise as demonstrated by his Will and creation of the GBC. Following his demise, the GBC was fully vested with the highest ecclesiastical authority within ISKCON, responsible for spiritual and administrative oversight of ISKCON worldwide. This type of "top-down" structure is typical of hierarchically organized religions. See Serbian, supra.
Moreover, ISCKON's 1989 Bylaws, which were established prior to the Defendants' "takeover" of the Freeport Temple, unequivocally set forth that the GBC is the "ecclesiastical head" of ISKCON. Thus, applying the "complete deference" approach, the GBC's resolutions regarding the purely religious controversies between the parties (i.e. whether defendants should have been expelled due to their practice of Ritvik philosophy) are binding on this Court. Any consideration as to which faction of the religion is correct—traditional ISKCON philosophy versus Ritvik philosophy—would be an impermissible inquiry into ecclesiastical issues that rests within the discretion of the GBC.
Accordingly, insofar as the Plaintiffs seek a declaration as to membership within ISKCON or whether the GBC acted appropriately in expelling the Defendants and appointing new trustees, this Court shall defer to the resolutions passed by the GBC in 2005, 2006 and 2008.
We next address the "neutral principles of law" doctrine. Upon a careful, secular review of the record before this Court we find that the dispute regarding ownership and control of the Freeport Temple must be decided in favor of the Plaintiffs.
With regard to the "neutral principles of law" approach, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), explained that the doctrine relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. Id. at 603. It thereby frees civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Id. The application of the neutral principles method requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents for language of trust in favor of the general church. Id. at 604. However, the Supreme Court cautioned that in undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, not relying on religious precepts. Id. Further, in cases where the deed or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property, and the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Id.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, applied the neutral principles of law approach in Presbyterian of Hudson River of Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. Trustees of First Presbyterian Church and Congregation, 72 AD3d 78 (2d Dept.2010), holding that the church property in dispute was held by the plaintiff in trust for the religious organization. Courts are required to "look to the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property." Id. at 426; see also Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 11 NY3d 340 ; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 N.Y.2d 110. In Presbyterian of Hudson River, the Appellate Division highlighted the express trust provision contained in the general church's "Book of Order" as a way in which the national denomination may ensure that church property is retained by the faction loyal to the national denomination upon secession of any particular church.
In the instant matter, documentary evidence such as the certified deed to the Freeport Temple, ISKCON's Bylaws, the ISKCON Law Book, and the Founder's Will, are documents from which this Court may "discern the objective intention of the parties" and "protect the legitimate interests" in securing the Plaintiffs title to property they rightfully own. See First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady 62 N.Y.2d at 121.
The operative Bylaws of 1982, and the revised Bylaws of 1989 approved by the GBC, set forth the voting requirements for leadership within member temples of ISKCON. Specifically, the 1989 Bylaws, approved and adopted by the GBC, prohibits members of the congregation from voting for trustees and officers of the corporation. [Plt. Ex. 64, Tr. at p. 121]. While the Bylaws do contain provisions that involve ecclesiastical or religious doctrine civil courts are barred from considering, this Court need not rely on such provisions to find that the 2005 election held by the Defendants, which allowed congregational members to vote, violated ISKCON's Bylaws. Insofar as the Defendants permitted members to vote in the 2005 "election", they violated ISKCON's Bylaws. The certified copy of the deed to the Freeport Temple and the original Certificate of Incorporation for ISKCON, Inc. also demonstrate the Plaintiffs' rightful ownership of the Freeport Temple. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' purchased the property well before the Defendants' arrival and interference with the Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the property. Prior to the 2005 "election" where Gupta and his adherents purportedly changed the leadership of the Freeport Temple, the Plaintiffs sufficiently established that all financial and ecclesiastical issues regarding the Freeport Temple were decided and/or approved by the GBC or its chosen delegates (i.e. the mortgage against the property in 1985 and decision to keep the Freeport Temple open).
Further evidence of the Plaintiffs' ownership and control over the Freeport Temple is their constitution, the ISKCON Law Book, which creates an express trust in favor of the Society at large under the control of the GBC. Section 10.4.4.4 of the ISKCON Law Book requires member temples to hold their real estate and other assets for the benefit of the ISKCON Society under the administration of the GBC. [See Plt. Ex. "19"]. Alienation of ISKCON's real property without the expressed written consent of the GBC or its representatives designated for such purpose is prohibited. ISKCON Law further requires immediate transfer of real property and other assets to a fully recognized affiliate of ISKCON as designated by the GBC Body in the event of voluntary or involuntary termination of affiliation with ISKCON.
The Founder also established a Trust in the second Article of his Will which declared that each ISKCON temple would be held for the benefit of the ISKCON Society at large. The language of the Trust provision specifies that the GBC would continue to manage the ISKCON Society in perpetuity.
Based on neutral principles of law, this Court finds that the Defendants' continued possession of the Freeport Temple unlawfully interferes with the Plaintiffs' ownership, possession and use of the property. The Defendants must vacate the premises in accordance with the terms of this Order.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the motion (Mot Seq. 25) interposed by the Defendant, GUPTA, which seeks an order to vacate the default judgment, dismissing the action against him, is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the motion (Mot.Seq.26) interposed by the Plaintiffs, which seeks an order imposing sanctions against the Defendant, GUPTA, is DENIED, and it is further
ORDERED, that the Court shall defer to the resolutions passed by the Plaintiff, GBC, concerning the Defendants, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits "54", "55" and "56", as such are binding on this Court; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Plaintiffs' are GRANTED immediate possession of the Freeport Temple located at 197 South Ocean Avenue, Freeport, New York, and its assets, including any religious deities, and the Plaintiffs' demand for ejectment of the Defendants and individuals who otherwise through the Defendants occupy, reside, lease or claim any other possessory interest in and to the premises, is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Defendants and any individuals who otherwise through the Defendants occupy, reside, lease or claim any other possessory interest in and to the premises and/or its assets shall vacate the premises located at 197 South Ocean Avenue, Freeport New York within thirty (30) days of the date this Order is served upon the Defendants with Notice of Entry; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Plaintiffs are hereby GRANTED a judgment of possession and warrant of eviction which shall be stayed for thirty (30) days from the date this Order is served upon the Defendants with Notice of Entry.
All applications not specifically addressed herein are denied.
This constitutes the decision and Order of the Court.