Opinion
No. 56904-0-I.
May 29, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-2-36129-0, Julie Spector, J., entered July 19, 2005.
Richard J. Kelley appeals summary judgment dismissal of his legal malpractice lawsuit against Roger Anderson. Anderson represented Kelley in an attorney fee dispute with the law firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Petersen, and Daheim, P.L.L.C., over the division of a contingent fee. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court allocated the fees in proportion to the time each firm spent on the case. Kelley sued Anderson alleging that he negligently failed to file an appeal of the trial court's attorney fee decision. On summary judgment, Anderson argued that as a matter of law because the Court of Appeals would have affirmed the trial court's decision, Kelley could not establish causation or damages. In opposition, Kelley claimed the trial court erred in rejecting his argument that he was entitled to one-half of the attorney fees based on the joint venture relationship between the firms. We conclude the undisputed findings support the trial court's conclusion that even if the relationship of the firms is characterized as a joint venture, the written fee agreement for the previous lawsuits and the parties' course of conduct established the intent to divide the fees in proportion to the time devoted to the litigation. We also conclude that the court on summary judgment did not abuse its discretion in granting Anderson's motion to strike pleadings and exhibits. In addition, the court did not err in refusing to consider Kelley's lost settlement opportunity claim and dismissing Kelley's claim for prejudgment interest on the attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Roger Anderson represented Richard J. Kelley in an attorney fee dispute with Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson, and Daheim, P.L.L.C., (GTH) after settlement of the last in a series of lawsuits brought by Kelley, GTH, and David Paul on behalf of the former residents of the O.K. Boys Ranch.
In 1993, Kelley in association with David Paul of Paul and Sugarman, P.C., sued the State of Washington, the Kiwanis Club, and others on behalf of some of the former residents of the O.K. Boys Ranch alleging physical and sexual abuse.
In 1994, GTH agreed to associate with Kelley and Paul on the case and to advance costs. GTH prepared a written agreement concerning the terms of their arrangement and the division of fees (1994 agreement). In the February 10, 1994 agreement, the three firms agreed that if they were successful, they would allocate the 40 percent contingent fee as follows — 30 percent to Kelley's firm, 30 percent to GTH, and 40 percent to Paul's firm. Under the 1994 agreement, the fee allocation was based on the commitment of each firm to fully participate in the case and that "the percentage of time devoted to the case by each firm will correspond as closely as possible to the percentage by which each firm shares in the contingent fee."
The first lawsuit (Phase I) settled in September 1994. In the settlement, the State agreed to pay $4 million, the Kiwanis Club agreed to pay $3 million, and the parties agreed to a stipulated judgment against the insurer for bad faith for $12 million. The attorneys divided the 40 percent contingent fee as provided in the 1994 agreement.
After the settlement, Kelley, Paul, and GTH agreed to represent several other former residents of the O.K. Boys Ranch (Phase II). In December 1995, the attorneys changed the fee allocation in the 1994 agreement to 33 1/3 percent for each law firm. The other provisions of the 1994 agreement remained unchanged. A December 28, 1995 letter from GTH to Kelley and Paul reiterates that the fee allocation understanding "is based on the premise that all three firms continue to participate fully in the case." When Phase II settled, the parties divided the contingent fee as previously agreed.
After Kelley, GTH, and Paul agreed to represent a third group of residents in 1996 (Phase III), Paul took a sailboat sabbatical, and Kelley started spending more time in Mexico building a new home. In June 1998, just before Phase III settled, the law firms filed another lawsuit on behalf of 42 former residents of the O.K. Boys Ranch against two therapists who worked at the Ranch, Jean Jacob and Valarie Noll (Jacob/Noll). Kelley, GTH, and Paul had represented the 42 former residents in the prior lawsuits. In December 1998, the attorneys met to discuss the allocation of the work on the Jacob/Noll case and fees. GTH was concerned about the allocation of work and the paralegal costs during Phase III.
Early in 1999, Paul decided to withdraw. Kelley wanted his brother, George Kelley, to replace Paul. GTH agreed to also associate with George Kelley on the Jacob/Noll case. The firms then attempted to reach an agreement on the division of fees and costs for the Jacob/Noll litigation. Based on their conversations, in July, GTH sent Richard and George Kelley a draft agreement. Under the draft agreement, GTH would receive 55 percent of the contingent fee and Richard and George Kelley would receive 45 percent, but all administrative and paralegal costs would be divided evenly between the three firms. The other provisions of the draft agreement were similar to the 1994 agreement. According to Kelley, because he and George did not agree with the division of the administrative and paralegal costs, they did not sign the agreement.
The trial in the Jacob/Noll case was scheduled for early spring 2000. Kelley left for Mexico on October 20, 1999, and did not return until January 7, 2000. Just prior to the trial date in March, the case settled. Following the settlement, Kelley and GTH disagreed about how to divide the $3.2 million fee. Pending resolution of the fee dispute, GTH deposited the $3.2 million in an interest bearing account. The trial court conducted a hearing to resolve the dispute. Anderson represented Kelley in the fee dispute.
After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 46-page decision and order. In the decision and order, the court concluded that the attorney fees should be divided in proportion to the time each firm worked on the case and awarded approximately $2.5 million to GTH, $540,000 to Kelley, and $66,000 to George Kelley.
Despite Kelley's request to appeal the trial court's attorney fee decision, Anderson did not file an appeal. Kelley sued Anderson for legal malpractice alleging that he "negligently failed to timely file for an appeal." Kelley also alleged that he was entitled to interest on the fee amount awarded by the trial court.
In addition, Kelley alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress but later dismissed this claim.
Anderson moved for summary judgment dismissal. The trial court granted Anderson's motion to strike portions of Kelley's brief, parts of the declarations of Kelley and of his spouse, and voluminous exhibits submitted in opposition to summary judgment. The court granted Anderson's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Kelley's lawsuit.
ANALYSIS
Motion to Strike
Kelley contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Anderson's motion to strike the unsupported factual assertions in Kelley's brief, the inadmissible hearsay in the declaration of Kelley and his spouse, and the numerous unauthenticated exhibits submitted in support of his opposition to Anderson's motion for summary judgment. We review a trial court's decision on a motion to strike and the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. O'Neill v. Farmers Ins. Co., 124 Wn. App. 516, 521, 125 P.3d 134 (2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
Here, the trial court's decision to grant Anderson's motion to strike is not manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. In response to Anderson's motion to strike, Kelley did not dispute that portions of his brief contained unsupported factual assertions, that the declarations contained hearsay, and that the exhibits were unauthenticated. Instead, Kelley submitted untimely supplemental pleadings in an effort to address the motion to strike. Whether to accept or reject untimely pleadings is within the trial court's discretion.O'Neill, 124 App. at 521. Because the trial court acted within its discretion in striking the supplemental pleadings as untimely, the record before this court is limited to the pleadings and documents properly considered by the court below.
Under CR 56(e) factual assertions must be made based on personal knowledge and set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. CR 56(e) also requires that documents must be authenticated to be admissible.
Legal Malpractice
Kelley challenges summary judgment dismissal of his legal malpractice lawsuit against Anderson. Kelley claims that if Anderson had timely appealed the attorney fee decision and order, the Court of Appeals would have reversed because the trial court erroneously interpreted and relied on former RPC 1.5(e) and failed to equally divide the fees under a joint venture theory.
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 324, 879 P.2d 912 (1994). An appellate court will affirm a summary judgment dismissal if the pleadings and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
To prove legal malpractice, Kelley must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty of care on the part of the lawyer; (2) breach; (3) proximate cause; and (4) damages. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 260-61, 830 P.2d 646 (1992).
The parties agree that because Anderson failed to timely file an appeal, the determination of whether his negligence constitutes legal malpractice is a question of law and Kelley must prove that but for the failure to file the appeal, Kelley would have prevailed. Nielson v. Eisenhower Carlson, 100 Wn. App. 584, 592, 999 P.2d 42 (2000) (citingDaugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn.2d 254, 259, 704 P.2d 600 (1985)). If the appeal would not have been successful, the parties agree that Anderson's negligence is not a proximate cause and Kelley's legal malpractice claim fails.Eisenhower, 100 Wn. App. at 595.
The trial court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing on the fee dispute between Kelley and GTH. The parties agreed there was no written agreement for the allocation of fees and costs in the Jacob/Noll case. Kelley took the position that there was an oral agreement that he and George Kelley would receive 45 percent of the contingent fee and GTH would receive 55 percent. In the alternative, Kelley argued the fees should have been equally divided under a joint venture theory. GTH argued the court should have awarded fees under a quantum meruit theory for the work Kelley could establish he performed.
Quantum meruit is a Latin phrase meaning "as much as he deserves". The concept refers to the extent of liability on a contract implied by law and is premised on the desirability of avoiding unjust enrichment. Thus, the law will imply a promise to pay a reasonable amount for labor and materials in the absence of an express promise to do so. Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 330 n3, 879 P.2d 912 (1994).
Kelley did not keep time records but estimated that he spent approximately 755 hours working on the case. GTH disputed Kelley's estimate of the hours he worked. GTH did not dispute the estimated 40 hours George Kelley spent on the case. Based on the GTH time records, there was no dispute that GTH spent 1555 hours on the case.
Based on the provisions of former RPC 1.5(e), and the intent of the parties as demonstrated by their course of dealing and prior agreements, the court ruled that "the parties intended that fees be proportional to attorney time devoted to Jacob/Noll." The court rejected dividing of the fees under a joint venture theory or based on quantum meruit. The court concluded former RPC 1.5(e) controlled and that the joint venture presumption of an equal division was no longer "viable, at least in the context of this case." The court also concluded the evidence did not support Kelley's estimation of the time he spent working on the case. The court allocated the fees in proportion to the time devoted to the litigation. The court awarded GTH approximately $2.5 million, Kelley approximately $540,000, and George Kelley approximately $66,000.
Washington adopted former RPC 1.5 in 1985. 2 Lewis H. Orland Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice RPC 1.5 author's cmts. at 373 (6th ed. 2004). Specifically, this case involves the application of former RPC 1.5(e)(2), which provides:
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(2) The division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable.
The court entered detailed and extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the decision. In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court describes the written fee agreement and the history of the association between Kelley and GTH for the eight previous lawsuits on behalf of the O.K. Boys Ranch residents. Based on these findings, the court concluded that whether the relationship between Kelley and GTH was characterized as an association or as a joint venture, the firms intended to divide the contingent fee in proportion to the services rendered by each firm. The court also concluded that RPC 1.5(e) required a proportionate division of the fees.
Kelley argues the Court of Appeals would have reversed the trial court's attorney fee decision because the court erred in relying on former RPC 1.5(e) and in failing to divide the fees equally under joint venture law. Relying on Brauns v. Housden, 195 Wash. 140, 79 P.2d 981 (1938), Kelley claims that because there was no written agreement, he is entitled to one-half of the attorney fees under joint venture law. And while Kelley also challenges the court's calculation and findings regarding the hours he worked, the other unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in relying on former RPC 1.5(e), we conclude that even under joint venture law, this court would have affirmed the trial court's decision to allocate fees in proportion to the time each of the firms devoted to the Jacob/Noll litigation.
RPC 1.5 was amended by the Amended Rules of Professional Conduct effective September 1, 2006. The amended rule now requires the client to agree in writing to the division of the fees between attorneys from different firms. The current version of RPC 1.5(e) provides that:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) (i) the division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(ii) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(iii) the total fee is reasonable; (Emphasis added).
Joint ventures are not created by operation of law. Adams v. Johnston, 71 Wn. App. 599, 611, 860 P.2d 423 (1993),rev. denied, 141 Wn.2d 1028, 11 P.3d 824 (2000) (citing Paulson v. County of Pierce, 99 Wn.2d 645, 654, 664 P.2d 1202 (1983)). A joint venture "is a relationship voluntarily assumed and arising out of contract." Rains v. Walby, 13 Wn. App. 712, 717, 537 P.2d 833 (1975). The elements of a joint venture are: (1) an express or implied contract, (2) a common purpose, (3) a community of interest, and (4) an equal right to a voice, accompanied by an equal right to control. Paulson, 99 Wn.2d at 654-55. The essential element of a joint venture is the express or implied contract between the parties. Carbaneu v. Peterson, 1 Wn.2d 347, 374, 95 P.2d 1043 (1939). The parties' intent in a joint venture always controls. Tanner Elec. Coop. v. Puget Sound Power Light Co., 128 Wn.2d 656, 674, 911 P.2d 1301 (1996) ("The touchstone of contract interpretation is the parties' intent.")
Because a joint venture is in the nature of a partnership, courts have held "[t]he relations of the parties in each of such associations are so similar that their rights, duties, and liabilities are generally tested by the same rules."Barrington v. Murry, 35 Wn.2d 744, 752, 215 P.2d 433 (1950) (quoting Paulson v. McMillan, 8 Wn.2d 295, 111 P.2d 983 (1941)). In the absence of an agreement to divide fees, attorneys in a joint venture presumptively share profits on an equal basis. Rains, 13 Wn. App. at 717.
See also Fitzgibbon v. Carey, 70 Or. App. 127, 688 P.2d 1367 (when attorneys from different firms associated to represent plaintiff in a class action, it is a joint venture);Thompson v. Hiter, 356 Ill. App. 3d 574, 586, 826 N.E.2d 503, 513 (2005) (where two attorneys jointly represent a client on a contingent-fee basis, the relationship between the two attorneys is a joint venture) (citing In re Johnson, 133 Ill.2d 516, 552 N.E.2d 703 (1989).
In Brauns, Mrs. Brauns retained an attorney to file a lawsuit for the wrongful death of her spouse. When the attorney became increasingly deaf, he associated with another attorney on the case. A third attorney also associated with the two attorneys to work on the case. Brauns, 195 Wash. at 141-42. The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to equally divide the fees between the three attorneys, even though the original attorney performed less work than the other two attorneys. Brauns, 195 Wash. at 144. The Court characterized the relationship between the attorneys as "special partners" and held that in the complete absence of an agreement as to the division of fees between the attorneys, the fee should be divided equally. Brauns, 195 Wash. at 145.
The Brauns court cites to several cases to support its conclusion. Bailey v. Griggs, 174 Okla. 90, 49 P.2d 695 (1935); Langdon v. Kennedy, Holland, De Lacy McLaughlin, 118 Neb. 290, 224 N.W. 292, (1929); and Underwood v. Overstreet, 188 Ky. 562, 223 S.W. 152, 10 A.L.R. 1352 (1920). The courts in Bailey andLangdon, in turn, cite to Underwood. InUnderwood, the court held that absent an express or implied agreement, the two special partners were entitled to receive one-half of the fee.
But here, unlike in Brauns, the unchallenged findings concerning the prior agreements and course of dealing between Kelley and GTH during the previous lawsuits and in the Jacob/Noll case support the trial court's conclusion that Kelley and GTH intended to divide the fees in proportion to the time each firm spent working on the case.
The Jacob/Noll case was the ninth case in a series of related lawsuits in which Kelley and GTH represented the former residents of the O.K. Boys Ranch. Prior to the Jacob/Noll case, Kelley, GTH, and Paul always operated under a written fee agreement. After successfully settling Phase I, the attorneys divided the fees according to the 1994 agreement. The 1994 agreement provided that Kelley would receive 30 percent, Paul 40 percent, and GTH 30 percent of the contingent fee based on the "commitment on the part of all firms to provide legal services to these clients such that the percentage of time devoted to the case by each firm will correspond as closely as possible to the percentage by which each firm shares in the contingent fee." In the event one of the firms did not fully participate, the parties agreed that:
The agreement also stated that:
". . . bringing all three counsel to bear on certain aspects of the litigation will have an extremely beneficial psychological impact. For this reason, we intend to remain flexible in our coverage of tasks necessary to bring this case to a successful resolution, while recognizing that no firm will expend legal services on behalf of the clients in excess of the above percentages."
[i]n the event of an occurrence which prevents one of our firms from continuing to participate fully in accordance with the percentages discussed above, we agree to revisit the issue of proportionate compensation and to make appropriate adjustments. Any adjustments will recognize work done to date as well as effort put into development of the case. If there is significant disparity between the efforts expended and the percentages discussed above, each firm will agree to act in good faith in making equitable adjustments in the percentage by which the fee is to be divided.
In December 1995, the attorneys modified the fee and agreed to divide the contingent fee based on a 33 1/3 percent allocation. The agreement again specifically states "[t]his adjustment is based on the premise that all three firms continue to participate fully in the case." The agreement also provides that "[i]f there is a significant disparity between the efforts expended and the percentages discussed above, each firm will agree to act in good faith in making equitable adjustments in the percentage by which the fee is to be divided."
The attorneys filed the Jacob/Noll case in June 1998. In December 1998, GTH met with Kelley and Paul to address what GTH perceived was an unequal division of the work and the paralegal costs in Phase III. In a fax dated March 2, 1999, GTH reiterates its concern:
There is a growing concern at GTH that . . . GTH is being asked to shoulder much more than 1/3 of the load and, particularly, much of the liability load. . . . GTH also had two paralegals working on both liability and damage issues. . . . These costs should be fairly shared.
In March 1999, Paul withdrew and George Kelley replaced Paul. After George Kelley replaced Paul, Kelley proposed an equal division of the contingent fee between GTH and the Kelleys. GTH rejected the proposal. The attorneys then tentatively agreed on a 55/45 division of the fees. But when GTH insisted on equally sharing paralegal and administrative costs, the Kelleys refused to sign the proposed agreement. Although the court found that the attorneys could not reach an agreement on fees and costs for the Jacob/Noll case,
[t]he parties operated as if a relationship existed between them. Until the eve of the settlement Connelly urged Richard Kelley to resolve the matter. Richard Kelley insisted on waiting until the case resolved then settling fees on the basis of an evaluation of the time he spent on the case. Richard Kelley was never treated as an hourly attorney. All settlement discussions were on the basis of his proportional share of the total contingent fee.
In short, the unchallenged findings concerning the agreements and communications between Kelley and GTH throughout the course of their association support the trial court's conclusion that Kelley and GTH intended to divide the fees in proportion to the time spent on the litigation. On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err in dividing the fees in the Jacob/Noll case based on the time each firm devoted to the case.
Kelley also contends the Court of Appeals would have reversed because the trial court failed to address GTH's fiduciary duty to disclose all relevant information to Kelley about the Jacob/Noll case and substantial evidence does not support the court's calculation of the hours Kelley worked on the case.
First, Kelley claims the court erred in failing to address GTH's fiduciary obligations. We disagree. The trial court found GTH and Kelley were equally responsible for any lack of communication about the case and Kelley's testimony was not credible. Appellate courts defer to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 108, 864 P.2d 937 (1994).
The undisputed findings establish that when Kelley left for Mexico on October 20, 1999, he knew that the discovery deadline for the Jacob/Noll case was January 3, 2000, and trial was scheduled for March 20, 2000. But the court found that Kelley did not take any initiative to get involved or obtain information about the case. During Kelley's absence, GTH was "going nuts" and called George Kelley at least twice to ask whether Kelley was going to return from Mexico.
Kelley claimed that he did not return until January because he was repeatedly assured by GTH that there was no need for him to return. Kelley also testified that the GTH paralegal told his wife in December that there was nothing going on with the Jacob/Noll case. But the paralegal testified that when he called Kelley in December to tell him that GTH had obtained investigation files from the O.K. Boys Ranch, Kelley told him George would review the files. The paralegal also denied telling Kelley's wife that there was nothing going on in the case. The trial court found the paralegal's "testimony most credible" and was "skeptical of the Kelleys' account." According to the court, the more likely reason for why Kelley did not return from Mexico was set forth in the December 22 fax from George Kelley to GTH: "`I have heard that Richard might not get back until January. Some trouble with the house in Mexico.'"
Kelley also argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court's calculation of the hours Kelley worked on the Jacob/Noll case. The trial court's findings concerning the hours Kelley spent on the case reflect the court's credibility determination and are supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, the appellate court determines whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record and if so, whether those findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law.Landmark Dev., Inc. v. City of Roy, 138 Wn.2d 561, 573, 980 P.2d 1234 (1999). The trial court set forth in detail the basis for calculating the time Kelley spent. The court calculated Kelley's hours from the GTH's building security log to obtain an average of 7.6 hours per day. Based on the evidence, including the testimony that Kelley was rarely seen at GTH's office, the court concluded that even if he worked seven days a week the most Kelley could average per day was 7.6 hours. On this record, the appellate court would not have reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees.
Substantial evidence is a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true.Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass'n v. Chelan County, 141 Wn.2d 169, 176, 4 P.3d 123 (2000).
Dismissal of Other Claims
Next, Kelley contends the court erred in dismissing his claims for lost settlement opportunity and prejudgment interest on the attorney fees awarded by the trial court. Anderson argues the court properly refused to consider Kelley's claims because (1) the claims were untimely, (2) Kelley's claim for lost settlement opportunity was speculative and not supported by legal authority, and, (3) as a matter of law, Kelley was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the attorney fees.
Two days before the hearing on Anderson's motion for summary judgment dismissal, Kelley filed a supplemental brief in support of his claims for lost settlement opportunity and prejudgment interest.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Kelley's untimely claim for lost settlement opportunity. O'Neil, 124 Wn. App. at 521. We also conclude that because Kelley's claim for prejudgment interest on attorney fees fails as a matter of law, dismissal of that claim was not erroneous.
Prejudgment interest is allowed when the amount due is "liquidated." Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 685, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) (citing Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'g Co., 74 Wn.2d 25, 32, 442 P.2d 621 (1968)). A liquidated claim is appropriate when "the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, make it possible to compute the amount due with exactness, without reliance on opinion or discretion." Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wn.2d at 685. An unliquidated claim is where the exact amount "cannot be definitely fixed from the facts proved, disputed or undisputed, but must in the last analysis depend upon the opinion or discretion of the judge or jury as to whether a larger or a smaller amount should be allowed." Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wn.2d at 686. In Weyerhaeuser, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest on attorney fees. Noting that the majority of courts conclude prejudgment interest on attorney fees is improper, the Court held an award of prejudgment interest on attorney fees "is precisely the type of discretionary claim where we have rejected the right to prejudgment interest." Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wn.2d at 688.
We affirm the decision to dismiss Kelley's legal malpractice lawsuit against Anderson.
Kelley filed a motion to seal the trial court record and the appellate record and to redact the names of the two therapists. Because the motion does not comply with the requirements of General Rule 15 or the Court of Appeals, Division One, General Order, In the Matter of Sealed or Redacted Materials, we deny the motion to seal.