Opinion
No. 27573
Decided December 5, 1977.
Driver of motor vehicle appeals decision of district court affirming the suspension of his driver's license, after he had accumulated twenty points on his license within twenty-four months. Driver challenges the constitutionality of section 42-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.) contending the statute results in a denial of equal treatment.
Affirmed
1. MOTOR VEHICLES — License — Suspension — Twenty Points — Statute — Unconstitutional — Lack of Merit. Where driver's license was suspended pursuant to section 42-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973, after he had accumulated twenty points on his license within twenty-four months and he now challenges the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, has "arbitrarily fixed six points as the trigger for a second suspension hearing," and that the statute results in a denial of equal treatment, held, the arguments advanced by driver are without merit; they have previously been disposed of in Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 191 Colo. 517, 554 P.2d 691 (1976).
2. Point Accumulation — Two Classes — Driver — Subject to Treatment — Provided by Law — Statute — Equal Treatment. The legislature has created two classes of point accumulation: twelve points in twelve months; and eighteen points in twenty-four months; a driver may fall into either class, neither class, or both classes; the driver subjects himself to the treatment the law provides for the class or classes in which he places himself; section 42-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.), is not unconstitutional as applied nor does it unconstitutionally deny equal treatment.
Appeal from the District Court of Mesa County, Honorable William M. Ela, Judge.
Richard M. Hall, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy, Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Arthur G. Staliwe, Special Assistant, for defendant-appellee.
The appellant, Arthur Keegan, appeals the decision of the district court affirming the suspension of his driver's license pursuant to section 42-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.). The appellant had accumulated twenty points on his license within twenty-four months. The appellant contends that section 42-2-123(1)(a) is unconstitutional as applied because (1) the appellee, the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, has "arbitrarily fixed six points as the trigger for a second suspension hearing," and (2) the statute results in a denial of equal treatment.
Section 42-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.), states in pertinent part: "The department has the authority to suspend the license of any driver who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points within any twelve consecutive months or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months. . . ."
[1] We find the appellant's arguments to be without merit, and therefore affirm. Perlmutter v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 191 Colo. 517, 554 P.2d 691 (1976), dealt with the exact argument that appellant makes here. Our decision in that case is dispositive.
[2] Our decision as to the appellant's equal treatment argument is controlled by Augustino v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 193 Colo. 273, 565 P.2d 933 (1977). The legislature has created two classes of point accumulation: twelve points in twelve months; and eighteen points in twenty-four months. A driver may fall into either class, neither class, or both classes. The driver subjects himself to the treatment the law provides for the class or classes in which he places himself.
The ruling of the district court is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES does not participate.