Opinion
July 6, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (Delaney, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The record reveals that the plaintiff submitted only an affidavit of an attorney without personal knowledge of the facts in response to the Wehran defendants' motion for summary judgment. It is clear that unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations of fact by an attorney lacking personal knowledge are patently insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; hence, the dismissal of the instant claims as against the Wehran defendants was proper (see, David Graubart, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 48 N.Y.2d 554; Grieshaber v. City of New Rochelle, 113 A.D.2d 821, appeal dismissed 66 N.Y.2d 1035; Sheahan v. County of Suffolk, 109 A.D.2d 832). Moreover, no documentary evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact accompanied the attorney's affidavit (see generally, Olan v. Farrell Lines, 64 N.Y.2d 1092; Weingarten v. Marcus, 118 A.D.2d 640), nor was any reasonable explanation for the absence of factual evidence set forth by the plaintiff (see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557).
The plaintiff's reliance upon the legal arguments and alleged new evidence presented in support of its motion for reargument of the Wehran defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, which was denied in an order of the same court dated August 11, 1986, is unavailing, since that motion alleged no new or additional relevant facts and was, in reality, solely one for reargument (see, Zebrowski v. Trustees of Town of Brookhaven, 128 A.D.2d 704). Since no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see, Wright v. General Motors Corp., 96 A.D.2d 510), the plaintiff's contentions raised in that motion are not properly before this court (see, Zebrowski v. Trustees of Town of Brookhaven, supra; Savino v. Nassau Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 579).
Finally, since the plaintiff at no point alleged any specific instance of misconduct on the part of the Wehran defendants subsequent to the alleged breach of the contract in April 1978, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the claims asserted in the fifth and sixth causes of action are barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, Kartiganer Assocs. v Town of New Windsor, 108 A.D.2d 898, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 925). Rubin, J.P., Kooper, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.