Opinion
A114264
4-20-2007
ANTHONY NICHOLAS KARNEZIS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ESTHER LYNN CLARK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
I.
INTRODUCTION
When a trial judge grants a motion for new trial in a civil case concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support a jurys finding, is the court required to identify the facts relied on by the judge in so ruling? We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure section 657 (section 657) requires that the written order granting a new trial motion must include a specification of the facts upon which the decision is based.
In this case, the trial courts order granting the motion for new trial simply stated that "the evidence as presented by the parties is insufficient to justify the jurys verdict of non-negligence of [d]efendant . . . ." This conclusory statement is inadequate to satisfy section 657s mandate that the court "specify the . . . reason or reasons for granting the new trial. . . ." (§ 657.) Accordingly, we reverse.
II.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUNDS
Because the disposition of this appeal turns on the question of whether the trial court complied with the legal requirements of the statute governing new trial motions, a detailed summary of the evidence at trial is unnecessary.
A "Complaint for Personal Injuries" was filed by respondent Anthony Nicholas Karnezis (plaintiff) on July 9, 2003. The complaint alleged that plaintiff suffered personal injuries when the motorcycle he was operating collided with a motor vehicle operated by appellant Esther Lynn Clark (defendant). The collision took place on March 29, 2003, on Irving Street in San Francisco. The complaint further alleged that the collision was caused by defendants negligence. An answer was filed by defendant denying the complaints allegations and asserting eight separate affirmative defenses.
Jury selection commenced on October 11, 2005. The following day counsel made their opening statements, and two witnesses were called, including plaintiff. Trial continued on October 17, with further examination of plaintiff consuming most of the day. Testimony from the depositions of several additional witnesses was introduced, and oral testimony was taken from Dr. Stephen Tomlanovich. The following day, plaintiff rested his case after calling one additional witness, Jennifer Stalvey.
Defendants case began with testimony of Dr. J. Michael Borah and the day ended with testimony by defendant. The fifth trial day was taken up with the testimony of two witnesses, Jeremiah Buckley and Mike Stephenson. Finally, evidence concluded on day six, October 24, with the reading of more deposition excerpts. Closing arguments were made by counsel for both parties, the jury was instructed on the law, and deliberations commenced.
Deliberations continued on October 25, 2005, with the jury reaching a verdict in the early afternoon. The verdict was delivered on a special verdict form. Only one question was marked by the jury as follows:
"1. Was ESTHER LYNN CLARK negligent? [¶] No[.]"
As defendant explained to the court below: "Having answered `No to that question, the jurors clearly felt that [plaintiff], alone, acted negligently and was the sole cause of this accident." The verdict form was signed by the presiding juror and dated.
Plaintiff filed a notice of intention to file a motion for new trial on January 24, 2006. Eight separate grounds for seeking a new trial were included in the notice. However, the memorandum of points and authorities filed in support of the motion addressed only one issue; a claimed insufficiency of evidence justifying the jurys verdict. The memorandum discussed in detail plaintiffs assertion that the jurys finding that defendant was not negligent was "contrary to the evidence" presented at trial.
All further year references are to the calendar year 2006, unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant filed an opposition to this motion on February 22, acknowledging that the sole issue was whether there was evidentiary support for the jurys finding adjudging defendant not to have been negligent. A hearing on the motion for new trial was held on March 3, at the conclusion of which the court took the matter under submission. A written order granting plaintiffs motion was filed by the court on March 14. In the order the court made the following determination:
". . . In granting this Motion, the Court concludes that the evidence as presented by the parties is insufficient to justify the jurys verdict of non-negligence of Defendant, a finding recorded in Question Number 1 of the Special Verdict form presented to the jury. After weighing the evidence, the Court is convinced from the entire record, including any reasonable inferences therefrom, that the jury should clearly have reached a different decision than a finding that Defendant was not negligent."
Defendant thereafter filed a notice of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
As noted, defendant does not challenge the trial courts grant of a new trial on its merits—the only challenge is procedural. Defendant claims that the courts written ruling on plaintiffs motion for new trial does not comply with section 657, which mandates as follows: "When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the courts reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated." (§ 657.) While defendant apparently concedes that the court adequately stated the ground for granting the new trial—insufficiency of the evidence—"the trial court failed to arm the parties and this Court with the knowledge of what aspects of the evidence failed due to insufficiency." As a result, defendant argues the statutory requirement that the "reason or reasons" be specified was not met in this case.
As is material here, the current procedural rule governing civil motions for new trial has been largely unchanged since it was amended in 1965. At that time, the last four paragraphs of the current version of section 657 were added. The amendments included the language quoted above, which requires trial courts now to "specify" both the grounds and the reasons for granting a motion brought under the section. (See Historical Note, 16A Wests Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1996 ed.) foll. § 657, p. 223.) A deleted paragraph, dating back to 1939, had simply required that, if a new trial was granted based on " `the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence . . . , the order shall so specify this in writing . . . ." (Ibid.)
The 1965 amendments also added the following mandate: "A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict . . . , unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision." (§ 657; Historical Note, supra, at p. 223.)
The trial court in this case used the exact language from the statute quoted immediately above in its order granting plaintiffs motion. Was this enough to satisfy the statutes requirement that the "reasons" for granting the motion be stated? Controlling California Supreme Court case law compels us to conclude it was not.
The seminal case interpreting the 1965 version of section 657 is Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104 (Mercer). Mercer involved facts almost identical to this case. The trial of a personal injury action arising out of a two-vehicle collision resulted in a defense verdict. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for new trial under then newly amended section 657, stating simply: " `The court is of the definite opinion, after analyzing the evidence in this case, that there has been a definite miscarriage of justice. The court is of the opinion that the jury trying this case should have rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs, and against the defendants. " (Id. at p. 108.)
The Supreme Court held that this finding failed to meet section 657s requirement for a specification of reasons upon granting a motion for new trial. (Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 108 .) The opinion began with the court summarizing the two statutory purposes for amending section 657 to include this new requirement. One purpose was to ensure that decisions by trial judges to grant new trials, which are rarely reversed, "be the product of a mature and careful reflection on the part of the judge." (Id. at p. 113.) Requiring the trial judge to prepare a specification of grounds and reasons promotes that goal.
Second, where motions for new trial are granted based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, requiring the trial court to "reveal in what respects [the court] found the evidence to be insufficient" improves the opportunity for meaningful appellate review. (Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 114.) Given the amendment to section 657, "[t]he scope of review is thus narrowed to more manageable proportions: the appellant need only address himself to those asserted deficiencies in the proof which are specified as reasons for the order, and the reviewing court need only determine if there is a substantial basis for finding such a deficiency in any of the respects specified." (Id. at p. 115.)
The court cautioned that "[n]o hard and fast rule can be laid down" as to how far trial courts must go in specifying the reasons for granting motions for a new trial. (Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 115.) The trial court must at least furnish a "concise but clear statement of the reasons . . . ." (Ibid.) Where the ground is insufficiency of the evidence, "the judge must briefly recite the respects in which he finds the evidence to be legally inadequate . . . ." (Id. at p. 116.) This includes a requirement that the order granting the motion also "briefly identify the portion of the record which convinces the judge `that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision. " (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
The issue was revisited by the Supreme Court just two years later in Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 359 (Scala). That case, too, arose out of a personal injury action, but there the jury found the defendant negligent. In granting the defendants motion for new trial, the trial judge stated, using language similar to that employed by the trial judge in this case: "[T]here is no sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was negligent and the evidence does show that the plaintiff failed to use ordinary care for his own safety and that that failure was a proximate cause of his injuries." (Id. at p. 363.)
The high court held that such statements of "ultimate facts" do not meet the statutory requirement, particularly in light of the purposes to be served by requiring trial judges to state both the grounds and reasons for granting motions for new trial, as articulated in Mercer. (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 369-370.)
In reading the opinion, it becomes clear why the Supreme Court weighed in once more on this issue only two years after Mercer was decided. In the intervening two years, a number of intermediate appellate courts had wrongly interpreted Mercer, in published opinions, to hold that statements of "ultimate facts" were adequate to meet the requirements of section 657. (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 365-367.) These cases were specifically disapproved in Scala. (Id. at p. 370 & fn. 6.)
The Supreme Court explained its reasoning as follows: "Negligence, whether of the defendant or of the plaintiff, is a complex issue requiring for its resolution the determination of the existence or nonexistence of a variety of different elements, including the standard of due care, foreseeability of risk, duty to the person injured, breach of that duty, cause in fact, and proximate cause. To state that a party `was not negligent does not identify which one or more of the foregoing elements the adversary failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence; and to state that a party `was negligent does not identify which of his acts or omissions deviated so far from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person as to warrant that condemnation. Indeed, it borders on the tautological to `specify that a new trial is granted on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict finding the defendant negligent because that evidence fails to show the defendant was negligent. Such a `reason simply reiterates the ground of the ruling itself." (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 366-367, italics omitted.)
The high court went on to reiterate its direction in Mercer that trial courts " ` "must briefly recite the respects in which he finds the evidence to be legally inadequate," " and " `must briefly identify the portion of the record which convinces the judge "that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.". . ." (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 363-364, italics omitted.)
The court explained further: "It was precisely because of this danger that in an often-quoted passage of Mercer (68 Cal.2d at p. 116) we required the trial judge to briefly identify the deficiencies he finds in `the evidence or `the record or (at p. 115) `the proof—rather than merely in `the issues or `the ultimate facts. " (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 367.)
The Scala court did recognize some limit to how far trial judges must go in articulating factual finding justifying a new trial: "We agree, for example, that to comply with section 657 `the trial judge is not necessarily required to cite page and line of the record, or discuss the testimony of particular witnesses, nor need he undertake `a discussion of the weight to be given, and the inferences to be drawn from each item of evidence supporting, or impeaching, the judgment. [Citation.] On the other hand, he must do more than in effect reiterate the ground of his ruling." (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 370; see also Resort Video, Inc. v. Laser Video, Ltd. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1679.)
Tested against the standards set forth in Mercer and Scala, it is evident that the trial courts finding in this case was plainly inadequate. At best, the written order in this case simply states ultimate facts; that "the jury should clearly have reached a different decision than a finding that Defendant was not negligent." This general statement, without any attempt to identify the factual basis for the courts conclusion, does not comply with the requirements of section 657, under the "minimum standards" set forth in Mercer. (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 365.)
We caution that a trial court cannot rely on its oral pronouncements when the motion for new trial is argued to bolster any deficiencies in its written order granting a motion for new trial for insufficiency of the evidence. The statement of reasons for granting the motion must appear in the written order itself. (La Manna v. Stewart (1975) 13 Cal.3d 413, 422-423.)
Yet plaintiff points out that in reviewing section 657 orders, the facts and circumstances of each case must be taken into account in assessing the adequacy of the courts reasoning (citing Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 115). Plaintiff goes on to argue that because this case was a simple one factually, there can be little doubt as to why the court felt the defendant was negligent. We disagree.
Without reference to the facts adduced at trial, we have no idea whether the trial judge believed the defendant was negligent due to speed, inattention, the failure to activate a turn signal, a combination of these facts, or for other reasons. Plaintiffs suggestion that we can divine the trial courts specific reasons because of the simplicity of the case "in effect turns back the clock to the pre-1965 period when `the appellant was left in the dark as to which aspect of the trial to defend, and quite understandably struck out blindly in several directions at once. This process, however, was not likely to illuminate the reviewing court, which remained equally uninformed of the basis on which the trial judge acted. (Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 113.)" (Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 367.)
We emphasize again that Mercer, like the case here, was a personal injury action arising out of a two-vehicle collision. In fact, the trial in Mercer was only four days long (Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 107), while the instant case consumed six court days.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The order granting plaintiff a new trial is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant.
We concur:
Reardon, J.
Sepulveda, J.