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finding no abuse of discretion where district court denied motion as untimely because filed after 18 months and without justification
Summary of this case from Salazar v. District of ColumbiaOpinion
No. 08-7093.
Filed On: December 19, 2008.
BEFORE: Henderson, Brown, and Kavanaugh, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance; the motion for summary reversal, and for disqualification and removal of district court judge, and for sanctions, and the response thereto; and the motion for appointment of counsel and for abeyance of proceedings until appointment, and the response thereto, it is
ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel and for abeyance of proceedings until appointment be denied. With the exception of defendants appealing or defending in criminal cases, appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted and the motion for summary reversal denied. The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary affirmance. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's May 2008 motion to reopen.See Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quotingBrowder v. Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7 (1978)); Lepkowski v. Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
To the extent the motion to reopen was filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because it was filed more than a year after entry of the dismissal order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). To the extent appellant's motion was based on either Rule 60(b)(4), (5), or (6), the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining his motion was not filed "within a reasonable time," because appellant proffered no explanation for the 18-month delay in filing the motion.See generally Ackermann v. U.S., 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) (cited in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining motions be denied.
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc.See Fed.R.App.P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.