Opinion
No. CV 04 4000984 S
May 23, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendants, all employed by Connecticut Valley Hospital ("CVH"), have moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds in this action in which the plaintiff, Robert Kalman, a patient acquittee, seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Connecticut Patients' Bill of Rights, and federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process. Patient acquittees are persons who have been adjudged not guilty of criminal charges by reason of mental disease or defect. Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-13, § 17a-580.
Facts
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment the defendants have submitted the affidavits of Ellen Weber and Dr. Daniel Papapietro. The plaintiff has submitted no affidavit, nor has he submitted any opposing memorandum.
The following facts are undisputed. Kalman is an acquittee who was committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB") by operation of law pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 17-602. On September 25, 2002, the Superior Court for the Judicial District of New Haven committed Kalman to the jurisdiction of the PSRB for a period not to exceed thirty-five years after he was acquitted of charges of Illegal Possession of Explosives, Failure to Appear in the First Degree and two counts of Risk of Injury by reason of mental disease or defect. In a Memorandum of Decision dated May 21, 2004, the PSRB, reviewing Kalman's status, found that "Robert Kalman is a person who should be confined and he is mentally ill to the extent that his discharge or conditional release would constitute a danger to himself and others." Affidavit of Ellen Weber, ¶ 5. The PSRB further found that Kalman was no longer so violent that he required confinement within a maximum-security hospital setting. Based on that finding, the PSRB ordered that "Robert Kalman shall be confined at the Dutcher Service of Connecticut Valley Hospital for the purposes of care, custody and treatment." Id., ¶ 6. That decision specified that "[t]his Order may be appealed in accordance with the provision of Chapter 54 of the Connecticut General Statutes." Id.
On May 27, 2004 Kalman was transferred from the maximum security Whiting Service to the Dutcher Service of the Whiting Forensic Division of CVH. CVH personnel provided Kalman with his computer, clothes and other belongings which were set up in a seclusion room that was temporarily transformed into a bedroom. While Kalman was in the room, the door was not locked, Kalman used the temporary room for approximately two weeks before a regular bed became available.
On July 14, 2004 pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-586, the defendants submitted a written report to the PSRB with respect to the mental condition and course of treatment of Kalman. This report described Kalman's personality disorder and his drug and alcohol abuse as primary risk factors which exacerbated each other. The report stated that as a result of his personality, Kalman had a history of criminal activity, antisocial behavior and failure to comply with past treatment and supervision. The report also stated that Kalman had a significant history of substance abuse, and if not in a highly structured setting, there was a substantial risk that he would relapse to using drugs and alcohol. The defendants concluded that once Kalman was under the sustained effects of drugs and alcohol, there was an even stronger potential for his returning to antisocial, impulsive, and/or threatening behavior. The report concluded that Kalman should remain in his present setting, that he could not be adequately controlled with available treatment and supervision on conditional release, and that his conditional release from the hospital or discharge from the jurisdiction of the PSRB would constitute a danger to himself and others.
At all times relevant to the complaint, all of the defendants worked at Connecticut Valley Hospital. Dr. Daniel Papapietro is a Clinical Psychologist employed by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) at Connecticut Valley Hospital. Dr. Shantala Umashankar is a Principal Psychiatrist employed by DMHAS at Connecticut Valley Hospital. Dr. Alec Buchanan is a Consulting Forensic Psychiatrist for DMHAS. Drs. Papapietro, Umashankar, and Buchanan were signatories on the July 14, 2004 report to the PSRB. Dr. Michael Niman is Chief of Operations at Connecticut Valley Hospital.
Discussion of the Law and Ruling
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fojtik v. Hunter, 265 Conn. 385, 389, 828 A.2d 596 (2003); Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 158-59, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002); Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 202, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995). Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact; D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Practice Book §§ 17-45, 17-46; Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Town Bank Trust Co. v. Benson, 176 Conn. 304, 309, 407 A.2d 971 (1978); Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647, 443 A.2d 471 (1982); New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 243-44, 659 A.2d 1226 (1995).
Summary judgment should only be granted if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Scinto v. Stam, 224 Conn. 524, 530, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 176, 126 L.Ed.2d 136 (1993); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246, 571 A.2d 116 (1991). Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims against state officials sued under the Fourteenth Amendment in their official capacity for money damages. Prigge v. Ragaglia, 265 Conn. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 542 (2003). Sovereign immunity is a "well settled principle that the sovereign [the state] is immune from suit unless the state, by appropriate legislation, consents to be sued." Federal Deposit Insurance Co. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc. 239 Conn. 93, 101, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). Since the state can only act through its officers, a suit against a state official concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is a suit against the state. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).
The state may waive its sovereign immunity through statutory waiver; White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); or through the Office of the Claims Commissioner, Connecticut General Statutes § 4-441, et seq.; Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corporation, 41 Conn.App. 61, 64, 674 A.2d 858 (1996).
DMHAS is an agency of the State of Connecticut. Connecticut General-Statutes § 17a-450. Connecticut Valley Hospital is a state-operated facility within DMHAS. The defendants work at Connecticut Valley Hospital and are being sued in their official capacities.
The plaintiff does not allege that he received permission from the Claims Commissioner to sue the state for monetary damages. The plaintiff has not cited any statute which expressly waives the state's sovereign immunity as to the plaintiff's constitutional claim for damages. Therefore, that claim is barred.
The United States Supreme Court has held that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Therefore, all damage claims under § 1983 are also barred against the defendants in their official capacities.
By Public Act 85-506 the Connecticut Legislature established the PSRB to perform function previously assigned to the courts. These functions include the determination whether an acquittee ought to be confined, conditionally released, or discharged under Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-584, as well as consideration of reports from state medical professionals about the mental condition of patients placed in their care by the court system under Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-586. The PSRB also considers reports of an acquittee's mental condition by an examiner chosen by the acquittee under Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-596. Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-597 provides that an acquittee may appeal a decision by the PSRB regarding his or her custody.
Doctors responsible for preparing and providing psychological reports to the Connecticut courts concerning a person's mental health and confinement status are entitled to absolute immunity in the course of performing such function. Kalman v. Carre, 352 F.Sup.2d 205 (D.Conn. 2005). The Court in Kalman stated:
Officials performing a judicial function are entitled to absolute immunity. Absolute and qualified immunity are immunity from suit. If an official is entitled to such immunity, there can be no finding that liability attaches to him or her. Furthermore, where a defendant is immune from suit, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Whether immunity exists is determined according to the function performed by an official, not that official's title. Therefore, judges, when they are performing a judicial function, are generally entitled to absolute immunity so long as they are not acting in the "clear absence of jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978). When the role played by a judge or prosecutor is administrative, however, absolute immunity does not attach. Similarly, where an official who is not a judge nonetheless performs a judicial function, absolute immunity will attach. Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1998); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that where an official act as" arms of the court" or where "a non-judicial person . . . fulfills a quasi-judicial role at the court's request," that person is entitled to judicial immunity). The policy underlying this rule is clear. Absolute immunity must attach to such officials for the same reason it attaches to judges performing their judicial function. It is in the best interests of society that officials performing judicial functions be motivated by that societal interest and not by the fear of a future lawsuit.
352 F.Sup.2d at 207-08.
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that doctors performing psychiatric or psychological evaluations pursuant to court requests are entitled to absolute immunity for the preparation and submission of that evaluation. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2001); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516 (1981).
In Hughes the court held that a licensed clinical social worker and a licensed clinical psychologist who evaluated parents in a child custody dispute pursuant to a court order were entitled to judicial immunity from suit for damages by a father who alleged that reports were false and misleading.
In Moses, the Court stated:
Recently this court held that "nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process have absolute immunity for damage claims arising from their performance of the delegated functions." Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir. 1987) (court appointed therapist). As a psychiatrist appointed by the court to conduct a competency examination, Dr. Parwatikar performed functions essential to the judicial process. See Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 2217, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971); Miner v. Baker, 638 F.Sup. 239, 241 (E.D.Mo. 1986) (doctor" enjoys absolute immunity in his performance of the quasi-judicial function of court-appointed psychiatrist").
Also, Dr. Parwatikar's function is analogous to that of a witness in a judicial proceeding. See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984). His appointed duties consisted of examining Moses and reporting his findings back to the court. Anything less than absolute immunity would defeat the requirement that the "paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth * * * be left as free and unobstructed as possible." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1114, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)). Without absolute immunity two problems are likely to develop in cases such as this. First, psychiatrists will be reluctant to accept court appointments. This will hurt the indigent criminal defendants who, without sound psychiatric help, may not be able to prove their mental deficiencies. Second, the threat of civil liability may taint the psychiatrist's overall opinions. The disinterested objectivity, so necessary to an accurate competency determination, will be lost. In short, only by granting absolute immunity will the paths to the truth remain open. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 103 S.Ct. at 1114.
In preparing and providing psychological reports to the PSRB for the determination of Kalman's mental health and confinement the defendants were performing functions essential to the judicial role of the PSRB and, therefore, are entitled to absolute immunity for all claims relating to the contents of their reports.
The plaintiff has also alleged that, the defendants violated his rights under Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-550. The complaint alleges that the defendants violated his rights because the contents of their reports was "fictitious." Since this claim also turns on the contents of the reports, the defendants have absolute immunity with respect to the allegations based on § 17a-550.
Summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the defendants because the plaintiff filed no response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and for the reasons set forth above.