Opinion
June 29, 1967
Appeal by plaintiffs, as limited by their brief from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated December 13, 1965, as, on defendant's cross motion, dismissed the second, third and fourth causes of action in plaintiffs' complaint. Order reversed insofar as thus appealed from, thus deleting the second ordering paragraph, with costs to plaintiffs, and defendant's cross motion denied as to said causes of action. The second, third and fourth causes of action were dismissed by the Special Term on the ground that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction of an action to grant support to infants unless statutory power to do so is specifically present ( Kagen v. Kagen, 48 Misc.2d 856, 857). Subsequent to the decision of the learned Special Term, we held that there is concurrent jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and the Family Court to direct support for infants in any appropriate action, whenever that issue may arise ( Vazquez v. Vazquez, 26 A.D.2d 701). Brennan, Acting P.J., Rabin, Hopkins, Benjamin and Nolan, JJ., concur.