Opinion
No. 3D05-2785.
Opinion filed February 14, 2007.
Lower Tribunal No. 94-12239 CA 15.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Gill S. Freeman, Judge.
William L. Richey; Ferrell Law and H. Eugene Lindsey, for appellant.
Arthur W. Tifford, for appellees.
Before COPE, C.J., and GREEN and LAGOA, JJ.
Luis Juega, as administrator for the estate of Simon Davidson, appeals an order dismissing him from this lawsuit for lack of standing. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
Simon Davidson died testate in 1991, leaving behind a son, Allan Davidson, and a brother, Stanley Davidson. Prior to Simon Davidson's death, the Nozomi Corporation, of which Simon Davidson was the director, executed a loan and promissory note to Stanley Davidson in the amount of $5 million. Following Simon Davidson's death, Stanley Davidson closed several accounts held by Simon Davidson, appropriating the assets for himself. Estate proceedings commenced in Spain, and Luis Juega ("Juega") was appointed as estate administrator.
The circumstances regarding the loan are disputed on this record, but have no bearing on the outcome of this appeal.
In 1994, Nozomi filed suit in Miami-Dade County ("the Nozomi litigation"), seeking repayment of the note and foreclosure on property securing the note. In 1995, Juega, as estate administrator, joined Nozomi's lawsuit, and asserted additional claims on behalf of the estate and its beneficiaries for conversion and civil theft.
In 2003, the Spanish court entered an order closing Simon Davidson's estate and finding Allan Davidson to be his father's sole heir. Juega's notice to the court regarding estate assets failed to list the Nozomi lawsuit as an estate asset, but did mention the lawsuit's existence under the category "other remarks." When the estate was closed, Juega was discharged from his administrative responsibilities.
Subsequent to the estate's closing and his discharge as the estate administrator, Juega filed a Fourth Amended complaint in the Nozomi litigation. Stanley Davidson moved to dismiss on the ground, among others, that Juega lacked standing to pursue the litigation because as the estate was closed he no longer was the estate administrator under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a), Florida's real party in interest rule. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety.
Stanley Davidson moved for reconsideration solely as to Juega, continuing to argue Juega's lack of standing. Juega then moved to substitute Allan Davidson as the real party in interest. In support of the motion, Allan Davidson filed an affidavit attesting that Juega was pursuing the litigation for his benefit and ratified all actions taken by Juega since the inception of the lawsuit. At a hearing on the reconsideration motion, Juega withdrew his motion to substitute parties, and relied solely on the argument that he could pursue the litigation in Allan Davidson's name as his agent. The trial court dismissed Juega from the lawsuit and this appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a party's dismissal for lack of standing.See Payne v. City of Miami, 927 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Our review is confined to the complaint's four corners, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the dismissed party. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a) states, in pertinent part:
Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
By its express wording, Rule 1.210(a) enumerates six categories of persons who may bring an action for the benefit of another without joining the real party in interest. However, the real party in interest may prosecute in his own name as well even if one of those six categories of persons is available. See Estate of Morales v. Iasis Healthcare Corp., 901 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("[i]n cases involving claims made by . . . an estate, there are two parties: the estate and the personal representative"). Here, Juega ceased to be the estate administrator and the Estate ceased to be the real party in interest in 2003.
Because Juega ceased to act in his representative capacity in 2003, he did not have standing in 2004 to raise claims on behalf of the estate. Moreover, in 2004, the real party in interest was no longer the estate but Allan Davidson. As such, the Fourth Amended Complaint was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, Allan Davidson. The proper procedure under these circumstances would have been to move to substitute Allan Davidson for Juega. For reasons not made clear on this record, Juega, however, chose to abandon his motion for substitution. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
Affirmed.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.