Summary
In Judson Mills v. S.C. Unemployment Comp. Comm. 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535, unemployment benefits were denied claimant where she could not work on the third shift because of her children, even though she could have worked on the first or second shifts.
Summary of this case from Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.Opinion
15603
January 3, 1944.
Before G. DEWEY OXNER, J., Greenville County, August, 1943. Affirmed.
Pauline Moss Gaines filed an Application for Unemployment Compensation. A Claim Examiner of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission disallowed the Claim upon the ground that the Claimant was unavailable for work and hence ineligible for benefits under Sect. 4 of the S.C. Unemployment Compensation Act. The Claimant appealed to the Appeal Tribunal of the Commission, which affirmed the determination of the Claim Examiner. An Appeal was then taken to the full Commission. The Commission reversed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal affirming the determination of the Examiner, and held that the Claimant was able and available for work within the purview of the Act and was therefore eligible for benefits. The Employer, Judson Mills, then began an Action (In effect an Appeal) against the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission, and Sam B. Pratt, Jr., A.J. Hatfield, and Sam W. Hunter, as Members of said Commission, and Pauline Moss Gaines, Claimant, for a judicial review of the Commission's decision. The case was heard by His Honor, Judge Oxner, who, in his Order, reversed the decision of the Commission and sustained the Claim Examiner's determination as affirmed by the Appeal Tribunal. From this Judgment of the Circuit Court the Commission appeals.
The Circuit Decree of JUDGE OXNER, adopted as the Opinion of the Court, follows:
This action was instituted by the claimant under Section 6(i) of the South Carolina Unemployment Act, Code 1942, § 7035-86(i), and is in the nature of an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission.
The facts, as found by the Commission, are undisputed. It appears that the claimant, Pauline Moss Gaines, was employed by Judson Mills during the spring of 1942, as a quiller tender on the third shift. The claimant, the mother of four children, ranging in age from nine to twenty years, had never worked prior to this employment. Prior to November 7, 1942, a relative of the claimant had looked after her children while she was working. On November 7, 1942, this relative left, and claimant being unable to find anyone else to care for her children, was compelled to give up her work and remain at home and care for them. She has been offered work on the third shift at Judson on several occasions since quitting but has refused each time, stating that she was only available for work on the first or second shifts.
The claimant made application for unemployment benefits on January 11, 1943. The claim was disallowed by a deputy's decision upon the ground that she was unavailable for work. The claimant appealed from this adverse decision to a special appeals Referee constituting an appeal tribunal, who on February 19, 1943, filed a decision affirming the decision of the deputy and holding that the claimant was not available for work from January 11th to February 16th.
Within due time the claimant appealed to the full Commission, which on March 31, 1943, reversed the decision of the appeal tribunal, holding that the claimant voluntarily quit her work for good cause, and was genuinely unavailable for the third shift since it was necessary for her to be with her children at that time, but that since she was able and available for work on the first and second shifts, she was able and available for work within the purview of the act. Within due time plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of having the decision of the Commission reviewed.
Counsel for the Commission first take the position that the Commission's finding that the claimant was available for work within the purview of the act constitutes a finding of fact and is not subject to review if supported by any evidence. It must, of course, be conceded that the findings of the Commission upon disputed facts are not subject to review by the Courts if there is any evidence to support them. In this case, however, there were no disputed facts. The plaintiff, by its appeal, is in no way challenging the correctness of the Commission's findings of fact. The error complained of relates to the Commission's application of the law to these undisputed facts. This, it seems to me, is clearly subject to review. Any other view would substantially deprive the plaintiff of the right to appeal. I, therefore, overrule this contention.
The decision in this case hinges upon the meaning of the term "available for work." It is conceded that the claimant is no longer available for work on the third shift where she had always been employed, but the Commission takes the view that since she could accept work on either the first or second shifts, she is available for work on two of the three shifts now prevailing in the industry and, therefore, is available for work within the purview of the Act.
It does not appear that the Courts of this State have heretofore had occasion to construe this section of the statute. As a guide to its interpretation and application, the Legislature saw fit to include in the Act a declaration of State policy whereby economic insecurity due to unemployment was declared a serious menace to the health, morals and welfare of the people of the State. It further declared involuntary unemployment to be a subject of general interest and concern requiring appropriate action by the General Assembly to prevent its spread and lighten the burden which it entailed.
Involuntary unemployment could obviously result from numerous causes. Sickness, accident, old age and changes in personal conditions and circumstances could result in a person becoming unemployed through no fault of his own as readily as lack of suitable work. It is obvious, however, from the provisions of the Act that the term "involuntary unemployment" as used therein had reference to unemployment resulting from a failure of industry to provide stable employment.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in the light of the evil it seeks to remedy and in the light of the conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment. Warr et al. v. Darlington County, 181 S.C. 254, 186 S.E., 920.
This statute was passed in 1936, at a time when this State, in common with the entire nation, was suffering from a prolonged depression which had resulted in industry laying off many workers, many of whom were left without the means of obtaining even the barest necessities of life. This unquestionably was the evil which the Legislature was seeking to remedy. Unemployment due to changes in personal conditions of the employee, making it impossible for him to continue on his job had existed for many years, but there is no reason to believe that the evil resulting therefrom was any more pronounced in 1936 than it had been prior to that time. I find nothing in the Act itself or in the circumstances surrounding its passage to indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to provide benefits for a worker compelled to give up his job solely because of a change in his personal circumstances.
It will be noted that one of the remedies proposed by the Legislature in its declaration of State policy was the encouragement of industry to provide more stable employment. In furtherance of this objective, the Act imposed upon the employer the entire burden of creating and maintaining a fund for the payment of unemployment benefits. While contributions are kept in a common fund, the Commission is required under Section 7(c) of the Act, Code 1942, § 7035-87 (c), to maintain a separate account for each employer and to "classify employers in accordance with their actual experience in the payment of contributions on their own behalf and with respect to benefits charged against their accounts with a view to fixing such contribution rates as will reflect such experience."
The primary purpose of this provision would be greatly impaired, if not completely defeated, if benefits were paid to persons who became unemployed, not because the employer could no longer provide them with work but solely because of changes in their personal circumstances. I am constrained, therefore, to conclude that in order to be entitled to benefits under the Act the unemployed individual must be able to and available for the work which he or she has been doing.
This conclusion is in accord with the only case which has been cited me bearing upon the question. In Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Review, 70 Ohio App., 370, 45 N.E.2d 152, 155, the employee gave up her job because the room in which she worked was subject to drafts and she was peculiarly susceptible to colds. Her claim for unemployment benefits was sustained by the Commission upon the view that she was justified in giving up her job and that by availability for work was meant availability for suitable work. The eligibility provisions involved were practically identical with those contained in our Act and read: "No individual shall be entitled to any benefits unless he or she (1) is capable of and available for work." Gen. Code. § 1345-6.
In reversing the Commission, the Ohio Court of Appeals said: "In our judgment Subdivision 1 is applicable and determinative under the facts of the instant case. This means capable and available for the work she had been doing. It is undisputed that the job was open, but claimant was not capable or available to take the job."
Wherefore, it is ordered and declared that Decision No. 43-C-18 of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission be, and the same is hereby reversed and set aside and the defendant, Pauline Moss Gaines, is hereby declared to have been unable and unavailable for work within the purview of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act and therefore not eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits from January 11 until the hearing before the appeal tribunal on February 16, 1943, which constitutes the period of time within the scope of the record in this case.
It is further ordered that any benefits that have been paid to the defendant, Pauline Moss Gaines, under Section 6(i) of the Act and Decision No. 43-C-18 of the Commission be not charged to the reserve account of Judson Mills.
Mr. James Julien Bush and Mr. Robert G. Horine, both of Columbia, S.C. Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, cite: As to review by Court of a Finding Of Fact Of the Commission: Code of S.C. Secs. 7035-87(i); 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865; 137 F.2d 531; 219 N.C. 305, 13 S.E.2d 544; (Ga.), 13 S.E.2d 863; 114 P.2d 164; 114 P.2d 995. As to Claimant Being "Available for work" within purview of Act: 1 So.2d 305; 45 N.E.2d 152; Sec. 7035-87(c) (1) of Code of S.C.; Sec. 7035-82 of Code of S.C.; Sec. 7035-82(c) (1) of Code of S.C.; Sec. 7035-99(k) of Code of S.C. As to Claimant Being Entitled To Compensation Even Though Not Available For Exact Job She Had Been Doing: Sec. 7035-82, Code of S.C. As to Benefits Paid To Claimant Being Charged to Experience Rating Of Employer: Sec. 7035-87 (c) (1), Code of S.C.; Secs. 7035-86(b) (1) and 7035-86 (i) of Code.
Messrs. Haynsworth Haynsworth, of Greenville, S.C. Counsel for Respondent, cite: As to Review By Court Of Finding Of Fact of Commission: 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E., 594. As to Claimant Being "Available for work" within purview of Act: Code of S.C. 1942, Sec. 7035-84 (c); 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 654; 180 S.C. 491, 186 S.E., 395; 25 R.C.L., at p. 1015; 181 S.C. 254, 186 S.E., 920.
January 3, 1944.
This is an appeal from a decree of Honorable G. Dewey Oxner, Judge of the Thirteenth Circuit. With that decree this Court finds itself in agreement. The conclusions reached by Judge Oxner are entirely proper and correct.
The appeal must be dismissed.