Opinion
No. CV 07-5012781
January 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In this action to foreclose upon Hartford city tax liens brought by the plaintiff JRiege, LLC, assignee of the liens, plaintiff moves for summary judgment. The defendant interposes the special defenses of accord and satisfaction, estoppel and laches. No facts are alleged in support of these special defenses. No documentary evidence has been presented by defendant to establish payment of the subject tax liens or an agreement by an entity to buy the tax liens upon which defendant relied. The defense of laches is not valid against a municipality. Joyel v. Commissioner of Education, 45 Conn.App. 476, 486 (1997) ("The doctrine of laches may not be invoked against a governmental agency").
Defendant alleges a fourth special defense of unclean hands. However, after the court granted plaintiff's motion to revise, defendant did not replead the defense of unclean hands. Consequently, this court will not consider it.
The defendant's primary defense is that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-195b, the City did not "by a resolution of its legislative body . . . assign" the subject tax liens. The City claims its resolution of February 23, 2004 authorized its corporation counsel to assign the tax liens and pursuant to that authority the corporation counsel did assign the tax liens to the plaintiff.
That 2004 resolution provides: ". . . the Corporation Counsel, with the approval of the Mayor, is hereby authorized and may enter into monetary settlement in amounts not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollard ($20,000.00) per claim or action brought against the City of Hartford, without further Counsel approval." The defendant properly points out the authorization only applies to claims against the City of Hartford. A tax lien is clearly a claim in favor of the City of Hartford.
However, on October 14, 2008, the Hartford City Counsel passed a resolution ratifying its prior delegation to the Corporation Counsel to approve the assignment of tax liens up to Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00). The resolution provides as follows:
"WHEREAS, in accordance with the provisions of the 2004 ordinance the City assigned certain tax liens to JReige on the 31st day of May 2007 for a purchase price of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to allow JRiege to foreclose on property owned by the O'Leary Limited Partnership and, upon successful completion of the foreclosure, to put such property back into productive, tax paying use; now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED that the Court of Common Counsel ratifies its prior delegation under the 2004 ordinance of its power to approve the assignment of tax lien claims in an amount not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to Corporation Counsel with the approval of the Mayor; and be it further
RESOLVED that this ratification of authority shall be effective as of the date of the 2004 ordinance and shall apply to all tax lien assignments taking place on and after said date; . . ."
"It is the general rule that whatever acts public officials may do or authorize to be done in the first instance may subsequently be adopted or ratified by them with the same effect as though properly done under previous authority." 10A McQuillan, The Law on Municipal Corporations., § 29.104 (3d Ed. Rev. 1999). It is also well settled that "ratification is equivalent to previous authorization and operates upon the act ratified in the same manner as though authority had been given originally." John J. Brennan Construction Co. v. Sheldon, 187 Conn. 695, 712 (1982). 10A McQuillan, The Law on Municipal Corporations, (3d Ed. Rev.) § 29.106.
Accordingly, the 2008 resolution operates as though the Court of Common Counsel did authorize, as of the date of the 2004 ordinance, the Corporation Counsel and the Mayor to assign the subject tax liens.
There being no material issue of fact, and the plaintiff being entitled to recover as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment is granted.