Opinion
2013-00592
07-22-2015
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, National Association, respondent, v. Vicki SCHOTT, also known as Vicki A. Mosello, also known as Vicki A. Schott, appellant, et al., defendant.
Jeffrey I. Klein, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant. Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC, New York, N.Y. (Anthony W. Vaughn, Jr., and Kashif I. Chand of counsel), for respondent.
Jeffrey I. Klein, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant.
Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC, New York, N.Y. (Anthony W. Vaughn, Jr., and Kashif I. Chand of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., PETER B. SKELOS, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Opinion In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Vicki Schott, also known as Vicki A. Mosello, also known as Vicki A. Schott, appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), dated September 5, 2012, as granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against her and to appoint a referee.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.In 2004, the appellant obtained a mortgage loan from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (hereinafter WaMu). In 2008, after WaMu had entered receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter the FDIC), the plaintiff and the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption agreement, pursuant to which the plaintiff acquired all of WaMu's loans and loan commitments (see JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Russo, 121 A.D.3d 1048, 996 N.Y.S.2d 68 ; JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v.
Miodownik, 91 A.D.3d 546, 547, 937 N.Y.S.2d 192 ). In 2010, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose on the appellant's mortgage.
The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the appellant and to appoint a referee. In support of its motion, the plaintiff produced the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Catizone, 127 A.D.3d 1151, 1152, 9 N.Y.S.3d 315 ; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Enaw, 126 A.D.3d 830, 7 N.Y.S.3d 146 ). The plaintiff also established that it had standing to commence the action, and that it strictly complied with the notice requirement of RPAPL 1304 (see Emigrant Mtge. Co. v. Persad, 117 A.D.3d 676, 677, 985 N.Y.S.2d 608 ; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Weisblum, 85 A.D.3d 95, 103, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609 ). Accordingly, the plaintiff established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. DeSouza, 126 A.D.3d 965, 3 N.Y.S.3d 619 ; Rimbambito, LLC v. Lee, 118 A.D.3d 690, 986 N.Y.S.2d 855 ).