Opinion
Civ. No. 99-3754, SECTION "K"(3).
March 30, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the court is plaintiffs Motion to Remand. The court heard oral argument on the motion on February 16, 2000, and the parties have filed supplemental briefing. For the reasons explained more fully below, the court finds that plaintiffs motion lacks merit and should be denied.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Jeffery Joyner ("Joyner"), began working as a field service technician for Cooper Cameron Corporation ("CCC") on August 16, 1997. (CCC'S Opposition Memo, Exhibit A, Affidavit of William Guidry). As a field service technician, Joyner's responsibilities included installing on various wells certain equipment manufactured or sold by CCC, such as tubing or casing hangers, tubing or casing heads, well control stacks and valves. (CCC'S Opposition Memo, Exhibit A, Affidavit of William Guidry).
William Guidry has been CCC's Human Resource Manager in the Ville Platte office for three years.
During Joyner's year and a half with CCC, Joyner received ninety-five work assignments from CCC. (CCC's Opposition Memo, Exhibit A, Affidavit of William Guidry) of those ninety-five assignments, seventy-one were located at a well on land or at a well that terminated at a fixed offshore platform. The other twenty-four assignments involved work performed to a wellhead solely from a jack up or other floating rig. When Joyner performed work on a wellhead from a jack up or other floating rig, CCC did not direct him to participate in the navigation of the rig.
The details of the alleged accident giving rise to this litigation are sketchy. In fact, even the date of the accident is unclear. Plaintiffs original state court petition asserts that he was injured on March 24, 1999. CCC has supplied the court with the affidavit and report of Roger McCall ("McCall"), plaintiffs supervisor, and an ENSCO Employee Injury or Illness Report completed by Thomas Gant ("Gant"), the ENSCO toolpusher on the rig. McCall's report and the ENSCO Injury Report indicate that the accident occurred on March 21, 1999.
On March 18, 1999, plaintiff was dispatched by CCC to an offshore oil platform located off the coast of Louisiana in West Delta Block 94. Plaintiff performed his work of installing the tubing hanger as part of the process of completing the well. He then returned to shore on March 22 and reported the injury to McCall. McCall completed a "Cameron Supervisor's Report," which states that the accident occurred on an "offshore platform." McCall's report describes the accident as having occurred while plaintiff was running in "hold down pins using a pipe wrench and cheata [sic] pipe." As described by Joyner himself in the Illness or Injury Report, the accident occurred as follows:
Ran in hold down pin's [sic] on hanger and pulled up to get pin's [sic] tight as I could. The next day I am wake up [sic] with lower back pain. I took Aleeve [sic] and reported to Barge Ing. in afternoon. My company makes us write report.
The report completed by Joyner further states that the accident occurred on the "Platform +10 deck," which is the deck on the platform ten feet above the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
The well, which terminated at the platform, was owned by defendant Hall-Houston Oil Company ("Hall-Houston"). Hall-Houston had contracted with CCC in a Master Service Agreement for certain goods and services to be provided to Hall-Houston in connection with drilling and maintenance activities. ENSCO Offshore Company ("ENSCO") had entered a Domestic Daywork Drilling contract with Hall-Houston to perform a well workover at the platform. ENSCO owned the ENSCO Rig 90, a jack up rig, which was on location at the platform at the time of Joyner's alleged accident.
The ENSCO 90 was manned by its own crew, which was supplied by ENSCO. Plaintiff claims that he was a crew member of the ENSCO 90 and worked "shoulder to shoulder" with ENSCO crewmembers. Defendants argue that Joyner was strictly an employee of CCC and that CCC did not direct Joyner or any of its other employees to participate in the maintenance, navigation, or voyage of the ENSCO 90.
Robert Clary ("Clary") was employed by Petroleum Professionals International, Ltd., an independent contractor of Hall-Houston. Clary acted as the operator or "company man" for Hall-Houston wells in West Delta Block 94. No more than four or five days prior to March 21, 1999, Clary had called a dispatcher to send for a wellhead serviceman to install the wellhead and tubing hanger on the well. The plaintiff was the field service technician or "wellhead serviceman" sent at Clary's request.
ERC Industries, Inc. ("ERC") (d/b/a Wood Group Pressure Control)("WGPC") is a corporation which was allegedly responsible for supplying/repairing/refurbishing certain equipment in use at the time plaintiff was injured. Wood Group Light Industrial Turbines, Inc. ("WGLIT") is a sister corporation of ERC. WGLIT provides repair, overhaul, and performance testing service of turbines. ERC maintains that the tubing spool head that allegedly caused Joyner's injury was sold to Hall-Houston in 1995 by Premium Valve Services, L.L.C. ("Premium Valve"). In March of 1998, ERC purchased certain assets of Premium Valve, but the tubing spool head in question was not part of that asset purchase.
On August 13, 1999, Joyner filed suit in the 25th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines, asserting various causes of action the following defendants:
Against CCC, Joyner has alleged liability under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and the willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure.
Against Hall-Houston, Joyner has alleged liability under the Jones Act and general maritime law for unseaworthiness, negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, the willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure, under § 905(b) of the Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and strict liability under Louisiana law.
Against ENSCO, Joyner has alleged liability under the Jones Act general maritime law for unseaworthiness, negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, the willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure, under § 905(b) of the Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and strict liability under Louisiana law.
Against Clary, Joyner has alleged liability under the Jones Act general maritime law for unseaworthiness, negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, the willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure, under § 905(b) of the Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and strict liability under Louisiana law.
Against WGLIT, and WGPC, for negligence under the general maritime law.
Joyner also named Conoco, Inc. as a defendant but has since dismissed Conoco from the action.
On December 15, 1999, defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, et seq. Defendants argue that removal was proper because plaintiffs alleged injury arose out of operations on the Outer Continental Shelf, giving this court federal question jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"). 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq.
Plaintiff filed this Motion to Remand on January 18, 2000, arguing that the action is nonremovable because there exists a reasonable probability of his establishing a Jones Act claim on the merits. 46 U.S.C. App. § 688; 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (a). Furthermore, plaintiff argues that he has asserted valid claims under the general maritime law and that the matter is absolutely nonremovable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) as one of the named defendants is a Louisiana citizen. Defendants contend that the Jones Act was fraudulently pleaded and does not bar removal. Defendants further argue that plaintiff has not asserted valid claims under the general maritime law, and that federal question jurisdiction exists. The court will address each of these arguments in turn.
II. Standard for Remand
Joyner moves this court to remand this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c), which reads as follows:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before the final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the remand shall be mailed by the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
The well-established law of the Fifth Circuit is that when the district court is faced with a motion for remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction over the controversy. Vasquez v. Alto Bonito Gravel Plant Corp., 56 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1995); Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992); Kidd v. Southwest Airlines Co., 891 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1990).
III. Motion to Remand
In this motion, Plaintiff argues that the court lacks removal jurisdiction over this case and that it has properly asserted claims against at least one Jones Act employer. Defendants counter that plaintiff has fraudulently joined parties and claims. Plaintiff also contends that he has not stated claims under OCSLA, that he has valid claims arising under the general maritime law, and that complete diversity does not exists among the parties named in this action.
IV. Plaintiff's Jones Act Claims
Generally, claims arising under the Jones Act are non-removable. Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1995). Joyner alleges in his petition that he is a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. App. § 688. Defendants argue that the Jones Act employers named in plaintiffs petition have been fraudulently joined to defeat removal jurisdiction. In Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 990 F.2d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit addressed fraudulent joinder of a Jones Act employer:
Joyner has alleged Jones Act claims against ENSCO, CCC, and Hall-Houston.
[D]efendants may pierce the pleadings to show that the Jones Act claim has been fraudulently pleaded to prevent removal. The fact that Jones Act claims are ordinarily not removable does not prevent this inquiry. Lawsuits in which non-diverse defendants have been joined are ordinarily non-removable as well. Nonetheless defendants are permitted to demonstrate that parties — or claims — are baseless in law and fact and serve only to frustrate federal jurisdiction.Id. To prevail a defendant must prove that the allegations were fraudulently made and that, as a matter of law, there is no reasonable basis for predicting that the plaintiff might establish a cause of action. Defendants have met their heavy burden.
A. Is Plaintiff a Jones Act Seaman?
In order to recover under the Jones Act, the plaintiffs complained of injury must have been suffered while he was a seaman and in the course of his employment. Section 688(a) (authorizing action by "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment"). In order to be a seaman, an individual must have an "employment related connection to a vessel in navigation." Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). To establish an employment related connection to a vessel in navigation, the plaintiff must satisfy a two prong test. First, the employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or accomplishment of its mission. Second, the employee "must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997) ( quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. 347 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ordinarily, seaman status is a fact-specific inquiry better left to the province of the jury. Ducote v. V. Keller Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000, 1002 (5th Cir. 1992). However, "[w]hen the underlying facts are established and the rule of law is undisputed, the issue is whether the facts meet the statutory standard." McDermott Int'l. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991).
Joyner maintains that he was a seaman at the time of his injury because he was living and working aboard the ENSCO 90 together with ENSCO employees. He attests that his injury occurred while he and ENSCO employees were jointly attempting to seat the tubing spool head. Plaintiff also attests that he has spent eighty to ninety percent of his career aboard navigable drilling vessels. (Plaintiffs Memo, Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Jeffery Joyner).
1. Is the ENSCO 90 a "Vessel?"
A vessel is "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 1 U.S.C. § 3. In general, the "greater the structure's resemblance to conventional seafaring craft, the greater the odds of securing vessel status." Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1990). Unusual appearance alone will not suffice to preclude vessel status, however, the Fifth Circuit has recognized "a variety of special purpose structures, far removed from the conventional notions of ships and seagoing barges, to be vessels." Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc. 182 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1999) ( citing Manuel v. P.A. W. Drilling Well Service, Inc. 135 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Courts have long recognized a distinction between "work platforms" that are designed for primarily stationary residence and true vessels. See Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887) (floating dry dock is not a vessel). Looking to the language of the statute, the Fifth Circuit has consistently defined vessel status in reference to the importance of transportation as the craft's purpose. Manuel, 135 F.3d at 348. Specifically, courts have focused on three factors when trying to determine whether a structure is a work platform beyond the realm of the Jones Act:
First, we ask whether the structure was constructed to serve primarily as a work platform. Second, we look to whether or not the structure was moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident. Lastly, we attempt to ascertain whether the transportation function of the structure went beyond theoretical mobility and occasional incidental movement.Fields, 182 F.3d at 358 ( citing Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176).
The Fifth Circuit has previously held that drilling rigs, such as the jack up rig in this case, and other special purpose craft do more than merely float on navigable waters and serve as work platforms. Rather, they serve as important function transporting passengers, cargo or other equipment across navigable waters. Manuel, 135 F.3d at 351. See also Vickers v. Chiles Drilling Co., 822 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1987).
In this case, the defendants do not dispute that the ENSCO 90 is, in fact, a vessel. Rather, they argue that Joyner did not have a substantial connection to the vessel in navigation and that Joyner did not contribute to the accomplishment of the mission or function of the ENSCO.
2. Did Joyner Contribute to the Function of or Accomplishment of the Mission of the ENSCO 90?
Joyner urges the court to ignore Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent and follow the recent holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wisner v. Professional Divers of New Orleans, 731 So.2d 200 (La. 1999). Wisner was a professional diver who asserted claims under the Jones Act. In Wisner, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the plaintiffs Jones Act claim, despite the absence of a connection to any vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. The Wisner court reviewed the long-established jurisprudence but decided that the true focus should be on the total circumstances of the plaintiffs employment rather than allowing "jurisprudential tests to obscure such a finding." Wisner at 204.
Pretermitting the sagacity of the holding in Wisner, this court is bound to follow the law of the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit, as Jones Act claims are governed exclusively by the federal maritime law of the United States. The test for seaman status is clearly established. Therefore, to establish seaman status, Joyner must first show that he contributed to the function of the vessel or accomplishment of its mission. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368.
Joyner asserts that he worked "shoulder to shoulder" with ENSCO employees. Nonetheless, Joyner was not directed to perform work aboard the ENSCO 90, and he has submitted no evidence from which the court could conclude that he in any way contributed to the function of the vessel or accomplishment of its mission. To the contrary, it appears that the ENSCO lodging primarily served as sleeping quarters for Joyner, despite Joyner's working closely with ENSCO employees on the platform.
3. Did Joyner Have a Substantial Connection to a Vessel or Identifiable Fleet of Vessels in Navigation, Substantial in Both Its Duration and Nature
To attain seaman status, a claimant must show that he was either permanently assigned to or performed a substantial part of his work aboard a vessel or identifiable group of vessels. Papai, 520 U.S. at 555-58. Regardless of the percentage of Joyner's career spent on vessels, the court's inquiry is focused on his employment with CCC, particularly his assignment at the time the accident occurred. Id. Joyner was never assigned to a vessel in navigation. Joyner was assigned to fixed platforms, which are not vessels. While Joyner may have slept aboard vessels on occasion, merely sleeping aboard a vessel attached to a fixed platform does not forge a connection to the vessel in navigation. Joyner's employment was not substantially connected to a vessel in terms of its nature. See also Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, there was no common ownership of the vessels upon which Joyner ate and slept. He was not permanently assigned to any vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. Rather, he was dispatched by CCC as a well head technician either to land wells or to wells terminating at offshore platforms, owned by different entities with which CCC contracted. As explained above, during Joyner's employment with CCC, Joyner received ninety-five work assignments, seventy-one of which were located at a well on land or at a well that terminated at a fixed offshore platform. While Joyner slept on vessels during some assignments, the vessels were owned and provided by different companies. The other twenty-four assignments involved work performed to a wellhead solely from a jack up or other floating rig. Likewise, there was no common ownership of the vessels upon which Joyner actually worked. See Hufnagel, 182 F.3d at 347 ( citing Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) ("By fleet we mean an identifiable group of vessels acting together or under one control. We reject the notion that fleet of vessels in this context means any group of vessels an employee happens to work aboard.") (footnote embodied)).
Finally, Joyner's assignments only lasted as long as it took him to perform his specialized task. In this case, Joyner was dispatched to the Hall-Houston platform on March 18 and returned to shore five days later. Thus, Joyner's connection to the vessel was not substantial in terms of its duration.
The court does not find that Joyner meets the second prong of the test for seaman status.
B. Was Joyner a Borrowed Servant of ENSCO?
It was suggested at the oral argument on this motion that Joyner might establish seaman status if he were a borrowed servant of ENSCO. The Fifth Circuit has explained that [t]he borrowed servant doctrine is the functional rule that places the risk of a worker's injury on his actual rather than his nominal employer. It permits the injured worker to recover from the company that was actually directing his work." Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1981). In Hall v. Diamond M Company, the Fifth Circuit listed the considerations for determining borrowed servant status:
(1) Who has control over the employee and the work he is performing, beyond mere suggestion of details or cooperation?
(2) Whose work is being performed?
(3) Was there an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds between the original and borrowing employer?
(4) Did the employee acquiesce in the new work situation?
(5) Did the original employer terminate his relationship with the employee?
(6) Who furnished tools and place for performance?
(7) Was the new employment over a considerable length of time?
(8) Who has the right to discharge the employee?
(9) Who had the obligation to pay the employee?
732 F.2d 1246, 1249 ( citing Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1977)). "[N]o one of these factors, or any combination of them, is decisive, and no fixed test is used to determine the existence of a borrowed-servant relationship . . ." Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1969). Nonetheless, in Hebron v. Union Oil Co. of California, 634 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1981), the court stated that "[t]he central question in borrowed servant cases is whether someone has the power to control and direct another person in the performance of his work."
In this case, Joyner was not directed by ENSCO personnel to perform drilling or workover operations on the rig. (Hall-Houston's Opposition Memo, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Thomas Gant). On the job, Joyner primarily reported to Clary, Hall-Houston's company man. (Hall-Houston's Opposition Memo, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Robert Clary). There is no evidence that CCC had any agreement with ENSCO for Joyner to provide services aboard the rig. If Joyner were considered the borrowed servant of any party, it would be Hall-Houston, not ENSCO. Therefore, Joyner cannot establish seaman status through the borrowed servant doctrine.
The undisputed evidence reflects that, as a matter of law, Joyner was not a seaman and has no even arguable Jones Act claim. Therefore, remand is not required by the Jones Act. The court must now examine the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
C. Removal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
The question before the court is whether Joyner's claims against defendants are removable under § 1441. Section 1441(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
Defendants contend that this court has original jurisdiction over Joyner's claims because his petition implicates OCSLA. OCSLA was enacted by Congress to provide a federal body of law to govern operations on the outer Continental Shelf. Recognizing that the statutory federal law may in some areas be inadequate, Congress incorporated into OCSLA the laws of adjacent states, where they are not inconsistent with OCSLA. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (a)(2)(A). Nonetheless, OCSLA is exclusively federal law. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). Hence, federal courts have original jurisdiction over OCSLA claims. Such claims are removable under § 1441 without regard to the citizenship of the parties. See Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
On the other hand, plaintiff has asserted claims against defendants under the general maritime law. General maritime claims do not "arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States" for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. An admiralty action filed in state court under the savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), is not removable solely because it might have been filed in federal court. Rather, removal of an admiralty action filed in state court is possible only if jurisdiction is based on other grounds, such as diversity or a statutory provision. Tennessee Gas v. Houston Casualty Co., Ins., 87 F.3d at 153 (5th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, to determine removability pursuant to § 1441, the court must ascertain whether plaintiffs petition implicates OCSLA. If, as Joyner contends, OCSLA is inapplicable here, the case must be remanded. Otherwise, if OCSLA does apply, the court must determine whether plaintiff has asserted valid claims under the general maritime law. If there are no general maritime claims, but only OCSLA claims, the case was properly removed.
Yet another scenario exists when there general maritime and OCSLA claims overlap in the same case. In such a situation, the citizenship of the parties becomes relevant to the question of removability. See Rivas v. Energy Partners of Delaware, civil action nos. 99-2742, 99-3352 (slip copy) (Duval, J.) ( citing Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 156).
1. Does Joyner's Complaint Implicate OCSLA?
Although plaintiffs petition does not invoke OCSLA, it is not necessary that a plaintiff plead OCSLA specifically as long as the allegations in his complaint set forth legal claims based on OCSLA. See Hufnagel, 182 F.2d 349-350; Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 154-155. In this case, Joyner asserted claims of strict liability under Louisiana law against ENSCO, Hall-Houston, and Clary. Hall-Houston is the owner of the fixed offshore oil platform on the Outer Continental Shelf, and Joyner claims that it is liable for actions allegedly occurring on that platform. Only under OCSLA may a plaintiff maintain a Louisiana cause of action for strict liability for an accident occurring on the Outer Continental Shelf. Therefore, OCSLA provides Joyner's only strict liability remedy against Hall-Houston, ENSCO, and Clary under these factual circumstances.
The Fifth Circuit applies a "but-for" test to determine whether a cause of action arises under OCSLA. A plaintiffs claims arises under OCSLA if 1) plaintiffs employment furthered mineral development on the continental shelf, and 2) plaintiffs injury would not have occurred, but-for his employment. See Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1988).
In this case, but-for Joyner's employment as a well head technician and deployment to the on the platform, he would not have been injured. The alleged injuries occurred while Joyner was in the course of installing the tubing hanger and well head on the well. Clearly, he was involved in the "exploration, development, or production" of minerals on the shelf. The but-for test is satisfied, and OCSLA governs Joyner's strict liability claim against Hall-Houston, ENSCO, and Clary. Therefore the court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over such claim.
2. Has Plaintiff Made Valid General Maritime Claims?
Joyner has asserted general maritime law claims against ENSCO, Hall-Houston, Clary, ERG, WGLIT, and CCC. The court's finding of OCSLA jurisdiction does not preclude the assertion of valid general maritime claims where both could apply. See Hufnagel, 182 F.3d at 350 ( citing Smith v. Pernod Drilling, 960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992)("When an event occurs on an OCSLA situs but is also governed by maritime law, maritime law controls.").
To give rise to a tort claim in admiralty, the alleged wrong must have both a maritime situs and a connection to traditional maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). The situs or location test requires that the tort either occurred on navigable waters, or, if the injury is suffered on land, that it was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. See Grubart, 115 S.Ct. at 1048. Joyner's accident, by all accounts, could only have occurred on the fixed platform and, hence, did not occur on navigable waters. See Rodrigue, 89 S.Ct. at 1839-40; Smith, 960 F.2d at 459 (drilling platforms constitute artificial islands). Nor was the accident caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Neither Joyner nor the platform was struck by a vessel. Therefore, Joyner does not satisfy the situs requirement.
Although there was some suggestion at oral argument that the accident occurred on the rig, rather than on the platform, the undisputed evidence submitted to the court, including the Injury and Illness Report, which Joyner himself completed, indicates that the accident could only have occurred on the platform.
Furthermore, the accident also fails the connection test. The court must determine whether the activity giving rise to the accident bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime commerce. Rodrigue, 89 S.Ct at 1840. In this case, installing a tubing hanger and well head on a well do not bear any relation to traditional maritime commerce. See Herb's Welding Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985) (finding offshore platform worker not engaged in maritime employment). Neither prong of the test is satisfied in this case. Therefore, Joyner has asserted no valid maritime claims.
V. Conclusion
The undisputed evidence shows, as a matter of law, that Joyner was not a Jones Act seaman. At the time of his injury, Joyner was not assigned to any identifiable vessel or fleet of vessels. Therefore, remand is not required by the Jones Act.
Furthermore, Joyner's claims do not arise under the general maritime law. Rather, he has alleged against defendants claims under Louisiana law, made applicable through OCSLA. Thus, his claims are removable without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Remand is hereby DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 29 th day of March 2000.