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noting that "The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has set forth the range of duties imposed upon co-independent contractors as follows: 'at the very least, [an independent contractor] owe [a fellow independent contractor] the duty to refrain from gross, willful or wanton negligence, and at the most the duty to refrain from creating an unreasonable risk of harm or a hazardous condition.'"
Summary of this case from Bonin v. Bilfinger Salamis, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-3754 SECTION "K"(5)
February 7, 2001
Before the Court is Petroleum Professionals International ("PPI") and Robert Clary's ("Clary") motion for summary judgment (record document 127). The Court heard oral argument on January 4, 2001 and has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant case law and decides for the reasons that follow.
I. Background
For purposes of this motion, the following facts are relevant. Plaintiff, Jeffrey Joyner ("Joyner") allegedly was injured on or about March 22, 1999 while installing a tubing spool head on an offshore well serviced from a fixed platform owned and operated by Hall-Houston. Joyner has sued several actors for breach of their alleged duties with respect to the installation of the tubing spool head. PPI and Clary have filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that because they are independent contractors, they owe no duty to Joyner. An examination of the legal relationships of Joyner, PPI and Clary is therefore appropriate.
Joyner was an employee of Cooper Cameron Corporation ("CCC"). On January 16, 1999 Hall-Houston, an oil company, hired CCC to perform work on its wellhead. On March 18, 1999 CCC sent Joyner, a field service technician, to perform work on the Hall-Houston platform located at West Delta Block 94 in the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while tightening down hanger lock down pins on the Hall-Houston platform.
Petroleum Professional International supplies engineering support consultants and drilling consultants to provide technical support at rig sites for various customers throughout the oil and gas industry. See Affidavit of B. Randy Sullivan at 2. PPI typically uses independent contractors when supplying rig site drilling consultants to its customers. Id. On January 1, 1996, PPI and Hall-Houston entered into a Master Service Agreement whereby PPI, as an independent contractor, was to provide a variety a supervisory and inspection services personnel to Hall-Houston.
On June 23, 1997, PPI and Robert Clary signed a "Consulting Agreement" obliging Robert Clary, as an independent contractor, to act as a drilling consultant on behalf of the company. Consulting Agreement at ¶ 1. Under the Consulting Agreement, Clary retained "the sole control over the manner and means of performance" of the Agreement. Consulting Agreement at ¶ 7.
To summarize, PPI was an independent contractor to Hall-Houston. Clary was an independent contractor to both Hall-Houston and PPI. Neither Clary nor PPI had a contractual relation with Cooper Cameron Corporation, or Joyner himself. As to PPI's activities, no one from PPI was at the site of the Hall-Houston West Delta 94 Project at any time. As such, no one from PPI exercised any authority or supervision over Joyner or his work activities. See Affadavit of B. Randy Sullivan at ¶¶ 12-13. With respect to Clary, no one from PPI trained, supervised or controlled Clary. Id.
As an independent contractor on the project, Clary's job was to ensure that Hall-Houston's plans were carried out. Although Clary had the right to check work progress and quality, he did not supervise the actual work methodology employed by Joyner. See Joyner deposition at 10-12, 22, 36, 166-67. Depending on the stage of the project, Clary would tell the workers what duties needed to be done, and it would then be the responsibilities of the workers, including Joyner, to complete their tasks.
Although plaintiffs theory as to PPI is vague and undefined, his theory against Clary is clear. Plaintiff claims that he was injured while trying to get a seal on the hanger. Joyner claims he advised Clary that the existing hanger was worn down and missing two lock pins and that it would be a million to one shot to obtain a seal. According to Joyner, Clary in response told a toolpusher to tell Joyner to "get a seal" on the defective hanger. It was a this point that Joyner chose to use a cheater bar to add leverage and assist him in tightening down the damaged hanger. was during this tightening operation that Joyner alleges he was injured. Plaintiff claims that Clary exercised operational control over Joyner, and breached his duty of reasonable care to Joyner, proximately causing the back injury. It is the defendants contention that as separate independent contractors who did not exercise operational control they have no duty to Joyner and thus cannot be held liable for his alleged injuries. With these facts in mind, the Court turns to the relevant legal standards.
II. Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as-a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citingSkotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986))). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356-57 (1986). Finally, the Court notes that the substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
The Court now turns to the merits.
III. Analysis
A. PPI
"Under Louisiana law, a principal generally is not liable for the offenses an independent contractor commits in the course of performing contractual duties." LeJuene v. Shell Oil Company, 950 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Plaintiff points out no facts connecting PPI to the work performed on the rig at any time. As plaintiff makes no specific allegations with respect to PPI that raise an issue of fact, the Court can only conclude that plaintiff's sole cause of action is against PPI vicariously for Clary's alleged actions. However, the agreement between Clary and PPI clearly set forth Clary's role as that of the independent contractor. See Consulting Agreement at ¶¶ 1 7. Moreover, there are no factual issues to implicate PPI's involvement in drilling activities whatsoever. Therefore, PPI, as a principal, cannot be held liable for its independent contractor's alleged offenses. See Ainsworth v. Shell Oil, 829 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1987).
B. Clary
Defendant claims that he is "immune" from liability because of his status as an independent contractor. As such, he claims that he owes no duty to the plaintiff. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, the primary question that must be asked is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. See La. Civ. Code Art. 2315; Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987). Duty is a question of law. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La. 1991). The determination whether or not a particular defendant owed a duty to a particular plaintiff is imperative because "[i]t is a fundamental principle of tort law that there can be negligence unless there is first a duty." Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, 830 F.2d 1332, 1340 (5th Cir. 1987).
Clary is neither the owner of the rig or the principal in this matter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that he may not claim that his duty is that of a principal or avail himself of the independent contractor defense. As stated above, the independent contractor defense shields a principal from liability arising from the acts of his independent contractor. In this case, plaintiff seeks to hold Clary liable for his own acts, i.e. allegedly urging plaintiff to get a seal on the hanger when Clary allegedly knew that it would be extremely difficult. Thus, the Court must determine the duty imposed by law upon Clary.
"Generally, a person owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others against the foreseeable risks of his misconduct." Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, p. 101 (1996). "Louisiana courts routinely analyze personal injury and property damage cases arising from drilling activities under negligence principles." Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, 829 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1987). When contractor liability is concerned, "a contractor owes third parties a duty to exercise ordinary care and refrain from creating hazardous conditions in the fulfillment of its contractual obligations." Cormier v. Honiron Corp., 771 So.2d 193 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2000); See also Oxley v. Sabine River Authority, 663 So.2d 497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1995). The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has set forth the range of duties imposed upon co-independent contractors as follows: "at the very least, [an independent contractor] owe[s] [a fellow independent contractor] the duty to refrain from gross, willful or wanton negligence, and at the most the duty to refrain from creating an unreasonable risk of harm or a hazardous condition." Lafont v. Chevron, U.S.A., 593 So.2d 416, 420 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Therefore, the duty imposed upon Clary is that imposed on all persons, the exercise of reasonable care. Thus, plaintiffs claim must be analyzed under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, which codifies the principle that "every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another obliges by him whose fault it happened to repair it."
In determining "fault under [article 2315], Louisiana courts apply a duty-risk analysis, which the Louisiana Supreme Court has resolved into the following three inquiries: (1) was the affirmative conduct a cause in fact of the resulting harm; (2) was there a duty to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner; and (3) was that duty breached." Ellison v. Conoco, Inc., 950 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1992)(citing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 566 (La. 1990). "Whether an alleged tortfeasor owes a duty to protect others from a particular risk of harm is a legal question to be determined by the trial court." Martin v. Watson's Grocery, 615 So.2d 999, 1001 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993). "[I]n making this determination, the court must look to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the accident at issue"Id.; See also Parish v. L.M. Daigle Oil Co., Inc., 742 So.2d 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1999).; Caldwell v. Let the Good Times Roll Festival, 717 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1998); Mays v. Gretna Athletic Boosters, Inc., 668 So.2d 1207 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff argues that Clary is legally liable for plaintiff's injuries based on two grounds. As stated above, plaintiff claims that Clary told him to tighten down the seal when Clary knew that the existing hanger was worn and defective and also was told that it would be a million to one shot to accomplish that task of getting seal on the hanger. Plaintiff claims that Clary's knowledge is proven through his actions in ordering new equipment to replace the defective mechanism upon which Joyner injured himself.
The question the Court must answer then, is whether Clary owed a duty to Joyner to prevent Joyner from injuring his back when tightening lockdown pins on an allegedly defective piece of equipment. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court must answer that question in the negative. Mr. Joyner himself testified that based upon his 10-12 years experience as a wellhead technician, that he did not feel that his work method, or use of the cheater bar to tighten down the pins, was unsafe or risky. See Joyner depo. at p. 62, 162. Nor did he voice an objection to tightening down the pins. See Joyner depo. at 171. This is critical considering that it was Joyner's specialized technical job to tighten down the lock down pins, not Clary's. See Joyner depo. at 10, 12. Considering his specialized knowledge of the field and that it was Joyner's own decision to choose an appropriate work method, Joyner depo. p. 36, the Court cannot find that Clary owed a duty to prevent Joyner from injuring himself while tightening down the lock down pins. In other words, Clary's duty to Joyner did not encompass the risk that Joyner would be injured using a work method that Joyner himself, an experienced field technician who chose his own work methods and had the authority to refuse any unsafe work procedure, believed to be safe. See generally Verdin v. Kerr McGee Corp., 1997 WL 39308 (E.D. La. 1997) (in a negligence case, holding that there is no legal duty between two independent contractors).
Even if there were ad duty in this case, there is clearly no breach of that duty. "The standard [to determine breach of duty] is generally an objective one, i.e., what a reasonable person in the actors position would have done under the same or similar circumstances, and not what any particular subsequent trier of fact would have done." Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, p. 139 (1996).
According to plaintiffs deposition testimony, Clary had the right to check the progress and quality of Joyner's work but did not actually supervise the methods used by Joyner to accomplish his tasks. See Joyner depo. at 40-43. Additionally, Clary did not even watch Joyner the day he was injured, including setting the hanger; testing the seal or tightening the lock down pins. See Joyner depo. at 22-26. Even more importantly, Joyner admitted that it was his responsibility to choose the work method that he used, including the use of the cheater bar to tighten the lock down pins on the day he was allegedly injured. See Joyner depo. at 36, 10-12, 22 and 166-67. Finally, Joyner himself believed that it was safe to use the cheater bar to tighten the lock down pins at the time of his accident. See Joyner depo. at 152, 160. Indeed, the only act alleged against Clary is the a double hearsay statement; Joyner alleges that Clary told a toolpusher to tell him to "get on it and get a seal." However, there is no allegation that Joyner was told how to do his job or even raised an issue as to the effectiveness of his own work method. Such facts indicate that there is no issue of fact as to a breach of duty by Clary. Joyner's actions were clearly of his own volition and in accordance with his best professional judgment. That Clary, a person not an expert in Joyner's field, allegedly told someone to tell Joyner to finish his job simply does not rise to the level of a failure to exercise ordinary care. Therefore, Joyner's claims against Clary fails to establish a breach of duty either. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed By Petroleum Professionals International and Robert Clary is GRANTED.