Opinion
E033566.
7-24-2003
JOSEPH E., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDRENS SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
William E. Drake for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Alan K. Marks, County Counsel, and Jeffrey S. Moret, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner Joseph E. is the presumed father of M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2. Father filed this writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B challenging an order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing as to the children. Father contends (1) the juvenile court erred in granting San Bernardino County Department of Childrens Services (DCS) request to change the childrens permanent plan from long-term foster care to adoption; and (2) there were compelling reasons, such as the sibling exception and the parent/child relationship exception, to prevent the court from setting a section 366.26 hearing. For the reasons provided below, we reject Fathers challenges and deny his petition.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 11, 1998, DCS filed section 300 petitions on behalf of J.E., who was then one and a half months old, M.E., who was then one years old, S.E.1, who was then two years old, S.E.2, who was then two years old, E.E., who was then three years old, and M.A., who was then four years old. The petition alleged that Mother, Michelle S., had a substance abuse problem which impaired her ability to parent the children; that Mother had consistently failed to obtain necessary and follow-up care for the children; and that Father was a registered narcotics abuser which impaired his ability to parent the children. At the September 14, 1998, detention hearing, where Father was not present, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention of the children out of the home, and placed them in the temporary custody of DCS.
J.E., E.E., and M.A. are siblings to M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2, but are not parties to this writ petition.
In a report dated October 2, 1998, the social worker reported the parents long-standing history of drug abuse and history with DCS. DCS had investigated several referrals concerning the parents substance abuse and severe neglect of the children from 1993 to 1998. The parents had been involved in a previous dependency proceeding in October 1995 concerning siblings to M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 as a result of admitted drug abuse. In addition, M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 had all tested positive for drugs after they were born. Both Mother and Father admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana.
The social worker recommended that the court find the allegations in the petition true; that the children be removed and placed in out-of-home custody; and that the parents be provided with family reunification services.
At the November 13, 1998, jurisdictional/dispositional hearing both Mother and Father were present. After the parents waived their rights to a trial on the issues, the juvenile court found the allegations in the petitions true, declared the children dependents of the court, and removed the children from parental custody. M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 were maintained in the home of the paternal great-grandmother, along with their siblings E.E. and M.A.. J.E. was maintained in confidential foster care separate from his siblings because the great-grandmother indicated she could not provide for the child. The juvenile court approved the family reunification services plan and ordered the parents to participate.
In a report dated May 13, 1999, the social worker reported that Mother, who was four months pregnant, continued to be incarcerated for possession of drugs for sale and had made no contact with the children. Father, after he was released from jail, contacted the social worker on or about March 2, 1999 to arrange visits. Father thereafter visited the children on a regular basis and completed a parenting class. Although the social worker opined that the parents had made minimal progress on their family reunification plan and that the prognosis for reunification was poor, the social worker nevertheless recommended six more months of reunification services.
At the May 20, 1999, hearing, both parents were present and the court followed the social workers recommendations. The court found that custody by the parents continued to be detrimental to the childrens welfare and continued family reunification services. M.E., S.E.1, S.E.2, E.E. and M.A. continued to be maintained in the great-grandmothers home; and J.E. continued to be maintained in confidential foster care.
In a November 1999 report, the social worker noted that while Father had completed a 90-day inpatient drug treatment program, he had shown little emotion at being away from his children. He had never expressed regret or responsibility for his part in the childrens removal. Between July 29, 1999, to September 2, 1999, Father scheduled no visits with the children and explained that he had not contacted the social worker to arrange for visits because he had hurt his leg. The social worker opined that Father continued to display the classic personality traits and interpersonal dynamics of a substance abuser. The children continued to reside with the great-grandmother and appeared comfortable and safe in placement. Based on the parents lack of progress, the social worker recommended that family reunification services be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set.
On November 22, 1999, the 12-month review hearing was continued to December 15, 1999, for a contested hearing. On December 15, 1999, the contested 12-month review hearing was held, and DCS agreed to change its recommendation and offer the parents continued family reunification services until the 18-month date.
In a March 31, 2000, report, the social worker reported that Mother and Father had been residing together in a one-bedroom apartment with their non-dependent five-month-old son. Father obtained a job at the apartment complex as a maintenance worker; he had been attending Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings; he had completed a six month after care program at his in-patient drug treatment program; and he had completed a parenting class. Mother had also completed a 90-day in-patient drug treatment program and a parenting class. When the social worker visited the apartment, the worker found the apartment to be adequate and clean. Regarding visitation, the social worker noted that the parents had been visiting the children on a weekly basis. The social worker, however, opined that given the parents history, six to nine months of sobriety did not demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety long term and at the same time assume the added responsibility of adequately providing for six additional children. The social worker therefore recommended that family reunification services to the parents be terminated.
At the April 17, 2000, contested hearing, after the social worker and the parents testified and after hearing arguments from counsel, the juvenile court continued the children as dependents and ordered the social worker to transition all the children, with the exception of J.E., into the parents home.
Regarding J.E., the court found his circumstances different than his siblings and proceeded to terminate family reunification services to the parents and set his matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
In an October 17, 2000, status review report, the social worker reported that M.A. and E.E. had been transitioned back into the parents home, while M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 continued to reside with their great-grandmother. The social worker had concerns about returning the three girls to the parents custody. The apartment was not big enough for three additional children; when the social worker visited the home several times, there were eight children in the home with three of them being the parents; Fathers sister, a drug user, and her five children were residing in the home; food supply in the home was scarce; E.E. was found to have a black eye; the parents had not been attending their NA meetings; E.E. and M.A. were not attending school due to transportation problems; E.E. had lost weight; the children stated to family members that they had been spanked; E.E. appeared fearful when in the presence of his father; the home was found to be filthy; and the parents had missed several visits with the girls. The social worker recommended terminating reunification services to the parents as to M.E., S.E.2 and S.E.1, and implementing a permanent plan of long-term foster care with the great-grandmother.
At the October 17, 2000, semi-annual review hearing, Mother and Father submitted on the social workers reports and did not request a contested hearing. After the court read and considered the social workers reports, the court found that return of M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 to the custody of Father and Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or emotional or physical well-being of the children. The court also found that reasonable services had been offered to Father and Mother, and thereafter terminated reunification services as to the three girls and implemented the permanent plan of long-term foster care. M.E., S.E.1, and S.E.2 continued to reside with the great-grandmother who was willing to continue to care for the children but would not commit to adoption.
In an April 17, 2001, status review report, the social work noted that the parents had not consistently visited the girls. The great-grandmother, despite her age of 70 years, continued to provide care for the girls, with the assistance of the paternal great-uncle. A search for other relatives who could provide a more permanent placement for the children had been initiated. The great-grandmother and great-uncle were looking for relatives who would be interested in guardianship or adoption.
Mother and Father failed to attend the April 17, 2001, permanency planning hearing. The court found that long-term foster care for the children remained appropriate and continued them in the great-grandmothers home. The dependency proceedings concerning siblings E.E. and M.A. were dismissed.
In an October 17, 2001, status review report, the social worker reported that the parents whereabouts had become unknown in the last six months and that the parents had not made any contact with the great-grandmother to arrange visitation in the last six months. The social worker also noted that due to the great-grandmothers age and energy level, she may not be able to care for the girls long term. The great-uncle believed that the great-grandmother needed a break from full-time parenting. The great-grandmother did not deny that she was tired, but wanted the children to grow up with their biological family. A relative had expressed an interest in adopting the girls and the social worker believed they were adoptable. Therefore, the social worker recommended that a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 be set for the court to consider a more permanent plan for the children.
At the November 29, 2001, continued permanency planning review hearing, the matter was set contested by Fathers counsel, although Father was not present in court. The contested hearing was set for February 7, 2002. That hearing was later continued to April 10, 2002.
In an April 10, 2002, addendum report, the great-grandmother indicated that she wanted the girls to remain with family and that she would consider adopting the girls. However, she was not against the idea of an outside family adopting the girls, as long, as she had contact with the girls. DCS ruled out the paternal grandmother as an adoptive parent and evaluated all other possible relatives with no success. M.E. informed the social worker that she wanted to see her father as she had not seen either her mother or father in a couple of months. S.E.1 and S.E.2 indicated that they wanted to "meet some new parents" and that the great-grandmother could "call them if they went to live with them." The great-grandmother reported that Mother remained in jail and that Father remained unemployed. The social worker opined that although the current placement of the girls with the great-grandmother remained stable, DCS still needed to explore adoption options for the best interest of the children.
The April 10, 2002, contested permanency planning review hearing was continued because Mother was incarcerated and had not been transported to court. At the May 20, 2002, continued hearing, Father was not present in court, and the social worker recommended that the court continue with the permanent plan of long-term foster care. The court continued the plan of long-term foster care and continued the matter to November 20, 2002, for a permanency planning review hearing.
On August 1, 2002, DCS filed a section 387 supplemental petition, requesting authorization to remove the children from the great-grandmothers home and place the children in an adoptive home. On August 7, 2002, the supplemental petition was withdrawn by DCS.
On September 10, 2002, DCS filed another section 387 supplemental petition, requesting removal of the children from the great-grandmothers home and into a home able to provide more permanency for the children. In a September 11, 2002, detention report, the social worker indicated that in the last three months the great-grandmother had stated that she was not willing/able to provide a more permanent home for the girls. The great-grandmother had difficulty making medical and dental appointments for the girls without interventions by the social worker. The girls school nurse reported that S.E.1 and S.E.2 had head lice three times since September 2001. The girls were behind developmentally and socially. The social workers main concern was with the great-grandmothers present and future ability to provide adequate, long-term care and permanency for the girls. The great-grandmother had hoped that the parents would eventually be able to care for these children but she had given up on that possibility. Although the parents had stated that they would like to have their children, they had not contacted the social worker and had not maintained consistent visitation with the children over the last three years. The social worker had spent close to a year trying to find another relative to adopt the children but was unsuccessful. The social worker had found a foster family who desired to adopt all three children and recommended that the children be moved to that home.
The parents appeared at the September 11, 2002, detention hearing and set the matter contested. At the contested detention hearing on September 17, 2002, the court dismissed the section 387 supplemental petition as a legal basis for removal from the great-grandmother had not been met. The court then ordered Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) since a new relative, a maternal cousin residing in Arkansas, had come forward asking for permanent placement of the children.
In an October 20, 2000, status review report, the social worker recommended that the children be removed from the great-grandmother and placed in an adoptive home. The maternal cousin informed the social worker that she was interested in adopting the girls and would provide all the necessary information and documentation needed to complete an adoption home study. The social worker explained to the great-grandmother that maternal relatives in Arkansas were being evaluated for placement and the great-grandmother stated that she was in agreement to having the girls adopted by a family member. It appears that the parents were also in agreement in having the maternal cousin adopt the girls. According to the concurrent planning/adoption assessments for the children, the children were likely to be adopted and concurred with the court-ordered evaluation of the maternal cousin in Arkansas for possible adoption.
The October 20, 2000, status review report also indicated that the great-grandmother had been arrested in September 2002 for public intoxication. When the great-grandmother had been questioned about her continued ability to care for the children, she responded that her body was beginning to tire from all of the work that was entailed in caring for the children. The great-grandmother utilized the services of the great-uncle, who resided in the home and had a criminal record, and her grandson, who at times resided in the home and failed to take a criminal background test, for assistance in caring for the children. The great-grandmother, however, on October 23, 2002, changed her mind and stated that she was willing to adopt the girls.
At the November 20, 2002, hearing, the parents were present in court and the mother set the matter contested. The matter was then continued.
In a January 17, 2003, addendum report, the social worker continued to have concerns about the great-grandmothers ability to care for the children. The great-grandmother had difficulty remembering requests made by DCS to meet the childrens needs, and the children continued to have developmental and social delays. On December 20, 2002, the great-grandmother reported that she was in agreement with the children being placed with their mothers cousin in Arkansas.
On January 27, 2003, the matter was continued to February 19, 2003, so that DCS could send a social worker to Arkansas to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the suitability of the maternal cousin to adopt the children. In a February 19, 2003, addendum report, the social worker reported information regarding the evaluation completed on the maternal cousin and her husband. The home was very clean, neat, well-organized, and well furnished. When questioned whether they were willing to adopt the children, they relied "yes." They had maintained a relationship with the children by sending them "care packages," e-mails, and letters. They had no problems in allowing the parents to visit the children and they appeared to have a strong family support network locally. The social worker noted that the relatives genuinely appeared to care about the children and wanted to provide a loving home for the children.
The February 19, 2003, report, also included current information concerning the parents. Mother reported that she and her other four children, as well as, Father, were all living in Riverside with their paternal grandmother. Mother and Father were unemployed and trying to seek employment. Mother had difficulty finding a job due to her criminal record, but stated that she remained "drug-free" and wanted the children back.
At the February 19, 2003, permanency planning review hearing, both parents were present and they did not object to the children going to Arkansas to visit the maternal cousin and her husband. Fathers counsel requested mediation. The court then took the matter off the contested calendar and set the matter for mediation and a further permanency planning hearing on April 14, 2003.
At the April 14, 2003, permanency planning review hearing, Mother and Father were both present in court. Mother agreed with the social workers recommendation of setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to upgrade the permanent plan for the children to adoption and with placing the children in Arkansas with the maternal cousin. Father, through his attorney, indicated that he disagreed, but failed to specify what he disagreed with and failed to raise any specific objections. Father, however, did not oppose the ICPC being initiated pending the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The court found that the permanent plan of long-term foster care was no longer appropriate and that it was in the best interests of the children to consider the termination of parental rights. The matter was then continued for a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
On April 22, 2002, Father filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Order Setting the Matter for a Section 366.26 Hearing
Father contends the juvenile court erred in changing the childrens permanent plan from long-term foster care to adoption and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Specifically, Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support the change in the childrens permanent plan. We disagree.
Subdivision (d) of section 366.3 calls for review of every long-term placement "at least every six months." Subdivision (g) provides that when a child is in long-term foster care, the court must set a hearing under section 366.26 unless it finds by "clear and convincing evidence" that such a hearing is not in the childs best interests in specified respects. By effectively creating a presumption in favor of setting a section 366.26 hearing, these provisions effectuate the policy under which "long-term foster care is discouraged as a permanent placement solution for dependent children." (In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1376, fn. omitted.) These provisions do not require any showing of changed circumstances to schedule a matter for hearing under section 366.26, and indeed compel the court to order such a hearing in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Of the available options, the Legislature has stated a "mandatory preference" for adoption as the permanent plan for dependent children who will not be returned to their natural parents. (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882, 888, 919 P.2d 1329.) There is no statutory preference for guardianship or long-term foster care with a relative at that juncture of the proceedings. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164-1165.) Plainly, long-term foster care is the least favored of the available alternatives and, indeed, there is a statutory presumption that long-term foster care is inappropriate as a "permanent living situation" for children of this state. ( § 396; San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 888, fn. 3.)
Here, the children had been out of Fathers home for almost five years and the court had terminated reunification services about three years ago. At this stage of the dependency proceeding, the childrens need for permanency and stability has become paramount, and the court must focus on those needs. (In re John F., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1376-1377; see also In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309, 851 P.2d 826.) Clearly, under these circumstances, it would not benefit the children or be in their best interests to forego a section 366.26 hearing and continue them in the uncertainty of foster care as a way of procrastinating and deferring a decision on a more permanent placement option. (In re John F., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)
Furthermore, there was ample evidence for the juvenile court to find that setting a section 366.26 hearing was in the best interests of the children. The adoption assessments found that the children were likely to be adopted. The maternal cousin, who had already prepared the girls bedrooms and bought them furniture, clothes and toys, was sincerely willing and able to adopt the children. The maternal cousin also indicated that she would continue the relationship between the girls and their great-grandmother, parents, and other relatives in California by sending them letters, e-mails, videotapes, photographs, and if possible, by visiting them. Additionally, the maternal cousin began establishing a relationship with the children by sending them care packages, letters, and e-mails. Although the children had been in placement with the great-grandmother since November 1998, the great-grandmother repeatedly informed the social worker that she was unwilling/unable to adopt the children. Thus, the only viable long-term permanent plan for the children in the great-grandmothers home was long-term foster care. In addition, there was rising concern that as a result of the great-grandmothers age, she was no longer able to meet the childrens long-term needs. The great-grandmother admitted on several occasions that she was getting tired in her old age and that she utilized the services of the great-uncle and her grandson to care for the children. Moreover, the great-grandmother agreed with the recommendation that the maternal cousin adopt the children. The current circumstances support the finding that the childrens best interests would be served by proceeding with the termination of the parents parental rights and the permanent plan of adoption. Hence, we believe there was overwhelming evidence that the setting of a section 366.26 hearing was in the best interests of the children.
B. Parent/Child Relationship and Sibling Relationship Exceptions
Father also contends the juvenile court erred by selecting adoption as the permanent plan because it failed to consider the parent/child relationship and the sibling exceptions found in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(E). DCS responds Father waived these exceptions by failing to raise them at the review hearing in the court below. We are inclined to agree with DCS.
"Many dependency cases have held that a parents failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. [Citations.] As some of these courts have noted, any other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citations.]" (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339, and cases cited therein; see also In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) This policy applies full-force to the instant case as neither the court nor DCS were put on notice that there were compelling reasons for the court to decline to set a section 366.26 hearing, even though Father had ample opportunity to object to it.
The application of any of the exceptions enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) depends entirely on a detailed analysis of the relevant facts by the juvenile court. (See for example In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 1330; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567; In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363.) If a parent fails to raise one of the exceptions at the hearing it deprives the juvenile court of the ability to evaluate the critical facts and make the necessary findings, but it also deprives this court of a sufficient factual record from which to conclude whether the trial courts determination was supported by substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Allowing a parent to raise the exceptions for the first time on appeal would be inconsistent with this courts role of reviewing orders setting a section 366.26 hearing. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; See also In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501.) Thus, Fathers attempt to challenge the juvenile courts order changing the childrens permanent plan from long-term foster care to adoption and setting a section 366.26 hearing based on the parent/child relationship and the sibling exceptions is an attempt to raise new issues which were not presented to the court below. We find the issues waived, and we need not consider them further. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [" . . . [A] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the [juvenile] court."].)
Even assuming Father preserved these issues for appeal, we would find his arguments unmeritorious. The sibling exception is inapplicable under the facts of this case, despite Fathers contention to the contrary. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) provides an exception to termination of parental rights where termination would cause a substantial interference with the sibling relationship. "If termination will substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) lists numerous factors the juvenile court is to consider in determining whether the circumstance of any given case warrant the application of the exception. First a juvenile court must consider the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, factors such as 1) whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, 2) whether the child shared significant common experiences, or 3) whether the child has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling. If the relationship exhibits some or all of these factors, the juvenile court must then go on to balance any benefit, emotional or otherwise, the child would obtain from ongoing contact with the sibling against the benefit of legal permanence the child would obtain through adoption. [Citations.]" (In re Erik P. , supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 403; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); In re L.Y.L (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949.)
In In re Erik P., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 395, the court held that the parent seeking to assert the sibling relationship exception bears the burden of asserting and demonstrating its existence. (Id. at p. 401.) Here, Father failed to present any evidence in the court below to support his position. He has also failed to argue any specific facts in his writ petition that the sibling relationship is so beneficial it should prevent the girls from being adopted. Furthermore, although the girls resided with their siblings, M.A. and E.E., until they were about three to four years old, there is no evidence the girls shared any significant common experiences with these siblings, or that the girls had a strong bond with these siblings. Regarding the sibling that was born to Mother and Father after the instant dependency proceedings began, the girls had never lived with that sibling; thus, it was unlikely that they shared a strong bond or significant common experience with that sibling. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, there is no evidence to show that the sibling exception outweighed the benefit of legal permanence the children would obtain through adoption. Hence, we fail to see how the sibling exception would apply in this case.
We also believe that the parent/child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) does not apply here. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides that the court may not terminate parental rights if the parent has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) This exception applies only if "the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated." (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575; accord, In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822; In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341-1343; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1369; In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
"The parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the childs life. [Citations.]" (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) "Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [Citation.]" (In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1534, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The burden of proving that the exception applies is on the parent. (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773; In re Autumn H., supra, at p. 574.)
Here, M.E. was taken from Fathers custody when she was one year old; and S.E.1 and S.E.2 were taken from their fathers care when they were two years old. After Fathers reunification services were terminated in October 2000, the record shows that Father failed to consistently and regularly visit and make contact with the children. Despite a liberal visitation order, Father at times had gone months without seeing his children. The juvenile court here could reasonably find that Father no longer played a parental role in the childrens lives. There was virtually no evidence that the childrens relationships with Father promoted their well-being — and certainly no evidence that severing their relationship would greatly harm them. At the same time, there was evidence that the children would gain significant well-being from a permanent adoptive home. Separately and alternatively, no matter how beneficial the relationship may have been in the past, it was clear that the children would not benefit from continuing it. As explained above, "to establish the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the parents must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Rather, the parents must show that they occupy a parental role in the childs life. [Citation.]" (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) Father has not shown, and the evidence does not demonstrate, that Father occupied "a parental role" in the childrens lives. We conclude that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception does not apply here either.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is DENIED.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P.J., KING J.