Opinion
00 Civ. 8172 (LAP) (JCF)
December 14, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Rudolph Joseph, proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction for assault in the first degree. Mr. Joseph was convicted after a jury trial in New York State Supreme Court, New York County. Mr. Joseph now contends that: (1)he was subjected to double jeopardy; (2) the court "mishandled" the jury; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct at trial; (4) the trial and appellate attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) the court denied the petitioner's right to access the courts; and (6) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the petition be denied.
Background
A. Statement of the Facts
The petitioner, Rudolph Joseph, and the victim, James Holland, had known one another for several years before the incident that precipitated the criminal proceedings at issue. The two men were acquaintances who sometimes met to take drugs and have sex. (Tr. 375-77, 382, 613-14).
"Tr." refers to the trial transcript.
On the evening of November 18, 1995, Mr. Holland had spent time visiting his mother and then had gone to visit his "sister." He had been drinking at her apartment for a few hours and, at around midnight, was on his way to catch the subway back home to Brooklyn. (Tr. 378-80). That same day, Mr. Joseph had spent most of the day smoking crack cocaine in his room. At around midnight, he left his apartment to buy marijuana and more crack. (Tr. 614-15). The two men encountered each other on the street. Mr. Joseph invited Mr. Holland to accompany him to buy the drugs and then to join him at his apartment to get high, and Mr. Holland agreed. He was carrying a shoulder bag and had with him some food and a bottle of wine. (Tr. 380-82, 389, 616).
The woman whom he was visiting was not his biological sibling but a close friend whom he referred to as his "sister." (Tr. 377).
Once they arrived at Mr. Joseph's room, they began sharing ten vials of crack in addition to smoking marijuana and drinking wine. (Tr. 388-91). At around 2:00 a.m. Mr. Joseph left the apartment to get more crack. Mr. Holland stayed behind. (Tr. 395-96, 517-18, 617-18). Details of the ensuing events vary significantly, and I will detail the petitioner's version first.
1. The Petitioner's Story
Upon returning to his apartment with more crack, Mr. Joseph found Mr. Holland naked in bed and observed that things in his room were misplaced. (Tr. 620-21). He specifically noticed that his bike bag was not where he usually left it. (Tr. 620). He tried to look for it but was "continuously distracted" by Mr. Holland, who made repeated requests, including asking the petitioner to take off his clothes. (Tr. 621-22). Mr. Joseph complied, placing his pants on the handlebars of a bicycle in his room, and he joined Mr. Holland in bed to smoke some crack. (Tr. 622-23).
Mr. Holland then jumped up from bed, saying that he wanted to change the station on the radio that was directly opposite the bed, behind the bicycle. (Tr. 624). This aroused Mr. Joseph's suspicion because Mr. Holland, instead of going toward the radio, went closer to where the petitioner's pants, which contained his money, were hanging on the bicycle. (Tr. 624-25). Mr. Joseph therefore got up himself and changed the station, and both men returned to bed. (Tr. 625).
As Mr. Joseph started to light his pipe again, Mr. Holland left the bed and again went towards the pants on the bicycle. This time Mr. Joseph saw that Mr. Holland had removed the money from the pants and was hiding it in his hands behind his back. (Tr. 625-26). However, when Mr. Joseph asked why he took the money, Mr. Holland denied taking it, approached Mr. Joseph, and spun around to show that he did not have the money. (Tr. 626). Mr. Joseph then went over to the bike and attempted to find where Mr. Holland may have dropped it. (Tr. 627).
While Mr. Joseph was looking for the money, Mr. Holland picked up a sweatshirt from the bicycle, twirled it like a rope, and tried to put it over Mr. Joseph's neck. (Tr. 627-28). Mr. Joseph responded by flipping Mr. Holland into bed and lecturing him about taking the money. (Tr. 628-29). Mr. Holland then asserted that the money was on the floor by the bicycle. (Tr. 629). Mr. Joseph walked over to the bicycle to look for the money and noticed that some of his possessions were inside Mr. Holland's shoulder bag. (Tr. 629-31). Without turning around to face Mr. Holland, Mr. Joseph told him to remove those things from the bag and leave. (Tr. 632-33).
Mr. Joseph then felt a blow to his neck, as Mr. Holland rushed him from behind with a "barrage of blows to [his] head." (Tr. 631, 633). Mr. Joseph ducked, grabbed a knife that was in a tray by his bed, and told Mr. Holland to move back. (Tr. 633-34). According to Mr. Joseph, he feared that Mr. Holland may have picked up a tool or one of the other implements that were littered around the apartment. (Tr. 634). At this point, Mr. Joseph noticed that Mr. Holland was holding a black object. (Tr. 635).
The two men then struggled, and Mr. Holland grabbed Mr. Joseph's wrist while still holding onto the black object in his other hand. (Tr. 636-37, 640). As they continued to wrestle Mr. Holland cried out that he was cut. (Tr. 637). Although Mr. Holland was still holding onto Mr. Joseph's wrist (Tr. 637-38, 643), Mr. Joseph could see that he was cut and his "intestine was sticking out." (Tr. 643).
While the two men fought, there was knocking at the door. (Tr. 641-42). Still struggling with Mr. Holland, Mr. Joseph opened the latch, allowing Reginald Barnes, his roommate, to enter the room. (Tr. 641-44). Mr. Joseph put the knife down, and Mr. Barnes and Mr. Joseph together placed Mr. Holland on the bed. (Tr. 643-44). Mr. Joseph screamed for Mr. Barnes to "get the ambulance." (Tr. 645). Mr. Barnes left, and Mr. Joseph remained in the room with Mr. Holland. (Tr. 645-46).
While Mr. Holland was on the bed, Mr. Joseph tried to move his head closer to the window because Mr. Holland said that he wanted some air. (Tr. 646). Mr. Holland tried to kick the petitioner and then reached for a tool laying on the table. (Tr. 646-47). As Mr. Joseph was still fearful of what Mr. Holland might do, he picked up a hammer and held it over Mr. Holland's head. (Tr. 647-48).
At this point, Allan Smalls, Mr. Joseph's other roommate, entered the room and took the hammer away from him. (Tr. 648-49). Then, as Mr. Smalls was about to leave the room, Mr. Joseph pled "Please don't leave me." Thereafter the police arrived. (Tr. 650-51).
2. The Victim's Story
Mr. Holland's version of the events in the apartment was quite different. When Mr. Joseph returned to the bedroom with crack, his demeanor had changed. (Tr. 402). He was mumbling to himself, and Mr. Holland could not understand what he was saying. (Tr. 402). Mr. Joseph suggested that they "roll a joint" and asked Mr. Holland if he wanted to "fool around." (Tr. 402-04). Mr. Holland removed his shorts and underwear, and Mr. Joseph also took off his clothes except for his underwear. (Tr. 404). Then the two men smoked some of the crack that Mr. Joseph had just purchased. (Tr. 405).
After smoking the first bag, Mr. Joseph started mumbling again, as he often did when he was high. (Tr. 406). The petitioner then stood up and paced while Mr. Holland remained sitting on the bed. (Tr. 407). Mr. Joseph accidentally bumped the back of the bike as he was putting his pants on it, and money and drugs fell from the front of the bike. (Tr. 408).
Mr. Holland tried to catch the falling items but could not, and Mr. Joseph went over to pick them up. (Tr. 409-10). Then, Mr. Joseph grabbed a knife and stabbed Mr. Holland in the lower left abdomen. (Tr. 413). Mr. Holland attempted to take the knife away, but Mr. Joseph continued to stab him as he tried to defend himself and screamed for help. (Tr. 418-20). Mr. Holland tried to shield himself with the bike while the petitioner continued to swing the knife and stab him. (Tr. 421-22). Mr. Holland then laid down on the bed. (Tr. 425).
3. Testimony of the Roommates
At around 2:15 a.m., Mr. Barnes, Mr. Joseph's roommate, heard commotion and screaming coming from the petitioner's room and banged on the door. (Tr. 288). When Mr. Joseph opened the door, Mr. Barnes found him holding Mr. Holland in a choke hold and clutching a knife in his hand. (Tr. 288-89). He also saw Mr. Holland "holding his stomach area," from which "intestines and stuff" were protruding. (Tr. 291). Mr. Barnes then asked Mr. Joseph to drop his knife, but when he did not Mr. Barnes hit him and recovered the weapon. (Tr. 291-93). At this point, Mr. Barnes told Mr. Joseph to stay in the room and put Mr. Holland on the bed. (Tr. 293). Then he went downstairs to call 911 and told Mr. Smalls, whom he met outside, to go up to Mr. Joseph's room. (Tr. 293-95).
When Mr. Smalls arrived in the room, he found Mr. Joseph holding a hammer over Mr. Holland, who was lying on the bed and holding his intestines in his left hand. (Tr. 268). He then told Mr. Joseph to put on some clothes and removed the hammer from his hand. (Tr. 279, 283). Thereafter, the police arrived and Mr. Holland was taken to the emergency room.
4. Medical Testimony
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence from Dr. Egel Francois, the physician who attended to Mr. Holland at the emergency room, and Maria Luz Alandy, the acting deputy chief medical examiner. Both testified to the life-threatening nature of the stab wounds that Mr. Holland sustained. (Tr. 439-79, 573-607).
B. Procedural History
On March 12, 1996, a jury acquitted Mr. Joseph of attempted murder in the second degree but convicted him of assault in the first degree. (Tr. 881). He was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to a maximum term of fifteen years imprisonment. (S. Tr. 10-11).
"S. Tr." refers to the sentencing transcript.
Mr. Joseph subsequently appealed his conviction on grounds that (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the prosecutor's summation had deprived him of a fair trial; (3) the court failed to properly instruct the jury; and (4) the sentence imposed was excessive. (Affidavit of Stacy Robin Sabatini dated April 23, 2001 ("Sabatini Aff."), Exh. A). On October 21, 1999, the Appellate Division, First Department unanimously affirmed the conviction and sentence. People v. Joseph, 265 A.D.2d 222, 698 N YS.2d (1st Dep't 1999). On January 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Joseph, 94 N.Y.2d 881, 705 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2000).
"Sandoval Tr." refers to the transcript from the Sandoval Hearing. This hearing was held to assess the admissibility of prior criminal acts for impeachment purposes. See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 512 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (2d Dep't 1987).
Thereafter, Mr. Joseph filed a motion pursuant to section 440.10 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law (the "440 motion"), arguing that: (1)he had been subjected to double jeopardy; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by withholding evidence at trial; (3) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (4) he was deprived of his right to file a supplementary brief on appeal. (Sabatini Aff., Exh. E). On August 8, 2000, the Supreme Court denied this motion (Sabatini Aff., Exh. F), and Mr. Joseph did not appeal. He then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Discussion
A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Generally, a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding must exhaust all available state court remedies for each claim prior to federal review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, U.S., 121 S. Ct. 1404 (2001). Furthermore, if a claim would be procedurally barred in state court it is deemed exhausted but the habeas court is precluded from reviewing it on the merits. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2000).
In this case, the respondent argues that some of Mr. Joseph's claims are unexhausted or procedurally defaulted. It is unclear from the respondent's brief, however, which claims are being referenced. Under Point I of the brief, the respondent argues that claims (1), (3), (4), and (6) of the petition are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because the petitioner failed to appeal the denial of the 440 motion. (Memorandum of Law for Respondent in Response to Petition ("Resp. Memo.") at 15). But the concluding paragraph of that section asserts instead that claims (3), (4), and (5) are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Resp. Memo at 17). In addition, the respondent simply asserts that the claims are "constructively exhausted through procedural default" without elaborating. (Resp. Memo. at 15). Instead, the respondent simply moves on to address the merits of the six claims. In light of the conclusory nature of the respondent's exhaustion argument and the fact that each of the petitioner's claims is wholly without merit, it is appropriate to address the substance of each claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State."); Jones v. Senkowski, F.3d, No. 00-2145, 2001 WL 1230800, at *4-5 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2001) (federal court may reach merits of unexhausted claim that is "hopeless," i.e., "patently meritless" or "wholly without merit").
B. Merits
1. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98 (1997). This provision "does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment." Id. at 98-99 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Rather, it protects only against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Id. at 99.
The petitioner asserts that he was found guilty of "the same act [that he] was earlier found not guilty of." (Affidavit of Rudolph Joseph dated April 22, 2000 ("Joseph Aff."), attached to Petition at 1). Mr. Joseph infers that because he was acquitted of attempted murder in the second degree, his conviction for assault in the first degree constitutes double jeopardy. However, these verdicts were for two different crimes, not for the "same offense." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98. Therefore, Mr. Joseph's double jeopardy claim fails to state a cognizable constitutional violation.
2. Mishandling of Jury
Mr. Joseph maintains that the jury's reading of the verdict "was strangely interupted by prosecutor's motion for a lunch-break. To which the jury left out the court-room [sic]." (Joseph Aff. at 1). He argues that this "mishandling of [the] jury" led to a compromise verdict. (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.") at 6). To make out a claim that his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was violated, the petitioner must show that "prejudice was manifest.". See Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)).
Mr. Joseph has failed to allege any such prejudice. Furthermore, his allegation of jury "mishandling" is premised on an erroneous understanding of what transpired at trial. A review of the transcript clearly indicates that there was neither a motion by the prosecution nor any other interruption during the reading of the verdict. (Tr. 880-81). It appears from the record that the petitioner may be confusing a recess taken between the court's reading of, and response to, notes submitted by the jury during their deliberations with the actual reading of the verdict. (Tr. 861, 880). Therefore, Mr. Joseph's jury mishandling claim has no factual basis in the trial record and should be dismissed.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The petitioner next asserts that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct at trial because he withheld portions of the petitioner's taped interview as well as a written statement from Mr. Holland where he allegedly admitted that he was trying to rob the petitioner. (Pet. at 5). Although Mr. Joseph does not explicitly cite to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in his argument, the issue of whether the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence is a Brady claim. Under Brady, the state violates a defendant's due process rights when it suppresses evidence favorable to an accused and the evidence is "material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87. Favorable evidence is only "material" where "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
But Mr. Joseph never claims that the prosecutor withheld the taped interview from him; rather he argues that the entire tape should have been presented to the jury. (Joseph Aff. at 2). Indeed, it is clear from the record that the defense had access to this material. (Tr. 736). Because he has not alleged that any evidence was withheld, Mr. Joseph has failed to make out a constitutional violation.
Equally meritless is Mr. Joseph's claim relating to the written statement. Although the petitioner does not specify which statement he is referring to, it may be inferred from the trial transcript that he is alluding to Mr. Holland's personal journal, which the defense demanded be turned over during trial. (Tr. 349-57, 364). However, the trial court found that the journal contained no "factual account of the incident that is in issue." (Tr. 364). The document was marked as an exhibit to preserve the record and sealed in order to protect Mr. Holland's privacy rights. (Tr. 351-57, 364-65). Thus, the defense had no access to Mr. Holland's journal not because the prosecution withheld it, but because the trial court determined that the document was not Brady material. The petitioner has presented nothing to suggest that this determination was erroneous.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
a. Trial Counsel
In order to obtain reversal of a conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). Under this standard, reasonable strategic and tactical decisions, even if unsuccessful, will not mandate reversal. See DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987). In assessing the first prong of the Strickland test, a reviewing court must determine whether counsel's conduct "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" given the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A habeas corpus court must be "highly deferential" and "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. The second prong requires a "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable," and that "but for" the claimed errors of counsel, the trial result would have been different. Id. at 687, 694.
Mr. Joseph first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for convincing him not to testify before the grand jury or at the initial hearing. However, this is a question of trial strategy. As Mr. Joseph indicates in his affidavit, the trial attorney counseled against his testifying prior to trial because "he wanted to see what the prosecutor had first." (Joseph Aff. at 2). This is a reasonable strategic decision, and such decisions, even if unsuccessful, should not be "second-guess[ed]" by the courts. Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)).
Next, Mr. Joseph alleges that his trial "counsel would not confer with [him] on issues and made only mandatory-token motions without knowing [his] points of view." (Joseph Aff. at 2). However, the record indicates that the defense counsel communicated with the petitioner several times before going to trial, discussing the possibility of testifying before the grand jury as well as a potential plea bargain. (Sandoval Tr. 3-4, 6).4 Trial counsel was not required to confer with the petitioner about each and every motion and strategic decision. Moreover, the defense attorney did move to suppress statements and physical evidence (Tr. 5), and Mr. Joseph does not identify any other promising motions that might have been brought. Thus, the defense attorney's actions before and during trial "fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Mr. Joseph's third contention, that counsel would not pursue charges of assault against Mr. Holland (Joseph Aff. at 3), is frivolous. Defense attorneys cannot press criminal charges against individuals; that is the province of the District Attorney's Office.
The petitioner also claims that the counsel "demeaned [his] character" during closing argument. (Joseph Aff. at 3). Although the petitioner does not cite specific portions of the trial attorney's closing argument in support of his claim, it appears that Mr. Joseph objects to the following statement:
Now, let's look at Rudolph Joseph's story, what Rudolph Joseph told you. I'm not going to stand here and tell you Rudolph Joseph is an angel. He is no angel. As a matter of fact, he is sort of in the same boat [as Mr. Holland], like two dogs with different fleas.
(Tr. 730). Counsel made this statement directly after presenting a lengthy argument to the jury about how Mr. Holland was an "opportunistic thief" whose testimony could not be trusted because of his past criminal history, drug abuse, and propensity to lie. (Tr. 718-29). In light of the petitioner's equally checkered history, which he acknowledged during trial, it is not surprising that defense counsel would have made such a statement in order to deal with any issues of credibility. Thus, the defense attorney's statement during his summation reflects a strategic choice, not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, Mr. Joseph claims that "counsel did nothing to establish [the petitioner's] contention of protecting self and property." (Joseph Aff. at 3). However, defense counsel did elicit testimony, both on direct and cross-examination, supporting the theory that Mr. Joseph was acting in self-defense and was trying to thwart a robbery. (Tr. 534-42, 624-27). He then summarized this theory in closing argument:
I think everyone sitting here knows what happened in that apartment.
They know that Mr. Joseph was trying to defend himself against James Holland, against Holland stealing his stuff and ripping him off, and you know that because Mr. Holland is unbelievable, is not trustworthy as a witness, because he is an opportunistic thief.
(Tr. 749). Thus, the record does not support the petitioner's claim that his attorney neglected to advance a potential defense.
In no respect, then, was trial counsel's performance deficient.
b. Appellate Counsel
To establish ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the petitioner must demonstrate the same two Strickland factors: (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there existed a reasonable probability of a different result in the proceedings, but for the errors of counsel. Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Strickland standard to evaluate appellate counsel's effectiveness). Furthermore, it is well recognized that an appellate attorney "need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by the appellant." Jameson v. Coughlin, 22 F.3d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985)). In fact, winnowing out the weaker claims and focusing on the stronger "is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)).
Mr. Joseph claims that appellate counsel "would not submit points of law [he] brought to [the attorney's] attention" and "counsel . . . scuttled leave to appeal to [the] Court of Appeals by not fillin [sic] any points of law." (Joseph Aff. at 4). However, these claims are unsubstantiated. First, the petitioner does not describe the specific claims that he believes should have been raised by appellate counsel. Thus, it is impossible to assess whether counsel's purported omissions violated the reasonableness standard or whether there is any probability that the result of the case would have been different. Moreover, the appellate attorney prepared a twenty-three page brief on behalf of Mr. Joseph raising four plausible claims and laying out arguments supported by case law. Thus, the attorney's performance was objectively reasonable; his decision not to include claims that he may have deemed to be weak does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel.
5. Access to the Courts
Mr. Joseph asserts that his civil rights were violated because the Appellate Division prevented him from advancing arguments in a supplemental brief. (Joseph Aff. at 4-5). Further, he asserts that he was required to "abide only by appointed [appellate] counsel['s] determination." (Joseph Aff. at 4). There is nothing to substantiate Mr. Joseph's claims that the Appellate Division prevented him from filing a supplemental brief or that he was required to acquiesce in his attorney's judgment. After appellate counsel exercised discretion not to assist Mr. Joseph in filing a supplemental brief, the petitioner could have asked the court for permission to file one pro se. Nothing in the record indicated that he filed such a motion. Although "liberal pleading rules require careful scrutiny of habeas petitions," habeas corpus is a "special proceeding to right wrongs, not a routine procedure to search for them." Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Therefore, in the absence of some factual basis for his allegations, Mr. Joseph's claim of deprivation of access to the courts is meritless.
6. Sufficiency of Evidence
In support of his sufficiency of evidence claim, the petitioner complains that, aside from Mr. Holland's testimony, there is no evidence to support the prosecution's theory that the stabbing was motivated by "rage," and that the jury's decision was influenced by the prosecution's emphasis on the "severe and shocking nature of the injury." (Sabatini Aff., Exh A at 15, 19). Mr. Joseph further asserts that the testimony given by Mr. Smalls and Mr. Barnes supports his contention that there was a "self protective struggle first and then [an] accidental stabbing." (Sabatini Aff., Exh. A at 17).
There is a "very heavy burden placed upon a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction." Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To succeed, [the defendant] must demonstrate that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, . . . no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt" Id. at 178 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
A federal judge reviewing a sufficiency claim does not make an independent determination of whether the evidence demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19. Rather, the judge "stands in the shoes of the state trial court." Mallette v. Scully, 752 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Quartararo v. Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170 (2000). "As long as any competent evidence went to the fact-finders from which they could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction will stand." Martin v. Scully, 748 F. Supp. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting McShall v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp. 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); see also Quartararo, 186 F.3d at 97.
As Mr. Joseph admitted that he stabbed Mr. Holland (Tr. 717), this case turned largely on the credibility of the witnesses testifying to his intent and to the circumstances surrounding the stabbing. The jury is "exclusively responsible for determining a witness' credibility." Bossett v. Walker, 41 F.3d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1993)). The court must defer to the jury's resolution of any conflicts in the testimony and its assessment of the witnesses' credibility. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 616 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993) (Jackson inquiry asks only whether decision to convict was rational, not whether it was correct). Therefore, the jury was entitled to accept the testimony of Mr. Holland regarding Mr. Joseph's actions and demeanor and the testimony of Dr. Francois regarding the life threatening nature of the stab wound over the testimony of Mr. Smalls and Mr. Barnes, which Mr. Joseph claims shows that he was merely protecting himself against Mr. Holland's attempt to rob him. (App. Br. at 15-18). Moreover, as discussed previously, the defense vigorously presented its theory of self-defense and justification during trial. That the jury still found Mr. Joseph guilty of assault in the first degree indicates that it found the prosecutor's evidence more credible. Thus, the jury was entitled to find that the assault charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that Mr. Joseph's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with extra copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Loretta A. Preska, Room 1320, and to the chambers of the undersigned, Room 1960, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007. Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review.