Jorie, LP v. Roberts Mcgivney Zagotta, LLC

Full title: JORIE, LP, ALFRED KOPLIN, and CONTENT CURATION & DATA ASSET MANAGEMENT…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT

Date published: Apr 27, 2021

2021 IL App (2d) 190519 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

Opinion

No. 2-19-0519

04-27-2021

JORIE, LP, ALFRED KOPLIN, and CONTENT CURATION & DATA ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. ROBERTS MCGIVNEY ZAGOTTA, LLC, NICHOLAS M. ZAGOTTA; CHRISTOPHER C. JOHNSON, AND NICHOLAS C. ZAGOTTA, Defendants (Jorie, LP, and Alfred Koplin, Plaintiffs-Appellees; Christopher C. Johnson, Defendant and Cross-Defendant-Appellant; and Roberts McGivney Zagotta, LLC and Nicholas C. Zagotta, Defendants and Cross-Plaintiffs-Appellees).

JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. No. 17-L-728 Honorable Robert G. Kleeman, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in: (1) ordering Johnson to sit for a deposition in Illinois, even though he was living overseas; (2) issuing sanctions after Johnson failed to appear for the deposition, specifically a default order and barring his counsel from actively participating in discovery; (3) entering judgment against Johnson for Jorie in the amount of $5.75 million; and (4) granting Roberts McGivney Zagotta's and Nicholas C. Zagotta's petition for rule to show cause against Johnson for violating discovery, and awarding them sanctions of $19,258.93. Therefore, we affirm. ¶ 2 In the fall of 2015, Alfred Koplin invested $7.75 million in Content Curation & Data Asset Management, LLC (CCDM), through his company, Jorie, LP (Jorie); all three of these parties are plaintiffs¹ in this action. Plaintiffs allege that in order to procure this investment, defendants, Roberts McGivney Zagotta, LLC (RMZ), Nicholas C. Zagotta (NCZ) (collectively RMZ defendants), Christopher C. Johnson, and Nicholas M. Zagotta (NMZ), falsely represented that CCDM had a lucrative licensing agreement with International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). Plaintiffs sought to depose Johnson, who was living overseas, but contrary to the trial court's orders, he refused to travel to Illinois for a deposition. The trial court therefore found Johnson in default and entered a judgment in plaintiffs' favor for $5.75 million. The trial court also ordered Johnson to pay attorney and expert fees to RMZ defendants as a sanction related to electronic discovery. Johnson appeals these rulings, and we affirm.

1 We subsequently use the term "plaintiffs" to refer to either all three named plaintiffs or to just Koplin and Jorie.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint

¶ 5 On June 26, 2017, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants for the investments that Koplin/Jorie made in CCDM. On March 1, 2018, plaintiffs filed an amended six-count complaint, alleging as follows. Koplin was a 90-year-old real estate investor and entrepreneur. RMZ was a Chicago-based law firm of which NCZ was a principal and his son, NMZ, was of counsel. Since 2009, RMZ defendants had represented Koplin as legal counsel in connection with about 20 proposed transactions valued at over $80 million. As a result, they had gained Koplin's trust and were privy to private information about Koplin's financial means, what types of investments he was willing to make, and on what terms he would make the investments. ¶ 6 Johnson and NMZ founded CCDM on June 30, 2014, and were its controlling members. Between its founding and September 28, 2015, CCDM was thinly capitalized and had no revenue sources. Defendants concocted a false "software license agreement" effective August 15, 2015, between CCDM and IBM to induce Koplin to invest in CCDM. In mid-September 2015, the Zagottas contacted Koplin about investing in CCDM, and they repeatedly pressured him to do so before the end of September. They maintained that the investment was a " 'sure thing' " and that Koplin would receive a " 'guaranteed return' " of $30 million. They also repeatedly emphasized that IBM had already subjected the software to over 2 million tests and intended to implement the software immediately because it would increase the efficiency of IBM's cloud offerings from 76% to 90%. As a result, Koplin agreed to invest $7,750,000 in CCDM through Jorie. In return, he was promised a return of his capital on a priority basis and 20% of the profits thereafter. ¶ 7 On September 29, 2015, "Koplin or Jorie" funded an initial investment of $2,750,000 to CCDM. On October 30, 2015, Koplin signed on Jorie's behalf an Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of CCDM (Operating Agreement), which was backdated to September 29, 2015. It reflected the terms of the parties' agreement and installed NMZ as CCDM's manager. Also on October 30, 2015, Koplin signed on Jorie's behalf a CCDM Subscription Agreement. On November 2, 2015, they funded the remaining $5 million investment, of which $3 million was invested in CCDM and $2 million was deposited in an escrow account. ¶ 8 Although the Operating Agreement gave priority to Jorie for distributions, NMZ distributed to himself $1,225,000 on September 30, 2015, and $1,400,000 on November 3, 2015. He distributed to a Merrill Lynch account $1,225,000 on October 1, 2015, and $1,400,000 on November 3, 2015. Upon information and belief, the Merrill Lynch account belonged to Johnson, who owned the same percentage of CCDM as did NMZ. CCDM also improperly incurred expenses, which were allocated to Jorie's account, without any return revenue, totaling $275,352.25 in 2016. ¶ 9 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had consistently placed their own interests before those of plaintiffs, engaging in fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, breaches of contract, and conspiracy to commit the same. Count I was directed against all defendants and alleged fraudulent inducement; count II was on behalf of Koplin against RMZ defendants and NMZ and alleged breach of fiduciary duty; count III was directed against all defendants and alleged unjust enrichment; count IV was directed against all defendants and alleged civil conspiracy; count V was a derivative action by CCDM against NMZ and Johnson and alleged unlawful distribution; and count VI was on behalf of Jorie against NMZ and Johnson and alleged breach of the Operating Agreement.

¶ 10 B. Proceedings

¶ 11 On June 21, 2018, the trial court denied motions to dismiss filed by defendants. On July 24, 2018, Johnson filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the first amended complaint, denying that he was ever a member of CCDM, that there was a scheme to defraud, or that he made false statements. He admitted receiving a total of $2,625,000 from CCDM. Johnson asserted affirmative defenses that Koplin lacked standing to bring the complaint, and that plaintiffs were contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of the investment by failing to conduct their own due diligence. On July 30, 2018, RMZ defendants filed a separate answer denying the relevant allegations. They alleged the affirmative defenses of waiver/estoppel as to count I and waiver as to count II. NMZ filed an answer on August 22, 2018, in which he admitted making the two distributions to the Merrill Lynch account and one distribution to himself.² He stated that at all times he believed in good faith that there was an enforceable contract between CCDM and IBM. NMZ asserted the affirmative defense of waiver as to counts I and II and the affirmative defense of "sophisticated investor" as to all counts. ¶ 12 In the interim, on July 25, 2018, RMZ defendants filed a motion to compel against Johnson, arguing that he had not answered the interrogatories and document requests that they served upon him on May 11, 2018. On July 26, 2018, the trial court ordered Johnson to fully comply with all written discovery requests within 21 days. On August 29, 2018, RMZ defendants filed a motion for rule to show cause against Johnson, alleging that he had not provided any discovery to them, contrary to the July 26, 2018, order. On September 6, 2018, the trial court ordered that Johnson's electronic devices be imaged by September 17, 2018. The petition for rule to show cause was entered and continued. ¶ 13 On November 1, 2018, NMZ filed a crossclaim against Johnson for fraud. He alleged that Johnson had fabricated e-mails from IBM employees regarding an alleged licensing agreement between CCDM and IBM, and presented the fabricated e-mails to NMZ. NMZ alleged that he relied on Johnson's false representations when securing Koplin as an investor. ¶ 14 Meanwhile, on October 9, 2018, plaintiffs noticed a discovery deposition for Johnson to be taken on October 30, 2018, in Chicago. On October 18, 2018, Johnson filed a motion to quash the deposition notice. He cited Illinois Supreme Court Rule 203 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996), which states in part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, depositions shall be taken in the county in which the deponent resides or is employed or transacts business in person." Johnson asserted that he had been a resident of Zamora, Spain, prior to being served with process in this action. He further alleged that he had not been a resident of or traveled to Illinois before the complaint was filed and before most of the facts alleged in the first amended complaint occurred. Johnson agreed to be deposed only in Spain. He attached an affidavit attesting to these statements. Johnson further averred in the affidavit that he moved to Zamora in September 2015 and that he was unable to travel to Illinois "[d]ue to circumstances," including his residence in Spain and his pregnant wife. ¶ 15 In their October 31, 2018, response, plaintiffs argued that Rule 203 gave the trial court the discretion to order Johnson to appear in Illinois for a deposition. They argued that Du Page County was appropriate for Johnson's deposition because all of the lawyers involved in the case routinely worked in and traveled to Du Page County and practiced before the court. Plaintiffs stated that they believed that Johnson was recently a resident of this State and that he met with plaintiffs in Illinois, induced them to invest in a business formed under Illinois laws, and received disbursements from a bank account located at a bank headquartered in Illinois. Plaintiffs also argued that based on the pleadings in a parentage lawsuit pending in Cook County, Johnson regularly traveled from Spain to visit relatives in Illinois. Plaintiffs asserted that under these circumstances, he should not be allowed to shift the travel expenses to plaintiffs and the other three defendants. Finally, plaintiffs argued that the history of discovery in the case supported having Johnson deposed in Illinois, as he had already missed multiple deadlines. They argued that if difficulties arose during the deposition, the parties could readily seek the court's assistance in Illinois, as opposed to risk having the deposition suspended and counsel being required to make multiple overseas trips. ¶ 16 Johnson filed a reply on November 8, 2018, stating that he had not been in Illinois since 2015. He additionally stated that plaintiffs' counsel had an office in Spain that could supply an attorney for his deposition, and/or his deposition could be taken by videoconference. ¶ 17 The trial court held a hearing on the motion on November 15, 2018. After argument, the trial court stated as follows. Rule 203 gave it the discretion to order a party to appear at a designated place in Illinois for a deposition. Johnson may not have been in Illinois for a few years, but he was "a central figure in a *** significant piece of litigation." Three attorneys wanted Johnson to come to Du Page County. Directing everyone to go to Spain to do the deposition, as opposed to Johnson being the one person to come to Du Page County, would be inconsistent with efficiency, fair play, and justice. The trial court ordered that Johnson appear for a deposition in Du Page County on or before January 31, 2019, and that the other parties pay reasonable expenses for his travel. ¶ 18 On December 26, 2018, plaintiffs noticed Johnson's discovery deposition for January 10, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. in Chicago. ¶ 19 On January 4, 2019, RMZ defendants filed a supplement to their petition for a rule to show cause against Johnson. They alleged that, contrary to the trial court's order, Johnson did not produce forensic images of his electronic devices until December 20, 2018. They alleged that preliminary expert analysis of the information revealed that Johnson had not produced all of the electronic devices in his possession, specifically an iPhone 6 that he connected to his laptop on August 1, 2018; that he had cleaned data from his computer; and that he had downloaded a program to ensure that his cleansing efforts were successful. ¶ 20 On January 9, 2019, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to compel Johnson's appearance at the January 10, 2019, deposition. They argued that discovery had revealed that the alleged IBM contract, purportedly signed by Johnson on behalf of CCDM and by Johnson's aunt on behalf of IBM, was a sham, and that e-mails allegedly sent from IBM to Johnson (and then forwarded to other parties) were fake. Plaintiffs alleged that after the trial court denied Johnson's motion to quash the October 2018 notice of deposition, plaintiffs' counsel had a conversation with Johnson's counsel on December 17, 2018, who agreed that Johnson's deposition would go forward on January 10, 2019, at plaintiffs' counsel's office in Chicago. Therefore, plaintiffs served a notice of deposition on December 26, 2018. Johnson's counsel did not object until he sent an e-mail on January 7, 2019, stating that Johnson would not be attending the scheduled deposition on January 10, 2019. He did not provide an explanation or offer any alternative dates. Plaintiffs argued that Johnson's conduct was part of a pattern of noncompliance with discovery, and that court intervention was necessary. ¶ 21 The trial court held a hearing on the emergency motion on January 10, 2019. Johnson's counsel stated that plaintiffs' motion did not qualify as an emergency because Johnson was ordered to be deposed by January 31, 2019. The trial court asked if, from his perspective, Johnson's deposition could go forward, just not on the 10th. Johnson's counsel replied:

"I don't want to hide the ball from the Court that I have spoken to Mr. Johnson; and, as of this time, I don't—he does not plan to appear for his deposition in the United States based upon the fact—the reading of the plaintiff's [sic] complaint and his concerns about it."

Plaintiffs' counsel responded that Johnson's counsel had said the "magic words"— that Johnson was "never going to show up." He said that they should proceed to "get this act on the road and get to the inevitable entry of a default." The trial court stated that until the deposition failed to go forward, sanctions would be premature. It stated that it would grant the emergency motion and order the deposition to go forward that day as scheduled pursuant to plaintiffs' notice. ¶ 22 Johnson's counsel stated that the prior order required that the deposition take place by January 31, 2019, whereas the trial court stated that it was going to order that it take place that day. The trial court replied:

"Well, I mean, I probably—if you came to me—and I appreciate your candor with the Court, your professionalism, but if you told me it could go on the 18th or something, I suppose I'd entertain that, but because you're telling me it's not going to—he's not going to comply whenever I set it, I don't see any point in putting off this whole thing.

It was noticed for the 10th. The parties are ready for the 10th. I have no explanation other than he intends to—forgive me, but he intends to thumb his nose at the notice. So we're going to order to go today and we'll get moving. I don't see any point waiting until the 31st."

The trial court's written order required that Johnson appear at 1:30 p.m. at plaintiffs' counsel's office for his deposition. Johnson did not appear. ¶ 23 On January 16, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Johnson for failing to appear at the deposition. They stated that the $2 million that had been placed in an escrow account had been returned to them, leaving damages of $5,750,000 as a result of Johnson's conduct. They sought this amount in damages, they sought fees and costs for bringing the motion, and they sought to have Johnson's attorneys barred from further participation in the litigation. ¶ 24 On January 24, 2019, Johnson filed an answer and affirmative defenses to NMZ's crossclaim against him. On January 28, 2019, he filed a response to RMZ defendants' supplement to their petition for rule to show cause. He argued that he had turned over the discovery they requested, whereas they had objected to his motion to compel discovery of their electronic devices; that they were raising an entirely new issue from their original petition for rule to show cause; and that there was no evidence connecting the alleged iPhone 6 to Johnson, especially considering that the laptop had numerous previous owners and that Johnson had allowed many other people to connect to it in group settings. Johnson also took issue with the expert's other opinions. ¶ 25 Johnson filed a response to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions on February 1, 2019, stating as follows. On January 10, 2019, his counsel "confirmed that he would not be attending the deposition on January 10, 2019 and confirmed that it was likely that *** Johnson would not be travelling for his deposition in Du Page County prior to January 31, 2019." He was willing to sit for a deposition in Spain, so the issue was not his unwillingness to comply with discovery, but rather the deposition's location. It was his position that the trial court did not have the authority to force him to be deposed in Illinois. Johnson asked that if the trial court decided to sanction him, it make a finding of " 'friendly contempt,' " which would be immediately appealable. Johnson further argued that the sanctions that plaintiffs requested "completely exceed[ed] any rational initial sanction that would be issued in this matter." ¶ 26 The trial court held a hearing on the motion for sanctions on February 5, 2019. We summarize its findings. Under section 2-1007.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1007.1 (West 2018)), a party who had reached the age of 70 could move for a preferential trial setting. Koplin was in his 90s, so the trial court was trying to give everyone a fair opportunity for discovery while keeping the litigation moving. Having multiple parties trying to depose Johnson by video in a case that involved many written documents seemed unworkable. Because of this, and because it was a multimillion-dollar case, it was not unreasonable to require Johnson to be deposed in person. ¶ 27 As for where the deposition would take place, the trial court's choices were to either have all of the attorneys in front of him plus possibly additional individuals go to Spain and incur the related expenses, or have Johnson come to Illinois. It was reasonable and within the trial court's discretion under the circumstances to require Johnson to travel to Illinois, with the other parties paying his expenses. Further, Johnson did not have just minimal contacts with Illinois, as he admitted that he received $2.65 million from a business transaction that occurred in this State and in which he played a central role. Johnson's motion implied that at 9:30 a.m. on January 10, 2019, when Johnson was in Spain, the trial court ordered him to appear in Chicago at 1:30 p.m. To the contrary, plaintiffs properly noticed the date and time of the deposition, and there was no explanation as to why Johnson was refusing to come. The trial court did not issue sanctions at 9:30 a.m. because Johnson had not yet violated the notice to appear, and it did not "think there was an actionable violation of the discovery procedure until the 1:30 hour came and went." ¶ 28 The trial court found that, therefore, sanctions were appropriate. The trial court was cognizant that entering a default was a drastic sanction that should be employed only when all other efforts of the court have failed to advance the litigation. However, it had ordered Johnson to be deposed by January 31, 2019, and he received notice to appear for a deposition on January 10, 2019. Johnson thereafter did not seek to move the date of the deposition or seek relief from the order, but rather stated that he was refusing to comply with the order. The trial court could again order Johnson to come to Illinois and impose monetary sanctions, but it had no doubt that he would still refuse. If it held him in friendly contempt, the case would be appealed and delayed another six months. ¶ 29 The trial court stated:

"I have an obligation. I have the authority. I think I have a duty to manage the discovery in this case, and it's not to punish a recalcitrant party. It's to keep this case moving and nothing more.

I don't know how else to say it. I could, again, try to do it incrementally, but this isn't a case where somebody is giving me excuses. This is somebody who said flat out, I'm not complying. And his attorney, and I commend it for him, says, I can't promise he's ever going to comply."

The trial court stated that Johnson had willfully disregarded its order and was likely to continue to do so. It stated that it would enter an order of default in plaintiffs' favor and strike all of Johnson's responsive pleadings. It would set a date for prove-up more than 30 days out, on March 12, 2019, and if "Johnson [sat] for his deposition before then, [it would] reconsider." If the deposition did not occur, it would go forward with the prove-up. The trial court reiterated that its goal was to obtain compliance rather than punish. ¶ 30 Johnson's counsel asked if he would still be allowed to attend discovery depositions. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that if a party was refusing to show up and give sworn testimony, they should not have the benefit of having their lawyer participate in the case. Johnson's counsel argued that although there was a default entered, there was still a question of damages, and he should be able to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court stated that plaintiffs were entitled to prove damages simply through affidavits due to the default. It stated that Johnson's counsel could attend depositions but not participate in them. In its written order, the trial court stated that Johnson's attorneys were "allowed to be passive observers only as to all future discovery matters." ¶ 31 The trial court next addressed RMZ defendants' petition for rule to show cause. RMZ defendants argued that, according to its expert, a computer that Johnson provided in discovery showed that there was an Apple device that was attached to the hard drive that was not disclosed, and some files had been permanently deleted from the hard drive. Johnson's attorney argued that it was a spoliation of evidence issue rather than a rule to show cause. The trial court replied that it was possible to have a spoliation claim but that RMZ defendants were arguing that Johnson had not fully tendered all of his devices for discovery and that at least some files had been deleted from his hard drive. ¶ 32 RMZ defendants' witness, computer forensics expert Lee Neubecker, testified that Johnson had sent an Apple laptop with a backup file from a synced iPhone 6, but claimed to own an iPhone 8. The call log of the iPhone 8 showed suspicious patterns that led Neubecker to believe that they were fake, and that the iPhone 8 was not actually associated with Johnson. Specifically, the log had an entry for "Warning skipping bar mobile library preferences com.neinzedd9.fake call history, 1 not in apps include list." Neubecker searched "neinzedd9" and "fake call history" and found a web page for a program designed to help create fictitious call log entries. Further, the log did not have any incoming calls, there was no phone number associated with the device, and there were calls to different numbers that had the exact same call duration. ¶ 33 The trial court found that there was "at least enough of a question here that there has not been full compliance." It stated that RMZ defendants were entitled to accurate records, but it was probable that someone had attempted to create a false call history and that the records had been altered. The trial court stated that Johnson may be able to provide a reasonable explanation, but the trial court was persuaded that a rule to show cause was appropriate. It ordered Johnson to appear on February 19, 2019. ¶ 34 Johnson did not appear on February 19, 2019. His counsel argued that Johnson had a motion to compel discovery against RMZ defendants but could not proceed with it after being defaulted, so it was unfair for RMZ defendants to move forward with its request for discovery sanctions. The trial court issued a body writ for Johnson for indirect civil contempt and set bond at $100. ¶ 35 On March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a declaration claiming $5.75 million in damages. The declaration was authored by Caroline Palmer, who was Koplin's daughter and also the Vice President and General Counsel to Hinsdale Management Agency, which was founded by Koplin and provided centralized management functions to affiliated companies, including Jorie. She attached a ledger from Jorie which she stated was printed at her direction by Brian Beck, the Controller for Hinsdale Management. She stated that the ledger showed a $2.75 million debit on September 30, 2015, for the initial investment in CCDM. Palmer stated that the ledger also showed a $5 million debit on November 2, 2015, of which $2 million went to an escrow account and $2,950,000 to CCDM's account. She also attached documents showing corresponding credits to CCDM's Lakeside Bank account. The ledger had a handwritten notation stating that the remaining $50,000 of the November 2, 2015, payment went to plaintiffs' counsel's firm. ¶ 36 On March 11, 2019, RMZ defendants filed a motion for sanctions against Johnson related to the discovery of his electronic devices. They sought a total of $35,146.55, comprised of attorney fees, Neubecker's professional fees, and court reporter fees. ¶ 37 At a hearing on April 16, 2019, Johnson's counsel argued that plaintiffs' declaration of damages was insufficient because, among other things, it did not specify which plaintiff was entitled to damages. The trial court agreed, stating that it would allow plaintiffs to supplement their motion for sanctions to explain which plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment, and why. The trial court also reiterated its reasoning for finding Johnson in default. ¶ 38 Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum in support of their damages on April 24, 2019. They asserted that Jorie was an investment vehicle for Koplin such that there was a complete unity of interest between them, and it was therefore not necessary for the trial court to apportion damages. They alternatively argued that damages could be apportioned in any one of three ways: (1) 100% to Koplin, because he was the true target of defendants' scheme; (2) $2.75 million to Koplin, representing the money he put into CCDM before identifying Jorie as the holder of the membership interest in CCDM, and $3 million to Jorie, representing the money contributed to CCDM after Jorie was identified as the holder of the membership interest; or (3) 100% of the award to Jorie "as such an allocation of damages through Jorie will indirectly benefit Mr. Koplin." ¶ 39 Johnson filed a response arguing that Palmer's affidavit was insufficient, confusing, and did not allow the trial court to properly find for plaintiffs at the prove-up stage. He argued that plaintiffs also did not explain why he alone would be responsible for the full claimed amount of $5.75 million that was transferred to CCDM. Finally, he argued that plaintiffs were separate and distinct entities with separate causes of actions, and therefore must be viewed and awarded damages individually. ¶ 40 On May 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the prove-up. Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that Johnson was responsible for the entire amount of their damages, and not just the money that ended up in his own pocket, because he was one of the conspirators and was defaulted. The trial court ruled that a judgment against Johnson was appropriate, without a set-off, because he was in default. It stated that the two payments to CCDM were part of a single transaction, and Koplin made the initial $2.75 contribution on Jorie's behalf. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment against Johnson in Jorie's favor on counts I (fraudulent inducement) and IV (conspiracy) for $5.75 million, and on count III (unjust enrichment) for $2,600,000. Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of count V (CCDM's derivative claim) with respect to Johnson, without prejudice. Count VI (breach of Operating Agreement) remained pending against Johnson. ¶ 41 At a hearing on May 20, 2019, the trial court granted RMZ defendants' motion for discovery sanctions against Johnson. It stated that discovery was ordered, Johnson tendered electronic data, RMD defendants had the data analyzed, and "[t]here were a number of legitimate questions that were raised." The trial court had ordered Johnson to appear on February 19th to explain the issues, but he had refused to come without substantial justification. Sanctions were thus warranted to compensate RMZ defendants for the expenses they reasonably incurred in expert fees and attorney fees for preparing the relevant motions. The trial court ordered that Johnson pay attorney fees of $6,806, and professional fees of $12,452.93. It entered an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) on this ruling, as well as for the prior default judgment entered against Johnson in plaintiffs' favor. Johnson timely appealed. ¶ 42 After Johnson filed his notice of appeal, litigation continued regarding the unresolved counts. Plaintiffs and the remaining defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 6, 2019, the trial court denied all of the motions for summary judgment, except that it granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on count III, alleging unjust enrichment, as to liability against NMZ. On August 26, 2019, the trial court entered judgment against NMZ in Jorie's and Koplin's favor on count III for $2.625 million. The judgment against NMZ is not at issue in this appeal.

2 In RMZ's January 15, 2019, deposition, he admitted that he "got over 2-1/2 million of Mr. Koplin's money" and that he and Johnson "each pulled at least $2.6 million out of CCDM."

¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44 On appeal, Johnson challenges the trial court's rulings leading to the entry of the default order against him in favor of plaintiffs, and its award of damages. Johnson also appeals the discovery sanction against him in favor of RMZ defendants. ¶ 45 Johnson first argues that the trial court could not order an international defendant to appear in Illinois for a deposition, citing People ex rel. Prince v. Graber, 397 Ill. 522 (1947). Whether the trial court had the authority to order Johnson to appear presents a question of law that we review de novo. See Dameron v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 2020 IL 125219, ¶ 19 (questions of law are subject to de novo review). In Graber, our supreme court stated, "Courts of law had no power at common law to compel a witness to give his deposition, and such power exists now only by virtue of the statutes providing for exercise of such authority." Graber, 397 Ill. at 525. The court concluded that under the relevant statutes and supreme court rules in effect at the time, the trial court did not have the authority to require the non-resident plaintiff to come to Illinois for a deposition. Id. at 526-27. ¶ 46 Graber is not controlling here because Rule 203 did not exist when Graber was published. Rule 203, entitled "Where Depositions May be Taken," provides:

"Unless otherwise agreed, depositions shall be taken in the county in which the deponent resides or is employed or transacts business in person, or, in the case of a plaintiff-deponent, in the county in which the action is pending. However, the court, in its discretion, may order a party or a person who is currently an officer, director, or employee of a party to appear at a designated place in this State or elsewhere for the purpose of having the deposition taken. The order designating the place of a deposition may impose any terms and conditions that are just, including payment of reasonable expenses." Ill. S. Ct. R. 203 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996).

We interpret supreme court rules in the same manner as statutes. McCarthy v. Taylor, 2019 IL 123622, ¶ 17. Our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intention, which we determine by applying the rule's plain and ordinary language. Id. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written without resorting to further aids of statutory construction. Id. The interpretation of a supreme court rule is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Rule 203's plain language states that a trial court has the authority to order a party "to appear at a designated place in this State or elsewhere for the purpose of having the deposition taken." Ill. S. Ct. R. 203 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996). Thus, the trial court had the authority to order Johnson to be deposed in Illinois. ¶ 47 Johnson asserts that it is unclear whether Rule 203 even applies to an international deponent, as it states that the deposition shall take place "in the county in which the deponent resides or is employed" (id.), whereas Spain does not even have counties. Regardless of how we construe the word "county," however, it is clear that the trial court has the authority to require a party "to appear at a designated place in this State" (id.). Further, excluding international parties would create "exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent" of the rule, contrary to the principles by which we construe supreme court rules. Davis v. Village of Maywood, 2020 IL App (1st) 191011, ¶ 15. Johnson's argument is therefore without merit. ¶ 48 Johnson argues that even if Rule 203 applies, his deposition should have taken place in Spain. Johnson argues that he has not been in Illinois since 2015 and has lived and worked in Spain since 2017. He argues that plaintiffs never presented evidence to overcome Rule 203's "default" stance that his deposition take place where he lives and works. According to Johnson, we should review this issue de novo because it involves the application of law to undisputed facts. ¶ 49 Rule 203 states that the trial court, "in its discretion" (Ill. S. Ct. R. 203 (eff. Jan. 1, 1996)) may order that a party's deposition take place in Illinois, so our standard of review is abuse of discretion. See also Brandt v. John S. Tilley Ladders Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307 (1986) (the "plaintiff, as a non-resident, was subject to the exercise of the circuit court's discretion as to where the deposition would be taken, 'at a designated place in this State or elsewhere for *** [that] purpose,' under Supreme Court Rule 203"). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Johnson to appear for a deposition in Illinois. The trial court stated that Johnson was "a central figure" in a multimillion dollar transaction that occurred in Illinois; that three parties were requesting that he be deposed in Illinois, and requiring that all their attorneys go to Spain for the deposition rather than have Johnson come to this state would be inconsistent with efficiency, fair play, and justice; and that having multiple parties trying to depose Johnson by video in a case that involved a lot of written documents seemed unworkable, especially given the lawsuit's scale. The trial court ordered that the other parties pay reasonable expenses for Johnson's travel to decrease the burden on him. Based on these considerations, viewed against the backdrop of the case's circumstances, the trial court's ruling was well-within its discretion. ¶ 50 Johnson also maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to find him in friendly contempt on the issue of where the deposition should take place, which he argues is an issue of first impression. However, Johnson has cited no authority for this argument, even on the subject of friendly contempt, thereby forfeiting the issue for review. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (argument shall contain citation to authority); Atlas v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C., 2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33 (a reviewing court is not a repository into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it our obligation to act as an advocate, and the failure to clearly define issues and support them with authority results in forfeiture of the argument). We also note that Johnson's arguments regarding the trial court's authority to order him to appear in Illinois for a deposition are contrary to Rule 203's plain language, which weighs against his argument that he should have been allowed to appeal this issue through a friendly contempt finding. ¶ 51 Johnson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its January 10, 2019, ruling, in which it stated that he was required to appear at 1:30 p.m. at plaintiffs' counsel's office for his deposition. Johnson points out that on November 15, 2018, the trial court ordered that he appear for his deposition in Illinois by January 31, 2019. Johnson argues that when plaintiffs filed their January 9, 2019, emergency motion to compel his appearance at the deposition, he had not violated a court order and was not even on the verge of violating a court order, given the January 31 deadline. Johnson contends that the lack of an emergency was made even more apparent because other individuals were deposed after January 31, 2019. ¶ 52 Johnson relatedly argues that the trial court ordered him to do the impossible, i.e., show up for a 1:30 p.m. deposition when he was still in Spain. Johnson states that sanctions against him became inevitable the moment the trial court entered this ruling. Johnson maintains that the order was unfair for this reason and because it changed the requirements for the timing of his deposition even though the trial court gave substantial leeway to the depositions of others. Johnson argues that the January 10, 2019, order began the snowball effect that led to a default judgment against him for $5.75 million. ¶ 53 Trial courts have wide discretion on discovery matters, and we will not disturb a discovery ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Rico Industries, Inc. v. TLC Group, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 172279, ¶ 50. Johnson's argument takes the trial court's January 10, 2019, ruling entirely out of context. It is true that the trial court initially ordered that his deposition take place by January 31, 2019. Thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel and Johnson's counsel agreed that it would occur in Chicago on January 10, 2019, and plaintiffs served notice of the deposition on December 26, 2018. However, on January 7, 2019, Johnson's counsel sent a message to plaintiffs' counsel stating that Johnson would not attend the deposition, without providing an explanation or offering alternative dates for the deposition. At the hearing on January 10, 2019, the trial court specifically asked Johnson's counsel if Johnson could be deposed a different day. Johnson's counsel replied, "he does not plan to appear for his deposition in the United States based upon the fact—the reading of the plaintiff's [sic]complaint and his concerns about it." Plaintiffs' counsel stated that Johnson's counsel had said the "magic words" that Johnson was "never going to show up," and he argued that they should begin the process that would lead to a default judgment. The trial court stated that sanctions would be premature because Johnson had not yet missed the scheduled deposition. It stated that it would grant plaintiffs' emergency motion and order that the deposition take place as scheduled pursuant to plaintiffs' notice. Johnson's counsel took the position that Johnson is asserting now, that the prior order required only that he be deposed by January 31, 2019. The trial court stated that if counsel had said that Johnson could come on a different date, it would consider that, but counsel was saying that Johnson was not going to comply whenever it set the deposition, so there was no point to putting off the deposition. ¶ 54 Thus, the report of proceedings reveals that Johnson's attorney indicated that Johnson would not show up for a deposition in Illinois regardless of when the trial court set it, and Johnson's attorney did not dispute plaintiffs' counsel's or the trial court's explicit statements to this effect. The trial court ordered Johnson to appear for a deposition that same day not because compliance was possible at that time, but rather because Johnson had already been noticed to appear for that deposition, stated that he would not appear without providing an explanation or an alternative date, and admitted through counsel that he was refusing to appear for any deposition in Illinois. The trial court explained that it was ordering Johnson to appear because it could not sanction Johnson until the time for his deposition had passed. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its January 10, 2019, ruling. ¶ 55 Johnson further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in default on February 5, 2019, without incremental sanctions. Johnson highlights that in Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 123 (1998), our supreme court stated that a "just order of sanctions under Rule 219(c) is one which, to the degree possible, insures both discovery and a trial on the merits." Johnson additionally cites Locasto v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576 and Koppel v. Michael, 374 Ill. App. 3d 998 (2007). ¶ 56 In Locasto, our supreme court stated as follows. Rule 219 gives the trial court broad discretion to sanction a party for refusing or failing to comply with rules or court orders regarding discovery. Locasto, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576, ¶ 26. Sanctions have the purpose to both combat abuses of the discovery process and maintain the court system's integrity. Id. ¶ 27. A sanction should be tailored to promote discovery rather than punish a dilatory party. Id. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sanction, we look to the same factors that the trial court considers in fashioning a sanction, specifically: (1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony or evidence; (3) the nature of the testimony or evidence; (4) the diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery; (5) the timeliness of the adverse party's objection to the testimony or evidence; and (6) the good faith of the party offering the testimony or evidence. Id. No single factor is determinative. Id. ¶ 57 "[A] court should reserve an order of default or dismissal for the most recalcitrant and unyielding parties" because it brings a premature end to the litigation without an adjudication on the merits. Id. ¶ 35. Locasto cited Koppel as an appropriate application of discovery sanctions. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. In that case, the trial court imposed increasing sanctions to compel discovery during a period of over six months before entering a default judgment. Koppel, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. In Locasto, the court stated that before imposing a sanction of default or dismissal, the trial court should have already considered the above-mentioned factors and determined that sanctions are warranted, and then additionally consider: (1) the degree of the party's personal responsibility for the noncompliance, (2) the party's level of cooperation and compliance with previous discovery and sanction orders, (3) whether less coercive measures are available or would be futile; and (4) whether the recalcitrant party had been warned, either orally or in writing, about a possible default or dismissal. Id. ¶ 58 Applying these four factors, Johnson argues that his choice not to attend the January 10, 2019, deposition was not in violation of a court order. He asserts that he was never previously sanctioned and had taken part in written discovery. Johnson argues that the trial court had a plethora of less coercive measures available, and that he was never warned about the possibility of a default judgment before the trial court sanctioned him with the default. Johnson contends that, unlike in Koppel, the trial court here defaulted him in less than one month with no intermediate sanctions. Johnson maintains that, as stated in Locasto, plaintiffs here "went for the jugular, default, in the first instance rather than seek sanctions in proportion to the gravity of the violations" and thereby "went too far." Id. ¶ 41. Johnson argues that plaintiffs have used Koplin's age as both a sword and a shield, asking that everything be expedited due to his age but also using the same to ask for a continuance of the trial when it is convenient to them. ¶ 59 Contrary to Johnson's characterization, the February 5, 2019, default judgment did not occur in a vacuum, nor did it occur with no warning. Rather, on October 9, 2018, plaintiffs noticed a discovery deposition for Johnson to be taken on October 30, 2018, in Chicago, and Johnson thereafter filed a motion to quash the deposition notice, arguing that he should be deposed in Spain. On November 15, 2018, the trial court ruled that Rule 203 gave it the discretion to order Johnson to come to Illinois for a deposition, and it ordered him to do so by January 31, 2019. As discussed, Johnson's counsel initially agreed that Johnson would be deposed on January 10, 2019, and then essentially admitted at the January 10, 2019, hearing that Johnson was refusing to come to Illinois for a deposition at any time. The trial court stated that if counsel offered an alternative deposition date, it would "entertain that," but if Johnson was not going to comply regardless of when the deposition was set, there was no use waiting until January 31, 2019. Again, Johnson's counsel did not state that Johnson would be willing to be deposed in Illinois on a different date or disagree with the statement that Johnson was never going to comply with an order to be deposed in this State. To the contrary, in Johnson's February 1, 2019, response to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, he stated that it remained his position that the trial court did not have the authority to force him to be deposed in Illinois. ¶ 60 At the February 5, 2019, motion for sanctions, the trial court explicitly recognized that entering a default was a drastic sanction that should be employed only when all other efforts of the court have failed to advance the litigation. It stated that it could again order Johnson to come to Illinois and impose monetary sanctions, but it had no doubt that he would still refuse. The trial court stated that it "could, again, try to do it incrementally, but this isn't a case where somebody is giving me excuses. This is somebody who said flat out, I'm not complying." It stated that its sanction was not to punish a recalcitrant party, but to keep the case moving, especially given Koplin's advanced age. Tellingly, it stated that it would set a day for prove-up for the default more than 30 days out and if "Johnson [sat] for his deposition before then, [it would] reconsider." Accordingly, the trial court gave Johnson the opportunity to vacate the default judgment, but he chose not to do so. ¶ 61 Therefore, it is clear from the record that Johnson was refusing to be deposed in Illinois under any circumstances, such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that sanctions were warranted. Looking at the Locasto factors that a court should consider before imposing a sanction of default (see supra ¶ 57),³ the degree of the party's personal responsibility weighs strongly in favor of the sanction, as Johnson had communicated to his attorneys that he would not come to Illinois. For the second factor, Johnson had refused to comply with two notices to appear for a deposition, despite the trial court's ruling that it had the discretion to order Johnson to appear in Illinois. For the third factor, less coercive measures were available but would have been futile because Johnson was unequivocally refusing to travel to Illinois for a deposition. Last, Johnson had been warned about the possibility of a default at the January 10, 2019, hearing. Even after entering the default, the trial court stated that it would reconsider if Johnson appeared for his deposition within the next 30 days, which Johnson chose not to do. See Lopez v. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d 773, 779 (2006) (the "defendant created his own problems by failing to comply with discovery and then further added to those problems by failing to take any action to correct the sanctions imposed against him"). Locasto stated that "a court should reserve an order of default or dismissal for the most recalcitrant and unyielding parties" (Locasto, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576, ¶ 35), which could be used to describe Johnson, such that under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse is discretion in imposing a sanction of a default judgment without first imposing incremental sanctions. See Yow v. Jack Cooper Transport Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140006, ¶ 33 (the determination of an appropriate sanction depends on each case's specific circumstances). ¶ 62 Johnson additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that his counsel could be only a "passive observer[]" to all future discovery matters. Johnson argues that this ruling essentially prevented him from defending himself in the litigation, which was ongoing. He argues that he was unable to prosecute a motion to compel against RMZ defendants; was not allowed to ask questions of Palmer at her deposition even those she testified in opposition to her prove-up affidavit, thereby destroying his ability to defend himself on the question of damages; and was unable to defend himself for nearly one year against NMZ's fraud complaint against him. Johnson states that he has not found any caselaw where such a sanction was issued against an active party in litigation, and stripping his ability to have his counsel defend against active claims is unheard of and improper. ¶ 63 Plaintiffs argue that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Johnson the benefit of participating in discovery after he was sanctioned for refusing to follow the trial court's orders and give his deposition. They argue that if he wanted to continue to participate, he could have appeared in Illinois for his deposition. Plaintiffs assert that Rule 219(c) gives trial courts immense discretion for determining sanctions for the violation of discovery orders, and it creates no limitations on how the court crafts a sanction. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting Johnson's participation in discovery to that of a passive observer, especially considering that it could have eliminated his participation altogether. ¶ 64 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Johnson's counsel to a passive observer for discovery. A discovery sanction should be proportionate to the circumstances. Koppel, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. As the trial court stated during the February 5, 2019, hearing, based on the default judgment against Johnson, plaintiffs could prove their damages through affidavits. See Johnson, 324 Ill. App. 3d 543 (2001); Ward v. Rosenfeld, 204 Ill. App. 3d 908 (1990). Accordingly, having Johnson to be able to question witnesses during depositions and engage in other discovery, while at the same time withholding crucial discovery evidence by refusing to sit for his own deposition in Illinois, can be reasonably construed as unfair. Again, even after imposing this sanction on February 5, 2019, the trial court stated that it would reconsider the sanction if Johnson came to Illinois for a deposition within 30 days, but Johnson chose not to do so. We note that the trial court still allowed Johnson to argue at hearings and to question witnesses outside of discovery, such as Johnson's cross-examination of RMZ's computer forensics expert. For these reasons, we conclude that the sanction was not an abuse of discretion. Cf. Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1086-87 (1994) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a discovery sanction that barred the defendant's president from testifying and barred the defendant from presenting a defense); Lewis v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 669, 680 (1992) (it was not arbitrary or unfair for the trial court to impose the discovery sanctions of barring the defendant from examining or cross-examining witnesses who were improperly contacted and from using records obtained through the improper contacts). ¶ 65 Johnson next argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment against him for Jorie in the amount of $5.75 million, based on insufficient proof. Johnson argues that Palmer's affidavit was "wildly insufficient" because it relied on a ledger of an unsworn individual whose company provided accounting services to Jorie. Johnson maintains that the affidavit also stated that CCDM received $5.75 million from plaintiffs and that Johnson received $2.6 million from CCDM, but Palmer could not be cross-examined about her ability to make statements about what Johnson received. Johnson argues that the prove-up materials did not explain the basis for the remaining $3.15 million of the judgment, and Palmer's own testimony and later pleadings from plaintiffs showed that these amounts were estimates at best and failed to take into account money CCDM paid to other individuals, including money paid by CCDM to plaintiffs' counsel and money it still had left in its account when it stopped operating. ¶ 66 Plaintiffs argue that Johnson has forfeited his argument by failing to cite authority. They alternatively argue that just because the ledger was prepared and written by someone other than Palmer, it does not mean that she could not attest to its accuracy as Vice President and General Counsel of Hinsdale Management. Plaintiffs assert that this situation is similar to an attorney attesting to a billing statement that their office manager prepared, or bank officer in a foreclosure case attesting to mortgage foreclosure forms that they may not have drafted, executed, or witnessed, but of which they have first-hand knowledge. See U.S. Bank v. Advic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶¶ 26-27 (bank employee whose duties included reviewing and analyzing business and loan records could be said to have personal knowledge of the records for the loan at issue in the case). Plaintiffs further argue that any evidence discovered after the May 16, 2019, hearing was not before the trial court that day and should not be considered. They contend that, regardless, no party in the lawsuit has disputed that Koplin and/or Jorie paid CCDM $7.75 million; that $2 million of that amount was returned to plaintiffs; and that Johnson and NMZ each received $2.625 million of the funds that plaintiffs deposited into CCDM.⁴ Plaintiffs argue that, as such, their claim that they have been damaged in the amount of $5.75 million from their investment through defendants' fraud has not been refuted. ¶ 67 We agree with plaintiffs that Johnson has forfeited his argument about the insufficiency of the affidavit to prove damages because he has failed to cite any authority on this subject or regarding what types of documents affiants may rely on. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017); Atlas, 2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33. We additionally note that in his answer to the amended complaint, Johnson stated that the Operating Agreement "[spoke] for itself." The Operating Agreement stated that Jorie had contributed $7,750,000 to CCDM. Johnson also admitted receiving $2.625 million from CCDM, and NMZ admitted receiving the same amount in his deposition. In that deposition, which occurred months before the hearing on damages, NMZ also discussed some of CCDM's expenditures, and the documents attached to plaintiffs' declaration of damages stated that $50,000 of the investment went to plaintiffs' counsel's law firm. Accordingly, Johnson had information about various expenditures by CCDM at the time of the prove-up hearing, but he did not raise the issue. Even otherwise, the expenditures would not have been incurred but for Jorie's investment in CCDM, which allegedly occurred based on Johnson's fraudulent representations of a contract with IBM that never existed. ¶ 68 Johnson argues that the damage award is also barred because plaintiffs still have not specified who the proper plaintiffs are to receive the judgment. Johnson argues that plaintiffs originally asserted that Koplin had individually incurred the damages, but then later argued that it would be appropriate to alternatively award damages to just Jorie or to both Koplin and Jorie. They ultimately received a judgment for Jorie, but Johnson argues that their subsequent judgment against NMZ in favor of both Koplin and Jorie represents an inconsistent judgment. Johnson argues that this inconsistency could result in further inconsistent judgments and will affect every litigant when the case is ultimately resolved, including him, as he is still defending against NMZ's fraud claim. ¶ 69 Plaintiffs argue that Johnson has also forfeited this argument by failing to cite authority, and because he does not argue who he believes should have received the damages or how he is prejudiced by the trial court entering the judgment in Jorie's favor. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court did not err in entering judgment for Jorie, as it was based on its finding that the two payments constituted one transaction and that Koplin made the payments on Jorie's behalf. Plaintiffs maintain that although the subsequent judgment against NMZ was for both Koplin and Jorie, this case is unique because the two parties are, apart from legal formalities, essentially the same. They argue that they had a single demand of $5.75 million from all defendants based on a single course of conduct. Plaintiffs cite Gold v. Ziff Communications Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 32, 45 (2001), for the proposition that separate verdict forms are not appropriate where recovery on a single demand is sought from more than one defendant. Plaintiffs maintain that although it was their position that the verdict should have been in favor of both Koplin and Jorie, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment in solely Jorie's favor. ¶ 70 We do not find that Johnson has forfeited this issue. However, as plaintiffs in litigation may plead factual allegations and legal theories in the alternative (Bureau Service Co. v. King, 308 Ill. App. 3d 835, 841 (1999)), we conclude that there was no error in plaintiffs advancing alternative arguments as to which plaintiff or plaintiffs were entitled to damages. Though Johnson argues that this has resulted in an inconsistent judgment for NMZ and will likely cause inconsistent judgments in the future, the propriety of the NMZ judgment and future judgments are not before us in this appeal. Looking at the damages awarded against Johnson, we conclude that the trial court's determination that the judgment should be entered in Jorie's favor was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Flynn v. Maschmeyer, 2020 IL App (1st) 190784, ¶ 70 (a reviewing court will defer to a trial court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence). The Operating Agreement defined the "Investor" as Jorie, and it stated that the Investor's initial capital contribution was $7,750,000. This supports the trial court's reasoning that the two payments to CCDM were part of a single transaction, and that Koplin made the initial $2.75 contribution on Jorie's behalf. ¶ 71 Johnson additionally argues that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of RMZ defendants on their petition for rule to show cause. Johnson argues that this was another situation in which the trial court should have issued incremental sanctions, and that this was a spoliation of evidence issue rather than a rule to show cause issue. He also argues that RMZ defendants' assertion that this evidence was critical was belied by the fact that in response to a similar discovery request from Johnson, RMZ defendants argued that the request was overly broad, burdensome, would not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, would cause a substantial cost burden, and would embarrass RMZ defendants. Johnson maintains that, for the same reasons, the trial court erred in issuing a body writ attachment on February 19, 2019. ¶ 72 RMZ defendants did not file their appellee brief by the deadline, and we denied their subsequent request to file their brief instanter. Accordingly, we may not consider their brief. In First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976), our supreme court provided three possible approaches to a situation where the court lacks an appellee brief. First, if justice requires, we may serve as advocate for the appellee and search the record for purposes of sustaining the trial court's judgment. Second, we may decide the appeal's merits if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that we can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief. Third, if the appellant's brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error, as supported by the record, we may reverse the trial court's judgment. Id. ¶ 73 The third approach applies here, but the selection of the correct approach is largely an academic exercise because Johnson has forfeited most of the arguments that he advances against RMZ defendants. In the section of Johnson's brief presenting the arguments set forth above, he does not cite a single authority, resulting in forfeiture. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017); Atlas, 2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33. However, he previously cited authority on the subject of incremental sanctions, so he has preserved that issue for review. ¶ 74 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the sanctions it imposed for electronic discovery. At the February 5, 2019, hearing on the petition for rule to show cause, the trial court found that someone may have attempted to create a false call history, and that there was "at least enough of a question here that there has not been full compliance." It stated that a rule to show cause was therefore appropriate, and it ordered Johnson to appear on February 19, 2019, stating that Johnson may be able to provide a reasonable explanation for the irregularities to which the expert testified. Therefore, Johnson had a full opportunity to respond to Neubecker's testimony and avoid sanctions. However, he chose not to appear on February 19, 2019. RMZ defendants subsequently sought a total of $35,146.55, consisting of attorney fees, Neubecker's professional fees, and court reporter fees. On May 20, 2019, the trial court found that sanctions were warranted to compensate RMZ defendants for the expenses they reasonably incurred in expert fees and attorney fees for preparing the relevant motions. It awarded them a total of $19,258.93. Because Johnson chose not to appear and testify regarding the discovery issue, and because the trial court limited the amount of sanctions to just the expenses that it found that RMZ defendants incurred related to the motions at issue, the trial court acted within its discretion.

3 The Locasto factors that a trial court is to consider before initially imposing a sanction (see supra ¶ 56) do not directly apply to the type of situation here.

4 We note that the $2.625 million that NMZ and Johnson each allegedly received adds up to $5.25 million. --------

¶ 75 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 76 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. ¶ 77 Affirmed.