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utilizing "chain of causation" language in introducing the cause of action of malicious prosecution
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11-cv-2588 (GRB)(AYS)
2021-09-01
Jennifer JORGENSEN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Suffolk County Police Department, Detective Roy Baillard, in his individual and official capacity, Police Officers John Doe 1-10, in their official and individual capacities (those being the names of officers who were present and committed wrongful acts and whose names are known by the other defendants), Police Detectives John Doe 1-2, in their official and individual capacities (those being the names of officers who were present and committed wrongful acts and whose names are known by the other defendants), Suffolk County Office of the District Attorney, District Attorney Thomas Spota, in his individual and official capacity, Assistant District Attorney Laura Newcombe, in her individual and official capacity, Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, Lori Arendt, in her individual and official capacity, Brian Macri, in his individual and official capacity, Michael Katz, in his individual and official capacity, and Robert Genna, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.
Albert Darnell Manuel, III, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempsead, NY, Frederick K. Brewington, Maria K. Dyson, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, NY, Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, New Paltz, NY, for Plaintiff. Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Detective Roy Baillard, Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, Lori Arendt, Brian Macri, Michael Katz, Robert Genna. Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Elizabeth Miller, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Riverhead, NY, for Defendant Suffolk County Office of the District Attorney. Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, I. Edward G. Heilig, Heilig, Branigan, Miller & Castrovinci, Holbrook, NY, for Defendant District Attorney Thomas Spota. Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Stephen Lee O'Brien, O'Brein & O'Brein, LLP, Nesconset, NY, for Defendant Asist. DA Laura Newcombe.
Albert Darnell Manuel, III, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempsead, NY, Frederick K. Brewington, Maria K. Dyson, Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, NY, Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, New Paltz, NY, for Plaintiff.
Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Detective Roy Baillard, Suffolk County Crime Laboratory, Lori Arendt, Brian Macri, Michael Katz, Robert Genna.
Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Elizabeth Miller, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, Riverhead, NY, for Defendant Suffolk County Office of the District Attorney.
Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, I. Edward G. Heilig, Heilig, Branigan, Miller & Castrovinci, Holbrook, NY, for Defendant District Attorney Thomas Spota.
Arlene S. Zwilling, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, Stephen Lee O'Brien, O'Brein & O'Brein, LLP, Nesconset, NY, for Defendant Asist. DA Laura Newcombe.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Gary R. Brown, United States District Judge
In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Jennifer Jorgensen alleges that Suffolk County Crime Lab employees Lori Arendt, Brian Macri, and Michael Katz, along with other defendants associated with Suffolk County, violated her rights in connection with a vehicular homicide investigation and prosecution by, inter alia , manipulating blood test results, withholding exculpatory evidence and committing perjury. The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") purports to assert causes of action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process and associated Monell liability.
The Court dismissed a purported HIPAA claim at a pre-motion conference. DE 82.
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DE 91-7, 92-1, 93-1. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED as to the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Crime Lab employees Arendt, Macri, and Katz, and GRANTED in all other respects.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 18, 2009, plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury and arrested pursuant to a warrant issued the next day by the County Court for the County of Suffolk. DE 91-4; SAC ¶ 97. Plaintiff was charged with three counts of second degree manslaughter ( N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15[1] ), one count of aggravated vehicular homicide ( N.Y. Penal Law § 125.14 ), and one count of driving while intoxicated ( N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192[4-a] ). See People v. Jorgensen , 26 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 WL 796830 (Sup. Ct. 2010) ; DE 91-3 (Indictment 1425-2009); DE 91-6 (Indictment 1099-2010).
Plaintiff's first criminal trial in 2011 ended in a hung jury. People v. Jorgensen , 26 N.Y.3d 85, 88, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778 (2015). Following that trial, plaintiff initiated this action against defendants, which was stayed pending retrial. DE 1; SAC ¶ 8. Upon retrial in 2012, the jury acquitted plaintiff on all counts except manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her child who was in utero at the time of the car accident. Jorgensen , 26 N.Y.3d at 89, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778. On January 22, 2014, the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department upheld plaintiff's conviction. People v. Jorgensen , 113 A.D.3d 793, 978 N.Y.S.2d 361 (2012), rev'd , 26 N.Y.3d 85, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778 (2015). On October 22, 2015, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, in a case of first impression, holding the manslaughter statute inapplicable to reckless conduct that causes injury to a fetus in utero where, as here, the child is born alive and dies days later. Jorgensen , 26 N.Y.3d at 89, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778.
On June 1, 2016, plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint. DE 30. On October 2, 2019, the Court ordered the release of the grand jury minutes underlying the state court indictments in their entirety. DE 68. On January 4, 2021, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c) seeking dismissal of the SAC. DE 91-7, 92-1, 93-1.
Previously, on March 3, 2010, Suffolk County Supreme Court had ordered the production of a portion of the grand jury minutes, finding that fundamental fairness required a copy of the grand jury testimony of Robert Genna and Lori Arendt be provided to plaintiff. People v. Jorgensen , 26 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 WL 796830 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
II. FACTS
The SAC provides the following facts, which, of course, are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. See Lynch v. City of New York , 952 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020).
On May 30, 2008, plaintiff was in the process of moving from her mother's home to a new apartment. SAC ¶ 40. Plaintiff packed personal belongings, including prescription medications, into her 2008 Nissan Sentra. SAC ¶¶ 40, 43. Plaintiff then drove to a mall where she shopped at a craft store, card store, and pizzeria. SAC ¶¶ 41-43. Receipts in plaintiff's car indicated she was shopping at 1:51 PM, approximately one hour before the accident. SAC ¶ 121.
At approximately 2:30 PM, plaintiff left the shopping center and made a left turn onto Whiskey Road going east towards Ridge, New York. SAC ¶ 47. Plaintiff called her future father-in-law using her car's Bluetooth and told him she would be arriving at his house shortly. SAC ¶ 47. Plaintiff felt a sharp pain in her stomach and fell unconscious – her last memory before a collision at 2:50 PM. SAC ¶¶ 48-49, 122. Robert Kelly, a retired police officer, died in the accident. SAC ¶ 32. Mary Kelly was hospitalized and died about a month later from an infection. SAC ¶ 34. Plaintiff was airlifted to the hospital. SAC ¶ 52. According to expert medical opinion, plaintiff – who was eight months pregnant at the time – had experienced a spontaneous placenta abruption. SAC ¶ 48. Plaintiff also has a pituitary tumor and had been suffering from blackouts and dizziness. SAC ¶ 128. At the hospital, doctors performed an emergency Cesarean section on plaintiff and delivered her child, Ashley Kaiser. SAC ¶ 54. Ashley Kaiser died several days later. SAC ¶ 54.
The hospital tested plaintiff's urine at approximately 4 PM. SAC ¶ 55. The results were negative for drugs and alcohol. SAC ¶ 55. None of the emergency personnel who cared for plaintiff at the scene of the accident noted any scent of alcohol. SAC ¶ 53.
At the scene of the accident, Det. Baillard found prescription medications in plaintiff's car and obtained a search warrant to search plaintiff's vehicle for medications. SAC ¶¶ 35-36, 57, 59. Late in the evening on May 30, 2008, a police detective and physician's assistant arrived at the hospital with a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from plaintiff. SAC ¶ 60. The initial results were again negative for drugs and alcohol. SAC ¶ 61. Det. Baillard took statements from the police detective and physician's assistant who performed the drug test. SAC ¶ 62. Det. Baillard also asked the nurse to save the remainder of the blood from the trauma panel taken from plaintiff. SAC ¶ 56. A transfused blood sample performed on plaintiff's daughter forty hours after she was born reported an alleged weak positive for ethanol. SAC ¶ 88. On the basis of this test result, Child Protective Services ("CPS") brought a Family Court action against plaintiff for the removal of her son. SAC ¶ 92. Although the case was initially dismissed, CPS reopened its case, allegedly because of conversations between CPS and ADA Laura Newcombe. SAC ¶ 94.
In June 2009, a grand jury was convened to indict plaintiff for charges arising out of the fatal car crash on May 30, 2008. As part of the investigation, Crime Lab employees Brian Macri and Lori Arendt performed tests on plaintiff's blood, and assistant chief toxicologist Michael Katz supervised and evaluated the test results. SAC ¶¶ 21-23, 74-75. Arendt testified before the grand jury that the lab found "[e]thanol present [in plaintiff's blood] at a level of point zero six percent" and "clonazepam present at a level of less than twenty-five micrograms per liter." DE 91-2 at 42. Combined, she testified, alcohol and clonazepam have a "synergistic effect" which "enhances any side-effects that would have been from the clonazepam or from the alcohol alone." DE 91-2 at 43. Det. Baillard testified that he found a cell phone in plaintiff's car and records indicated plaintiff made two calls shortly before the crash. DE 91-2 at 15. A grand juror asked Det. Baillard if plaintiff "was ... wearing any indication of an earpiece for her cell phone at anytime [sic] of the crash, or was one found or recovered?" DE 91-2 at 16. Det. Baillard replied, "Nothing was found, and there was no indication she was wearing any." Id. Though offered the opportunity, the grand jury declined to hear the witness testimony from the employees who observed plaintiff shopping before the accident. DE 91-2 at 34-36.
Clonazepam is an anticonvulsant or antianxiety medication used to treat depression. DE 91-2 at 43.
The two grand jury minutes, which defendants attached to their motion as Exhibit A (DE 91-2) and Exhibit D (DE 91-5), are deemed incorporated by reference. The SAC references the grand jury transcripts, ¶¶ 101, 104, 148, and they are integral to plaintiff's Section 1983 claim that the blood test results were falsified. See Sira v. Morton , 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (misbehavior report and disposition sheet that defendant attached to Rule 12(c) motion is incorporated by reference in Section 1983 action because plaintiff's complaint refers to and relies upon the documents to show due process violation); see also L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC , 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (emails that plaintiff had notice of before defendant attached them to an answer were incorporated by reference because they were integral to the negotiation exchange that was the basis for the complaint).
Plaintiff was indicted on June 18, 2009, and a warrant was issued for her arrest the following day. DE 91-4. Plaintiff was detained overnight at the Suffolk County Jail in Riverhead, New York, and released on her own recognizance the following day. SAC ¶¶ 97-98.
Following the indictment, plaintiff's attorney visited the Crime Lab to view the blood sample. SAC ¶ 99. The vial contained a few dried red flakes but no blood. SAC ¶ 99. In April 2010, before a second grand jury, Arendt testified that "there are preservatives that are put in the tubes to prevent things from breaking down." DE 91-5 at 27. At a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of the blood tests, it was discovered that the toxicologist had testified untruthfully before the grand jury when she said the hospital-drawn blood sample contained a preservative. SAC ¶ 101. The blood Det. Baillard had asked the nurse to save came from a red capped tube. SAC ¶ 63. Such tubes do not have blood preservatives or anticoagulants. SAC ¶ 64. Furthermore, the blood sample contained only 2 milliliters of blood instead of the standard 8-10 milliliters. SAC ¶¶ 63, 109.
A second grand jury was convened before the first trial to charge plaintiff with three separate counts of manslaughter because the Suffolk County Supreme Court had held that the initial indictment's single count of manslaughter for the death of three individuals was duplicitous. See Jorgensen , 26 Misc. 3d 1232(A).
Plaintiff alleges the Crime Lab tested centrifuged blood from a red top tube that did not contain an anticoagulant or a preservative, and a green top tube containing only plasma and serum. SAC ¶ 110. Centrifuged blood would have invalidated the procedure used to calculate the toxicology results. SAC ¶ 108. Had the proper methods been used, the tests would have confirmed that plaintiff was not impaired. SAC ¶ 108. At trial, Macri admitted that the methods used to test plaintiff and/or plaintiff's daughter's blood had never previously been used by the Crime Lab. SAC ¶ 67.
Plaintiff alleges that the Crime Lab employees testified falsely at trial to conceal these flaws. Katz falsely testified at trial that he believed plaintiff had consumed at least three alcoholic beverages within an hour of the accident although he knew that hospital records indicated plaintiff had tested negative for alcohol on the day of the accident. SAC ¶¶ 77-78. Katz also allegedly allowed the samples taken from plaintiff and the baby to go untested for at least three weeks. SAC ¶ 80. Another lab employee, a non-party, testified that she would have made the necessary adjustments if she knew plaintiff's daughter's blood was transfused and not whole. SAC ¶ 72. Finally, Crime Lab employees Katz, Arendt and Macri all falsely testified that the blood received from the hospital was whole blood, not centrifuged blood. SAC ¶ 106. The Crime Lab employees provided no explanation for what happened to the rest of plaintiff's blood or why a 2 milliliter sample was used instead of the standard 8-10 milliliter sample. SAC ¶ 109.
On June 22, 2012, plaintiff was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her daughter Ashley Kaiser and acquitted of all other charges. Jorgensen , 113 A.D.3d at 793, 978 N.Y.S.2d 361 ; Jorgensen , 26 N.Y.3d at 89, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778. After the New York Court of Appeals reversed plaintiff's conviction, this Court lifted the stay on the instant action. Electronic Order dated Nov. 25, 2015. This motion follows.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that [for granting] a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Patel v. Contemporary Classics , 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To present a plausible claim, the "pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but does not impose a probability requirement. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Although conclusory allegations are not assumed to be true, the Court is required to accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and "construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Lynch , 952 F.3d at 74-75 (quoting Arar v. Ashcroft , 585 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 2009) ). "[T]he court's task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint ... not ... the weight of the evidence." Lynch , 952 F.3d at 75.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who under color of state law "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. " Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of [federal] rights established elsewhere." Thomas v. Roach , 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ). A tort is actionable under Section 1983 if it results in a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law. Cook v. Sheldon , 41 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1994). Courts generally look to state law to determine the elements of a tort brought under Section 1983. See Cook , 41 F.3d at 80 ; see also Dancy v. McGinley , 843 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2016) ; cf. Lanning v. City of Glens Falls , 908 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (state law is persuasive but not binding in determining elements of malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 ).
IV. DISCUSSION
Here, the only claims that require extended discussion are the false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action lodged against the Crime Lab employees.
a. False Arrest
The only element at issue regarding false arrest with respect to the Crime Lab employees is whether "the confinement was not otherwise privileged." See Savino v. City of New York , 331 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (setting forth four elements of false arrest). Probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest. Kee v. City of New York , No. 20-2201-CV, 12 F.4th 150, 158–59 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021). Probable cause exists if an officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Savino , 331 F.3d at 76 (quoting Martinez v. Simonetti , 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) ).
"[A]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant is presumed to be made with probable cause ...." Martinetti v. Town of New Hartford , 12 Fed. App'x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2001) ; see also Johnson v. Dobry , 660 Fed. App'x 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Walczyk v. Rio , 496 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007) ). However, this presumption can be overcome by plausible allegations that "the officer submitting the probable cause affidavit ‘knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his affidavit’ or omitted material information, and that such false or omitted information was ‘necessary to the finding of probable cause.’ " Soares v. Connecticut , 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven , 950 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1991) ); see also Cogswell v. Cty. of Suffolk Deputy Sheriff's Dep't , 375 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). "[If] a judge's probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer's false statements ... [that] person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification." Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 911, 915, 918-19, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017) (finding Fourth Amendment claim where county judge ordered detention of plaintiff at Gerstein hearing based on false report that pills found during traffic stop were ecstasy).
The alleged irregularities in the Crime Lab's testing procedures set forth a plausible claim for false arrest against Lori Arendt, Brian Macri, and Michael Katz. If the blood sample were centrifuged, as plaintiff alleges, the Crime Lab's test results would have been invalidated. SAC ¶ 108. Even though Arendt, Macri, and Katz enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims for their testimony before the grand jury and at trial, absolute immunity does not extend to acts outside the grand jury room such as fabricating evidence. See Rehberg v. Paulk , 566 U.S. 356, 367, 370 n.1, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) ; Coggins v. Buonora , 776 F.3d 108, 110-13 (2d Cir. 2015) ; cf. Horn v. Stephenson , No. 19-2418-CV, 11 F.4th 163, 172 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2021) (applying Brady to forensic examiners in state crime labs). "The fact that [Arendt's] grand jury testimony paralleled information [she] gave in other contexts does not mean that [plaintiff's] ... claim was ‘based on’ [Arendt's] grand jury testimony" such that Arendt would be entitled to absolute immunity, Coggins , 776 F.3d at 113, because "[a] government official cannot immunize for Section 1983 purposes all unlawful conduct performed prior to and independent of a later immunized act, merely by subsequently engaging in conduct entitled absolute immunity," Victory v. Pataki , 814 F.3d 47, 66 (2d Cir. 2016), as amended (Feb. 24, 2016). Arendt, Macri, and Katz are not entitled to qualified immunity because there is a clearly established "constitutional right ... not to be deprived of liberty on the basis of false evidence fabricated by a government officer." Zahrey v. Coffey , 221 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) ; cf. Horn , 11 F.4th at 169–73.
The Court does not decide now whether qualified immunity protects the remaining defendants, as the claims against them are dismissed on other grounds.
By contrast, the SAC is devoid of allegations establishing actionable improprieties by Det. Baillard, Genna, or ADA Newcombe. Although plaintiff alleges Det. Baillard falsely testified that there was no Bluetooth in her vehicle, DE 81 at 4, this misconstrues the testimony. See DE 91-2 at 16 (Baillard testifying there was no earpiece found in the vehicle). In any event, Det. Baillard enjoys absolute immunity from claims based on his grand jury testimony. Rehberg , 566 U.S. at 369, 132 S.Ct. 1497. ADA Newcombe enjoys absolute immunity from any claims arising out of her presentation of evidence at trial or before the grand jury, including her alleged failure to investigate the hospital's medical records. See Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ; Ying Li v. City of New York , 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 600, 640 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (allegation that ADA failed to examine medical reports amounts to a claim that the prosecutor sought an indictment based on insufficient evidence – an "essential prosecutorial decision"). Although ADA Newcombe could be liable for fabricating the blood test results, see Hill v. City of New York , 45 F.3d 653, 662 (2d Cir. 1995), the allegations in the complaint are not sufficient to support this claim. As to Crime Lab Director Robert Genna, the allegations regarding his failure to gather data from the car's black box can only establish negligence, which is not actionable, see Rafiy v. Cty. of Nassau , No. 15-CV-6497(SJF)(GRB), 2019 WL 7862885, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted , No. 15-CV-6497(SJF)(GRB), 2019 WL 7046560 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019), and there is no allegation that he knowingly falsified plaintiff's alleged rate of speed. Finally, the unnamed officers who arrested plaintiff cannot be liable for false arrest because they arrested her pursuant to a facially valid warrant and were not involved in the alleged fraud. See Johnson , 660 Fed. App'x at 71.
Robert Genna did not learn that plaintiff's vehicle had an Event Data Recorder (a "black box") until after the first trial. SAC ¶ 84. Although plaintiff alleges Genna erroneously testified that plaintiff exceeded the speed limit, she does not specify whether or not the black box data confirmed or denied his estimate of her rate of speed. SAC ¶¶ 112, 114.
b. Malicious Prosecution
Under New York law, malicious prosecution requires "(1) the initiation of a proceeding, (2) its termination favorably to plaintiff, (3) lack of probable cause, and (4) malice." Savino , 331 F.3d at 72 (quoting Colon v. City of New York , 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (1983) ). To establish favorable termination, plaintiff must establish that the state prosecution "terminated in his favor ... such as to indicate the accused is not guilty." Lanning , 908 F.3d at 26 (citing Singleton v. City of New York , 632 F.2d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 1980) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Kee , 12 F.4th at 161. To initiate a criminal proceeding, one must "play[ ] an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act." Manganiello v. City of New York , 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010). When a plaintiff pursues a claim of malicious prosecution against police officers based on an unlawful arrest, the "intervening exercise of independent judgment" by a prosecutor usually breaks the "chain of causation" unless the plaintiff can show the prosecutor was "misled or pressured" by an officer. Dufort v. City of New York , 874 F.3d 338, 352-53 (2d Cir. 2017) (failure to inform grand jury and prosecutors that eyewitness identified defendant in a suggestive lineup solely based on his clothing may rebut presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment and decision to prosecute does not interrupt chain of causation). For example, an officer can initiate a prosecution "by creating material, false information and forwarding that information to a prosecutor or by withholding material information from a prosecutor." Ying Li , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 605 (quoting Costello v. Milano , 20 F.Supp.3d 406, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ); see also Manganiello , 612 F.3d at 163.
As with false arrest, probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution claims. Savino , 331 F.3d at 72. In malicious prosecution claims, probable cause requires "facts and circumstances [that] would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty." Ying Li , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (quoting Boyd v. City of New York , 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) ). "Probable cause must be shown as to each crime charged in the criminal underlying action." Kee , 12 F.4th at 165–66. "[I]ndictment by a grand jury creates a presumption f probable cause that may only be rebutted by evidence that the indictment was procured by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith.’ " Dufort , 874 F.3d at 352 (quoting Savino , 331 F.3d at 72 ). Finally, malice does not require actual spite or hatred, but only "that the defendant must have commenced the criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served." Dufort , 874 F.3d at 353 (quoting Nardelli v. Stamberg , 44 N.Y.2d 500, 502-03, 406 N.Y.S.2d 443, 377 N.E.2d 975 (1978) ). Malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause. Id.
Once again, given the extensive factual allegations, plaintiff makes out a plausible claim for malicious prosecution against Crime Lab employees Lori Arendt, Brian Macri, and Michael Katz. The favorable termination prong can be satisfied because plaintiff was acquitted of all offenses except second degree manslaughter for the death of her child, and the New York Court of Appeals subsequently reversed because her conduct is not criminalized under Penal Law § 125.15[1]. Lanning , 908 F.3d at 26 ; see also Janetka v. Dabe , 892 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that an acquittal satisfied the favorable termination requirement even though there was a conviction on a related charge arising from the same incident). The presumption of probable cause created by the indictment can be overcome because the allegations support the inference that Arendt, Macri, and Katz lied to prosecutors about plaintiff's intoxication, a fact that was crucial to probable cause. Manganiello , 612 F.3d at 163. Finally, malice can be inferred from the absence of probable cause. Dufort , 874 F.3d at 353. Hence, plaintiff makes out a colorable claim against Arendt, Macri, and Katz for malicious prosecution.
Defendants argue that knowingly providing false information to law enforcement does not necessarily constitute initiation. DE 91-7 at 19. The two cases they cite are readily distinguishable. In Watson v. Sims , the Second Circuit found that even assuming, arguendo , that the defendants provided false information, their role was too attenuated to initiate the proceeding. 648 Fed. App'x 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2016). In Fleurimond v. Holder , even though a criminal complaint for larceny was allegedly incorrect in certain respects, it was undisputed that plaintiffs had removed merchandise for personal use. 403 F. Supp. 3d 95, 108, 111-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). Indeed, Fleurimond acknowledges "there is a conflicting line of cases that have held that ‘[g]iving information to the police that is known to be false qualifies as the commencement of the prosecution....’ " Id. at 113 (quoting Rivers v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby Inc. , No. 07-CV-5441 (DGT)(RML), 2009 WL 817852, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009) ). Essentially, these two cases stand for the proposition that conveying non-material false information to prosecutors is insufficient to establish initiation. Hence, these cases are inapposite because here it is alleged that Arendt, Macri, and Katz manipulated plaintiff's blood test results so it appeared she was driving under the influence – crucial evidence used to indict plaintiff.
As to ADA Newcombe, she is shielded by absolute immunity from malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983, a privilege denied only where a prosecutor acts without any colorable claim of authority. See Imbler , 424 U.S. at 424-29, 96 S.Ct. 984 ; Bernard v. Cty. of Suffolk , 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004). That is certainly not the case here. At the time of her prosecution, it was an unsettled question whether a manslaughter prosecution could emanate from the death of a newborn that was caused by injuries recklessly inflicted on the baby in utero. Jorgensen , 26 N.Y.3d at 90, 19 N.Y.S.3d 814, 41 N.E.3d 778 ("When [the definition of person in § 125.05[1]] is read in conjunction with the manslaughter [statute § 125.15[1] ] ... it is ... ambiguous as to whether the legislature intended to criminalize a mother's own reckless conduct directed at herself and, consequently, the fetus."). Thus, ADA Newcombe enjoys absolute immunity from a malicious prosecution claim based on her prosecution of plaintiff for the death of her newborn. Lastly, the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Baillard must be dismissed, as there are no factual allegations that he knowingly provided false information to prosecutors or withheld material information. See Ying Li , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 600, 605-07 (allegations that a detective spoke to hospital staff and examined medical charts insufficient to show initiation of malicious prosecution).
Although not explicitly set forth in the complaint, to the extent plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim against ADA Newcombe predicated upon her report to CPS, plaintiff's claim fails because she does not present plausible allegations that would support such a claim, including favorable termination thereof, and such claim would almost certainly be barred by the statutory immunity granted to prosecutors under New York's mandatory reporting statute. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 413(a)(1), 419.
c. Remaining Claims
The remaining claims in plaintiff's complaint constitute a broad array of "kitchen sink" allegations which fail for a variety of reasons. Many of these claims emanate from a characterization of the investigative work as negligent or shoddy; however, such contentions, even if true, are simply not actionable in a Section 1983 case. See Rafiy , 2019 WL 7862885, at *4 ; see also Jaegly v. Couch , 439 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (an officer is not "required to explore and eliminate every plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest").
Plaintiff's abuse of process claim fails because she cannot establish the collateral objective element. Savino , 331 F.3d at 76 (abuse of process requires allegations that the defendant intended "to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process"). There is no allegation that the defendants engaged in conduct for a purpose other than pursuing plaintiff's arrest and prosecution. Id. at 77.
Plaintiff's efforts to allege conspiracy among the Crime Lab employees fails because the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine prevents such a claim against agents of the same legal entity unless individual employees were pursuing a "personal interest." See Herrmann v. Moore , 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978) ; Rizk v. City of New York , 462 F. Supp. 3d 203, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). This analysis extends to the claimed conspiracy between the Crime Lab employees and Det. Baillard as all are agents of Suffolk County and are engaged in similar functions. See Broich v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton , 650 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bars alleged conspiracy among Village's board, mayor, former and current chief of police). In any event, plaintiff's claim is not plausible because there are no allegations of specific communications or meetings between Det. Baillard and the Crime Lab employees. The alleged conspiracy between the DA's Office and the Suffolk County Police Department fails for the same reason. Compare Ying Li , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 621 (plausible conspiracy claim that detectives and doctors acted jointly to fabricate medical evidence where detectives were in lengthy communications with hospital staff and detective was present at autopsy).
The claims against former DA Spota in his individual capacity lack any factual allegations of personal involvement, and any official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York , 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) ; Reid v. Schuman , 83 Fed. App'x 376, 377 (2d Cir. 2003) (same for ADAs). Finally, the claims grounded in municipal liability fail, as plaintiff fails to allege with sufficient specificity a policy or custom that would warrant Monell liability. See Stratakos v. Nassau Cty. , No. 15-CV-7244(ADS)(ARL), 2016 WL 6902143, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016) ("[B]are recitation of ‘the magic words from Monell ,’ together with his supposed knowledge of ‘numerous’ other accusations of police misconduct over the past five years ... is insufficient to survive dismissal.").
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is hereby Ordered that the defendants’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings is denied in part and granted in part, as set forth in this opinion.