Opinion
2:23-CV-00772-MRH-CRE
02-14-2024
DIANA M. JORDAN, AS WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARY OF THE ESTATE OF MARQUIS ANTHONY DREW, DECEASED; Plaintiff, v. RYAN MCWREATH, WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA SHERIFF'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON COUNTY SH ANTHONY E. ANDRONAS, WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, JOHN/JANE DOES, ABC CORPORATIONS, Defendants,
Honorable Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was removed to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas of Washington, County, Pennsylvania on May 10, 2023. Plaintiff Diana M. Jordan, as wrongful death beneficiary of the estate of Marquis Anthony Drew (“Decedent”), alleges that Defendants violated Decedent's civil rights, were negligent and caused the wrongful death of Decedent when Deputy Sheriff McWreath struck Decedent with his vehicle resulting in fatal injuries to Decedent.
Defendants are Ryan McWreath, a Deputy Sheriff of the Washington County Sheriff's Office (“Deputy Sheriff McWreath”), Anthony E. Andronas, the Washington County Sheriff (“Sheriff Andronas”), Washington County, Pennsylvania d/b/a Washington County and Washington County Sheriff's Office (the “County Defendants”), John/Jane Doe(s), and ABC Corporation(s). Defendant John/Jane Doe(s) and ABC Corporation have not been identified or served and are not represented by counsel.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants Deputy Sheriff McWreath, Sheriff Andronas, and the County Defendants' partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike certain allegations of Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (ECF No. 16). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 17, 24, 25).
For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part as follows: the motion to dismiss should be granted as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against all Defendants (Count III); Plaintiff's negligence claim against Sheriff Andronas (Count I); Plaintiff's claims for wrongful death and survival against Sheriff Andronas (Counts IV and V); and for Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages for her section 1983 claims and for her state law tort claims against the County Defendants. It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied in all other respects, and the following claims remain: a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against the County (Count I); a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count II); a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against the County, Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count III); a wrongful death claim under Pennsylvania law against the County and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count IV); and a survival action claim under Pennsylvania law against the County and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count V).
II. REPORT
a. Background
On December 9, 2020 at approximately 7:45 p.m., Decedent was a pedestrian walking upon the shoulder of the roadway at or near 773 Old National Pike, South Strabane Township, Pennsylvania. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) at ¶ 19. Decedent was walking against the flow of traffic to observe motor vehicles approaching him. Id. at ¶ 20. At the same time and place, Deputy Sheriff McWreath was operating a motor vehicle owned by the County and Sheriff Andronas and was acting within the course and scope of his employment. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Sheriff McWreath was driving at a high rate of speed, did not have lights or sirens engaged, had an unobstructed view ahead of him and was not adequately paying attention. Id. at ¶¶ 23-26. Deputy Sheriff McWreath crossed the solid white fog line and entered the shoulder of the roadway and failed to observe Decedent walking toward him upon the shoulder of the roadway. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Deputy Sheriff McWreath did not apply his brakes when approaching Decedent and did not make any evasive maneuvers to avoid striking Decedent. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Deputy Sheriff McWreath then violently struck Decedent and was thrown more than 50 feet from the impact location where he landed in a ditch along the north berm of Old National Pike and survived the collision. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 38-43. Decedent eventually succumbed to his injuries while he laid in the ditch along the north berm of Old National Pike. Id. at ¶ 44.
Deputy Sheriff McWreath did not know he violently struck Decedent and he did not stop immediately after striking Decedent. Id. at ¶¶45-46. Decedent was struck with such force that the vehicle's debris field continued for more than 100 feet from the impact location, and the vehicle was ultimately declared a total loss with more than $17,000.00 in accident-related damage. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 49. Deputy Sheriff McWreath stopped several hundred feet from the impact location, walked back through the debris field to ascertain what he violently struck, and observed Decedent laying on his right side in the ditch along the northern berm of Old National Pike. Id. at ¶¶ 50-52. According to Plaintiff, Sheriff Deputy McWreath did not call out to or approach Decedent, nor did he attempt to render any type of aid. Id. at ¶¶ 53-56. Eight minutes after the impact, Sheriff Deputy McWreath called 911 at 7:53 p.m. and Pennsylvania State Police and eventually the Washington County Coroner were summoned to investigate the accident and declared Decedent deceased at the scene. Id. at ¶¶ 57-60, 63. An autopsy of Decedent's body determined the cause of death as blunt force trauma of the head and neck resulting from being struck by Deputy Sheriff McWreath. Id. at ¶ 64. A toxicology examination of Decedent's blood and urine did not reveal any positive findings of toxicological significance. Id. at ¶ 65.
Following the accident, Plaintiff alleges that the County Defendants and Sheriff Andronas failed to investigate the accident, failed to get a statement or interview Deputy Sheriff McWreath about the accident, failed to get a statement or interview any eye witness to the accident, failed to have Deputy Sheriff McWreath submit to toxicology testing to determine whether any intoxicating substances were in his system, failed to perform any accident reconstruction, failed to photograph the accident scene, failed to examine, download and store the Event Data Recorder of Deputy Sheriff McWreath's vehicle, failed to procure investigative reports and materials of any other investigating agency or discuss the accident with any other investigating agency, failed to investigate and determine whether Deputy Sheriff McWreath's actions warranted employment repercussions and did not suspend or terminate Deputy Sheriff McWreath or determine whether additional training or retraining was required, failed to document the accident for their own records and do not possess any documentation about the accident. Id. at ¶¶ 66-81.
Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against Defendants: (1) a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against the County and Sheriff Andronas (Count I); (2) a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count II); (3) Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County, Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count III); (4) a wrongful death claim under Pennsylvania law against all Defendants (Count IV); and (5) a survival action claim under Pennsylvania law against all Defendants (Count V).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims, any official capacity claims against Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath, the negligence claims against Sheriff Andronas, and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Defs. Br. (ECF No. 17) at 6-13. Defendants further move to dismiss parts of the Amended Complaint they deem improper. Id. at 13-15. Defendants do not move to dismiss Counts I, IV and V related to negligence and wrongful death and survival under Pennsylvania law against the County Defendants. Id. at 2.
b. Standard of Review
i. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 18384 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
c. Discussion
i. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Sheriff McWreath violated her procedural due process rights by striking Decedent with his car resulting in his death, failing to administer aid to Decedent, and waiting eight minutes before calling 911. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) at ¶ 106. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Sheriff McWreath violated her substantive due process rights by engaging in conscience-shocking conduct with deliberate indifference to Decedent's well-being by recklessly driving resulting in Decedent's death, failing to render aid, waiting eight minutes to call 911, and disregarding and violating unspecified Sheriff's Office and County policies and procedures in operating his vehicle. Id. at ¶ 107. Plaintiff claims that the County and Sheriff Andronas aided in depriving Plaintiff of her due process rights by failing to investigate Deputy Sheriff McWreath's actions, and that they failed to train and supervise Deputy Sheriff McWreath. Id. at ¶¶ 113-14.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims arguing that there is no basis for a section 1983 claim where a citizen suffers a physical injury due to a police officer's negligent use of his vehicle under the substantive due process clause and the procedural due process clause has no application here. Defs. Br. (ECF No. 17) at 7-8 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854 n.13 (1998)).
In response, Plaintiff reiterates the allegations in her complaint and argues that she has sufficiently pleaded a section 1983 claim because Deputy Sheriff McWreath struck and killed Decedent while acting in the scope of his employment, did not render aid to Decedent and did not call 911 for eight minutes, and that the County and Sheriff Andronas failed to investigate the accident and did not take any action against Deputy Sheriff McWreath. Pl. Resp. Br. (ECF No. 24) at 8-9.
Procedural Due Process
For courts analyzing a procedural due process claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, “the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). Once a court determines “that the interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ‘[t]he core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.' ” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998)).
Defendants argue that procedural due process has no application under these set of facts. Plaintiff does not directly respond to Defendants' argument and generally argues she has stated a valid section 1983 claim. Defendants are correct that Plaintiff has alleged no facts supporting a procedural due process claim and her claims are better suited for analysis under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's procedural due process claim be dismissed.
Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause “limits what government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures that it employs[.]” Boyanowski v. Cap. Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2000). A claim under the substantive due process clause arises only when a governmental employee's “conduct amounts to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience.” See Porter v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 447 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, to state a claim for substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government deprived her of an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and such deprivation “shocks the conscience.” Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015).
In cases involving injuries sustained by a citizen due to a police officer's negligent or reckless use of his vehicle, this conduct does not support a due process claim. Fagan, 22 F.3d 1296. To state a claim under section 1983 for an automobile accident with a state official, there must be a “factual basis for a finding that [the state official's] actions ‘were inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience.” Timko v. City of Hazleton, 665 F.Supp. 1130, 1134 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying the “shocks the conscience” standard)).
While Plaintiff's complaint uses terms like “wrongful, malicious, reckless, and deliberately indifferent” to describe Deputy Sheriff McWreath's conduct, Am. Compl. (ECF No. 15) at ¶ 103, that type of conduct does not automatically support a finding of unconstitutional behavior under these circumstances as Plaintiff must illustrate that Deputy Sheriff McWreath's conduct was “conscience shocking” to state a substantive due process claim. However, whether conduct shocks the conscience as a matter of law is better determined “based on a fully developed factual record[,]” Eastman v. Smith, No. CV 19-577, 2019 WL 5102818, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), and it would be premature to make that determination at this procedural juncture. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim be denied without prejudice for Defendants to raise at summary judgment with the benefit of a completed record.
While the issue of whether Plaintiff will be able to provide evidence of conscience shocking behavior is yet to be determined, it is noted that the undersigned has found no case in this circuit that the court found sufficient evidence of conscience shocking behavior in a policevehicle accident case. See e.g., Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1307 (decedents failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that police conduct shocked the conscience for fatal injuries sustained, including to a bystander, during a police chase); Carroll v. Borough of State Coll., 854 F.Supp. 1184, 119394 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (police pursuit case did not shock the conscience); Triest v. Gilbert, No. CIV. A. 95-1984, 1997 WL 255668, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (police accident case where officer was responding to a call from dispatcher which resulted in the death of a bystander did not shock the conscience); Gillyard v. Stylios, No. CIV.A. 97-6555, 1998 WL 966010, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1998) (applying the “shocks the conscience” standard and finding no substantive due process claim where there was no police pursuit and a police motor vehicle accident caused the death of a pedestrian). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (stating in dicta that “survivors of an innocent bystander . . . negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims equally cognizable under [section] 1983”); Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the “shocks the conscience” standard to substantive due process claims for actions of emergency medical personnel).
Plaintiff also argues that she has stated a substantive due process claim for Deputy Sheriff McWreath's failure to provide Decedent aid after the accident and has stated a substantive due process claim against Sheriff Andronas and the County for failure to train. Because Defendants do not provide arguments specifically addressing those claims, no recommendation on the viability of those claims will be made.
ii. Official Capacity Claims
Next, Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath made against them in their official capacities as duplicative against the County Defendants.
Plaintiff responds that her “claims against Defendants Andronas and McWreath are against them in their individual capacities, not their official capacities.” Pl. Resp. Br. (ECF No. 22) at 12.
Claims made against individual defendants in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the governmental entity itself and are redundant. Harris v. Cashman, No. 2:20-CV-00528-CRE, 2021 WL 602679, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021) (quoting Burton v. City of Philadelphia, 121 F.Supp.2d 810, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). Therefore, while Plaintiff does not assert official capacity claims against Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath, to the extent the complaint is construed as asserting official capacity claims against those Defendants, it would be proper to dismiss the claims as redundant.
iii. Negligence Claims against Sheriff Andronas and the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
Next, Sheriff Andronas argues that the negligence claims set forth in Counts I, IV, and V of the amended complaint should be dismissed against him because they are barred by governmental immunity under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.
Defendants do not move to dismiss the negligence claims against the County and no recommendation will be made as to the viability of those claims.
Count I is a negligence claim against Sheriff Andronas for the acts of Deputy Sheriff McWreath for the motor vehicle accident and Counts IV and V are claims for wrongful death and survival under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8301, 8302.
The PSTCA insulates government actors from liability for torts committed by its agents acting in their official capacities, except under limited circumstance that are defined by statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541, et seq. (“no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.”). Under the PSTCA, immunity does not extend to “willful misconduct,” which is “synonymous with the term ‘intentional tort.' ” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006). One exception to the PSTCA which allows for damages from personal injury caused by a municipal employee includes the operation of motor vehicles. Because it is not alleged that Sheriff Andronas operated or had any control over the operation of the motor vehicle that resulted in Decedent's death, this exception does not apply to Sheriff Andronas. Moreover, Plaintiff's negligence claims against Sheriff Andronas sound in vicarious liability and “[t]he PSTCA precludes imposition of liability upon a governmental unit based upon the theory of vicarious liability” unless otherwise provided by the statute. Dean v. Com., Dep't of Transp., 561 Pa. 503, 751 A.2d 1130, 1133 (2000). Doe v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., __ F.Supp.3d __, __, No. 4:22-CV-01387, 2023 WL 6929316, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2023). Therefore, because Plaintiff's negligence claim at Count I against Sheriff Andronas is not an enumerated exception to the PSTCA and is based on vicarious liability of Deputy Sheriff McWreath's actions, Sheriff Andronas is entitled to immunity for these claims, and it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's negligence claim be dismissed as to Sheriff Andronas.
These exceptions include: (i) the operation of motor vehicles; (ii) the care, custody or control of personal property; (iii) the care, custody or control of real property; (iv) a dangerous condition of trees, traffic controls and street lighting; (v) a dangerous condition of stream, sewer, gas or electric systems; (vi) a dangerous condition of streets; (vii) a dangerous condition of sidewalks; and (viii) the care, custody and control of animals. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(b). These exceptions must be strictly construed. Lindstrom v. City of Corry, 563 Pa. 579, 763 A.2d 394 (2000).
As for Counts IV and V for wrongful death and survival, these claims “are not substantive causes of action; rather, they provide a means of recovery for unlawful conduct that results in death.” Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 12-2602, 2012 WL 3024033, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, “wrongful death and survival actions sound in tort and are governed by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.” Marks v. Philadelphia Indus. Corr. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 14-5168, 2014 WL 5298008, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2014) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff's wrongful death and survival action claims against Sheriff Andronas are based upon the negligence claim, and these claims do not fall within one of the exceptions to immunity under the PSTCA, it is respectfully recommended that these claims be dismissed as to Sheriff Andronas. See also Panas v. City of Philadelphia, 871 F.Supp.2d 370, 376 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (barring wrongful death and survival actions under the PSTCA); Costobile-Fulginiti v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F.Supp.2d 521, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (same).
iv. Punitive Damages
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages against Washington County and the Sheriff's Office or employees in their official capacities should be dismissed because punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law against municipalities and their employees acting in their official capacities. Defendants also argue that the punitive damages claim against Deputy Sheriff McWreath should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts showing entitlement to those damages.
Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants' argument with respect to the County Defendants, and instead argues she has pleaded sufficient facts to show entitlement to punitive damages with respect to Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath in their individual capacities.
Defendants are correct that Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages against a municipal defendant or for claims against public officials made in their official capacities for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“we hold that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Punitive damages cannot be recovered from defendants in their official capacities” under section 1983). The same is true for claims of punitive damages made against a municipal defendant for claims barred by the PSTCA, because the PSTCA bars all damages for tort claims, unless included in the narrow list of exceptions. Joseph M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 516 F.Supp.2d 424, 444 (M.D. Pa. 2007). It is therefore respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages be dismissed with prejudice as to Plaintiff's section 1983 and the state law tort claims against the County.
As for Plaintiff's claim of punitive damages against Deputy Sheriff McWreath, to qualify for punitive damages under section 1983, “the defendant's conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous. Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the defendant's action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.” Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989). Likewise, under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages “may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. Punitive damages must be based on conduct which is malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or oppressive.” Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (1984). At this stage of the litigation, it would be premature to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Deputy Sheriff McWreath or Sheriff Andronas, and it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied in this respect.
v. Motion to Strike
Defendants argue that the amended complaint contains “several purely conclusory, inflammatory, impertinent or otherwise improper allegations that are not supported by any well-pleaded factual allegations” and should be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Defs. Br. (ECF No. 17) at 13. Defendants take issue with Plaintiff's allegations that Deputy Sheriff McWreath was speeding before or at the time of the accident, that he failed to operate his vehicle within a single lane, that he failed to render aid, that he failed to use his lights and siren at the time of the accident, that the County Defendants failed to train or supervise Deputy Sheriff McWreath, that there was a failure to have the proper policies and procedures in place, that the County Defendants negligently entrusted Deputy Sheriff McWreath with the subject vehicle, and that Decedent survived for some number of minutes after the accident. Defs. Br. (ECF No. 17) at 1415.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to strike from a pleading any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Motions to strike are highly disfavored and where a defendant seeks to strike individual allegations from a complaint, the court will deny the motion “unless the moving party shows that ‘the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues.” Eisai Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 629 F.Supp.2d 416, 425 (D.N.J. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When faced with allegations that could possibly serve to achieve a better understanding of plaintiff's claims or perform any useful purpose in promoting the just disposition of the litigation, courts generally deny such motions to strike.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Even when challenged materials meet the definitions in Rule 12(f), a motion will not be granted in the absence of clear prejudice to the adverse party.” Jenkins v. Veney, No. CV 23-954, 2023 WL 4295824, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2023).
While Defendants maintain that the allegations they seek to strike are unsubstantiated, it would be premature to make that decision at this procedural juncture and it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to strike be denied.
d. Conclusion
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part as follows: the motion to dismiss should be granted as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against all Defendants (Count III); Plaintiff's negligence claim against Sheriff Andronas (Count I); Plaintiff's claims for wrongful death and survival against Sheriff Andronas (Counts IV and V); and for Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages for her section 1983 claims and for her state law tort claims against the County Defendants. It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied in all other respects, and the following claims remain: a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against the County (Count I); a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law against Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count II); a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against the County, Sheriff Andronas and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count III); a wrongful death claim under Pennsylvania law against the County and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count IV); and a survival action claim under Pennsylvania law against the County and Deputy Sheriff McWreath (Count V).
Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and the Local Rules for Magistrates, unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge, the parties have until February 28, 2024 to object to this report and recommendation. Unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of the objections. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).