Opinion
MMXCV136013438
06-21-2016
Russell Jordan v. Jon D. Biller
June 22, 2016, Filed
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL DEFENSES (#186)
Elpedio N. Vitale, J.
Pursuant to Connecticut Rule of Practice § 10-39(a), the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, Jon and Jacqueline Biller (hereinafter " Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs"), move to strike the Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants, ' Russell Jordan and Lorraine Jorsey (hereinafter " Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants"), Special Defense to Defendant's Counterclaim dated March 1, 2016. The Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs argue that the Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' Special Defense is " inappropriate and legally insufficient because it merely makes allegations inconsistent with allegations made in the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiff's Counterclaim."
The Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants' object to the motion and argue that " the allegations of the . . . Special Defenses are appropriate fact pleading in accordance with the Rules of Practice." Oral argument on the motion was heard June 20, 2016. At oral argument, the Plaintiffs'/Counterclaim Defendants represented that the Special Defenses " apply to all of the counts."
Discussion
" [W]henever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a). " A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 529, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). " In addition to challenging the legal sufficiency of a complaint or counterclaim, our rules of practice provides that a party may challenge by way of a motion to strike the legal sufficiency of an answer, 'including any special defenses contained therein . . .'" GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 179-80, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).
" In . . . ruling on [a] . . . motion to strike, the trial court [is obligated] to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). " [W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).
Although the court reads the allegations of a pleading favorably to the nonmoving party, a motion to strike only " admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the [pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
With regard to special defenses, our Supreme Court has stated that " the fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). Practice Book § 10-50 provides: " No facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue. Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." " The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).
Practice Book § 10-50 enumerates several particular special defenses: " accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, coverture, duress, fraud, illegality not apparent on the face of the pleadings, infancy, that the defendant was non compos mentis, payment (even though nonpayment is alleged by the plaintiff), release, the statute of limitations and res judicata . . ." " [T]he list of special defenses in § 10-50 is illustrative rather than exhaustive." Kosinski v. Carr, 112 Conn.App. 203, 209 n.6, 962 A.2d 836 (2009).
Special defenses, like all other pleadings, must be accompanied by facts sufficient to " apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., supra, 274 Conn. 456.
In Mitchell v. Guardian Systems, Inc., 72 Conn.App. 158, 804 A.2d 1004 (2012), which is relied on by the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that the second special defense was improperly pleaded because " it constituted a separate cause of action that should have been pleaded as a counterclaim." Id. at 166. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that, under the circumstances presented, the second special defense was improperly pleaded. Mitchell does not appear to be analogous to the present situation.
If a party seeks to introduce evidence under a denial " which is consistent with a prima facie case, but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action, the 'new matter' must be affirmatively pleaded as a special defense." Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 6, 327 A.2d 583 (1973).
Superior Court cases have held that a defendant's failure to specially allege facts in support of a special defense is a ground for that defense to be stricken. See Lamothe v. Midstate Medical Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV05-4002893, (April 10, 2006, Taylor, J.) (failing to plead specific facts in support of special defense is ground for special defense to be stricken); McRea v. Davis, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV02-0401037, (May 5, 2004, Dewey, J.) (holding allegation of mere legal conclusions without specifically pleaded facts is not a properly plead special defense). Based on the requirements of Practice Book § § 10-1 and 10-50, it may be inferred that a party must always plead facts when it asserts a special defense and that it may not merely state that such facts are scattered throughout another pleading.
The court observes that the special defenses contained in the Defendant's filing entitled " Answer, Special Defenses and Counterclaim" and dated January 19, 2016, appear substantially analogous to the special defenses that are the subject of the instant motion.
After consideration of the foregoing legal principles, the Motion to Strike Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants' Special Defenses is denied.