Opinion
05-21-00245-CV
07-31-2023
STEVEN JORDAN, Appellant v. MELANIE AARON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-03928
Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KEN MOLBERG, JUSTICE
In this breach of fiduciary duty case involving a disputed real estate transaction, appellant Steven Jordan challenges the trial court's judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of appellee Melanie Aaron, the plaintiff in this action, who sued Jordan on behalf of herself and as the independent executrix of the Estate of Melvin Carl Aaron, deceased. Among other things, the judgment canceled a deed dated September 6, 2017, from Melvin to Jordan on property located at 3930 Kiest Valley, Dallas, County, Texas, and ordered that Aaron recover from Jordan $18,000 as attorney's fees through the date of the judgment. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that included, in part, findings that Jordan used a power of attorney to transfer ownership of the subject real property from Melvin to himself and that Jordan had a fiduciary duty to Melvin at the time of the transfer. On appeal, Jordan, representing himself without an attorney, argues, in essence, that the trial court erred in concluding a fiduciary relationship existed and in entering judgment in Aaron's favor based on what Jordan describes as insufficient evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
For clarity, we refer to appellee as Aaron and to her father, Melvin Carl Aaron, as Melvin.
Jordan raises the following four issues in his appellate brief:
1. Did [Jordan] use the Power of Attorney to transfer [Melvin's] house to himself. [Aaron] used a copy of the Power of Attorney as Exhibit A. And used a copy of the Warranty Deed as Exhibit B. These two documents are the only pieces of evidence entered during trial.
2. Did [Jordan] ever have a fiduciary duty or relationship to ever breach.
3. Did the trial court err with the lack of facts and insufficient legal evidence to support the judgment or [Aaron's] claims.
4. Does [Jordan] have a right to the property based on agreement he had with [Melvin] and contract laws.
A party appealing an adverse judgment has the burden to show reversible error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for sufficiency of the evidence. Hegar v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020). We construe Jordan's first, third, and fourth issues as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and his second issue as a challenge to the trial court's conclusions of law.
We construe Jordan's fourth issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and not a mixed question of law and fact, based on Jordan's pleading-which included only a general denial, and thus did not include any affirmative request for an award based on contract-and based on our understanding of Jordan's arguments on appeal. As we understand Jordan's arguments, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding of fact I.C., in which the trial court found that Jordan "used the [p]ower of [a]ttorney to transfer ownership of the subject real property from [Melvin] to himself."
Our record on appeal consists of the clerk's record only. Because Jordan failed to request the reporter's record, we ordered the appeal submitted without it, after first giving him notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c)(1). "When confronted with an incomplete record, we presume the omitted portions are relevant to the appeal and the evidence contained within the omitted portions of the record support the trial court's judgment." Imagine Auto. Grp. v. Boardwalk Motor Cars, Ltd., 430 S.W.3d 620, 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, pet. denied). Without a reporter's record, it is impossible for Jordan to prevail on his sufficiency challenges in his first, third, and fourth issues because we must presume the evidence supports the trial court's judgment. See id.; Davis v. Kaufman Cty., 195 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Sam Houston Hotel, L.P. v. Mockingbird Rest., Inc., 191 S.W.3d 720, 721 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 05-09-01322-CV, 2011 WL 1549558, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating appellant's "evidentiary complaints without a reporter's record present nothing for our review"). Absent a reporter's record, our review is limited to complaints concerning errors of law, erroneous pleadings or rulings thereon, an erroneous jury charge, irreconcilable jury findings, summary judgment, and fundamental error. See Krasniqi v. Dallas Cty. Child Protective Servs., 809 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). Jordan raises no issue concerning such matters, other than his second issue, which is a question of law. We cannot conclude the trial court erred in its legal conclusion that Jordan owed Melvin a fiduciary duty at the time of the property transfer, as Jordan's appellate brief states Melvin signed a general power of attorney to Jordan on September 6, 2017, the same date as the property transfer. See Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572 S.W.3d 213, 231 (Tex. 2019) ("An agreement creating a power of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship.").
See Nat'l Plan Adm'rs, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 235 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. 2007); Kiger v. Balestri, 376 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
Based on the record before us, we conclude Jordan has not demonstrated any reversible error in connection with his appeal. We overrule Jordan's four issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee MELANIE AARON recover her costs of this appeal from appellant STEVEN JORDAN.
Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2023.