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distinguishing between creditors that were "innocent parties who were not signatories to the arbitration agreements" and would suffer detriment in arbitration with "a party to a contract who seeks to escape from an arbitration agreement to which he subscribed" and would not suffer detriment because the party agreed to said arbitration
Summary of this case from Fremeau v. Credit One Bank, N.A.Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Decided July 3, 1991.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV-87-6506-FFF; Ferdinand F. Fernandez, District Judge, Presiding.
C.D.Cal.
AFFIRMED.
Before SCHROEDER, FLETCHER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3.
Clarence Jones, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm.
Jones was convicted of federal bank robbery on July 6, 1976 and was paroled on December 21, 1983. In 1984, he was convicted of three counts of robbery by the state of California and was sentenced to a term of state imprisonment. On September 4, 1984, the United States Parole Commission issued a warrant charging Jones with violations of his federal parole conditions and notified state prison officials that upon completion of his state sentence, Jones was to be released to federal custody. After he finished serving his state sentence, the federal parole warrant was executed on October 24, 1986, and Jones was taken into federal custody. After a parole revocation hearing on January 7, 1987, the Parole Commission ordered that Jone's parole be revoked.
In his traverse to the government's response to his habeas petition, Jones alleged that he should have received credit for the approximately three months he spent in custody in 1976 before he was sentenced for the federal bank robbery conviction. Jones alleged that he was arrested in March 1986, was convicted on July 6, 1976 of federal bank robbery, and received credit for time served only from July 6, 1976. The record indicates that Jones apparently was held in state custody on state charges from the time of his arrest until he was released into federal custody in July to commence service of his federal sentence.
The district court dismissed the habeas petition because Jones had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to this claim and informed Jones that he could file a second habeas petition if he wanted to pursue the claim. Because Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies on this claim, we affirm the district court's dismissal. See Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir.1986).
The government asserts that Jones is arguing on appeal that he should receive federal credit for the time he served in state custody from March 8, 1984 until October 24, 1984 for his 1984 state robbery convictions. To the extent that Jones is raising this issue for the first time on appeal, we exercise our discretion to consider it because it presents purely a question of law. Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.1980). Jones is not entitled to credit for time served in state custody on the 1984 state convictions before his transfer to federal custody on October 24, 1986. See Raines v. United States Parole Comm'n, 829 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1987).
In his habeas petition, Jones also alleged that he had not received adequate notice that the 1984 convictions would be used at his federal parole revocation hearing. Because Jones and his counsel were given the opportunity to continue the hearing to prepare a defense and declined a continuance, the district court found that Jones had waived his right contest the adequacy of the notice. Jones has not raised this issue on appeal, and therefore, it is deemed abandoned. See Willard v. California, 812 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.1987).
AFFIRMED.