Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-182-C
March 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day the Court considered Defendants, THROCKMORTON COUNTY, TEXAS; JOHN RILEY, Sheriff, Throckmorton County, Texas; SHACKELFORD COUNTY, TEXAS; RICHARD WAGMAN, Sheriff, Shackelford County, Texas; RICHARD DEWAYNE MOON, RUSSELL MORGAN HARRIS, QUINTON LEE, and VIC HENDRDX's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 11, 2003. Plaintiff's filed their Response in Opposition on September 30, 2003. Defendants filed a Reply on October 8, 2003. After considering all the evidence and arguments, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The deceased, Charles C. "Casey" Jones ("Casey"), was arrested in Throckmorton County, Texas, on November 15, 2001, on a warrant for revocation of probation. At the time of his arrest, Casey was 23 years old. Because Throckmorton County does not have its own jail cell, the Sheriff of the county, John Riley ("Riley"), had Casey transported to the jail facility in nearby Shackelford County, Texas, to be incarcerated pursuant to an agreement between the two counties. Riley did not communicate any information regarding Casey's criminal history or narcotic and substance abuse to the jailer in Shackelford County. During the process of booking Casey into the jail, he was given an evaluation involving questions about any suicidal tendencies and other medical and physical conditions, utilizing forms approved by the Texas State Jail Commission. The evaluation did not disclose any evidence of suicidal tendencies.During the course of Casey's incarceration, his physician prescribed medication for him and made adjustments to the dosage of his medication. He was visited by various friends and relatives, as well as by his drug-rehabilitation case worker from MHMR, none of whom indicated to anyone that Casey was acting in any way suicidal. Casey was also transported once to Hendrick Memorial Hospital in Abilene, Texas, because he was apparently suffering seizures. He was treated and released. On December 18, 2001, he was treated at the jail by medical personnel from the Shackelford County Medical Clinic for another seizure episode but was not transported anywhere because he did not need any further medical attention. After this episode, Casey was relocated from the general population to an observation cell and placed on behavioral watch. The next day, the jail administrator, Vie Hendrix ("Hendrix"), interviewed Casey and determined that he was able to be returned to a two-man cell in the general jail population. During the morning of December 21, 2001, Casey committed suicide by hanging himself from the jail cell bars, using an 11-foot cord removed from the television set in his cell.
Casey's mother, Melanie Jones Gober ("Jones"), individually, and in her capacity as representative of Casey's estate, brought suit in this Court on September 16, 2002, against Defendants, alleging individual liability as well as municipal liability for the counties for survival and wrongful-death claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Tort Claims Act. The individual Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity to the § 1983 claims and official and sovereign immunity to state claims, and they have moved for summary judgment on those defenses as well as summary judgment on the issue of municipal liability on the part of the counties for the § 1983 claims.
Jones, as the mother of the deceased, asserts her own § 1983 cause of action and a separate § 1983 action as representative of Casey's estate. The Fifth Circuit recognizes a parent's right to a cause of action under § 1983 to recover for injuries caused by the deprivation of her child's constitutional rights. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1992).
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material feet is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255.
Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the nonmovant's favor. Id.
Finally, in reviewing the summary judgment evidence, "Rule 56 does not impose upon this Court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment," Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Rather, the Court need rely only on those portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs the Court's attention. Id. See also Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1536-37 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that two volumes of summary judgment evidence were insufficient to preclude summary judgment when plaintiffs failed to identify specific portions which supported their claims). Moreover, Local Rule 56.5(c) expressly requires that a party filing an appendix "must include in its brief citations to each page of the appendix that supports each assertion that the party makes concerning the summary judgment evidence," This Court will only consider the admissible summary judgment evidence discussed and specifically identified in the parties' motions and responses.
In cases where the defense of qualified immunity is raised, the moving party is not required to put forth evidence to meet its summary judgment burden for a claim of immunity. Beck v, Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000). "It is sufficient that the movant in good faith pleads that it is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity." Id. The burden is on the plaintiff to overcome a defendant's defense of qualified immunity. Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1274 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff must plead facts with sufficient particularity so that the facts, if proved, would warrant the relief sought. Id. Heightened pleadings in qualified immunity cases require that the plaintiff rest his complaint on more than mere conclusions alone and plead his case with precision and factual specificity. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff's allege that Defendants violated Casey's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Casey was jailed because his probation was revoked, although the reason for that revocation is unclear. [Pls.' App. to Resp. in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., at 2]. Whatever the circumstances that triggered Casey's revocation, his incarceration was pursuant to his prior conviction. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Unlike the typical pretrial detainee, the justification for the detention of a detained parolee is dual. . . . [T]he detention and subsequent re-incarceration of a parolee are only triggered by the new arrest; detention and re-incarceration are justified by the prior conviction"). That being the case, although Casey's incarceration might implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court is of the opinion that it actually does so only if the Plaintiff's have alleged that Casey's treatment was a form of punishment for a crime for which he had not yet been convicted. Id. Because there is no such allegation, the claims contained in Plaintiff's' Complaint more properly state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Id. at 106 n. 8. Where, as here, the issue is a jail official's action or failure to act in seeing to the medical needs or safety of a person incarcerated on a revocation of probation, this is a distinction without a difference.
See infra note 4.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity to Plaintiff's' claims under § 1983. Officials sued in their individual capacity for violations under § 1983 may assert a defense of qualified immunity. See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1998). The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government official as "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[.]" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, the affirmative defense should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation, Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156, and should protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity for a violation under § 1983, this Court must engage in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether a defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident. Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000). As to the first part of the inquiry, the relevant question is whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the [defendant's] conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. The Fifth Circuit does "not require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established federal rights; [precedence] places that burden upon plaintiffs." Thompson v. Upshur, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001).
The right of inmates not to have their serious medical needs treated with deliberate indifference has been clearly established since 1976. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). In addition, "a prison official's `deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Jail officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Id. at 832; see also Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("the State owes the . . . duty under . . . the Eighth Amendment to provide . . . inmates with basic human needs, including medical care and protection from harm during their confinement"). Inmate suicide implicates both the state's duty to provide medical care and its duty to provide protection from harm, albeit self-inflicted, See Hare, 74 F.3d at 644. Certainly, then, an inmate's suicidal tendencies are a serious mental health and safety risk to which jailers cannot be deliberately indifferent. See Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997).
Although Hare involved a pretrial detainee, whose rights are grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which protects convicted persons, i.e., inmates), an inmate is entitled to the same protection of those rights he shares with a detainee; and where the medical needs or safety of both are concerned, there is no difference. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 649.
Flores, too, is a pretrial-detainee case, but again the result is the same for inmates. See supra note 4.
Deliberate indifference occurs when an official (1) has a subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety, and (2) responds with deliberate indifference to that risk, See Jacobs, 228 F.3d at 394. Thus, deliberate indifference, under the Eighth Amendment, "describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. at 1978. As the detailed analysis of the deliberate-indifference standard by the Supreme Court in Farmer indicates, the standard for deliberate indifference is not an objective one; i.e., it is not acting or failing to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is known or is so obvious that it should be known-rather, the standard is whether "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. The test to be satisfied is a subjective one that requires consciousness of that risk. Id. at 838-40. As the Supreme Court noted in Farmer, the test of subjective knowledge may be satisfied even by inference from the circumstantial evidence of the very obviousness of the risk itself. Id. at 842. This standard requiring subjective knowledge of the facts and their significance applies to inmate suicides. Honey v. City of Gumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1209, 116 So. Ct. 1826, 134 L.Ed.2d 931 (1996).
Plaintiff's claim that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual Defendants believed Casey was suicidal. There is no evidence that Casey himself ever told anyone that he felt suicidal or was suffering severe depression during the time he was jailed. Plaintiff's admit that there is no evidence that any family or friends who visited Casey while he was jailed ever communicated to any of the Defendants that Casey appeared suicidal. [Pls' Resp, in Opp. to Mot, Summ. J., at 9]. Casey's mother's statements to Defendant Riley at the time of Casey's arrest, indicating that she was afraid he was going to do something to himself and that she was worried about him because he was not acting right, is not evidence that he was a suicide risk. [Dep. of Melanie Jones Gober pp. 30-32, Defs.' App. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 at 8], Neither are her reports, made to Defendant Riley through her friend Tina Hantz, that Casey had called her from jail in an upset mood and that he was not acting right, evidence that Casey was suicidal. [Dep. of Tina Hantz p. 57, Defs.' App. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7 at 44], There is no evidence that any of the persons attending to Casey's physical or mental medical care during his incarceration ever indicated that Casey suffered from any suicidal tendencies whatsoever. In fact, the MHMR worker who visited Casey in jail stated that her visits with him did not lead her to believe he was at any point suicidal. [Dep. of Barbara Woodburn p. 23, Defs.' App. to Mot. Summ, J., Ex 10 at 61]. Nothing in the intake evaluation administered to Casey indicates any apparent risk of suicide. The allegations in the Complaint that various Defendants were aware of Casey's drug history, mental health history, or strange talk about non-existent "banditos," or that his physician changed his drug prescription while Casey was jailed, do not, without more, indicate an awareness that Casey presented an obviously substantial risk of suicide.
Plaintiff's also claim, however, that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Casey was put on suicide watch, and that this is particularly relevant to whether Defendant Hendrix believed Casey was suicidal. However, there is no evidence that Casey was put on suicide watch-only that at one point, from 4;00 p.m. on December 19, 2001, until 7:45 a.m. on December 20, 2001, he was placed under observation at 15-minute intervals in a special cell that permitted jailers to monitor him closely via cameras. [Dep. of Vie Hendrix p. 73-75, Pls.' App. to Resp, in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., at 15; pp. 87, 93, Defs.' App. to Mot, Summ. J., Ex. 15 at 124-25], The jail administrator, Defendant Hendrix, who authorized the special observation, stated that it was an "unacceptable behavior" watch, and Casey was placed in the special cell based on his previous behavior of hitting himself in the head with his hands. [Dep. of Vie Hendrix p. 73-74, Pls.' App. to Resp, in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., at 15]. Hendrix in fact specifically denied that Casey was under suicide watch at any time. [ Id. p. 89, Pls.' App. to Resp, in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., at 16].
Plaintiff's, however, submit the statement of one of the jailers, Defendant Moon, that he believed Casey was on suicide watch from the afternoon of the 19th to the morning of the 20th either as direct evidence to support the fact or as circumstantial evidence from which the fact could be inferred that Defendants were aware of Casey's suicidal tendencies. Moon, in fact, never actually states that he knew Casey was on a suicide watch, but only that if he were, he would be watched at 15-minute intervals in a special cell, and that since he was in fact watched every 15 minutes in that particular cell, that was consistent with a suicide watch. [Dep. of Richard Moon p. 17-19, Pls.' App, to Resp, in Opp. to Mot. Summ. J., at 22]. Hendrix, and not Moon, however, was the one who placed Casey under a special watch, and the fact that he did so on the same schedule as a suicide watch is not evidence that it was such, or from which such could be inferred. This is especially so in the absence of any indication that Casey was in fact suicidal and given the fact that Hendrix stated that it was not a suicide watch.
As Hendrix stated in his deposition, there were no written standards for his "unacceptable behavior" watch [Dep. of Vie Hendrix p. 73, 96, Pls.' App. to Resp, in Opp, to Mot. Summ. J., at 15, 17], because the jail was not required to have such a plan. [Reference to Wagman Dep., p. 131 in Defs,' App. to Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 24 at 197]. The fact that it was convenient to conduct an "unacceptable behavior" watch in the same location and on the same intervals established by the suicide policy does not make it a suicide watch. Without more, this Court finds this evidence insufficient as a matter of law to allow such an inference to be drawn. Furthermore, to allow such an inference would have a negative effect on jail administrators who might be inclined to provide more monitoring for an inmate's welfare than is required under the circumstances.
Although not in the form of admissible evidence, the documents submitted by Defendants indicate that even Casey's mother, who visited him in jail on December 20, reported that he seemed fine at the time and that she wasn't worried about him. [Reference to Jones Dep., p. 59 in Defs.' App. to Mot. Summ, J., Ex 24 at 198]. In addition, Casey's friend, Tina Hantz, also visited him on that same date and reported that Casey was "fine, being his chipper, happy self . . . like he always had been," [Reference to Hantz Dep., pp. 59-60 in Defs.' App. to Mot. Summ, J., Ex. 24 at 198].
Even assuming, arguendo, that a jury could find that Casey was under a suicide watch, that in itself may not necessarily indicate that he was a substantial risk for suicide. See Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Placing a pretrial detainee on some level of suicide watch, even the highest level, does not demonstrate a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of imminent suicide"). Even were this Court to determine that placement on suicide watch could permit the reasonable inference of a subjective awareness of a suicidal tendency, it is significant that Casey had been returned to the general population on Hendrix's determination that he no longer required a special watch, and there is no indication that he was suicidal from that time until he in fact committed suicide.
Hendrix's determination that the circumstances requiring a special watch had passed, even if it were a suicide watch, and to return Casey to the general population, was not deliberately indifferent. See Flores, 124 F.3d at 739 ("While it is easy in hindsight to conclude that [a] decision to discontinue the protective measures after twelve hours was ill advised, it was not, as a matter of law, deliberately indifferent"). At worst, it could be described as negligent under the circumstances, Negligent behavior, however, is not enough under § 1983. See Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 393.
Despite this lack of any direct evidence that any of the Defendants were subjectively aware that Casey presented a potential suicide risk, much less a substantial one, Plaintiff's nevertheless argue that a jury should be able to infer from the facts as they were known to the Defendants, that Defendants must have had a subjective awareness that Casey was a substantial suicide risk. Plaintiff's insist that Defendants should not be absolved of liability for their actions or failures to act on the basis of information available to them from their own observations merely because neither Casey nor anyone else ever told them Casey was suicidal. As noted above, the test for drawing the inference that a defendant must have known of a substantial suicide risk requires circumstantial evidence of the very obviousness of the risk itself. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Certainly none of the evidence, when viewed as isolated incidents, even in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff's, is sufficient as a matter of law to support the conclusion that Casey posed an obvious risk of suicide,
Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence when taken as a whole might be sufficient to allow a jury to find that the risk of suicide was obvious, Plaintiff's' argument ignores several crucial considerations. First, none of the Defendants was in possession of all the pieces of evidence. Even if some of the Defendants failed to pass on some facts of which they were aware to other Defendants, that is not a basis to impute knowledge of those facts to the other defendants. Second, nothing Casey did "so clearly indicated an intent to harm himself that the [officers] caring for him could have only concluded that he posed a serious risk of harm to himself." Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999). None of Casey's behaviors exhibit anything that could not be accounted for as a normal reaction to being incarcerated and certainly aren't sufficient to raise the inference of an obvious risk of suicide. With these two considerations in mind, this Court finds as a matter of law that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide to any of the individual defendants.
In the end, Plaintiff's have made only conclusory allegations that Defendants, in their individual capacities, violated Casey's constitutional rights through their deliberate indifference to his serious medical and basic human needs. The facts and evidence, even when all justifiable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff's' favor, fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual defendants had any subjective knowledge, or even any particular reason to suspect, that Casey was a substantial risk for suicide, nor is there any legally sufficient evidence of an obvious suicide risk from which such an inference could be drawn. Because this Court determines that none of the individual defendants was aware that Casey posed a substantial risk of suicide, the Court does not need to address the issue of whether any individual defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Absent the possibility that any of the individual defendants could have been deliberately indifferent, this Court finds as a matter of law that none of the individual defendants violated Casey's constitutional rights. Consequently, the Court does not need to consider whether defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable in light of a clearly established right, and there is no occasion to consider the individual defendants' defense of qualified immunity. The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims for violation of Casey's constitutional rights.
Municipal Liability for Civil Rights Claims
Plaintiff's further contend that summary judgment is inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Sheriff Riley acted with deliberate indifference in failing to advise Shackelford County officials about Casey's mental status and whether Sheriff Wagman acted with deliberate indifference in failing to follow up with MHMR. This Court is not certain whether Plaintiff's' claims implicate Sheriff Wagman's general failure to pursue more information from MHMR about Casey's previous mental condition and treatment, or whether they allege that the Sheriff should have involved MHMR more after Casey's jail episodes in an attempt to learn more about his then current mental condition. Whatever the nature of the allegation, Plaintiff's argue that these acts by Riley and Wagman, as sheriffs who are considered final policymakers, can serve as a basis for municipal liability under § 1983, citing Williams v. Kaufman County, 2003 WL 21962585 "14 (5th Cir. 2003). However, an isolated incident, such as this, can only be the basis for § 1983 liability "where the evidence that the municipality [county] had acted [through its official policymaker] and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and causation." Bd. of County Com'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1385, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Holding the counties potentially liable for these isolated acts by their respective sheriffs is not justified in light of the "rigorous culpability and causation standards [necessary] in order to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for its employees' actions." Id. At best, these are claims against the sheriffs in their individual or supervisory capacities, and as such do not survive summary judgment because the actions cannot be shown to be deliberately indifferent without evidence of subjective knowledge, which has not been shown.
9See supra pp. 5-14.
Plaintiff's further claim that Throckmorton County, through its sheriff, John Riley, and Shackelford County, through its sheriff, Richard Wagman, were deliberately indifferent to a violation of Casey's constitutional rights by promulgating policies and procedures or in the training and supervising of employees in ways that inadequately addressed potentially suicidal inmates' basic health and safety needs. Plaintiff's may recover against either county under § 1983 if they can show that some county policy or customary procedure caused its officials to deprive Casey of reasonable medical care for or protection from his own suicidal tendencies. Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 392. This Court can find no basis for such a claim against Throckmorton County; but as to Shackelford County, Plaintiff's contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Shackelford County acted with deliberate indifference in establishing a mental disabilities and suicide prevention plan that did not require consultation with mental health experts, and in failing to adequately train its jailers regarding its mental health and suicide prevention policy. However, to succeed in their claim, Plaintiff's must first show a violation of Casey's constitutional rights. See Flares, 124 F.3d at 739. "Congress did not intend municipalities [or counties] to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality [or county] directly caused a deprivation of federal rights," Bd. of County Com'rs of Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 415, 117 S.Ct. at 1394 (emphasis in original), Because all the claims for subjective deliberate indifference to Casey's constitutional rights against Defendants in their individual capacities fail, no underlying constitutional violation exists to implicate any existing policy or procedure. Despite the evident tragedy of what occurred, it is nevertheless true that "not every unfortunate incident constitutes a constitutional deprivation, nor reflects official policy, nor is compensable." Gagne v. City of Galveston, 671 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Consequently, Throckmorton and Shackelford counties are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of municipal liability for the § 1983 claims. State Law Claims
Plaintiff's also brought state-law claims against Throckmorton and Shackelford counties under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code sec. 101.021 et seq., alleging that Casey's death was caused by the negligence of an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment through the use of tangible property, i.e., the 11-foot coaxial television cable Casey used in committing suicide. Additionally, Plaintiff's assert state-law claims for negligence against the individual Defendants.
A federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims is provided for as follows:
[I]n any civil action in which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 2003). Furthermore, the district court may decline to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." § 1367(c)(3).
Because this Court in this Order grants summary judgment for all Defendants on all § 1983 claims, it declines to exercise its jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims for negligence and for liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act, and determines that Plaintiff's' state-law claims should be dismissed without prejudice to being re-filed in state court. A federal court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims is construed as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Texas "savings statute," which is designed to protect litigants from the running of limitations in certain circumstances. TEX. Civ. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a) (West 1997); see Vale v. Ryan, 809 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ). Plaintiff accordingly has 60 days to re-file her state-law claims in state court. TEX. Civ. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
The Court, having found no constitutional violation giving rise to individual or municipal liability, hereby orders that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED on the issue of liability for all claims brought under § 1983. Furthermore, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's' pendent state-law claims, and those claims are herewith dismissed without prejudice to being re-filed in state court.
All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
SO ORDERED