Summary
holding the trial court abused its discretion by improperly weighing the evidence, where after the jury found that defendants were not liable in a wrongful death claim, the trial court concluded that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, although it expressly found that the witnesses for both sides were credible, because the evidence was equally compelling in favor of both sides, and the negligence issue was a factual dispute properly resolved by the jury
Summary of this case from Hernandez v. FelicianoOpinion
No. 91-1766.
May 8, 1992.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Putnam County, Robert R. Perry, J.
John A. Forgas, III and Harold H. Catlin of Saalfield, Catlin, Coulson, Etheridge, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellants.
Jeffrey R. Garvin of Garvin Tripp, P.A., Fort Myers, for appellee Stevenson.
No appearance for appellee Martin Paving Co.
This appeal is from an order granting a new trial entered after the jury found that the appellants were not liable on Stevenson's wrongful death claim. We reverse.
In deciding Stevenson's motion for a new trial, the trial court properly considered the credibility of the witnesses. See Smith v. Brown, 525 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1988). Although the trial court expressly found that the witnesses for both sides were credible, the trial court concluded that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This conclusion was error. A jury verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only when the evidence is "clear, obvious, and indisputable." Perenic v. Castelli, 353 So.2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 1978).
In this case, the evidence was conflicting, but equally compelling in favor of both the appellants and Stevenson. Therefore the issue of whether the appellants were negligent was a factual dispute properly resolved by the jury. Given the court's finding that the witnesses for both sides were credible, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly reweighing the evidence. See Phar-Mor of Florida, Inc. v. Steuernagel, 550 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the order granting a new trial and remand the cause with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB and COWART, JJ., concur.