Summary
indicating that, because the officers were in "fresh pursuit," both the extra-jurisdictional stop and the subsequent search were lawful
Summary of this case from Rebalko v. City of Coral SpringsOpinion
Case No. 5D18-3375
09-20-2019
Phillip JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Paula C. Coffman, Orlando, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Paula C. Coffman, Orlando, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
LAMBERT, J.
The defendant, Phillip Jones, pled nolo contendere to charges of trafficking in twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine, fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, carrying a concealed firearm, and resisting an officer without violence, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his dispositive motion to suppress law enforcement's stop of his motor vehicle and its subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle. The court accepted Jones's plea and imposed the negotiated sentences. On appeal, Jones argues, as he did below, that the police officers lacked jurisdiction to stop the vehicle he was driving and that none of the exceptions for conducting the warrantless search of his car were applicable, thus violating his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. As we explain in seriatim, we find no error in the court's ruling regarding the stop of the vehicle. As to the warrantless search, we conclude that Jones has failed to fully preserve error. Accordingly, we affirm Jones's convictions.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Amend. IV, U.S. Const.
TRAFFIC STOP
Based upon the testimony presented at the suppression hearing, Jones, who was the sole occupant of his car, was traveling westbound on North Lane in Orlando, Florida, approaching the intersection with North Pine Hills Road. At the time, Officer Jiminez of the City of Orlando Police Department observed Jones making a right turn on a red light at this intersection without coming to a complete stop. Jiminez put on his blue lights and siren to effectuate a traffic stop. Jones, however, did not stop. Instead, he accelerated northbound onto North Pine Hills Road, which, at this point, is located in unincorporated Orange County. Jiminez would later testify at the suppression hearing that in lieu of engaging in a high-speed chase that would possibly violate departmental policy, he instead transmitted a GPS tracker from the front of his unmarked patrol car by pushing a button inside his car that "shoots out a dart that has glue on the front side of it and it attaches to the rear of the [pursued] vehicle; basically tracks it."
In this area, North Pine Hills Road is the border or line of demarcation between the City of Orlando and unincorporated Orange County.
Once the GPS tracker was affixed to Jones's vehicle, Jiminez put out an alert over his police radio to other officers in the area describing the vehicle and its direction of travel, its tag number, and a description of the driver. Approximately ten minutes later, Jiminez learned that the vehicle had stopped. Jones would testify that he drove his car to his girlfriend's house in unincorporated Orange County, parked in the driveway, and then locked the car as he exited. As will be discussed below in more detail, Jones was detained by law enforcement not far from his vehicle.
In his motion to suppress, Jones asserted that his actions both at the intersection of North Lane and North Pine Hills Road and then driving to his girlfriend's home all occurred outside the city limits of Orlando. Thus, as he argued below and argues here, when the Orlando police officers pursued him, they were outside their jurisdiction and resultingly lacked the authority to stop and later search his vehicle. Generally speaking, a county or municipal police officer has no official authority to arrest an offender outside the boundaries of the officer's county or municipality. See Huebner v. State , 731 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). However, under what is known as the "fresh pursuit" exception, an officer is allowed to pursue a fleeing suspect, even though the suspect crosses jurisdictional lines, provided that the officer had legally sufficient grounds to detain or arrest the suspect before he or she left the jurisdiction. See § 901.25(1) – (2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Porter v. State , 765 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
There was more than one officer in Jiminez's patrol car.
Admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing was a Mutual Aid Agreement between the Orlando Police Department and the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Pertinent here, this agreement permits City of Orlando police officers to take action in unincorporated Orange County if in "fresh pursuit" of a suspect, which it defines as "an ongoing investigation to locate a suspect immediately after an incident that originated inside the Orlando city limits" but limiting the time frame of the fresh pursuit to "normally ... occur[ing] within six hours of the incident."
The dispositive question of Officer Jiminez's authority to pursue Jones into unincorporated Orange County turns on whether Jones's failure to come to a complete stop at the red light at this intersection before turning right occurred within the boundaries of the city. If it did, Jiminez could properly pursue Jones into Orange County. Our resolution of this issue on appeal rests solely on where Jones was required to stop his vehicle at the intersection for the red light before properly turning right.
Neither party disputes that a law enforcement officer may stop a driver when there exists an objective basis that the driver committed a traffic infraction. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
Jones argues that, based on the configuration of the intersection, he first needed to enter into the intersection to ascertain if he was able to safely turn right and that, in doing so, his actions in allegedly failing to come to a complete stop before turning occurred on North Pine Hills Road, outside the city limits. Jones reasons that his right turn, even if improper, was committed in unincorporated Orange County, resulting in Officer Jiminez lacking the authority to stop him for this traffic infraction. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing does not support this argument.
Section 316.075, Florida Statutes (2017), answers the jurisdictional question. This section states, in pertinent part:
[W]henever traffic, including municipal traffic, is controlled by traffic control signals exhibiting different colored lights, or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination, only the colors green, red, and yellow shall be used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying a word legend, and the lights shall indicate and apply to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows:
....
(c) Steady red indication .—
1. Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until a green indication is shown; however:
a. The driver of a vehicle which is stopped at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection in obedience to a steady red signal may make a right turn ....
Thus, under this statute, if an intersection has a stop line or crosswalk, the driver must stop there before making a right turn on the red light. The map of the subject intersection that was admitted into evidence showed there was both a stop line and a crosswalk on North Lane for a driver approaching the intersection with North Pine Hills Road. Therefore, Jones was required to come to a complete stop at this line, which was within the city limits, before making his right turn on the red light. His failure to do so occurred within the City of Orlando. We conclude that Officer Jiminez's fresh pursuit of Jones into unincorporated Orange County was justified and that the trial court correctly denied Jones's motion to suppress as to the stop of his vehicle.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF VEHICLE
As previously indicated, Jones drove his vehicle to his girlfriend's house in unincorporated Orange County, where he parked the car and locked it after he exited. Two other Orlando police officers, Perales and Bland, were closest to Jones's vehicle when it was tracked to the girlfriend's house by GPS, and they responded to the call. Upon their arrival, Jones was standing outside the driver's side of the car. Officer Bland ordered him to stay there. Jones did not comply and instead ran from the officers. After a brief chase, Jones was arrested by Bland, who then placed him in handcuffs. Jones had the car keys next to his hand. The officers took the keys, unlocked Jones's vehicle, and conducted a warrantless search of his car. Within the vehicle, the officers found more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine and a concealed firearm, which they confiscated. Jones moved to suppress these seized items, arguing that because none of the exceptions to a warrantless search of a motor vehicle existed, the search was improper and the cocaine and firearm would be inadmissible at trial.
"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted). Here, because the search of Jones's vehicle was indisputably done without a warrant, the burden was on the State at the suppression hearing to show that the cocaine and firearm found in Jones's car were seized lawfully. See State v. Worsham , 227 So. 3d 602, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("[A] warrantless search constitutes a prima facie showing which shifts to the State the burden of showing the search's legality." (quoting State v. K.C. , 207 So. 3d 951, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) )); Miles v. State , 953 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ("The initial burden on a motion to suppress an illegal search is on the defendant to make an initial showing that the search was invalid. When that prima facie showing is made, however, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the search is valid."). Stated differently, the State bore the burden at this hearing to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applied to justify the search of Jones's vehicle. See Kilburn v. State , 54 So. 3d 625, 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
There are three ways by which law enforcement officers may validly conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. They are: (1) incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle; (2) the "automobile exception," based on probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime; and (3) pursuant to an inventory search. State v. Clark , 986 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Jaimes v. State , 862 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ). In denying Jones's motion to suppress the cocaine and firearm seized from the warrantless search, the trial court found that the search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest or, alternatively, pursuant to the automobile exception.
Although the trial court specifically declined to base its decision on the "inventory search" exception, Jones addressed this exception in his Initial Brief, which led the State to respond to this argument in its Answer Brief. Because the trial court made no factual findings regarding the inventory search exception, nor did it base its ruling on this exception, we need not address it any further.
The seminal case regarding the warrantless search of a motor vehicle incident to a lawful arrest is Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). In Gant , the United States Supreme Court held that police were authorized "to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." Id. at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710. Applying this principle to the present case, the undisputed testimony showed that Jones was in police custody and outside reaching distance of the passenger compartment of his vehicle at the time of the search. Thus, under this aspect of Gant , the trial court erred in concluding that the search of the vehicle was lawful as incident to Jones's arrest.
The Court in Gant also held that there may be "circumstances unique to the automobile context [to] justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle." Id. at 335, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (citing Thornton v. United States , 541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). Here, the "offense of arrest" was Jones's fleeing and eluding from the police officers. The trial court apparently applied this second prong of Gant as it separately found that the warrantless search of Jones's vehicle was justified because it was reasonable to believe that the officers would find evidence of the crime of fleeing and eluding in the car, such as Jones's "identity." Applying a de novo standard of review to the trial court's application of law to these facts, see Murphy v. State , 898 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (explaining that the application of law to the facts found by the trial court in denying the defendant's motion to suppress is reviewed de novo), we conclude that the trial court erred.
The case of State v. K.S. , 28 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), is particularly instructive. In K.S. , the defendant drove his car through a red light at an intersection and refused to stop when the police officers activated their lights to detain him. Id. at 986. K.S. eventually stopped in a residential yard and exited his vehicle. Id. K.S. was apprehended by a police officer shortly thereafter, at which point the officer handcuffed K.S. and placed him under arrest for fleeing and eluding. Id. The officer first searched K.S. and found no weapons on him. Id. He then searched K.S.'s vehicle and confiscated a firearm from the glovebox. Id. at 986–87. K.S. later moved to suppress the seizure of the firearm, which the trial court granted. Id. at 987. The State appealed. Id.
The Second District Court affirmed the suppression order. Id. Pertinent here, the court concluded that the search of the vehicle was improper because "the officer could not reasonably have believed he would find evidence of K.S.'s crime of fleeing and eluding." Id. ; see also Brown v. State , 24 So. 3d 671, 681–82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding that "[i]f the offense of arrest is for a crime for which there is no physical evidence, then the search of the vehicle is not authorized as an incident to arrest, unless the arrestee has access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle at the time of the search"). In the present case, because there would have been no physical evidence in Jones's vehicle of the crime of fleeing and eluding, the trial court erred in finding that the search of his vehicle was authorized under the "search incident to arrest" exception.
Lastly, the second, or alternative, ground under which the trial court held that the warrantless search of Jones's car was valid was the "automobile exception." Under this exception, a warrantless search of a vehicle based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband is not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). The automobile exception is based on the inherent mobility of vehicles, as well as the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle. Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). Jones, however, makes no argument in his Initial Brief as to why the court's denial of his motion to suppress based on the automobile exception was error. Thus, any claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion on this ground has been abandoned. See D.H. v. Adept Cmty. Servs., Inc. , 271 So. 3d 870, 880 (Fla. 2018) ("Claims of error not raised by an appellant in its initial brief are deemed abandoned.").
Accordingly, we affirm; but we do so without prejudice to Jones timely pursuing any and all postconviction relief that he deems appropriate.
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
ORFINGER, J., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.