Opinion
C.A. No. 03-12436-DPW.
December 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, (1) defendant's motion to affirm the administrative decision will be granted; and (2) plaintiff will be enjoined from filing further actions in this Court absent leave of Court.
BACKGROUND
On December 3, 2003, Samuel Jones, a repetitive litigant in this Court, initiated this action by filing a complaint and paying the $150 filing fee. Jones challenged an October 3, 2003 decision by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration affirming the decision of an administrative law judge that because Jones was at fault in accepting an overpayment of disability insurance benefits, the Social Security Administration had properly netted that overpayment against an underpayment due to him.
Jones has been a plaintiff or a party in eight other actions in this Court, including at least four actions naming the Boston Housing Authority as a defendant. See Jones v. East Coast Mortgage, et al., C.A. No. 93-12591-REK (action removed from state court; dismissed per settlement agreement); Jones v. MBTA, et al., C.A. No. 94-12360-NG (claims against MBTA settled; claims against individual defendant dismissed); Jones v. Holden, et al., C.A. No. 95-11451-DPW (stipulated dismissal); Doe, et al. v. Menino, et al., C.A. No. 96-12540-RCL (stipulated dismissal; Jones an "interested party"); Jones v. Boston Hous. Auth., et al., C.A. No. 00-11550-GAO (defendants' motion to dismiss granted), aff'd, (1st Cir. July 9, 2002); Jones, et al. v. Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 02-10605-WGY (dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)); Jones v. Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 02-10618-GAO (case dismissed sua sponte based on res judicata); and Jones v. City of Boston, Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 03-10206-RCL (directing Jones to demonstrate good cause why action should not be dismissed and, thereafter, dismissing case on account of his failure to do so, a decision Jones has since appealed).
In the first two of these actions Jones was represented by counsel from the inception of the case. In Jones v. Holden, et al., C.A. No. 95-11451-DPW and Jones v. Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 02-10618-GAO, his petitions to proceed in forma pauperis were granted at the inception of the case and, accordingly, the filing fees were waived and the court directed service of process to be made by the United States Marshals Service with costs of service to be advanced by the United States. Jones remained pro se throughout his case against the Boston Housing Authority, but was represented by counsel in the final months of the Holden action. In Jones, et al. v. Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 02-10605-WGY, Jones again petitioned the court to proceed in forma pauperis, but prior to the court ruling on the petition the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Jones filed Jones v. Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 02-10618-GAO, without paying the filing fee or completing an application to waive it. Because the court was dismissing the case sua sponte on res judicata grounds, it did not grant Jones additional time to pay the required filing fee or submit a completed application to proceed without paying the fee. InJones v. City of Boston, Boston Hous. Auth., C.A. No. 03-10206-RCL, Jones' petition to proceed in forma pauperis was granted in an order that also directed the case be dismissed after 35 days unless Jones had, before then, demonstrated good cause in writing for why it should not be dismissed. Jones failed to make such a showing and the court dismissed the action. The docket does not indicate whether service of the complaint was ever made on the defendant parties and, if so, how it was effectuated.
Jones sought somehow to broaden the dispute beyond the question of his Social Security benefits by bringing extraneous parties into this action. It is that aspect of the litigation which prompts me to consider whether Jones should be sanctioned or enjoined. In an order dated May 28, 2004, I ordered Jones to demonstrate good cause within 35 days why he should not be sanctioned or enjoined for doing so, based on (1) his re-filing claims against the Boston Housing Authority ("BHA"), where those claims previously have been decided and dismissed in other actions; and (2) his misuse of court process to have summonses and complaints served on the BHA, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"), the City of Boston, and Gillette Corporation ("Gillette"), none of which were named as parties in the case. Jones has not filed a response to the May 28, 2004 Memorandum and Order.
As discussed more fully in the May 28, 2004 Memorandum and Order, Jones obtained summonses for each of these parties and had them served by the United States Marshal Service even though he had not been granted in forma pauperis status by this Court.
I. THE SSA CASE
A. The Standard of Review
Under Section 405(g), this Court may affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") based upon the pleadings and a transcript of the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (b), (g). A court must affirm factual findings of the SSA if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are in accordance with the law. Id.; Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) ("We must uphold the [SSA]'s findings . . . if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusions.") (internal citations omitted). The administrative agency, not the Court, determines issues of credibility, draws inferences from the record, and resolves conflicts in the evidence. Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769; accord Evangelista v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 141 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[c]onflicts in the evidence are, assuredly, for the [SSA] — rather than the courts — to resolve"); Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (court must uphold administrative agency's final determination "even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as [the agency decision] is supported by substantial evidence"). Substantial evidence in this context has been defined as "more than a mere scintilla" and "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Waiver of Overpayment
Section 404 of Title 42 provides that upon a finding that more or less than the correct amount of disability benefits has been paid to any person, the overpayment shall be recouped either by the reduction of the amount of current benefits or through refund from the recipient, and underpayment shall be rectified via payment to the recipient of the balance owed. 42 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1)(A), (B). Recovery of an overpayment of disability benefits shall be waived if (1) the recipient is found to be without fault in causing the overpayment and (2) "such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose of [Subchapter II of the Social Security Act] or would be against equity and good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506 (detailing when waiver may be applied and how waiver requests are processed), 404.509 (defining "against equity and good conscience"), 416.553 (explaining when adjustment or recovery would be waived so as to not defeat the purposes of the program).
The claimant-recipient bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he meets both requirements of the waiver provision. See Valente v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1984) (after the claimant has established that he is "without fault" as defined for these purposes, "the statutory standard places the burden on him to show also that repayment would either be inequitable or would defeat the purposes of the Act"). If a claimant fails to establish that he was without fault with respect to the overpayment, analysis of the second prong is not necessary.Steinhardt v. Sullivan, 752 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that "there is no need to inquire further" after "an individual has been found to be `not without fault' in causing the overpayment" because "he is unable to meet both of the waiver requirements," and, therefore, "recovery of the overpayment cannot be waived").
A recipient is at fault in accepting an overpayment of disability benefits when he accepts a payment he "either knew or could have been expected to know was incorrect." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.507(c) (defining "fault"), 416.552 (setting forth grounds for waiver of adjustment or recovery where recipient "without fault"). In determining whether a recipient is at fault in causing the overpayment of disability benefits, the SSA must consider all pertinent circumstances including the recipient's age and intelligence, and "any physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations such individual may have." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.507. The SSA must make specific findings regarding these pertinent circumstances when resolving the "fault" question. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1979) (holding written review alone to be insufficient and requiring pre-recoupment oral hearing so decision-maker could evaluate "all pertinent circumstances" when assessing "the absence of `fault' and determin[ing] whether or not recoupment would be `against equity and good conscience'"). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 404(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.507.
C. ALJ Findings
In the administrative proceedings from which this action arises, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that: (1) Jones received an overpayment of benefits in the amount of $25,499.21 for the period of February 1990 through July 1992; (2) Jones was not "without fault" in incurring the overpayment; (3) Jones was underpaid by the SSA in the amount of $21,621.90 for the period of April 1994 through April 1996; (4) the netting regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 404.504 provided that the underpayment due to Jones should be used to reduce his outstanding overpayment; and (5) the SSA properly utilized the underpayment to reduce Jones' outstanding overpayment.
The ALJ determined that Jones was not "without fault" with respect to the overpayment because he asked the SSA in August 1990 to stop sending him checks, he had been advised by the SSA to return or refund any additional checks sent to him after he became ineligible for benefits, and he failed to return or refund the additional checks he received thereafter — all facts that Jones admitted.
D. Conclusion
Because there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's determination and the Appeals Council's decision affirming that determination, I affirm the administrative decision and dismiss this action. See generally Van Buskirk v. Shalala, 842 F. Supp. 1477, 1479 (D. Mass. 1994); accord Steinhardt, 752 F. Supp. at 97.
II. INJUNCTION AS TO FUTURE FILINGS
As discussed in the May 28, 2004 Memorandum and Order, over the past four years Jones has repeatedly attempted to bring new civil actions against the BHA based on the same facts and legal theories that previously have been rejected by this Court. In this action, Jones obtained summonses for parties not named as defendants in the case and had them served, without cost to him, by the United States Marshal Service even though he had neither applied for nor been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons stated below, Jones is enjoined from future filings in this Court absent leave of Court.
A. Authority To Impose Sanctions
Under Rule 11, this Court may impose sanctions on an unrepresented party if he or she submits a pleading for an improper purpose or if the claims within it are frivolous or malicious. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (2); Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v. Dep't of Commerce, 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that proceeding pro se "is not a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law") (internal citations omitted); Pronav Charter II, Inc. v. Nolan, 206 F. Supp.2d 46, 54 (D. Mass. 2002) (warning pro se party against whom sanctions were sought, albeit unsuccessfully, that Rule 11 applies to pro se litigants). One of the central purposes of Rule 11 is to protect parties and the Court from wasteful, frivolous, and harassing lawsuits, and the rule provides for sanctions as a deterrent to such abusive conduct.See Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1426 (1st Cir. 1992). "The imposition of a Rule 11 sanction usually serves two main purposes: deterrence and compensation. . . . Encompassed within these objectives are several related subsidiary goals, e.g., punishing litigation abuse and facilitating case management." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, —
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
The Advisory Committee notes regarding the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 set forth various factors that properly may be considered in determining whether sanctions under the rule are warranted. Jones's conduct in attempting to bring claims involving facts and circumstances previously and repeatedly rejected by this Court and against parties — the BHA in particular — not properly named in his complaint implicates several of these factors. I find that his actions were both willful and malicious. See, e.g., Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993) (it is malicious per se for a pauper to file successive in forma pauperis lawsuits that duplicate claims made in other pending or previous lawsuits). Furthermore, Jones' behavior in this action is the continuation of a deliberate pattern that has resulted in the expenditure by the Court of significant time and resources in processing and deciding his filings and pleadings, and by the affected defendants and other summonsed entities in responding as well. I take into consideration that Jones is not an attorney, but note that his status as a pro se litigant does not immunize him from potential sanction.
Those factors include: [1][w]hether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; [2] whether it was part of a pattern or activity, or an isolated event; [3] whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; [4] whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; [5] whether it was intended to injure; [6] what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; [7] whether the responsible person is trained in the law; [8] what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; and [9] what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993);Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 465, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).
Serious measures must be taken in order to underscore for Jones that his repeated litigation of previously-dismissed claims must end. See Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 465, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000) ("a substantial sanction is needed to send [the pro se litigant] a message that this litigation must be set to rest").Cf. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that "[t]he continued assertion of a factual or legal argument long after that argument has proven to be completely baseless is sanctionable conduct, as is `the waste of judicial resources and resulting inefficiencies and delays that affect all actual and potential litigants in the federal courts.'") (internal citations omitted); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (in upholding imposition of monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 against a pro se litigant, noting that such a litigant "`has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets'") (quoting Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
2. Inherent Powers
In addition to the power to impose sanctions under Rule 11, a district court has the inherent power to manage its own proceedings and to control the conduct of litigants who appear before it through the issuance of orders or the imposition of monetary sanctions for bad-faith, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive behavior. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-50 (1991); accord United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); John's Insulation, Inc. v. L. Addison Associates, Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 109 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding no abuse of discretion when district court, under inherent powers rather than Rule 41, dismissed complaint and entered default judgment as a sanction for plaintiff's "protracted delay and repeated violation of court orders");Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315-316 (7th Cir. 1997) (pursuant to court's inherent authority, sanctioning inmate $500 on account of his repetitious, meritless litigation). A district court has the power to enjoin litigants who abuse the court system by filing groundless and vexatious litigation.Elbery v. Louison, 201 F.3d 427, 1999 WL 1295871 at **2 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1999) (per curiam) (citing Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1993) for the proposition that "[f]ederal courts . . . possess discretionary powers to regulate the conduct of abusive litigants" and Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam) for the power to enjoin a party from filing "frivolous and vexatious lawsuits" pursuant to such authority).
Despite having been informed in at least four prior actions in this court that his claims against the BHA could not proceed, Jones once again attempts to re-litigate those claims in this action. Additionally, he obtained summonses for four entities, including the BHA, that were not properly named as parties in this action and — acting as though he had been granted in forma pauperis status, when that status had neither been sought nor granted — he apparently directed the United States Marshals Service to serve the summonses without cost to him. Two of the entities so served — the BHA and Gillette — expended time and resources filing motions to dismiss in response to the groundless summonses. I find the foregoing conduct by Jones to be vexatious, and the sanction described below to be warranted not only under Rule 11 but pursuant to this Court's inherent authority, as well.
The record does not make clear how, precisely, Jones obtained copies of the official United States Marshal Service process receipt and return forms he filled out for these four entities. As noted above, Jones paid a $150 filing fee to commence this action and did not submit an application/petition to proceed in forma pauperis. Given the possibility that Jones was provided with these forms and directed to the United States Marshals Service for service of process on account of some administrative error — and not due to his own misrepresentation of status to the Clerk's Office or through other willful conduct on his part — I am not prepared to charge him with the $225 cost of the improper service effected in this action.
Vexatious conduct occurs where a party's actions are "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Local 285 Serv. Employees Int'l v. Nontuck Res. Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 737 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); accord Alexander, 121 F.3d 315-16 (sanction appropriate when "objectively unreasonable litigation-multiplying conduct continues despite a warning to desist"). Vexatious conduct may be found even in the absence of subjective bad intent, Local 285 Serv. Employees Int'l, 64 F.3d at 737, and "to sue in bad faith means merely to sue on the basis of a frivolous claim, which is to say a claim that no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit." Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000).
B. Sanction imposed — Order of enjoinment
The First Circuit offers the following guidance when considering the appropriate sanction to impose:
In general, a trial court confronted by sanctionable behavior should consider the purpose to be achieved by a given sanction and then craft a sanction adequate to serve that purpose. . . . [T]he judge should take pains neither to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to wield a cardboard sword if a dragon looms. Whether deterrence or compensation is the goal, the punishment should be reasonably suited to the crime.Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990). The repeated filing by Jones of factually and legally deficient complaints against the BHA is an abuse of the processes of this Court for the administration of justice. It is the cessation of this behavior that the court seeks to achieve through the imposition of a sanction and the most effective means of accomplishing this goal is to enjoin Jones from making any additional filings in this court without first obtaining leave of court. Thus, I will issue an order to the Clerk of this Court that the Clerk not file documents presented by Jones absent leave of a judge of this Court. See Castro, 775 F.2d at 408 ("[I]n extreme circumstances involving groundless encroachment upon the limited time and resources of the court and other parties, an injunction barring a party from filing and processing frivolous and vexatious lawsuits may be appropriate."); accord Gordon v. Dep't of Justice, 558 F.2d 618, 618 (1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (1st Cir. 1980) (same).
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY,
(1) Defendant's motion for an order affirming the administrative decision is GRANTED;
(2) If Samuel Jones undertakes to file any additional papers in this Court, except those filings in currently pending actions or to effect an appeal from this order, he shall file a written petition seeking leave to do so. The petition must contain a copy of this Order, together with the papers sought to be filed, and a certification under oath that there is a good-faith basis for their filing. The Clerk of Court shall accept the documents, mark them received, and forward them, for action on the petition to a judge of this Court authorized to act on matters on the Miscellaneous Business Docket of the Court; and
(3) A copy of this Order shall be distributed to the Clerk of Court and to the session of each District Judge.
Plaintiff Samuel Jones is specifically instructed that any failure to comply with these requirements may result in additional sanctions, including monetary fines.