Opinion
2:23-CV-01868-CRE
11-21-2023
MATTHEW JONES, Plaintiff, v. PA STATE POLICE DEPT. TROOP B, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be pre-service dismissed. It is further recommended that the dismissal be with prejudice as amendment would be futile.
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Matthew Jones appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4). He initiated this case on October 30, 2023, against PA State Police Dept. Troop B as the sole defendant. In the Complaint, Plaintiff raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; the Federal Tort Claims Act; and state-law negligence. (ECF No. 5). He alleges that in January 2004 he visited his “legal identity by birth brothers,” “Purnel Jones, Jr. and Gregory Jones,” who, as he alleges, have “police brown black identities [but] take DNA to hide their skin color and learn acting to commit murder and live as their victims.” Compl. ¶ 3. During this visit in 2004, Plaintiff alleges that while seated at a table at “The Meadows Raceway” in Washington, Pennsylvania he was “attacked by surprise from behind by a uniformed State Police officer” and raped. Id. Plaintiff next alleges that this actor's “face. . . [and] voice changed into [his] brother.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that because he saw his brother “change identities” his brothers spoke of killing him. Id. His Complaint proceeds to elaborate on “identify thieves” for which he explains, among other alleged things, “take Havlicek DNA combined with lobster DNA to have a white appearance for a brief time.” Id. Plaintiff seeks ten million dollars in damages. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Federal courts are required to review complaints filed by persons who are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss any action that is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). A court's sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis cases “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit, and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
See Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 Fed.Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2008) (non-precedential) (noting that the statute's reference to prisoners in § 1915(a)(1) “appears to be a mistake” because IFP status is “afforded to all indigent persons, not just prisoners.”); Atamian v. Burns, 236 Fed.Appx. 753, 754 (3d Cir. 2007) (non-precedential) (“the provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all in forma pauperis complaints, not simply those filed by prisoners.”). Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not ruled on the issue in a precedential opinion, several district courts in the Third Circuit have considered whether the in forma pauperis statute applies only to prisoners and have concluded that it does not. See, e.g., Rose v. Maggio, No. 22-CV-0992, 2022 WL 17252088, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2022); Leatherman v. Obama, No. CIV.A. 12-1486, 2012 WL 5398856 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 12-1486, 2012 WL 5398912 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2012); Harrison v. Shapiro, No. CIV.A. 97-2133, 1997 WL 197950, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 1997); Jones v. N. Atl. Treaty Org., No. CIV. A. 98-1185, 1998 WL 136511, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 1998) n. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1998); McAllen v. Attic Away From Home, No. CIV. A. 00-941 (GMS), 2000 WL 1752618, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2000) n. 7 (D. Del. 2000). Each of these courts has found the mention of “prisoner” to be a typographical error, and that Congress meant the statute to read “person.”
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless,” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 325-28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, an action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
A court may also dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applying the same standard that is used in motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The question to be resolved is: whether, taking the factual allegations of the complaint, which are not contradicted by exhibits and matters of which judicial notice may be had, and taking all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those contradicted factual allegations of the complaint, are the “factual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, a complaint may be dismissed if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Even still, a pro se plaintiff may be granted “leave [to amend] . . . when justice so requires,” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), unless amendment would be inequitable or futile, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“dismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave to amend.”).
Because Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) apply. And because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes the Complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Court finds no legal basis for Plaintiff's claims against PA State Police Dept. Troop B because the allegations are legally and factually frivolous.
First, PA State Police Dept. Troop B is immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court irrespective of the kind of relief sought. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “Absent a state's consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court;and although Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, it did not do so by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521 (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
Next, even if the claims are raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the claims are time barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from the forum state's personal injury statute. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2000); Brown v. Tollackson, 314 Fed.Appx. 407, 408 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In Pennsylvania, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period, which “begins to run ‘from the time the cause of action accrued,' which [the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit] has previously interpreted to mean when ‘the first significant event necessary to make the claim suable' occurs.” Lake, 232 F.3d at 366 (quoting Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985)). Taken as true, the event giving rise to Plaintiff's Complaint took place in January 2004. Plaintiff initiated this action in 2023. From the face of the Complaint, the claims are time barred.
See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed as mostly frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), to the extent not clearly frivolous, based on Defendant's immunity from suit under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The claims presented and relief sought by Plaintiff are based on a fantastic or delusional factual scenario and, in any circumstance, time barred. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-38.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be pre-service dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is further recommended that the dismissal be with prejudice as amendment would be futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.
Plaintiff may file written Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation are due December 8, 2023. Failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing the standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).
Honorable Cathy Bissoon United States District Judge