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Jones v. Dir. of the Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Sep 28, 2023
C. A. 9:23-03015-BHH-MHC (D.S.C. Sep. 28, 2023)

Opinion

C. A. 9:23-03015-BHH-MHC

09-28-2023

Edward G. Jones, Petitioner, v. Director of the Greenville County Detention Center, Respondent.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge

Edward G. Jones, a pro se pretrial detainee, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (§ 2241). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. In this second Petition under § 2241, Petitioner appears to be challenging pending state criminal charges. See ECF No. 1 at 1. He claims he has been denied his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 2; see also ECF No. 1-1 and 3.

Petitioner previously filed a Petition under § 2241challenging his pending criminal charges. The Court found that abstention was appropriate and dismissed the case without prejudice. Jones v. Dir. of Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., 2023 WL 1802124 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6206, 2023 WL 3676786 (4th Cir. May 26, 2023).

Petitioner's ground for relief is that he “[a]sserted [his] right to a speedy and public trial under the U.S. Constitutional amend. VI and the S.C. Constitution Art. I, section 14 on December 1st 2022[,] was indicted in the first term[,] and was not tried in the second term.” He claims he has been awaiting trial for twenty-five months. Id. at 6. Petitioner requests that he be released immediately without bail and that “possibly charges be dismissed.” Id. at 7.

Records from Greenville County indicate that Petitioner has pending charges in state court in case numbers 2021A2320500366 (burglary-first degree), 2021A2320500367 (kidnapping), 2021A2320500368 (assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature), and 2021A320500369 (possession of a weapon during a violent crime). The charges were true bill indicted on February 14, 2023. See Greenville County 13th Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://www2.greenvillecoun tcounty.org/SCJD/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by the case numbers listed above) (last visited Sept. 27, 2023).

A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pro se habeas petition is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1983). The Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.

The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.

Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

III. DISCUSSION

Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is only available postconviction. However, pretrial petitions for habeas corpus may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). Generally, however, “‘[a]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution'” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976)).

This Petition should be summarily dismissed on abstention grounds. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Petitioner is currently detained and awaiting trial on pending state criminal charges, thus satisfying the first prong of the abstention test. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-02981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the petitioner “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”). The second criterion has been addressed by the Supreme Court's holding that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief[,]” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). In addressing the third criterion, the Supreme Court has noted that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).

Therefore, this case meets all criteria for abstention under Younger, and federal habeas relief is available under § 2241 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-226 ; see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973). While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pre-trial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy claim entitled to pretrial habeas intervention because the “very constitutional right claimed ... would be violated” if petitioner were forced to go to trial). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449. In Moore, the court concluded that the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal. Id.; see generally United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226-227.

In the present action, Petitioner may raise the claims contained in his Petition in state court. Petitioner does not allege any extraordinary circumstances to show that pretrial intervention would be appropriate. As Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court both during and after trial, he fails to demonstrate “special circumstances,” or to show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Petitioner is therefore precluded from federal habeas relief at this time, and his Petition should be summarily dismissed.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition in this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.

Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

Post Office Box 835

Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Jones v. Dir. of the Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Sep 28, 2023
C. A. 9:23-03015-BHH-MHC (D.S.C. Sep. 28, 2023)
Case details for

Jones v. Dir. of the Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr.

Case Details

Full title:Edward G. Jones, Petitioner, v. Director of the Greenville County…

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Sep 28, 2023

Citations

C. A. 9:23-03015-BHH-MHC (D.S.C. Sep. 28, 2023)