Opinion
No. CV04-4001435
June 15, 2007
Memorandum of Decision
The petitioner Jermaine Jones alleges in his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus initially filed on October 13, 2004 and amended for a final time on April 10, 2007, that his convictions for: murder in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-54a(a) and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-217(a)(1) were obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the state of Connecticut. He specifically claims to have been deprived of the effective assistance of his trial defense counsel.
This matter came on for trial before this Court on June 1, 2007 at which time testimony was received from the petitioner and his trial defense counsel, Atty. Lawrence Hopkins. As is explained in greater detail hereafter, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed in meeting his burden of proof and the petition shall be denied. The Court has reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact.
Findings of Fact
1. The petitioner was the defendant in a case in the Judicial District of Waterbury, under Docket Number CR01-0301473 entitled State v. Jones. The petitioner, after a trial to the jury and the court, was convicted of all counts.
The murder charge was tried to the jury while the criminal possession of a firearm was a bench trial.
2. The petitioner was thereafter sentenced by the court, Hartmere, J., to a total effective sentence of sixty-five years to serve.
3. Attorney Lawrence Hopkins represented the petitioner at trial.
4. During the petitioner's trial he erupted into a violent episode on February 3, 2004 that necessitated his forcible removal from the courtroom by eight judicial marshals. During the melee, one of the marshals suffered physical injury. The petitioner was willing to return to the courtroom the following day in full restraints, however, the trial court declined to allow that and kept the petitioner out of the courtroom for the remainder of the trial.
5. This became a central issue of the petitioner's direct appeal. Our state Supreme Court found that there was no constitutional violation. See State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613 (2007).
6. As regards the underlying crimes, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. "In June 2001, the defendant was residing in Hanford with his girlfriend, Erica Minnifield. At that time, the couple was not getting along because the defendant thought that Minnifield was too flirtatious with other men.
7. "On the afternoon of June 22, 2001, the defendant and Minnifield traveled together to Waterbury to visit friends and family. They parted ways, however, immediately upon arriving there. After stopping at her mother's house, Minnifield went to a local mall with the victim, Thomas Williams, whom she had met the week before, and purchased several new outfits. That evening, the defendant saw Minnifield outside a local bar wearing one of the new outfits and immediately suspected that another man had purchased the outfit for her. The defendant confronted Minnifield about his suspicions, and an argument ensued.
8. Later that evening, the couple received a ride back to Hartford from a friend, Theo Byrd. On the ride home, the defendant, who was seated in the front passenger seat of Byrd's car, again confronted Minnifield, who was in the backseat, about her new clothing. The argument became violent when the defendant reached into the backseat and began to hit Minnifield. During the altercation, the defendant, who was holding a knife, cut Minnifield on her right arm. As soon as they arrived home in Hartford, Minnifield bolted from the car and ran into a neighbor's yard. The defendant found her there and dragged her, kicking and screaming, into the couple's house. Once inside the house, the defendant began cutting Minnifield's pants from her body with the same knife that he had used in his earlier assault on her. The following morning, while the defendant was still asleep, Minnifield fled to her mother's home in Waterbury.
9. "That evening, the defendant was riding around Waterbury in a car driven by a friend, David Jackson, when Minnifield and the victim drove by in the victim's car. Upon observing Minnifield with the victim, the defendant became very angry and jealous. Later that evening, the defendant again saw Minnifield and the victim riding in the victim's car.
10. "Jackson eventually dropped off the defendant, who met up with Byrd. The defendant and Byrd proceeded to drive around Waterbury in Byrd's car. Eventually, the two men saw the victim's car parked on Elmwood Avenue. Byrd stopped his car, and the defendant got out. As the defendant exited the vehicle, he reached into his jacket pocket and cocked the hammer of a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun that he had concealed there. The victim, who was approaching his own car, greeted the defendant, and the defendant responded, "[Yo, you gonna stop fucking around with my girl?" The victim laughed and asked the defendant what he meant. The defendant told him that he was not playing around and that the next time he saw him with Minnifleld, he was going to kill him. The defendant then removed the handgun from his jacket. Upon seeing the weapon, the victim became scared and put his car into reverse. The defendant aimed the gun at the victim and shot him four times, mortally wounding him."
State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613, (2007).
11. Additional facts shall be discussed as necessary.
Discussion of Law
It is important at the outset to understand a critical difference between the legal status of a person who has been accused of a crime as opposed to one who has been convicted of a crime. While the person who has been accused of a crime is entitled to a presumption of his or her innocence, the petitioner in a habeas corpus petition is not. "It is undoubtedly true that `[a] person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 385, 90 S.Ct. 1062, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).' Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 859, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) . . . The presumption of innocence, however, does not outlast the judgment of conviction at trial . . . Thus, in the eyes of the law, [the] petitioner does not come before the Court as one who is `innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted by due process of law." Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397 at 422-23 (1994). The burden of proof in a habeas petition is on the petitioner.
In order to prevail on the issue of whether there has been ineffective representation by the petitioner's counsel, the petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh. denied, 467 U. S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d (1984), before the Court can grant relief. Specifically, the petitioner must CT Page 10627 first show "that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, infra at 687. If, and only if, the petitioner manages to get over the first hurdle, then the petitioner must clear the second obstacle by proving "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Strickland, infra at 687. In short, the petitioner must show both deficiency and prejudice. A failure to prove both, even though counsel's performance may have been substandard, will result in denial of the petition.
A habeas court knowing the outcome of the trial, "may not indulge in hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct, but must evaluate the acts or omissions from trial counsel's perspective at the time of trial." Beasley v. Commissioner of Corrections, 47 Conn.App. 253 at 264 (1979), cert. den., 243 Conn. 967 (1998). "A fair assessment of an attorney's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances to counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Henry v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn.App. 313 at 317 (2000).
In the instant case, the petition contains two specific allegations involving the failure of the petitioner's trial defense counsel to: (a) do more to convince Judge Hartmere to let the petitioner back into the courtroom following his violent and disruptive outburst, and (b) advise the petitioner in regard to his right to testify. The petitioner has failed to introduce any persuasive evidence at the habeas trial, aside from the petitioner's own self-serving statement. This court affords the testimony of Attorney Hopkins greater credibility and reliability and specifically finds that the petitioner was, in fact, properly advised as to his right to testify and further that the petitioner made a conscious decision not to testify, thus effectively waiving that right.
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases and undermine the trust between attorney and client." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 688 (1984).
Justifiably, then, the burden of persuasion in a habeas case rests with the petitioner because of the "fact that in many cases an order for a new trial may in reality reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution because of the debilitating effect of the passage of time on the state's evidence." Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397 at 419 (1994). There is, therefore, a strong societal interest "in not degrading the properly prominent place given to the original trial as the forum for deciding the question of guilt or innocence within the limits of human fallibility." Id.
Moreover it is not even necessary to consider whether a trial counsel's performance was deficient if the habeas Court is satisfied that there was no prejudice to the defendant by the actions of the trial counsel in representing the petitioner. "A reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 697; see Nardini v. Manson, 207 Conn. 118, 124, 540 A.2d 69 (1988) (`[a] court deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not address the question of counsel's performance, if it is easier to dispose of the claim on the ground of insufficient prejudice')" Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75 at 86 (1988).
In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to present any affirmative evidence that would support a finding of ineffective assistance by counsel for failure to convince the trial court judge to let this violent disruptive person back into the courtroom. Indeed, the decision to do so was not within the control of the trial defense counsel. There simply was nothing that he could do to make this happen. Insofar as the question as to whether the trial court was correct in hewing to that position, the issue is res judicata. This was the focus of the petitioner's direct appeal, decided adversely to the petitioner. The habeas court simply cannot reverse that decision.
The Strickland standard for ineffectiveness has not even come close to being met on either of the two prongs. It is indisputable that a criminal defendant is entitled to the representation of trained and competent legal counsel, however, "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 at 702 (2002); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003).
Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.