Opinion
Civil No. 04-4856 (DWF/JSM).
March 11, 2005
Jill Clark, Esq., Jill Clark, PA, counsel for Plaintiff.
Timothy S. Skarda, Assistant Minneapolis City Attorney, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, counsel for Defendants City of Minneapolis, Richard Zimmerman, Steve Wuorinen, Kevin Lazarchic, Scott Downing, and John Does 1-10.
D. Charles MacDonald, Esq., Faegre Benson, counsel for Defendant Fine Associates.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The above-entitled matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Defendant Fine Associates' Motion to Dismiss. In their Complaint and as against Defendant Fine Associates, Plaintiffs Rickey Jones and Tammy Henderson (collectively, "Plaintiffs") assert the following claims: (1) numerous constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) malicious prosecution. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Fine Associates' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Background
The events that gave rise to this action are alleged to have occurred at a November 20, 2002, birthday party in the party room at the top of Marquette Place, an apartment building in Minneapolis. Defendant Fine Associates is the property manager of Marquette Place. Plaintiff Tammy Henderson is a black woman who was a guest at the birthday party. (Complaint at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Rickey Jones is a black man and a freelance photographer who was asked to videotape the party. ( See id. at ¶¶ 1, 12.) According to the Complaint, Jones was well-known by the police for videotaping police misconduct in the City of Minneapolis. ( See id. at ¶ 13.)
The Complaint alleges that the party drew mostly black partygoers. ( See id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs assert that no violence occurred at the party prior to the arrival of police officers. ( See id.) However, sometime after 11 p.m., the hosts of the party asked the front desk security officer to prohibit additional persons from going upstairs to the party room because the room had reached capacity. ( See id.) Plaintiffs contend that, acting pursuant to an internal policy of Marquette Place, the security officer telephoned Defendant Richard Zimmerman, a Sergeant in the Homicide Unit of the Minneapolis Police Department who was employed by Fine Associates. ( See id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) The Complaint alleges that Zimmerman told the security officer that he had just finished his shift with the Homicide Unit, that he was tired, and that he was going to arrest someone if he had to come to the building. ( See id. at ¶ 17.)
Zimmerman arrived at the building in civilian clothing. ( See Complaint at ¶ 18.) According to the Complaint, Zimmerman told the security officer that he would call a squad car to assist. ( See id.) Plaintiffs contend that Zimmerman's conduct "gave the appearance" that he "had either sprung into on-duty status, or was somehow acting simultaneously as agent for Fine Associates, and for the Minneapolis Police." ( Id.) Plaintiffs assert that Zimmerman used a cell phone to call Minneapolis 911, indicated that he was working off-duty, and stated that he needed a squad car to come to Marquette Place. ( See id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that Zimmerman made the decision to do this "on his own" and without request from the party hosts or the security guard. ( See id.)
After calling 911, Zimmerman went up to the party room on the top floor of Marquette Place, where he allegedly socialized with partygoers, ate food, and carried bottles of champagne around in both hands. ( See id. at ¶ 20.) Sometime after midnight, Plaintiffs contend that Zimmerman called 911 a second time to inquire about the squad car that he had requested. ( See Complaint at ¶ 21.) According to Plaintiffs, Zimmerman told the 911 operator that there was a problem on the party floor that required police assistance and falsely told the 911 operator that he was making a "help" call, the code for a police officer in distress. ( See id. at ¶ 21.)
Fifty-two police officers answered the "help" call. ( See id. at ¶ 23.) According to the Complaint, when the officers arrived at Marquette Place, a melee ensued. Plaintiffs assert that the officers came out of the elevators in "riot" mode, using mace and night sticks in an attempt to clear the party floor. ( See id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that the officers guarded the doors to the party room to prevent the partygoers from leaving, and then struck, hit, tripped, trampled, and maced the partygoers. ( See id. at ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs further contend that the officers used racial epithets, saying things such as "get out of here, niggers, before we take your black ass to jail." (Complaint at ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs contend that the officers forced many of the partygoers to exit the building by walking down over 30 flights of stairs. ( See id. at ¶ 27.)
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Jones was singled out by the police officers because he had been videotaping the alleged police misconduct. ( See id. at ¶ 33.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the officers physically and verbally assaulted Jones, seized his camera and film, and forced him to walk down 35 flights of stairs while handcuffed from behind. ( See id. at ¶¶ 33-38.) Plaintiffs contend that Jones was charged with obstruction of legal process and disorderly conduct in an attempt to cover up for the police misconduct. ( See id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs assert that police since have harassed Jones, prevented him from making money as a freelance photographer, and filed additional false charges against him. ( See id. at ¶ 50.)
The Complaint also asserts that Plaintiff Henderson was targeted because she was videotaping the alleged police misconduct. ( See Complaint at ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs claim that the police attempted to physically overcome Henderson and take her video camera by force, but that she evaded capture. ( See id. at ¶ 31.) At some point, Henderson alleges that she was physically overcome by the mace in the air and collapsed. ( See id. at ¶ 32.) Henderson further asserts that she refused care from the emergency medical workers at the scene because they "refused to document that Henderson had collapsed due to the mace" and "did not have her best interest at heart." ( See id.)
Plaintiffs maintain that "Fine Associates is responsible for [Zimmerman's] conduct under the principle of respondeat superior" because Zimmerman was acting in his capacity both as a police officer and as an agent of Fine Associates. ( See id. at ¶ 4.) Defendant Fine Associates has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against it, asserting that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all facts in the Complaint to be true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. See Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). The Court grants a motion to dismiss only if it is clear beyond any doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the Complaint. See id. The complaint "must contain sufficient facts, as opposed to mere conclusions, to satisfy the legal requirements of the claim to avoid dismissal." DuBois v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 276 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendant Fine Associates maintains that Plaintiffs have not asserted a valid claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they have based their claim only on Fine Associates' vicarious liability for Zimmerman's conduct, a claim that is not recognized under Eighth Circuit precedent. The Court agrees.
In Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 984 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit rejected a claim that a private corporation was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of its security guard. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit held that:
a corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies. The proper test is whether there is a policy, custom or action by those who represent official policy that inflicts injury actionable under § 1983. Here, Sanders has not pled that Sears has a policy or custom of false arrests or malicious prosecution. Moreover, Sears "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." The fact that Sears employed Geiger does not make Sears liable under § 1983.Sanders, 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (1993) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim fails. Other than vague, conclusory reference to the "policy or customs" of the collective Defendants, Plaintiffs' Complaint makes no mention of the specific official policy, custom, or action of Fine Associates from which it derives its claims of liability under § 1983. ( See Complaint at ¶¶ 52, 53.) Nor does Plaintiffs' Complaint allege that Fine Associates conspired with either Zimmerman or the Minneapolis Police to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. C.f., Dossett v. First State Bank, No. 03-2624, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 443813 at *7 (8th Cir. Feb. 28, 2005). Plaintiffs' Complaint merely alleges that Fine Associates is liable under a theory of vicarious liability, and Plaintiffs have plead only conclusory allegations to support this claim. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid § 1983 claim.
III. Malicious Prosecution
Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs have not stated a valid malicious prosecution claim against Fine Associates because Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support such a claim. The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are: (1) the defendant's initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused party without probable cause; (2) malice; and (3) termination of the proceedings in favor of the accused party. See Henry v. City of Minneapolis, 512 F. Supp. 293, 295 (D. Minn. 1981) (citing Jones v. Flaherty, 165 N.W. 963 (Minn. 1917); Rosvall v. Provost, 155 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 1968); and Martin v. Cedar Lake Ice Co., 177 N.W. 631 (Minn. 1920)). Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that Fine Associates was involved in the Minneapolis Police Department's decision to initiate criminal proceedings against Jones. The Complaint does not allege any malice on the part of Fine Associates. The Court rejects Plaintiffs' attempt to link the Minneapolis Police Department's arrest and prosecution of Jones to Fine Associates through Zimmerman. Absent any allegations that Fine Associates actively initiated criminal proceedings against Jones, or that Fine Associates directed Zimmerman to initiate criminal proceedings against Jones, Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim against Fine Associates fails.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant Fine Associates' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 3] is GRANTED.