Opinion
No. 31886-5-II
Filed: May 17, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County. Docket No: 02-2-09197-6. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/21/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Sergio Armijo.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Charles D Williams, Attorney at Law, Bldg 10, 33515 10th Pl S, Federal Way, WA 98003.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Phillip D. Noble, Helsell Fetterman LLP, 1001 4th Ave Plaza Ste 4200, Seattle, WA 98154.
Ann Jones-Almlie, a former administrator for the Puyallup School District, appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her petition for review of her transfer to a subordinate certificated position. She argues that the District's attempt to remove her from her administrative position was invalid because the notice she received did not comply with RCW 28A.405.230. Concluding that Jones-Almlie's claim does not justify the exercise of the court's inherent power of review, we affirm the dismissal.
Facts
During the 2002 school year, the Puyallup School District employed Jones-Almlie as its Executive Director for Special Services. This position was part of the administrative team that worked with the District's superintendent.
On May 14, 2002, the District sent Jones-Almlie a notice of transfer letter informing her that she was being removed from her administrative position and reassigned to `a subordinate certificated position' because of perceived difficulties she was having being `a supportive and effective leader within the District's management structure.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 20. The letter stated that she would be transferred to `a certificated classroom teaching position with the District . . . consistent with [her] experience and certification status.' CP at 20. It further advised her that, pursuant to RCW 28A.405.230, she could request an informal meeting with the Board of Directors to request reconsideration of the transfer decision.
Jones-Almlie requested the informal meeting and met with the Board on June 10, 2002. At the meeting, Jones-Almlie submitted a statement to the Board and made an oral presentation. The Board upheld the transfer decision.
Rather than accept the new teaching position, Jones-Almlie resigned. In her June 27 resignation letter, she stated that she was resigning `under protest' because the letters written to support the transfer decision had `injured [her] reputation.' CP at 31. She further stated that she had already accepted a position in another school district and threatened legal action.
On July 8, 2002, Jones-Almlie filed a petition for review of transfer to subordinate certificated position in superior court. In her petition, she asserted that (1) her transfer was `arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law'; (2) she was confronted at the informal meeting with additional reasons for the transfer not contained in the May 14 letter along with various supporting documentation and was not allowed the statutory three-day period to review this information; and (3) RCW 28A.405.230 was not properly adopted by the legislature. CP at 1. Although she admitted there was no statutory basis for judicial review of the transfer decision, she argued that the court could review the decision under its inherent powers.
On August 15, 2002, the District responded to the petition. The District argued that the claim was moot because Jones-Almlie had voluntarily resigned her position and had been reemployed. It further responded that RCW 28A.405.230 was a legally enforceable statute and asserted that Jones-Almlie had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Twenty months later, the District moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jones-Almlie's request for judicial review was moot due to her voluntary resignation; that RCW 28A.405.230 was a valid statute; and that the District's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Jones-Almlie opposed the summary judgment motion, primarily reiterating her original arguments. She further argued that the case was not moot because her resignation amounted to constructive discharge and she had accepted her current job solely to mitigate damages. Additionally, for the first time, Jones-Almlie asserted that her transfer was invalid because the May 14, 2002 notice failed to identify the specific subordinate certificated position to which she would be transferred.
After reviewing the pleadings and supporting documents and hearing argument, the trial court granted the District's summary judgment motion and dismissed Jones-Almlie's petition with prejudice. The court's written order does not explain the basis of its decision, and the parties have not filed a transcript of the motion hearing. Jones-Almlie appeals.
Analysis
Abandoning her other arguments, Jones-Almlie's sole argument on appeal is that the summary judgment dismissal was error because the May 14, 2002 notice failed to identify the specific subordinate certificated position to which she would be transferred. She contends that RCW 28A.405.230 required this specific notice, that without proper notice her transfer was `contrary to law,' and that she was thus entitled to have her administrative contract renewed. She further argues that the trial court had the inherent power to review the transfer.
RCW 28A.405.230 provides in part:
Any certificated employee of a school district employed as an assistant superintendent, director, principal, assistant principal, coordinator, or in any other supervisory or administrative position, hereinafter in this section referred to as `administrator', shall be subject to transfer, at the expiration of the term of his or her employment contract, to any subordinate certificated position within the school district. `Subordinate certificated position' as used in this section, shall mean any administrative or nonadministrative certificated position for which the annual compensation is less than the position currently held by the administrator.
Every superintendent determining that the best interests of the school district would be served by transferring any administrator to a subordinate certificated position shall notify that administrator in writing on or before May 15th preceding the commencement of such school term of that determination, or if the omnibus appropriations act has not passed the legislature by May 15th, then notification shall be no later than June 1st, which notification shall state the reason or reasons for the transfer, and shall identify the subordinate certificated position to which the administrator will be transferred. . . .
Every such administrator so notified, at his or her request made in writing and filed with the president or chair, or secretary of the board of directors of the district within ten days after receiving such notice, shall be given the opportunity to meet informally with the board of directors in an executive session thereof for the purpose of requesting the board to reconsider the decision of the superintendent. Such board, upon receipt of such request, shall schedule the meeting for no later than the next regularly scheduled meeting of the board, and shall notify the administrator in writing of the date, time and place of the meeting at least three days prior thereto. At such meeting the administrator shall be given the opportunity to refute any facts upon which the determination was based and to make any argument in support of his or her request for reconsideration. The administrator and the board may invite their respective legal counsel to be present and to participate at the meeting. The board shall notify the administrator in writing of its final decision within ten days following its meeting with the administrator. No appeal to the courts shall lie from the final decision of the board of directors to transfer an administrator to a subordinate certificated position. . . .
This section provides the exclusive means for transferring an administrator to a subordinate certificated position at the expiration of the term of his or her employment contract.
(Emphasis added.)
The District argues that this case is moot in light of Jones-Almlie's resignation; that the courts, lacking statutory authority to review the transfer, should not exercise their inherent power to do so; that the language of the May 14, 2002 notice complied with RCW 28A.405.230; and, finally, that even if the notice was insufficient, any error was harmless.
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Graff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Wn. App. 799, 802, 54 P.3d 1266 (2002), review denied, 149 Wn.2d 1013 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the material facts are not disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). We consider all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Graff, 113 Wn. App. at 802 (citing Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982)). And we may affirm the trial court on any ground supported by the record. Graff, 113 Wn. App. at 802 (citing Redding v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 75 Wn. App. 424, 426, 878 P.2d 483 (1994)).
`The courts recognize three methods of appeal from administrative decisions: direct appeal expressly authorized by statute[,] . . . review pursuant to a statutory writ of certiorari . . . and discretionary review pursuant to the courts' inherent constitutional powers.' Kreager v. Wash. State Univ., 76 Wn. App. 661, 664, 886 P.2d 1136 (1994) (citing Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wn.2d 690, 693, 658 P.2d 648 (1983)). Jones-Almlie sought review by this third method.
Both parties agree, and RCW 28A.405.230 clearly states, that there is no statutory basis for review. Additionally, because the Board was not acting in a judicial capacity, Jones-Almlie is not entitled to invoke the statutory writ of certiorari. See Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 97 Wn.2d 215, 218-21, 643 P.2d 426 (1982); Odegaard v. Everett Sch. Dist. No. 2, 55 Wn. App. 685, 688, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
`Review under the court's inherent powers is limited to determining whether an administrative action was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law.' Kreager, 76 Wn. App. at 664 (citing Pierce County Sheriff, 98 Wn.2d at 693-94). But `[a]n application for the court to exercise this power `is rarely granted where a petitioner has failed to take advantage of another avenue of review without an adequate excuse.'' Odegaard, 55 Wn. App. at 691 (quoting Bridle Trails Comty. Club v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wn. App. 248, 254, 724 P.2d 1110 (1986)). Here, Jones-Almlie had an opportunity to raise and clarify the alleged deficiency in the notice at her informal hearing. She failed to do so, and she fails to allege any facts that would justify this failure. Had Jones-Almlie raised this issue at her informal hearing, the District could have clarified this issue at that time. Additionally, her failure to raise this issue at an earlier opportunity suggests that at the time she tendered her resignation, the specific nature of her new assignment was not relevant to her decision to resign. Under these circumstances, we hold that Jones-Almlie was not entitled to invoke the court's inherent powers, and that summary judgment for the District was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Because we conclude that Jones-Almlie's claim does not justify the exercise of the court's inherent powers, we do not reach the parties' other arguments.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT, J. and VAN DEREN, J., concur.