PER CURIAM.

Terrell M. Johnson, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of the circuit court denying his second successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)( 1), Florida Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. We hold that (I) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the defendant's public records claim or in concluding that all but one of the public records the State did not disclose to the defendant are either exempt from disclosure or not relevant; (II) the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), does not apply retroactively in Florida; and (III) execution by lethal injection is constitutional.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 1979, Johnson shot and killed two people — a bartender and a customer — at an Orange County tavern. He was convicted of first-degree murder of the bartender and second-degree murder of the customer. On the first-degree conviction, the jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of death. Johnson appealed the conviction and sentence to this Court, but the trial transcript was so incomprehensible that we relinquished jurisdiction for reconstruction of the record and an evidentiary hearing to determine its accuracy. After receiving a supplemental transcript, we affirmed the conviction and sentence. See Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 2181, 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984).

Johnson filed his first motion for postconviction relief in 1985. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and eventually denied the motion. We affirmed. Johnson v. State, 593 So.2d 206 (Fla.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S.Ct. 119, 121 L.Ed.2d 75 (1992). In 1995, Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. We found every issue either procedurally barred or lacking merit. See Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1996). In 1997, Johnson filed a second motion for postconviction relief. The circuit court denied all relief without an evidentiary hearing. Again, we affirmed. Johnson v. State, 804 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2001).

In 2002, Johnson filed a third postconviction motion. The motion, as consolidated and amended, raised four claims. After inspecting sealed documents in response to Claim I, the circuit court summarily denied relief. Johnson then moved for rehearing, which the court granted in part. The court again inspected the sealed documents and, "in an abundance of caution," released one document that referred to "a fugitive with a criminal history who uses as an alias the name of one of the jurors in [Johnson's] trial." The court maintained its denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing. Johnson now appeals the summary denial of his third postconviction motion to this Court. We address each claim in turn.

I. PUBLIC RECORDS CLAIM

Johnson first alleges that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and the Ninth Circuit State Attorney's Office withheld public records relevant to his case. He presented this claim as one of "newly discovered evidence." The documents at issue were filed with the state records repository in March and April 2001. Some were sealed; others were not. The unsealed documents mention six people who have the same names as jurors in Johnson's case: Linda Stewart, William Young, Peggy Smith, Gregory Simmons, Fred Cooper, and Betty Phillips. These names appear in various criminal investigation and intelligence documents. As to the sealed records, FDLE asserted several statutory exemptions from disclosure of public records concerning criminal investigations and confidential informants.

Johnson obtained copies of the unsealed records shortly after becoming aware of them. At the time, Johnson's appeal of his first successive postconviction motion was pending in this Court, and oral argument already had been held. Johnson filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction for consideration of the new documents. We denied the motion without prejudice to file a motion in the circuit court. Johnson subsequently filed the motion at issue in this case, requesting an evidentiary hearing on his public records claim. He also asked the circuit court to inspect the documents in camera pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(f).

After inspecting the sealed documents in camera, the circuit court summarily denied relief. The court concluded that "Defendant's claims are merely conclusory" and that "all documents not yet disclosed to Defendant are either exempt from disclosure or not relevant." Johnson moved for a rehearing, which the court granted in part. After again inspecting the sealed documents in camera, the court stated in a March 2003 order:

The Court finds that a valid exemption exists for each of the allegedly exempt documents. Moreover, for all but one document, the contents are clearly irrelevant to any possible Rule 3.851 proceeding. The sole exception is . . . an FDLE investigative report. The report refers to a fugitive with a criminal history who uses as an alias the name of one of the jurors in Defendants trial. While the Court notes that any connection between the fugitive and the actual juror is purely speculative, that investigative report is the only exempt document which the Court cannot definitively find to be irrelevant. Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the Court shall release copies of that single document to the parties.

The court maintained its denial of relief and refused to grant an evidentiary hearing.

Johnson now argues the court should have granted an evidentiary hearing. A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion unless (1) the motion, files and records in the case conclusively show that the defendant is not entitled to any relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1996); Holland v. State, 503 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1987). In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted, we must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record. See Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999). However, we have "rejected the argument that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve every postconviction motion that alleges a public records violation. The defendant must support his motion . . . with specific factual allegations." Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 659 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted) (citing Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 510-11 (Fla. 1999)). Conclusory allegations do not justify an evidentiary hearing. See Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989).

We agree with the trial court that Johnson's public records claim is legally insufficient as a "newly discovered evidence" claim. We repeatedly have held that "[i]n order to obtain relief on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a claimant must show, first, that the newly discovered evidence was unknown to the defendant or defendant's counsel at the time of trial and could not have been discovered through due diligence and, second, that the evidence is of such a character that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Mills v. State, 786 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. 2001) (citing Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1998)). Johnson has not explained how the unsealed records FDLE and the State Attorney's Office released "would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." In fact, we are confident they would not. The unsealed records date back only to 1988, whereas voir dire in Johnson's case was conducted in 1980. Thus, even if the records concern criminal activity by the jurors in Johnson's case — which at this point is sheer speculation — they still would be irrelevant.

Apparently recognizing that the unsealed documents do not contain any information likely to lead to a retrial, much less an acquittal, Johnson alleges that FDLE may be withholding additional relevant documents. Despite the State's representation to the circuit court that "we have a one-time occurrence here," Johnson claims that the tardy production of public records in early 2001 "calls into question the record keeping practices of the FDLE in regards to Mr. Johnson's case" and may indicate that more unproduced documents exist. Far from being a "specific factual allegation" as required by Thompson, 759 So.2d at 659, this allegation amounts to a "fishing expedition for records." Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting a public records claim because "importantly, [the defendant] has made no showing that there is any additional information that has not been disclosed").

We consistently have upheld the summary denial of public records claims based on a defendant's mere speculation about the existence of unproduced records. For example, in Downs v. State, 740 So.2d at 510, the defendant alleged that a law enforcement agency had withheld notes from witness interviews, whereas the State and the sheriff's office claimed that all relevant records had been disclosed. Id. Because the defendant "did not proffer or assert the existence of any evidence that such notes existed and were improperly being withheld," we affirmed the denial of relief. Id. at 511; cf. Mendyk v. State, 707 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla. 1997) ("In the absence of a showing that . . . notes or recording may have been made [by a sheriff's department], the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Mendyk's motion. . . ."); Mills v. State, 684 So.2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1996) ("We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to order the production of records [from a sheriff's department] when there is no demonstration that the records exist."). Like the defendant in Downs, Johnson has failed to allege the existence of specific additional, undisclosed public records. The mere fact that FDLE belatedly released some records in this case does not justify an evidentiary hearing regarding additional records in the absence of specific allegations that such records exist.

The trial court also followed the appropriate procedure in evaluating the sealed records. In Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1998), we held that where doubt exists as to whether the State must disclose allegedly exempt documents, the trial court should first review the documents in camera. Id. at 206; see also State v. Kokal, 562 So.2d 324, 327 (Fla. 1990). If the trial court decides that a document is not exempt, the State must release it to the defense. Ragsdale, 720 So.2d at 206. The trial court's decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See Mills, 786 So.2d at 552. Discretion is abused only when the trial court's decision is "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable." White v. State, 817 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla. 2002) (citing Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n. 2 (Fla. 2000)).

The record does not indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily, fancifully, or unreasonably in withholding all but one of the sealed documents after reviewing them twice. To the contrary, in an abundance of caution it released the only document even potentially relevant. Although some of the sealed documents do mention individuals with the same names as some of the jurors in Johnson's case, none of them dates back to 1980 or appears in any way helpful to Johnson. The sealed documents, like the unsealed ones, have absolutely no bearing on Johnson's case. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing on Johnson's public records claim or in withholding all but one of the sealed documents after twice reviewing them in camera.

II. RETROACTIVITY OF RING

For a defendant to be sentenced to death in Florida, the judge must find sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant the death penalty. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2004); § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2004). Johnson, whose jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five, received a death sentence after his trial judge found four aggravating factors. Johnson now argues that his death sentence is unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which held that a jury, not a judge, must find every fact upon which eligibility for the death penalty depends. We conclude, however, that Johnson may not invoke Ring. Applying the retroactivity analysis we announced in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980), we hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida to defendants whose convictions already were final when that decision was rendered.

A. Ring and Our Response

We begin by summarizing Ring and our response to it. In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in Ring that a jury, not a judge, must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to expose a defendant to a sentence of death. 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Ring was not a sudden or unforeseeable development in constitutional law; rather, it was "an evolutionary refinement in capital jurisprudence." Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 841 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). The Supreme Court merely applied the reasoning of another case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to death penalty cases. In Apprendi, the Court had announced that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Although Apprendi had excluded death penalty cases from its holding, id. at 497, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Court concluded two years later in Ring that "[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428.

Ring not only invalidated the judicial finding of aggravating factors in Arizona, id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, but also cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the death penalty laws of many other states, including Florida, where judges are partially or entirely responsible for deciding whether to sentence defendants to death. See id. at 608, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (stating that Florida has a "hybrid system" of capital sentencing, involving both judge and jury). Those states must now determine whether Ring requires minor or even major adjustments to their capital sentencing schemes.

We first analyzed Ring's effect on Florida law in two plurality opinions, Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070, 123 S.Ct. 662, 154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067, 123 S.Ct. 657, 154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Both opinions noted that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld Florida's capital sentencing scheme. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695; King, 831 So.2d at 143. They also cited that Court's admonition that "[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), quoted in Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695, and King, 831 So.2d at 143. Neither Bottoson nor King, however, garnered a majority. In fact, Chief Justice Pariente later recognized that "we have not yet as a Court determined whether Ring has any applicability to Florida's death penalty scheme or if so, whether any aspect of that holding would be retroactive to cases already final." See Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1263 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., specially concurring).

As a result of this lack of consensus, virtually every postconviction appeal filed in this Court since Ring invokes that case. We repeatedly have denied such requests for clear lack of merit, while reserving judgment on whether Ring even affects Florida law or applies retroactively to postconviction cases. Usually the Ring claims have failed because the sentence was supported by an aggravating factor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, such as a prior violent felony conviction or a contemporaneous enumerated felony conviction. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 886 So.2d 965 (Fla. 2004); Pietri v. State, 885 So.2d 245 (Fla. 2004); Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2004). We could easily dispose of Johnson's Ring claim in the same way because his death sentence was supported by an aggravating factor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt — namely, his prior convictions of two violent felonies. Johnson, 442 So.2d at 197.

We choose to use this opportunity, however, to answer one of the underlying questions on which we have previously reserved judgment: whether Ring applies retroactively in Florida to defendants, such as Johnson, whose convictions already were final at the time of that decision. Only in concurring opinions has this issue been discussed at length. See, e.g., Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 935 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (concluding that Ring should not apply retroactively in Florida); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 717 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively in Florida). Yet in our recent decision in Monlyn, a majority consensus began to emerge. Two concurring opinions, joined by a total of five justices, expressed the view that Ring is not retroactive in Florida. Chief Justice Pariente, joined by Justice Quince, concluded that Ring "does not apply retroactively to cases on postconviction review under the test of Witt." Monlyn, 894 So.2d at 841. Justice Cantero, joined by Justices Wells and Bell, agreed that under the Witt test Ring does not apply retroactively, but urged that, in determining the retroactivity of cases emanating from the United States Supreme Court, this Court abandon Witt in favor of the more recent test announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Id. at 840. Using the analysis articulated in Witt, we now hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida.

B. Overview of Retroactivity Analysis

It is clear that new law announced by this Court or the United States Supreme Court applies to all non-final criminal cases — that is, to all cases involving convictions for which an appellate court mandate has not yet issued. See Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992) (holding that "any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law . . . must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet final"), limited by Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1008 n. 4 (Fla. 1994) (reading Smith "to mean that new points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with respect to all non-final cases unless this Court says otherwise").

Whether newly announced rules of law apply to cases that already were final at the time of the announcement is a different question. We have recognized that once a conviction has been upheld on appeal, the State acquires a strong interest in finality:

The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective appellate review of other cases. There is no evidence that subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just. Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the person convicted nor society as a whole.

Witt, 387 So.2d at 925; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (noting that "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures"). To override the State's interest in finality every time a new rule is decided "would . . . destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state . . . beyond any tolerable limit." Witt, 387 So.2d at 929-30. Thus, when deciding whether a decision containing new law applies retroactively, "the fundamental consideration is the balancing of the need for decisional finality against the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases." State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1995).

The United States Supreme Court first established standards for retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). Linkletter considered the retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which applied the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states. In determining whether Mapp applied retroactively, the Court adopted a three-part test that considered (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 636-40, 85 S.Ct. 1731. Under that test, the Court decided that Mapp would apply only to subsequent trials. Id. Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court again applied the three Linkletter factors, cementing their status as the controlling federal test.

We incorporated Linkletter into our own retroactivity analysis in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d at 925. Witt held that a change in the law does not apply retroactively in Florida " unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance." Id. at 931. We explained that a "development of fundamental significance" is one that "place[s] beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties," or alternatively is "of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter." Id. at 929. By permitting the retroactive application of new rules only in these limited circumstances, we "declare[d] our adherence to the limited role for postconviction relief proceedings, even in death penalty cases." Id. at 927.

Nine years after we decided Witt, the United States Supreme Court began to turn away from Linkletter. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). While acknowledging that new rules of constitutional law should apply to every case pending on direct appeal, the Teague plurality concluded that they should not apply retroactively to postconviction cases unless (1) they place conduct beyond the power of the government to proscribe, or (2) they announce a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Less than a year later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the Court adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis as its majority view.

Applying the test for retroactivity under Teague, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), that Ring does not apply retroactively for purposes of federal law. But Summerlin does not control our decision. As courts in other states have noted, state courts are not bound by Teague in determining the retroactivity of decisions. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (acknowledging that "[s]tates are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires"); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (2002) (noting that "[w]e may choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure than Teague and its progeny require"); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D. 1990) (noting that states may decide how to provide access to state postconviction relief). We continue to apply our longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those adopted in Teague. We nevertheless conclude that, even under Witt, Ring does not apply retroactively.

C. Is Ring Retroactive in Florida?

The holding of Ring clearly satisfies the first two prongs of Witt because the United States Supreme Court issued a new rule that is "constitutional in nature." 387 So.2d at 930. Ring's retroactivity therefore depends on the third prong: whether the new rule constitutes a "development of fundamental significance." Id. In Witt, we clarified that most developments of fundamental significance fall within two categories: changes "which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties," and those "which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter." Id. at 929. Ring does not fall within the first category because it does not prohibit the government from criminalizing certain conduct or imposing certain penalties. Thus, the question is whether Ring is of "sufficient magnitude" to require retroactive application under three factors: (a) the purpose to be served by the rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 926. We address each factor in turn.

1. Purpose of the New Rule

The first factor under Witt is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted in Summerlin that its holding in Ring was not a substantive change to the law, but rather a "prototypical procedural rule," in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. 124 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court also determined that Ring does not change the elements of the offense of murder punishable by death, and does not greatly enhance the fairness or accuracy of death penalty proceedings. See id. at 2524-26. Regarding the latter concern, the Court noted that because the burden of proof in Arizona for aggravating factors found by the trial court was "beyond a reasonable doubt," the requirement of Apprendi that facts authorizing an increased sentence be found beyond a reasonable doubt was not at issue in Ring. Id. at 2522 n. 1. Florida law also requires that aggravating factors in death penalty cases be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 992-93 (Fla. 2001).

The Supreme Court cautioned in Ring that its determination of who decides whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty "does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders." 536 U.S. at 607, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Court subsequently stated in Summerlin that "for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate." 124 S.Ct. at 2525. Applying the Teague test, the Court concluded that "[w]hen so many presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy." Id.

Deferring to the United States Supreme Court's assessment of its own decision in Ring, we conclude that the purpose of the new rule does not support retroactivity. The purpose of the new rule in Ring is to conform criminal procedure to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, and not to enhance the fairness or efficiency of death penalty procedures. In Williams v. State, 421 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1982), we refused to apply a rule retroactively in part because it "did not involve an attack on the fairness of the trial." As we recognized in Witt, new rules generally will not warrant retroactive application "in the absence of fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding." 387 So.2d at 929. Ring casts no such doubt. The first Witt factor therefore disfavors retroactive application.

2. Reliance on the Old Rule

The second Witt factor is the extent of reliance on the old rule. Id. at 926. Like the first factor, this one weighs heavily against retroactive application of Ring. Florida has relied to an immeasurably large extent on its capital sentencing scheme. Since Florida's reinstatement of the death penalty in 1972, hundreds of defendants have been sentenced to death employing the procedures in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, that call upon the jury only to render an advisory sentence by majority vote. Fifty-nine defendants have been executed. See Fla. Dep't of Corrections, Death Row Fact Sheet, available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/index.html. Our situation is very different, for example, from the one the Missouri Supreme Court faced when it applied Ring retroactively. That court concluded that only five collateral cases would potentially be affected. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo. 2003). In contrast, about 367 defendants currently reside on Florida's Death Row.

Florida's reliance on its capital sentencing scheme has been entirely in good faith. The United States Supreme Court has examined and upheld Florida's capital sentencing statute for more than a quarter of a century. See Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695 (citing cases). In Apprendi, decided two years before Ring, the Supreme Court specifically excluded death penalty cases from its holding and confirmed the validity of its prior decision upholding Arizona's sentencing scheme, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Based on all of the information available at the time of Ring, Florida had every reason to believe that its capital sentencing scheme was constitutionally sound and worthy of reliance. We still have not held otherwise.

That Florida has reasonably relied on its longstanding capital sentencing scheme is an important factor weighing against the retroactive application of Ring. See Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 ("It was reasonable . . . to rely upon [the old] law. That significant reliance has been placed on the old rule is an important factor supporting [exclusively] prospective application of the new rule."); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (concluding under the Linkletter test that "the [Arizona] justice system's good faith reliance on Walton v. Arizona weighs against retroactivity").

3. Effect on the Administration of Justice

The third and final Witt factor is the effect that retroactive application will have on the administration of justice. 387 So.2d at 926. This factor, too, weighs heavily against retroactive application of Ring. As we mentioned above, about 367 defendants currently reside on Florida's Death Row. Some have been there for decades. The retroactive application of Ring in Florida would require reconsideration of hundreds of cases to determine whether a new penalty phase is warranted. This reconsideration alone would be a major undertaking. Even though we have rejected numerous Ring claims in postconviction proceedings on grounds other than non-retroactivity, such as existence of a prior violent felony conviction aggravator or a unanimous death recommendation, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether these distinctions comport with the Sixth Amendment. One member of this Court, relying on the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court on remand in Ring, has dissented from our conclusion that a single Ring-exempt aggravator permits reliance on other aggravators found solely by the trial judge. See Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 56 (Fla. 2003) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 993, 124 S.Ct. 2023, 158 L.Ed.2d 500 (2004). Thus, if Ring were made retroactive its impact on Florida's death-row population would remain unclear.

Resentencing hearings necessitated by retroactive application of Ring would be problematic. For prosecutors and defense attorneys to reassemble witnesses and evidence literally decades after an earlier conviction would be extremely difficult. We fear that any new penalty phase proceedings would actually be less complete and therefore less (not more) accurate than the proceedings they would replace. As we explained in State v. Glenn, 558 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990), where we declined to apply retroactively the double jeopardy ruling of Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987):

Granting collateral relief . . . would have a strong impact upon the administration of justice. Courts would be forced to reexamine previously final and fully adjudicated cases. Moreover, courts would be faced in many cases with the problem of making difficult and time-consuming factual determinations based on stale records. We believe that a court's time and energy would be better spent in handling its current case-load. . . .

Glenn, 558 So.2d at 8; see also Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively to child abuse cases because it "would require courts to revisit numerous final convictions and to extensively review stale records"); Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 (refusing to apply a new rule retroactively because it would entail hearings with "evidence possibly long since destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated" and witnesses who "may not be available or [whose] memory might be dimmed"); Towery, 64 P.3d at 835 (recognizing that "[c]onducting new sentencing hearings [for Arizona's 90 death row prisoners], many requiring witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified burden on Arizona's administration of justice").

To apply Ring retroactively in Florida would undermine the perceived and actual finality of criminal judgments and would consume immense judicial resources without any corresponding benefit to the accuracy or reliability of penalty phase proceedings.

4. Conclusion of Retroactivity Analysis

We conclude that the three Witt factors, separately and together, weigh against the retroactive application of Ring in Florida. To apply Ring retroactively "would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state . . . beyond any tolerable limit." Witt, 387 So.2d at 929-30. Our analysis reveals that Ring, although an important development in criminal procedure, is not a "jurisprudential upheaval" of "sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application." Id. at 929. We therefore hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida and affirm the denial of Johnson's request for collateral relief under Ring.

III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LETHAL INJECTION

Finally, Johnson argues that execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. This claim is without merit and was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing. See Provenzano v. State, 761 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 2000) (holding that execution by lethal injection is not cruel and unusual punishment); Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) (same). The claim is also procedurally barred because it was raised and rejected in Johnson's first successive postconviction proceeding. Johnson, 804 So.2d at 1225.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's summary denial of Johnson's second successive motion for postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

CANTERO, J., concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.