Opinion
A151575
06-21-2018
ERIK RODERICK JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN SNAVELY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG17857253)
Defendant and appellant John Snavely appeals from a civil harassment restraining order entered against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, after a hearing, in a proceeding brought by plaintiff and respondent Erik Roderick Johnson. The restraining order expired by its own terms on November 13, 2017. Because the order has been extinguished, no appellate relief can be granted. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff resided in a house with his wife, infant son, and an older daughter who stays there on weekends. On April 1, 2017, plaintiff rented a room in his house to defendant. Tensions arose in the house relating to noise, alleged invasions of privacy, and conflict over use of the home's kitchen.
On April 19, 2017, plaintiff initiated this civil harassment proceeding under section 527.6, in which he requested orders to stop defendant from harassing him and his family.
Following an evidentiary hearing held on May 10, 2017, the trial court issued the civil harassment restraining order against defendant, directing him to stop harassing plaintiff and his family and to stay away from them. The order did not evict him from the residence, though it ordered him "to stay as far away as possible" from the protected parties. The restraining order expired by its own terms on November 13, 2017.
DISCUSSION
Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a "person who has suffered harassment" may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction. "Harassment" is defined as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Here, it is undisputed that the restraining order expired by its own terms on November 13, 2017. Defendant does not offer any argument or evidence suggesting that the order has been renewed.
As a general rule, an appeal is moot when any ruling by this court "can have no practical effect [nor can it] provide the parties with effective relief." (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) " 'It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies and that a live appeal may be rendered moot by events occurring after the notice of appeal was filed. We will not render opinions on moot questions.' " (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 866.) An appeal from an expired restraining order is moot. (Cf. Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495-496 [appeal from expired civil harassment restraining order is not moot if the order has been renewed].)
We can and should explore a question of mootness on our own motion. (City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 479-480.) Here, defendant must be aware the order has expired, as the expiration date is plainly stated on the order. --------
A reviewing court, however, may exercise its discretion to hear a case that is otherwise moot in one of three circumstances: (1) the case raises an issue of broad public interest, (2) the conduct leading to the underlying action is likely to recur, or (3) a material question remains for the court to decide. (Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1088 (Malatka); see Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411.) None of these circumstances exist here.
We asked defendant to address the issue of mootness in a supplemental brief. He first asserts that if we dismiss this case the lower court "will be emboldened and continue her arbitrary and abusive behavior." Certainly every appellant is dissatisfied with a trial court's order or judgment. That being said, the offensive attack on the commissioner's conduct is insulting and completely unnecessary, and we do not take it lightly. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422 ["Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court."].)
Defendant also complains that the now-expired order will have a negative effect on his reputation. It is true that seeking to clear one's name or record can be an exception to application of the mootness doctrine in a criminal case. (See Malatka, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088 [describing the three discretionary mootness exceptions in a civil case]; cf. People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 790 ["defendant is entitled to the opportunity to clear his name of the adjudication that he is a probable mentally disordered sex offender"]; People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1368-1369 ["[a] criminal case should not be considered moot where a defendant has completed a sentence where, as here, the sentence may have 'disadvantageous collateral consequences' "]; People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484 [criminal defendant's appeal not moot where the defendant complied with the terms of her probation, including completing drug treatment program, and she was "entitled to an opportunity to clear her name and rid herself of the stigma of criminality"].) Such an exception, however, does not exist in the civil context.
DISPOSITION
We dismiss the appeal as moot.
/s/_________
Dondero, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Banke, J.