Opinion
No. 53271-5-I
Filed: February 28, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-2-25335-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 09/30/2003. Judge signing: Hon. L. Gene Middaugh.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Keith Johnson (Appearing Pro Se), 3613 36th Ave S, Seattle, WA 98144.
Dwight T. Vanwinkle, Attorney at Law, 4500 9th Ave NE Ste 300, Seattle, WA 98105.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Michael M.K. Hemphill, Danielson Harrigan Leyh Tollefson, 999 3rd Ave Ste 4400, Seattle, WA 98104-4017.
G. Val Tollefson, Danielson Harrigan Leyh Tollefson LLP, 999 3rd Ave Ste 4400, Seattle, WA 98104-4017.
Craig Richard Watson, Attorney at Law, Pt of Seattle Lgl Dept, PO Box 1209, Seattle, WA 98111-1209.
Janet I Lewis, Attorney at Law, 19802 62nd Ave S, Kent, WA 98032.
Richard Howard Robblee, Rinehart Robblee, 1100 Olive Way Ste 1620, Seattle, WA 98101-1873.
Keith Johnson appeals the trial court's decision to dismiss his lawsuit against the Port of Seattle (the Port) and his union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 46 (the Union). Johnson contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether (1) the Port breached the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by wrongfully discharging him without just cause and (2) the Union breached its duty of fair representation. We conclude that under the terms of the CBA the Port can require Aviation division electricians to obtain a state electrician's license and Johnson's repeated failure to get a state license established just cause to terminate him. Because Johnson cannot establish that the Port breached the CBA, his claim against the Union its breach of the duty of fair representation fails. We affirm.
FACTS
The Port is a municipal corporation with two operating divisions, Marine and Aviation. The two divisions operate independently under separate supervision. The Marine division manages waterfront property in Elliot Bay, and the Aviation division operates Sea-Tac Airport. In 1973, Keith Johnson began working for the Port as an apprentice electrician in the Aviation division. In 1975, Johnson took a leave of absence to obtain journeyman status as an electrician. After completing his apprenticeship and passing the Union's journeyman examination, Johnson returned to work for the Aviation division in July 1976. Johnson worked in the Aviation division as an electrician until the Port terminated his employment on July 16, 1999.
The exam administered by the Union was not a state certified licensing exam. Although Johnson obtained journeyman status in 1976, he did not obtain a state license at that time.
Johnson's employment with the Port was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Port and the Union. Section 2.02(b) and 2.06 of the CBA provide:
The Port designated the Puget Sound Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association as its bargaining agent and agrees it is bound by the CBA.
Section 2.02
(b) The Employer shall have the right to determine the competency and qualifications of its Employees and the right to discharge such Employees any just and sufficient cause.
. . . .
Section 2.06 Management's Rights. The Union understands the Employer is responsible to perform the work required by the owner. The Employer shall therefore have no restrictions, except those specifically provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in planning, directing and controlling the operation of all work, . . . in requiring all Employees to observe the Employer's and/or Owner's rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Agreement[,] in requiring all Employees to observe all safety regulations, and in discharging Employees for proper cause.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 453, 454 (emphasis added).
In 1996, the Electrical System Supervisor of Aviation maintenance, Riley Parker, instituted a policy that all electricians must have a Washington State electrician's license. Parker testified that the purpose of the new policy was to ensure a base line of competency among the electricians in the Aviation division; to obtain a tangible form of proof of competency for liability purposes; and to assure that the electricians were eligible to work on new construction projects that may require state licensing.
Parker reviewed the licensing status of all the electricians in the Aviation division in early 1997 and discovered that since 1983, management had repeatedly asked and encouraged Johnson to obtain his state license and that Johnson was the only electrician who did not have a state license. On February 11, 1997, Parker sent a letter to Johnson asking him to obtain a state electrician's license within the next six months.
On April 27, 1998, Parker met with Johnson to discuss reports of his tardiness at work and getting a state license. At the meeting, Johnson promised to obtain his license by the end of 1998. Parker sent a letter to Johnson confirming their discussion. In the letter, Parker informed Johnson that getting a state license was a requirement for his position and failure to obtain the license would lead to disciplinary action including dismissal.
On May 26, Johnson submitted a grievance to his union representative about the April 27 meeting with Parker. Johnson complained that Aviation division management failed to follow the normal policy for addressing tardiness concerns. Johnson's grievance did not mention the requirement to get a state license. After investigating Johnson's grievance, the Union decided not to file a grievance with the Port.
On July 1, Parker met with Johnson again and discussed alleged parking garage violations, tardiness, and Johnson's efforts in obtaining the state license. Johnson told Parker the Union was helping him with getting his state license. Johnson and Parker met again on July 15 about the alleged parking garage violations. After a lengthy discussion, Parker accepted Johnson's explanation about his off-duty use of the garage.
In response to the July meetings with Parker, Johnson submitted a second grievance with the Union on August 14. Johnson claimed the meetings were in retaliation for Johnson's April grievance and the alleged parking garage violations were discriminatory. After investigating, the Union decided not to file a grievance with the Port.
In October, Johnson agreed to trade overtime shifts with a co-worker. Johnson did not obtain the prior approval from his foreman to do so. Because Johnson failed get approval, his foreman did not let him work the traded shift. Johnson filed a third grievance with the Union claiming the foreman's decision was inconsistent with established policies and was based on retaliation and discrimination. The Union filed a formal grievance with the Port in November 1998 and proceeded to step one of the grievance process (a meeting with the employer, the Port). After meeting with the Port and further investigation, the Union concluded the grievance was without merit and did not pursue it further.
On December 8, 1998, John Christianson, the General Manager of Maintenance at the Aviation division, met with Johnson to discuss his progress in obtaining a state electrician's license by the end of the year. Johnson told Christianson he was working on it. Christianson informed Johnson that he had to take the license examination in January 1999, and failure to do so would result in his termination.
Christianson sent a letter to Johnson dated December 9, 1998, confirming that Johnson must obtain his state license and failure to take the January exam would result in termination.
Shortly after the December 8 meeting, Christianson learned that Johnson applied for the state exam, but not in time to take it in January 1999. Christianson did not terminate Johnson's employment but placed Johnson on an unpaid suspension, effective January 1, 1999. By letter dated December 16, Christianson informed Johnson that he was expected to take the February 1999 exam, and if he failed to pass, his employment with the Port would be terminated. The letter emphasized that Johnson repeatedly failed to follow management directives and that it was a State requirement to obtain an electrician's license.
After sending the December 16 letter, Christianson learned that the State did not require Port electricians to have a state license. Christianson did not inform Johnson that the statement in the December 16 letter was erroneous. Johnson independently learned from the Department of Labor and Industries that Port electricians were not required by statute to have a state license, "unless the electrical work is on the construction of a new building intended for rent, sale, or lease."
CP at 436 (quoting RCW 19.28.610(1)).
Johnson did not take the February 1999 exam. Christianson scheduled a pre-termination hearing with Johnson and the Union for April 8. At the hearing, Johnson explained that he was having difficulty getting his apprenticeship records, which were necessary to apply for the exam. Christianson agreed to give Johnson until July 9, 1999 to take the exam. Christianson also permitted Johnson to return to work, but told him that failure to obtain his license by July 9 would result in termination. On June 29, Christianson sent a letter to Johnson, reminding him that he must take and pass the state exam by July 9, and failure to do so would result in termination. On July 9, Johnson told Christianson that he had not taken the exam. Johnson provided no explanation for failing to do so. On July 16, 1999, Christianson terminated Johnson's employment with the Port, `for repeated violations of management directives to have a current State electrician's license.'
CP at 87.
Within 30 days of being discharged, Johnson submitted a grievance to the Union for wrongful termination in violation of the CBA's mandatory grievance process, section 1.06, and the CBA's nondiscrimination clause, section 1.10. On August 6, 1999, the Union filed a grievance with the Port on behalf of Johnson. By August of 2000, Johnson's grievance had proceeded to step three of the grievance process (a grievance committee). The Union ultimately concluded the Port had a right under the CBA to terminate Johnson and did not proceed to arbitration.
Section 1.06 outlines the following mandatory grievance process:
1. A Union representative and a Contractor representative shall meet to resolve the grievance within forty-eight (48) hours from date of filing. In the event settlement is not reached, the grievance shall proceed to step two.
2. The Union Business Manager/Agent and the NECA Chapter Manager shall meet to resolve the grievance within five (5) days from completion of step one. In the event settlement is not reached, the grievance shall proceed to step three.
3. A Grievance Committee consisting of three (3) Electricians selected by the Union who are not part of the staff and three (3) Contractors selected by NECA on a rotating basis selected from a list of all Contractors signatory with Local 46 shall meet to resolve the grievance within five (5) days of completion of step two. In the event settlement is not reached, the grievance shall proceed to step four.
4. In the event the grievance is not resolved in step three, Representatives of the Labor-Management Committee, one from each side, shall meet within five (5) days of the completion of step three and select an arbitrator by alternately striking fom a list of five (5) names supplied by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The arbitrator shall not have the right to add or subtract from any terms of this Agreement and all decisions must be within the scope and terms of this Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Labor-Management Representatives shall meet with the arbitrator and present their cases. They shall have the right to override the arbitrator during this meeting. In the event they can not reach a decision, the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding. CP at 451-52.
Section 1.10 provides, Non-Discrimination. All provisions of this Agreement, including provisions with respect to wages, hours and conditions of work, shall apply equitably, fairly, and without discrimination to all Employees covered by this Agreement. There shall be no discrimination by either the Union or the Employer against any Employee or job applicant because of race, religion, color, sex, age or national origin. CP at 452 (emphasis added).
Johnson also filed an unfair labor practices complaint against the Port with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC). Johnson alleged that the Port's decision to refuse to let him trade work shifts and his subsequent suspension and termination were in retaliation for the grievances he filed against the Port. After a hearing, PERC dismissed Johnson's complaint. PERC found Johnson failed to establish that the Port's personnel actions were in retaliation for the grievances filed by Johnson and that the Port's reasons for requiring Aviation division electricians to obtain and maintain a state license were legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
On September 16, 2002, Johnson sued the Port and the Union. Johnson alleged the Port breached the CBA by wrongfully discharging him without just cause and discriminated against him on the basis of age and race in violation of RCW 49.60.180 and RCW 19.28.261. Johnson alleged the Union breached its duty of fair representation by not pursuing Johnson's grievance for wrongful termination and failing to demand arbitration. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Port and the Union on all claims. Johnson appeals the dismissal of his CBA claims against the Port and the Union.
Johnson previously filed an action in superior court against the Port on February 9, 2001, but he voluntarily dismissed his claim after the Port filed a motion for summary judgment.
Johnson does not appeal the trial court's decision to dismiss his claim that the Port discriminated against him on the basis of his age and race in violation of RCW 49.60.180(2) and RCW 19.20.261.
ANALYSIS Standard of Review
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 481, 487, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004) (citing Degel v. Magestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wn.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996)). Summary judgment is appropriate if, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794, 64 P.3d 22 (2003); see also Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wn.2d 267, 279, 937 P.2d 1082 (1997). Summary judgment is proper when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion regarding the material facts. See Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 485, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
Collective Bargaining Agreement
Johnson contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against the Port for breach of the CBA. Specifically, Johnson argues that there are material issues of fact as to whether the Port discharged Johnson without just cause in violation of section 2.02(b) of the CBA and whether the licensing requirement is inconsistent with the provision in the CBA that conditions of work must apply equitably and fairly.
Section 2.02(b) provides, "The Employer shall have the right to determine the competency and qualifications of its Employees and the right to discharge such Employees for any just and sufficient cause." CP at 453.
Federal common law governs the interpretation and construction of collective bargaining agreements. Commodore v. Univ. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 120, 126-27, 839 P.2d 314 (1992); Swinford v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 82 Wn. App. 401, 918 P.2d 186 (1996) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1880, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988)). Washington courts therefore must apply federal common law when addressing breach of collective bargaining agreements. See Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 126-27; see also Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997). Traditional rules of contract interpretation may be applied to collective bargaining agreements to the extent they are consistent with federal labor policies. Intern, Union, United Auto., Aerospace Agric. Implement Workers of Am., and Local 134 v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983).
The underlying policy of this rule is to ensure uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and to peacefully and consistently resolve labor disputes. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1880, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988).
Johnson urges this Court to define `just cause' according to Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash. Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989) and Havens v. C D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 876 P.2d 435 (1994). The Court in Baldwin and Havens defined `just cause' as
a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power. We further hold a discharge for `just cause' is one which is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be true.
Baldwin, 112 Wn.2d at 139; accord Havens, 124 Wn.2d at 167.
However, neither Baldwin nor Haven involved claims under a collective bargaining agreement. See Havens, 124 Wn.2d at 162-65; Baldwin, 112 Wn.2d at 127-131. Because Johnson's claims are based on a collective bargaining agreement, which is exclusively governed by federal common law and not state law, Johnson's reliance on Baldwin and Havens is misplaced.
Courts are rarely required to determine whether an employer had just cause under a collective bargaining agreement because issues of just cause are normally resolved by arbitrators. See S.J. Groves Sons Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241, 1245 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1978). Some courts, however, have applied a common principle recognized by arbitrators that `for a penalty to be just it must be in keeping with the seriousness of the offense.' Crider, 130 F.3d at 1242; S.J. Groves, 581 F.2d at 1245, 1245 n. 7. The Seventh Circuit has described just cause as a "flexible concept, embodying notions of equity and fairness," Crider, 130 F.3d at 1242, that should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Scott v. Riley Co., 645 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1981).
(Citing F. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 612, 632 (3d ed. 1976)); see also Henry H. Perritt, 1 Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 208 (3d ed. 1992).
(quoting Arch of Ill., Div. of Apogee Coal Corp. v. Dist. 12, United Mine Workers of Am., 85 F.3d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Although the CBA between the Port and the Union does not provide a general definition of just cause, sections 2.11(d) and 2.06 indicate the parties contemplated insubordination as just cause for termination. Section 2.11(d) defines just cause for terminating a Job Steward as `intoxication or insubordination.' And section 2.06 provides that the employer shall `have no restrictions, except those specifically provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, . . . in requiring all Employees to observe the Employer's and/or Owner's rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Agreement, . . . and in discharging Employees for proper cause.' As an employer, the Port `has a right to see that reasonable plant rules are followed.' Scott, 645 F.2d at 568.
CP at 457.
CP at 454.
The Port argues Crider v. Spectrulite is similar to this case. In Crider, the employee's refusal to follow reasonable instructions established just cause for termination. Crider, 130 F.3d at 1242. The collective bargaining agreement in Crider did not define just cause, but expressly authorized the employer to administer drug tests following an employee's short leave of absence. The agreement listed ``failure to comply with instructions of supervision' as a `severe' disciplinary infraction. And stated an employee who refuses to take the drug test `will be terminated.'' Id. The employee in Crider was warned that refusal to take the drug test would result in his termination. Id. at 1240. The employee refused to take the test and was terminated. Id. at 1241.
The Crider court described the harms caused by an employee's refusal to comply with reasonable management rules:
One harm is economic. Here, work time was lost by several employees in dealing with Crider's refusal to take the drug test. And economic harm is likely to result whenever employees refuse to perform the tasks assigned to them. We also recognize the potential harm to employee morale and discipline. It is clear that both would suffer if Crider were permitted to disobey orders when he disagreed with them. Other employees would undoubtedly wonder why they should obey rules when Crider could flout them. And his insubordination, if unpunished, would undermine the supervisors' authority with all the employees.
Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Scott, 645 F.2d at 568) (citations omitted).
Here, Johnson does not dispute that the Port had the authority under section 2.02(b) of the CBA to `determine the competency and qualifications of its Employees' and admits that he failed to comply with the Port's requirement that he obtain a state electrician's license. He also admits that management repeatedly advised him that he had to obtain a license to continue employment with the Port. Although Johnson knew in April 1998 that his employment was conditioned on obtaining the license, he never filed a grievance or claimed the licensing requirement violated the CBA or was unfair. Instead, Johnson, like the employee in Crider, refused to obtain a state license. As in Crider, the Port had just cause to terminate Johnson for failing to comply with repeated management directives to obtain a state license.
CP at 453.
Johnson contends that the Port lacked just cause to terminate him because its reasons for the licensing requirement were not valid as applied to him. Johnson, however, ignores the uncontested and unambiguous provisions of the CBA that give the Port the right to require him to obtain a license. Labor contracts must be interpreted `as a whole so as to give meaning and effect to all of its provisions.' Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. Energy Workers Intern. Union v. Air Prods. Chems., Inc., 300 F.3d 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2002). Under traditional rules of contract interpretation, courts should first look to the explicit language of the agreement. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1479. Under sections 2.02(b) and 2.06 of the CBA, the Port has `no restrictions" on its express authority to determine the competency and qualifications of its employees except for `those specifically provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.' The Port negotiated the right to determine the competency and qualifications of its employees and there were valid reasons for adopting the policy requiring all electricians in the Aviation division to obtain and maintain a state license.
Section 2.02
(b) The Employer shall have the right to determine the competency and qualifications of its Employees and the right to discharge such Employees any just and sufficient cause. . . . .
Section 2.06 Management's Rights. The Union understands the Employer is responsible to perform the work required by the owner. The Employer shall therefore have no restrictions, except those specifically provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in planning, directing and controlling the operation of all work, . . . in requiring all Employees to observe the Employer's and/or Owner's rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Agreement{,} in requiring all Employees to observe all safety regulations, and in discharging Employees for proper cause. CP at 453-54. (emphasis added).
CP at 454 (CBA sec. 2.06).
Riley Parker, the Aviation division's Electrical Systems Supervisor, stated that the purposes in implementing the new policy were to ensure a base line of competency among the electricians in the Aviation division; to obtain a tangible form of proof of competency for liability purposes; and to ensure that the electricians were eligible to work on new construction projects that may require state licensing. Johnson claims that issues of liability and base line competency should not apply to him because his competency was not in dispute. Johnson had qualified for the highest level of journeyman status, had many years of experience, and took continuing education classes. But Johnson's argument ignores the provisions of the CBA that expressly permit the Port to determine the qualifications and competency of its employees.
Johnson also argues there are material issues of fact concerning the Port's reasons for adopting the policy because Christianson, the General Manager of Maintenance at the Aviation division, inaccurately informed Johnson that obtaining a license was a state requirement. There is no dispute that Parker, not Christianson, adopted and implemented the policy requiring electricians to get and maintain a state license. Parker knew Port electricians were generally exempt from state licensing requirements and did not tell Johnson otherwise. In addition, since 1983 the Port had requested and encouraged Johnson to obtain a license, with no mention that it was a state requirement. Further, Johnson knew the licensing requirement was a condition of his employment at least eight months before Christianson misinformed him. Christianson's misrepresentation, which occurred well after the policy was implemented, does not create a material issue of fact or undermine the Port's reasons to adopt the policy.
Johnson also questions the legitimacy of the Port's concern of making sure that its electricians are eligible to work on new construction projects that may require state licensing. Johnson reasons that the Port is not licensed as an electrical contractor and cannot engage in any new construction that would require state licensed electricians under RCW 19.28.041 and 19.28.261. See City of Seattle v. State, 87 Wn. App. 715, 721, 943 P.2d 337 (1997). But the fact that the Port is not licensed as an electrical contractor does not create an issue of fact as to the legitimacy of the Port's state licensing requirements for new construction projects.
Johnson next contends the licensing requirement is inconsistent with section 1.10 of the CBA, which provides that `conditions of work shall apply equitably, fairly, and without discrimination to all Employees.' Johnson claims that the licensing requirement is unfair in its application because he qualified as a journeyman in 1976 under the CBA and he is the only electrician that had to qualify twice as a journeyman. But Johnson does not dispute that section 2.02(b) expressly authorizes the Port to adopt and implement a policy requiring electricians to obtain a state license. And the record shows the Aviation division applied the policy to all its electricians. Johnson fails to show there is a genuine issue of material fact that the policy is inconsistent with any provision in the CBA, and his repeated failure to comply established just cause for his termination. See Crider, 130 F.3d at 1242-43; Scott, 645 F.2d at 569.
CP at 452.
Johnson was not the only Aviation division electrician who had to obtain a state license. The record indicates that another Aviation division electrician allowed his state license to lapse and was required to take time off from work to get his license.
Duty of Fair Representation
Johnson claims the trial court erred in dismissing his claim against the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Johnson argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by pursuing Johnson's grievance in an arbitrary and perfunctory manner and failing to demand arbitration.
Washington imposes a duty of fair representation on unions because of their status as the exclusive bargaining agent for their members. Allen v. Seattle Police Officers' Guild, 100 Wn.2d 361, 371-72, 670 P.2d 246 (1983); Womble v. Local Union No. 73 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 64 Wn. App. 698, 701, 826 P.2d 224 (1992). Johnson and the Union agree that to prevail on his claim against the Union, Johnson must prove (1) the Port breached the collective bargaining agreement and 2) the Union breached its duty of fair representation. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1983); Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); Womble, 64 Wn. App. at 703. The Union does not dispute that there are material issues of fact as to the second prong, but contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Port did not breach the CBA. We agree. Because the Port did not breach the CBA, Johnson's claim against the Union fails. See Crider, 130 F.3d at 1241, 1243; Skillsky, 893 F.2d at 1095-96.
Federal law does not preempt state law in claims for breach of duty of fair representation. See Fowlkes v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 58 Wn. App. 759, 763, 795 P.2d 137 (1990) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L .Ed. 2d 842 (1967)).
A union breaches its duty to its members if it acts discriminatorily, arbitrarily, or in bad faith. Lindsey v. Metro. Seattle, 49 Wn. App. 145, 148, 741 P.2d 575 (1987). Ignoring a meritorious grievance or processing it in a perfunctory manner will constitute breach, but negligence, alone, is insufficient. Womble, 64 Wn. App. at 701 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171. A claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and a claim for breach of fair representation are inextricably interdependent. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S 151, 164, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1983).
CONCLUSION
We conclude the CBA expressly authorized the Port to adopt a policy requiring all electricians in the Aviation division to obtain a state license and Johnson fails to show the policy is inconsistent with any provision in the CBA. Johnson's repeated failure to comply with the Port's directive to obtain a state license was just cause for the Port to terminate him. Because the Port did not breach the CBA, Johnson cannot, as a matter of law, prevail on his claim against the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation. We affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss Johnson's claims against the Port and the Union.
KENNEDY and AGID, JJ.