Opinion
No. 01-01911 c/w 01-1560, SECTION "C" (1)
December 23, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's ("the Board") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, dismissing the claims of Catherine Johnson ("Johnson" "Plaintiff"). Also pending is the Board's Motion to Strike Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-15, B, C, D, G, H and I attached to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Johnson. For the following reasons Defendant's Motion to Strike Exhibits is DENIED. Further, for the following reasons Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims by Plaintiff is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African-American woman who works at the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans ("MCLNO"). She alleges that during the year of 1999, she was denied promotion to the positions of Accountant Manager 1, Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 due to her race. Plaintiff alleges that she was qualified for all three positions and that less qualified Caucasian employees received the promotions. Plaintiff alleges that this was accomplished through the intentional manipulation of civil service rules.
On or about March 8, 1999, MCLNO Department of Human Resources requested a Certificate of Eligibles to fill the position of Account Manager 1, a continuously announced position. In response to MCLNO's request, the Louisiana Department of Civil Service issued Certificate of Eligibles No. 46802. (Rec. Doc. 64, Ex. A) Listed on this certificate in order of eligibility were (1) Lois Dorsay, an African American female and (2) Timothy Hitt, a Caucasian male. ( Id.). Catherine Johnson's name was not listed. ( Id.)
Also, in March of 1999, MCLNO authorized the hiring of Jacqueline Donellon and Rose Klein, each a Caucasian female, to restricted appointments as Accountant Supervisor 1. Subsequently, MCLNO learned that neither woman was qualified for the position and both were reappointed to unposted positions as Administrative Manager 3. Plaintiff alleges that she was more qualified than either Donellon or Klein.
For a more detailed analysis of the facts surrounding Donellon and Klein's appointments see the Court's Order and Reasons dismissing the claims of the named plaintiffs in consolidated case, 01-1560 filed as 01-191-Rec. Doc. 71.
Also, in May of 1999, MCLNO began posting the availability of an opening in the position of Administrative Manager 4. ( See Rec. Doc. 67, Exs. A-8-A-13). Having previously applied for the position of Administrative Manager 4, Plaintiff's name appeared on the appropriate Certificate of Eligibles. ( Id., Ex. A-16) Despite, being eligible for this position, on or about June 14, 1999, Plaintiff was not promoted. Instead, the position was awarded as a restricted appointment to Carl Stephen Wagner, a Caucasian male. ( Id., Ex. A-17).
Except where necessary to describe Plaintiff's supplement to her opposition for summary judgment, discussed in Part II below, all references to Plaintiff's Exhibits are described as attached to Rec. Doc. 67, however, it should be noted that the Court permitted Plaintiff to supplement her Opposition with amended Exhibits attached to Rec. Dcc. 72. As discussed below, the Amended Exhibits are substantially identical to those originally filed. Thus, the Court's reference to exhibits in Rec. Doc. 67 for simplicity's sake are ostensibly the Amended Exhibits found in Rec. Doc. 72.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE EXHIBITS
Defendant objects to Exhibits A, G and H, the sworn affidavits of Catherine Johnson, Gwen Mullens and Henry Wallace respectively on the grounds that each affidavit failed to state that the facts contained therein came from the personal knowledge of the affiant. In response, Plaintiff has supplemented her opposition for summary judgment with amended affidavits that cure Defendant's objections. ( See Rec. Doc. 72, Ex. A, G H).
Also, Defendant objects to Plaintiff's Exhibits B, C, D, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-15, and I on the grounds that they are unsworn, unverified documents of unknown origin. Johnson's Affidavit, Exhibit A has also been amended to address Defendant's objections to Exhibits A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-15. ( See, generally, Id., Ex. A). Plaintiff submits that Exhibits A-1 through A-4 are documents which she received from the Human Resources Department of MCLNO and represent business records maintained by MCLNO. Similar documents, attached as exhibits to Plaintiff's opposition are not objected to by Defendant. ( See Rec. Doc. 67 72, Exs. A-8-A-13 A-14).
Plaintiff submits that Exhibit A-5 is a document contained in the personnel file of. Timothy Hitt that was received from Defendant in response to a discovery request. Exhibit A-17 is a copy of Plaintiff's Pre-Employment Application dated May 17, 1999, which form is maintained by the Defendant in Plaintiff's personnel file. Exhibits B and I are reproductions of the applicable rules of the Louisiana Department of State Civil Service. Defendant has offered similar reproductions of other applicable provisions with its motion for summary judgment. Finally, Plaintiff submits that Exhibits A-5, C and D are copies of business record documents from the personnel files of Timothy Hitt, Jacqueline Donellon and Rose Klein received by Plaintiff in response to a discovery request.
All of these documents objected to by Defendant are verifiable and of known origin. In fact, they are business records maintained by the Defendant. Defendant does not allege that the documents are inauthentic. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike is denied.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . Land a] fact . . . [to be] "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).
B. DISCUSSION
Under Title VII and Louisiana State law, Plaintiff must establish that "but for " race she would have been treated differently. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Flummer v. Marriot Corp., 654 So.2d 843, 848 (La.App. 4th Cir, 1995), citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) Thus, Plaintiff's claims require a showing of intentional discrimination. See Plummer, 654 So.2d at 848.
A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of discrimination consists of a plaintiff showing that (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she applied for the position in question; (3) she was qualified for the position; (4) she was not selected for the position; and (5) after the employer declined to hire her, the position either remained open or was filled by someone outside the protected class. See Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994).
Because Louisiana courts have routinely looked to federal jurisprudence to determine whether a claim of discrimination has been asserted, the Court includes and applies its analysis of Title VII to Plaintiffs' state law discrimination claims. See, generally, Plummer, 654 So.2d 843.
Additionally, where the plaintiff claims discrimination in promotion to an unposted position, "she must establish that the company had some reason or duty to consider her for the post." Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1986), citing Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 1984).
If established, the plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. The defendant then must rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the focus then shifts to the ultimate question: whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id.
The plaintiff may attempt to overcome the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretextual. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
The plaintiff, therefore, "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case." Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207). A plaintiff can meet her burden of demonstrating pretext and thereby establish a jury issue to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [the plaintiff's protected status] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains." Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 374, n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that this analysis first formulated in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996), survives the Supreme Court's abrogation of Rhodes in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). A prima facie case and sufficient evidence of pretext would permit a court or jury to find unlawful discrimination, without additional independent evidence of discrimination, though such a showing will not always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-49, 120 S.Ct. at 2106-2109, 147 L.Ed.2d 105. See also Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas-St. Mary's burden-shifting analysis to ADEA claims).
1. Accountant Manager 1
Plaintiff has failed to allege a prima facie case as to her Title VII claims with respect to the position of Accountant Manager 1. Although she is a member of a protected class, African-American, she was not qualified for the position of Accountant Manager 1 at the time the position was filled by Timothy Hitt.
On or about March 8, 1999, MCLNO Department of Human Resources requested a Certificate of Eligibles to fill the position of Account Manager 1, a continuously announced position. (Rec. Doc. 64, Ex. A). Civil Service Rule 8.20 provides that all vacancies for permanent, competitive class state jobs at the GS-15 level or above are filled by the use of a Certificate of Eligibles. ( Id., Exs. A-C). In response to MCLNO's request, the Louisiana Department of Civil Service issued Certificate of Eligibles No. 46802. ( Id., Ex. A). Listed on this certificate in order of eligibility were (1) Lois Dorsay, an African American female and (2) Timothy Hitt, a Caucasian male. ( Id.). On or about March 19, 1999, Hitt was promoted to the position of Accountant Manager 1. (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. A-6). Catherine Johnson's name did not appear on the list, because at the time Certificate of Eligibles No. 46802 issued she did not possess the requisite Civil Service score. ( See Rec. Doc. 64, Exs. A E).
Moreover, LSUMC had no reason or duty to consider Plaintiff for the position because she did not meet the objective promotion criteria for the position. See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 469 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiff must demonstrate that she meets objective promotion criteria at prima facie stage), citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2001); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993). "It is the responsibility of each employee to qualify themselves for promotion to positions within MCLNO on their own initiative." (Rec Doc. 64, Ex. C, citing MCLNO Promotional Policy No. 8013 § III). Further, with respect to continuously announced positions, such as Accountant Manager 1, it is the employee's responsibility to complete a pre-employment application so as "to permit referral or placement on a promotional certificate before a specific vacancy occurs." ( Id.). Because Johnson failed to obtain a qualifying score such that her name would have appeared on Certificate of Eligibility No. 46802, MCLNO had no duty or reason to consider her for promotion.
Plaintiff's argument that in August of 1999 she submitted a job application for the position of Accountant Manager 1 and received a score of 95, well in excess of that received by Timothy Hitt is misplaced. Hitt was hired in March of 1999, therefore, the fact the Johnson was qualified or arguably even more qualified as of August 1999, five months later, is of no moment. At the prima facie stage of inquiry, the qualifications, or lack thereof of the hirees, is not pertinent. In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, Plaintiff must make a showing that she was qualified for the position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; and Davis, 14 F.3d at 1087. At the time that Hitt was hired, Plaintiff appeared unqualified because she had failed to obtain a Civil Service score for the position of Accountant Manager 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that at the time of the incident alleged in the Complaint that she met the objective promotional criteria necessary to establish a prima facie case.
However, Plaintiff offers evidence to suggest that all is not well at MCLNO. In her complaint she alleges that MCLNO is manipulating civil service rules to intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. Although Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case with respect to the Accountant Manager 1 position, the Court takes note of the appearance of impropriety in the promotion of Timothy Hitt.
On February 12, 1999, Timothy Hitt was detailed to special duty as Accountant Manager I. (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. A-5). Then, approximately one month later, on or about March 19, 1999, Hitt was promoted to that position. (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. A-6). In the interim, Certificate of Eligibles No. 46802 on which his name appeared issued. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Hitt's name would not have appeared on that certificate absent appointment to special detail, there exists a colorable inference that detailing qualified him for promotion. Also, Hitt is listed as the second eligible candidate with a score of 79, whereas Lois Dorsay, an African American woman is top-rated with a score of 95. (Rec. Doc. 64, Ex. A). Thus, there exists a colorable inference that Hitt was pre-selected for promotion and his qualification was fostered through the process of detailing.
The Court addressed the process of "detailing" in the previous ruling dismissing the claims of all other plaintiffs in this matter. See 01-191-Rec. Doc. 71, pp. 18-19 and especially n. 33.
In no way does the Court suggest that racial discrimination was Defendant's underlying intention, however, MCLNO's position that promotional opportunities arise purely by mechanical operation of the Civil Service Rules is less than genuine. Although such actions by Defendant may be well within the provenance of its discretion, the New Orleans District Office of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") found that such conduct generated reasonable cause that Defendant manipulated Civil Service Policy, thereby denying promotional opportunities to its employees based on race. ( See Rec. Doc. 71, pp. 4-6).
Again, the Court does not suggest that MCLNO's conduct was motivated by an intent to discriminate based on race. Rather, the Court recognizes that MCLNO's conduct, which appears to favor certain employees over others may appear unfair to some employees. Although the conduct may be warranted for legitimate business purposes, it may very well continue to invite litigation.
2. AdministratiVe Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4
Plaintiff has adequately alleged a prima facie case as to her Title VII claims with respect to the position of Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4. She is a member of a protected class, she was qualified and applied for the positions, and the positions were subsequently filled by persons outside the protected class.
The Administrative Manager 3 position was unposted. Thus, ordinarily a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had some reason or duty to consider her for the unposted position. See Jones, 793 F.2d at 724. Here, it is undisputed that Johnson knew of the availability of the unposted position and Plaintiff alleges that she did, in fact, apply for it.
There is some dispute as to whether Plaintiff applied for the specific Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 positions at issue here. The Court resolves this dispute by finding that Plaintiff had applied for these positions generally.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff "was offered an interview by Ms. Malhiet, but upon learning of the temporary restricted nature of the position[s] . . . she opted to not interview for [either] position." (Rec. Doc. 64, p. 12, citing Ex. D). In her affidavit, Elizabeth Malhiet, Director of Patient Services/Admissions and Registration at MCLNO, who "managed the department and interviewed candidates for positions," states that on or around May 17, 1999, Plaintiff inquired about the position of Administrative Manager 4 and was offered an interview but declined to apply upon learning that it was only a temporary position. ( Id., Ex. D). Also, at this same time Plaintiff expressed interest in the Administrative Manager 3 position in the Billing Department. Malhiet states that she explained that this position was also a temporary/restricted position and advised Plaintiff not to relinquish her permanent position in order to pursue a temporary appointment. ( Id.).
Plaintiff counters that she never spoke to anyone at MCLNO regarding the availability of the Administrative Manager 3 position filled by Donellon or Klein. (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. A, ¶ 3) Also, Plaintiff counters that the Administrative Manager 4 position in the Admissions and Registration section of MCLNO referred to in the affidavit of Elizabeth Malhiet is not the position she desired to apply for, nor the position that is the subject of this litigation. (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. A, ¶ 16). Rather, Plaintiff submits that the Administrative Manager 4 position at issue concerns a position in the Patient Billing and Receivables section of MCLNO. ( Id., ¶ 17) Plaintiff states that she had attempted to apply for this position as early as 1995. ( Id., ¶ 18; see, also Ex. A-14). Subsequent to the posting for the position on May 3, 1999, Plaintiff submitted a State Pre-Employment Application, dated May 17, 1999. ( Id., ¶ 19; see, also Ex. A-15). Her name appeared on the appropriate Certificate of Eligibles, dated May 20, 1999. ( Id., ¶ 20; see, also Ex. A-16). On June 14, 2002 Carl Stephen Wagner, a Caucasian male was appointed to the position of Administrative Manager 4 in the Patient Billing and Receivables section of MCLNO, although according to Plaintiff he was eventually assigned to employment in a different section. ( Id., ¶¶ 20 and 25). Wagner's name did not appear on the Certificate of Eligibles. ( Id., Ex. A-16).
Plaintiff does not deny that she ever spoke to Malhiet about an Administrative Manager 4 position nor does she deny declining to apply for said equivalent position because it was only temporary in nature.
Although there is some dispute as to whether Plaintiff applied for the positions at issue, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently established notice of her application for both positions by being listed on the appropriate Certificate of Eligibles as established by the Civil Service Rules. Thus, she has adequately made out a prima facie case of discrimination as to both the Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 positions generally.
After the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case, the defendant then must rebut that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. Here, Defendant proffers that both the Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 positions at issue were temporary, restricted appointments, defined by Civil Service Rule 8.10 and Louisiana Personnel Manual 9.8, which do not require a Certificate of Eligibles. ( See Rec. Doc. 64, Exs. B C). In 1999, MCLNO requested, and the Department of Civil Service approved, a temporary, restricted appointment for the positions of Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4. ( Id., Exs. B, C D). Essentially, Defendant submits that no race-based discrimination in promotion occurred because being only temporary, the positions complained of could not be considered promotions.
Both the Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 positions at issue were not permanent or classified positions. John Bradley, Assistant Director of Human Resources at MCLNO states that Jacqueline Donellon worked in the temporary restricted appointment of Administrative Manager 3 from approximately April 26, 1999 until August 3, 1999 and Rose Klein worked in the same position from approximately May 3, 1999 until August 2, 1999. ( Id., Ex. C, ¶ 24). Further, no permanent Administrative Manager 3 positions were filled in the Patient Billing Department at MCLNO in 1999. ( Id., ¶ 25). Second, Stephen Wagner worked in the temporary, restricted appointment as Administrative Manager 4 from approximately June 14, 1999 until July 30, 1999, and no permanent Administrative Manager 4 positions were filled in the Patient Services/Admissions Registration Department at MCLNO in 1999. ( Id., ¶¶ 19-20). Further, Bradley states that Wagner was exceptionally qualified, having a Masters Degree in Business Administration and experience as a Chief Financial Officer at four different hospitals, whereas Johnson did not even have a four year college degree. ( Id., ¶¶ 16 18). Bradley states that he was unaware of Johnson's interest in the temporary position of Administrative Manager 4, however, had she sought consideration for the position, he still would have chosen Wagner based on his superior credentials. ( Id., ¶ 18).
Because Plaintiff "retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case," Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319, she must rebut Defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason by providing evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely pretextual. See St. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Here, Plaintiff submits that Defendant is manipulating Civil Service Rules, particularly the misuse of temporary, restricted appointments in order to deny promotional opportunities to African Americans. Plaintiff maintains that this misuse is evidenced by Defendant's failure to comply with MCLNO Policy No. 8005, which requires that restricted appointments be limited until after "all reasonable efforts to fill the position or meet the staffing needs of the unit have been exhausted." (Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. J). Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to provide any justification for the restricted appointments.
Taken as a whole, Plaintiff's evidence fails to demonstrate pretext sufficient to establish a jury issue to avoid summary judgment. The Court will not second guess MCLNO to determine what is a reasonable effort to meet its staffing needs. Both the specific Administrative Manager 3 and Administrative Manager 4 positions at issue were temporary positions, thus they do not qualify as promotional opportunities. Plaintiff does not allege that MCLNO used these restricted, temporary positions to create permanent, classified positions for unprotected class members. In fact, none of the temporary hirees acquired permanent positions at MCLNO and only worked limited terms lasting from one and a half to three months. Further, Plaintiff does not allege the occurrence of multiple restricted appointments or a pattern of repeated or revolving restricted appointments in the same position offered to different persons. Such evidence would create a fact issue sufficient to rebut Defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason as pretextual. However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut MCLNO's explanation that it simply hired three short term, temporary employees to compliment its immediate temporary staffing needs.
A multiple restricted appointment is defined as "more than one restricted appointment of one person in one Cost Center during any twelve (12) month period when the person's total accumulated time on such appointments will exceed three months." Rec. Doc. 67, Ex. J.
Thus, plaintiff fails to create a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and fails to create a reasonable inference that [the plaintiff's protected status] was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains. Vadie, 218 F.3d at 374, n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a jury issue in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
1. Motion to Strike
Upon review of the motions, memoranda and supplemental memoranda and attached exhibits, and the applicable law the Court concludes that Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-15, B, C, D, G, H, I are admissible for summary judgment purposes. Plaintiff has cured the defect in Exhibits A, G, and H and the remaining objected to exhibits are all verifiable business records of the Defendant. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's Motion to Strike Exhibits is hereby DENIED.
B. Summary Judgment
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's, the Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, dismissing all claims by Plaintiff, Catherine Johnson. As all claims in this matter have been dismissed, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment accordingly.