Opinion
CAUSE NO. 3:02-CV-0177-K.
June 15, 2003.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant MBNA Hallmark Information Services, Inc.'s ("MBNA") motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Having reviewed the response, the reply, the parties' briefs, and any other filings relating to the motion, the Court finds the motion has merit and should be GRANTED.
Factual Background
Hubert Johnson, an African-American male, is employed by MBNA. On January 25, 2002, Johnson filed a lawsuit against MBNA, alleging that MBNA discriminated against him based on his sex and race. Specifically, Johnson's Amended Complaint alleges MBNA discriminated in "hiring practices, promotion practices, rates of pay, harassment based on race" and generally by "denying African-American salaried employees equal terms and conditions of employment." His complaint additionally alleges MBNA failed to adequately supervise, control, and discipline the employees engaging in unlawful conduct. The complaint alleges Title VII causes for Hostile Work Environment, Racial Harassment, Disparate Treatment, Disparate Impact and Racially Disparate Impact based on Unequal Pay.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
MBNA alleges this court lacks jurisdiction over all of Johnson's Title VII claims except his failure to promote claim, because Johnson's EEOC charge alleged race and gender discrimination based on only one event — MBNA's failure to promote him to "Staffing Manager" in March 2001 because of his race and gender.
A Title VII plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") before filing a judicial complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1136 (1998). A plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprives the court of jurisdiction over the claims. Barnes, 118 F.3d at 408; National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. Of San Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement ensures that (1) the EEOC has an opportunity to fulfill its statutory duty to investigate the charge of discrimination, and (2) the employer has notice of the alleged discrimination so it can take appropriate measures to correct or remedy the discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b; Brown v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up,. Inc., 2000 WL 370669, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2000) ("primary purpose" of administrative exhaustion requirement is to provide employer with notice of alleged discriminatory claims).
Civil complaints filed under Title VII may include only allegations of "discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the Commission." National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 40 F.3d at 711. Thus, a Title VII plaintiff's claims could include those within the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably have been expected to grow out of the charge. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995); Fine v. GAF Chemical Corp., 995 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1993).
Here, Johnson brought only one allegation in his EEOC charge — MBNA's failure to promote him to a "Staffing Manager" position in March 2001 based on his race and gender. Nothing in the charge would put either the EEOC or MBNA on notice that Johnson had claims for discrimination in hiring practices, rates of pay, allowing a racially hostile work environment, and/or racial harassment. The charge alleges only one event of discrimination personal to Johnson, and investigation of Johnson's other claims would not reasonably be expected to grow out of such allegation. See Dollis, 77 F.3d at 779, 781 (because plaintiff's EEOC charge alleged only failure to promote, court had no jurisdiction over other Title VII allegations, including hostile work environment, harassment, and disparate treatment based on race and gender); Brown, 2000 WL 370669 at *8 (plaintiff's EEOC charge alleging only failure to promote prohibited plaintiff from bringing other Title VII claims relating to discrimination in hiring, compensation, and working conditions).
Johnson responds by arguing that a liberal reading of the charge, along with the questionnaire he provided to the EEOC, broaden the scope of his allegations to include the claims alleged in his amended original complaint. This Court disagrees.
Under facts similar to those here, cases in this circuit have held that the questionnaire provided to the EEOC cannot be considered part of the EEOC charge. See McCray v. DPC Industries, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 295 (E.D. Tex. 96) (because employer never had access to questionnaire, it "could not have fulfilled the notification purpose of the EEOC," and could not be considered part of EEOC charge); Clemmer v. Enron Corp, 882 F. Supp. 606, 610 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (noting that Fifth Circuit has not extended scope of Title VII suit any further than scope of EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of administrative charge; questionnaire cannot be considered part of EEOC charge, especially when employer never saw it until produced in discovery in pending action).
Conversely, the case relied on by Johnson, Clark v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 18 F.3d 1278 (5th Cir. 1994) is factually distinguishable from this case. In Clark, the Court held that the plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment based on gender not brought in the EEOC charge was a reasonable consequence of the sexual harassment and retaliation claims alleged in the charge. Id. at 1280. The Court considered the charge itself and supporting documentation, including the questionnaire, because the record showed the employer was aware of all of plaintiff's Title VII claims during the EEOC investigation, and that the EEOC actually investigated plaintiff's other claims as evidenced by its formal determination. Id. Unlike here, the employer in Clark had notice of all plaintiff's claims during the administrative process. Conversely, the record in this case shows that MBNA did not receive the questionnaire until it was produced during discovery in this action, and that the EEOC investigated only the allegation in Johnson's EEOC charge.
Johnson's claims of harassment, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment are not a reasonable consequence of the claims set forth in his EEOC charge; the facts considered in an investigation for those claims would be different from those considered in a claim for discrimination in failing to promote. Further, MBNA was never given the opportunity to comply with Title VII or engage in conciliation with the EEOC regarding these claims. Because Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the Title VII claims alleged in Counts 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Johnson's Amended Complaint, this Court is without jurisdiction over those claims. See Barnes, 118 F.3d at 408.
Accordingly, MBNA's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Counts 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Johnson's Amended Complaint are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.