Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-145
November 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner's civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff Christopher A. Johnson ("Johnson"). Johnson complains that the defendants illegally arrested, falsely imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted him [Court File No. 1, at 3-9]. He requests punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00 against each defendant, compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000.00 against each defendant, and any other relief he is entitled to.
After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes all claims against Officer Cecil Crowe ("Crowe") in his official capacity and all claims against Chief Dotson ("Dotson") in his official and individual capacities are DISMISSED [Court File No. 1]. Thus, Dotson's motion to dismiss [Court File No. 13] is GRANTED and Crowe's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART, in that the claims against him in his official capacity are dismissed.
All claims against Donna Blackburn ("Blackburn") in her official and individual capacities are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and her motion to dismiss or for summary judgment [Court File No. 20] is GRANTED. All claims against Ted Anthonisen ("Anthonisen") in his official capacity are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and his motion to dismiss or for summary judgement [Court File No. 20] is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that the claims against him in his official capacity are dismissed. All claims against William Cox Jr ("Cox") in his official and individual capacities are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and his motion to dismiss or for summary judgment will be [Court File Nos. 20] is GRANTED.
The claims against Crowe and Anthonisen ("Anthonisen") in their individual capacities for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and the claim for false imprisonment against Sheriff Cupp ("Cupp") in his official and individual capacities shall go forward pursuant to the scheduling order the Court will enter. I. Non-Dispositive Motions A. Motion to Compel Discovery
Sheriff Cupp has only filed an answer in response to the complaint.
Before the Court is Johnson's motion to compel discovery [Court File No. 23]. First Johnson requests the defendants be ordered to provide the name of John Doe, which the Court assumes is the name of the Assistant District Attorney who was alleged to have assisted District Attorney General Cox in the prosecution of Johnson. However, as discussed below the prosecutors have absolute immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity in this situation, therefore, the motion is DENIED as futile [Court File No. 23] to the extent it requests the discovery of the name of John Doe.
Johnson also requests "the policies, practices, and customs of the City of Chattanooga, and Chattanooga Police Department as to arrests, searches of people, and seizers [sic] of property, requirements to obtain warrants, and if there are any difference between black neighborhood and whites, or between black people and white. Any screening process to prevent false arrest, malicious prosecutions, false imprisonments, any preventive action taken against officers for violating such." [Court File No. 23]. Johnson's filed his motion on or about July 14, 2003, claiming it had been more than thirty (30) days since he made the request to the defendants. The Court has not received any objections from the defendants. The motion to compel discovery is GRANTED [Court File No. 23]. The defendants SHALL provide the documents and discovery to Johnson within ten (10) days from the date of this order.
B. Motions to Amend
Also before the Court are two morions to amend [Court File Nos. 16, 26] filed by Johnson. Johnson asks that he be allowed to add the claim of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment as to defendant Crowe and Dotson. Johnson's original complaint included those claims, thus his motion to amend to add those claims is DENIED [Court File No. 16].
Johnson asks that he be allowed to add the claim of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment as to defendant Anthonisen and Blackburn. Johnson's original complaint included those claims, thus his motion to amend to add those claims is DENIED [Court File No. 16].
Johnson also asks to add the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee and Hamilton County, Tennessee on the grounds of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. In Johnson's original complaint in addition to suing city employees in their individual capacities, he also sued them on the grounds of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution in their official capacities, which in effect was suing the City of Chattanooga. Therefore, Johnson's amendment against the City of Chattanooga is DENIED [Court File No. 16].
Johnson originally sued Sheriff John Cupp in his individual capacity and in his official capacity for false imprisonment, the latter of which, in effect, is a suit against Hamilton County. Johnson has failed to state a claim against Hamilton County for malicious prosecution. Accordingly, Johnson's motion to amend to add Hamilton County is DENIED [Court File No. 16].
Next Johnson moves to add a conspiracy count to his complaint. Presumably the claim of conspiracy against the defendants is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The Court will deny the motion to amend to add a conspiracy claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the following reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) provides:
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
To sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), Johnson must prove the existence of a conspiracy among two or more persons. No specific allegation of a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus is required in order to state a claim under the first part of § 1985(2), which prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the administration of justice in Federal Courts. Such an allegation is necessary to sustain an action under the second half of § 1985(2), which prohibits conspiracies to deny or interfere with equal protection rights. Alien v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co. of Tennessee, 636 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (M.D. Term. 1986) (citations omitted).
Johnson seeks to recover damages presumably under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) for an alleged conspiracy at the state level to cause the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution of him. The first part of § 1985(2) relates only to federal judicial proceedings. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983). The alleged conspiracy in the present case concerns a state court action. Therefore, this Court concludes that the first part of § 1985(2)does not apply to the alleged violation in this case.
The second part of § 1985(2) concerns obstruction of justice at the state level. The second part of the statute contains language which requires that the conspirators' actions be motivated by an intent to deprive the victims of the equal protection of the law. Id. at 725. An allegation of a racial or other class-based discriminatory animus is required to state a claim under the second part of § 1985(2) which prosecutes conspiracy to deny or interfere with equal protection of rights. Alien, 636 F. Supp. at 1093.
In Kush the Court of Appeals concluded and the Supreme Court affirmed, that claims of witness intimidation and obstruction of justice at the state level were not actionable under the second part of § 1985(2) because there was not a sufficient allegation of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. In the present case, there is absolutely no allegation by the plaintiff of a conspiracy to deny him equal protection of the law which is motivated by racial or other class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. Section 1985(2) does not provide the plaintiff with any basis for relief. Willing v. Lake Orion Community Schools Bd. Of Trustees, 924 F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Mich. 1996). The motion to amend is DENIED [Court File No. 16] to the extent it requests to add a conspiracy claim. Accordingly, the motion to amend [Court File No. 16] is DENIED in its entirety.
Johnson's second motion to amend [Court File No. 26] requests that Ernest Craw be added as a defendant for false arrest and false imprisonment. Johnson avers he was not aware Ernest Craw was involved until August 2003 when he received a computerized document revealing Officer Craw's name. Johnson claims the paperwork he received at the time of his prosecution was not legible and the defendants told him Crowe was the officer listed on the warrants and reports. Johnson asserts the motion should not be time-barred because the statute of limitations should be deemed tolled because the defendants deceived and mislead him regarding the identify of Ernest Craw.
Apparently Johnson is using a theory of fraudulent concealment on which to base his tolling argument. For the statute of limitations to be tolled to allow the addition of Officer Craw as a new defendant on the theory of fraudulent concealment, Johnson must show the defendants concealed the information preventing Johnson from discovering the identity of officer Craw within the limitation period and that Johnson exercised due diligence to try to discover the name of the defendant officer. This doctrine does not apply in this case because Johnson has not shown the defendants concealed the identity of Officer Craw or that Johnson exercised due-diligence in trying to identify officer Craw. See Hill v. United States Department of Labor, 65 F.3d 1331, 1335-36 (6th Cir. 1995). Johnson was clearly aware of the alleged wrong having occurred and therefore, was put on notice to identify the proper defendants. The statute of limitations is not tolled while a plaintiff attempts to identify the proper defendants. Haynes v. Locks, 711 F. Supp. 901, 903 (E.D.Tenn. 1989). The fact that Johnson could not clearly read the copy of his warrant does not justify tolling the statute of limitations. The one year statute of limitations expired on January 3, 2003, and Johnson filed the motion to amend on or about September 29, 2003. Accordingly, Johnson's motion to amend [Court File No. 26] is DENIED to the extent it requests to add Officer Ernest Craw.
In his motion to amend [Court File No. 26] Johnson also asks that process be issued on Jimmy Cosby and Odie Jones which the Court DENIES because they are not named defendants in this action. Accordingly, Johnson's second motion to amend [Court File No. 26] is DENIED in its entirety.
II. Standard of Review Pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, pro se status does not exempt the plaintiff from the requirement that he comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981). Pro se plaintiffs must comply with Rule 8 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 1995).
Although the standard of review is liberal, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. Of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (standard of review for dismissing a complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)-failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); LRL Properties, 55 F.3d at 1103-04; Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993); Hartfield v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools, 960 F. Supp. 1259, 1268 (W.D. Mich. 1997). The complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726; Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). "In practice, `a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726 (citations omitted).
The Court also screens a prisoner complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 1915(e).
A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 1915(e)
When screening a prisoner complaint, a district court must examine both § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. If the civil action seeks redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the district court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, which (a) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (b) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from monetary relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Should the complaint contain any allegations that do not fall within § 1915A, the district court must then examine the complaint under § 1915(e)(2). The requirements of § 1915(e)(2) overlap the criteria of § 1915A. Section 1915A is restricted to prisoners who sue government entities, officers, or employees. In contrast, § 1915(e)(2) is restricted neither to actions brought by prisoners, nor to cases involving government defendants. Further, § 1915A is applicable at the initial stage of the litigation, while § 1915(e)(2) is applicable throughout the entire litigation process. A case that may not initially appear to meet § 1915(e)(2) may be dismissed at a future date should it become apparent that the case satisfies this section. Thus, in prisoner cases, the district court must first examine a complaint under § 1915A and then review the complaint under § 1915(e)(2) before the case can proceed in due course. A district court is required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the full filing fee, is a pauper, is pro se, or is represented by counsel as the statute does not differentiate between various civil actions brought by prisoners. The dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A does not negate a prisoner's obligation to pay the filing fee in accordance with § 1915(b)(1)-(2). See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997). We make it explicit: a court's responsibility under the Prison Litigation Act is to first examine the financial status of a prisoner and make the assessment of fees. After the fees have been assessed, the merits of a complaint or appeal may be reviewed. Our mandate, however, does not prevent a district court from making the fee assessment and conducting the screening process in the same opinion or order.McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997).
B. Standard of Review — FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to permit a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1987). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997); Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996).
In order to preclude dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations which comprise all of the essential, material elements necessary to sustain a claim for relief under some viable legal theory. Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 406 (6th Cir. 1998); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240(6th Cir. 1993); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to accept all well-pleaded allegations of fact as being true. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Mayer, 988 F.2d at 638; Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1989). When a factual allegation is capable of more than one reasonable inference, it must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228; Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109. The Court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss simply because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact in the complaint. Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 228-29; Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Allard, 991 F.2d at 1240. The Court does not, however, have to accept as true mere legal conclusions and unwarranted inferences of fact. Lewis, 135 F.3d at 405; Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998); Columbia Natural Resources, 58 F.3d at 1109; Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987).
C. Summary Judgement
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
III. Facts
The Court has reviewed the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff Johnson and makes the following findings. Johnson claims Crowe violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an illegal arrest because he submitted an affidavit causing the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution of Johnson for the offense of theft and burglary without probable cause. According to Johnson, the affidavit noted the crime was committed at Johnson's residence, 2514 Dodson Avenue and Johnson's father said Johnson admitted to the offense. However, during the preliminary hearing Johnson claims his father denied making such a statement.
Crowe never appeared for any of the scheduled court dates which expanded over a period of approximately three months. Johnson's father does not reside at 2514 Dodson Avenue and has not resided there for the past fifteen years. Johnson's father resides on Olive Street. Johnson's father came by the residence of Johnson and his mother at 2514 Dodson Avenue and apparently thought an air conditioner was missing. Johnson's father did not notify him or his mother about the missing air conditioner, but instead, called the police on his cell phone. Crowe responded to the scene at 2514 Dodson Avenue. Johnson's father told the officer he did not live at that residence but Johnson and his mother did. In addition, Johnson's father said he told the police officer Johnson probably burglarized the place and took the air conditioner. Johnson and his mother were in the residence but completely unaware of his father and Crowe being in the yard. No one ever knocked on the door and no one ever came to the residence seeking to arrest him.
Johnson said he had no idea there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest until he was stopped by police and a name check revealed the outstanding warrant on October 8, 2001. Johnson represented himself on these charges and during the first preliminary hearing his father testified the offense occurred September 13, 2001, and when Johnson asked him the last date he spoke with Johnson, the prosecutor objected to the question as irrelevant. The judge then slammed "the Hammer" and postponed the hearing until November of 2001. In November the hearing resumed and again Johnson began the same line of questioning and again the DA objected. Johnson told the Judge the question was relevant because the warrant was based on Johnson allegedly telling his father he committed the crime. The Judge agreed and Johnson's father testified he discovered the air conditioner was missing on September 13, 2001, and he immediately called the police. His father testified he had not spoken with Johnson or seen him since July of 2001. Johnson claims his father denied ever saying Johnson admitted to committing the offense nor did he write the report.
The prosecutor requested a continuance to obtain pawn shop receipts and the Judge continued the hearing until December 2001. When Johnson returned in December 2001 Crowe failed to appear. The prosecutor entered two pawnshop receipts showing Johnson pawned two items. When Johnson asked what dates were on the receipt the prosecutor objected and the Judge continued the case until January 3, 2002, and issued a subpoena for the pawnshop owner. On January 3, 2002, neither Crowe or the pawnshop owner were present. Johnson's mother was present to testify Johnson lived at 2514 Dodson Avenue but his father did not. Johnson's mother was also there to testify that the air conditioner was returned to Johnson's sister who owned it, and no one ever informed his mother of any alleged burglary of her residence.
The prosecutor attempted to convince Johnson to plead guilty to time served but he refused. Johnson contends the case was dismissed on the proof of evidence that plaintiff committed no crime.
Johnson complains that his parole officer, Anthonisen, also violated his due process and Fourth Amendment rights when he obtained a parole violation warrant on false information that Johnson burglarized his own residence. Anthonisen visited Johnson at his residence often and knew 2514 Dodson Avenue was Johnson's residence and not his father's residence. Anthonisen also charged Johnson with failing to show the arresting officer his parole ID and failing to report the arrest. During the revocation hearing the charges were dismissed because the parole officer admitted the arresting officer told him Johnson did show his parole ID. Anthonisen also admitted Johnson's mother called and notified him Johnson had been arrested. All charges were dismissed but Johnson contends the parole officer maliciously failed to withdraw the warrant for six days. Johnson claims he was sent to Tennessee Department of Corrections on January 10, 2002, for two hours and then was released because the warrant was finally withdrawn.
Lastly, Johnson claims Sheriff Cupp violated his constitutional rights by incarcerating him for ninety-six days. IV. Analysis A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
To state a § 1983 claim, Johnson must allege sufficient facts that, if true, would establish the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States while they acted under color of law. Johnson must allege he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of law, without due process of law. Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 384(6th Cir. 1997); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244(6th Cir. 1996); O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032 (1992).
Although the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE do not require a plaintiff to set out in detail the facts underlying the claim, the plaintiff must provide sufficient allegations to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotic Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). To state a § 1983 claim, Johnson must allege sufficient facts that, if true, would establish the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States while they acted under color of law. See Brock, 94 F.3d at 244.
Johnson claims his constitutional rights were violated when Crowe caused the unlawful issuance of a warrant based on false statements and without probable cause. Crowe and Dotson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [Court File No. 13]. Sheriff Cupp filed an answer [Court File No. 17], and Cox, Blackburn, and Anthonisen filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [Court File No. 20]. B. Claims are not Time-Barred
Defendants Crowe and Dotson have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asserting the complaint is time-barred. Cox, Blackburn, and Anthonisen have filed a morion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on several grounds including the allegation that certain claims are time-barred.
For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state statutes of limitation and tolling principles shall apply to determine the timeliness of the claims asserted. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). However, federal law determines the accrual of those claims. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1267 (1997); LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d at 1107.
Generally, a tort cause of action accrues when there has been a violation of a legally protected interest, and such a violation usually occurs when a tort is committed. See Echols v. Chrysler Corp., 633 F.2d 722, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1980). This is known as the "time of event" rule and is applied whenever greater than de minimis harm is discernible at the time the tort is committed. Hicks v. Nines Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir. 1987).
A statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his actions. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991).
Federal courts are to apply the single most analogous state personal injury statute of limitations to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276. The one-year statute of limitations period contained in TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1) applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee. See Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1992).
As stated above, usually the limitation period begins to run on the date the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury. However, the resolution of this issue in this case is more complicated in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 522 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) and other Supreme Court law. It does not appear that Johnson's case fits precisely in the statute of limitations cases previously decided by the Sixth Circuit because the policies that typically restrict federal jurisdiction appear to have applied to Johnson's case prior to the dismissal of his criminal action and his release from jail.
Johnson claims there was no probable cause to arrest him. If Johnson's cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued on the date of the arrest and imprisonment, and he had filed a habeas at that time, under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) the Court would have dismissed the complaint because Johnson was required to raise any constitutional claims as defenses to the criminal action in state court. The Supreme Court later held In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) "that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983."
In Heck, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two state prosecutors and a state investigator on the claim that the defendants knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence and caused the use of an illegal voice-identification procedure at trial. The Supreme Court determined Heck could not recover damages because his criminal conviction had not "been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 487. The Supreme Court reasoned that awarding damages in a § 1983 actions would, in certain cases, "necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction." Id. at 481-82. Thus, since a ruling in Heck's favor would arguably invalidate his conviction, the Court held, that in light of his still-outstanding conviction, his claim was not cognizable. The Heck Court included a caveat that "if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Id. at 487.
Although Heck's ruling that a cause of action under § 1983 that would imply the invalidity of a conviction does not accrue until the conviction is reversed or expunged and upon that event the statute of limitations would begin to run is not specifically on point, it does provide the Court with guidance for the proper resolution of the timeliness issue in the case before it.
The Court is also guided by a 1999 Sixth Circuit case involving a § 1983 claim of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999). The Shamaeizadeh case involved an alleged violation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments due to a police officer's follow-up warrantless search of a lower-level apartment and the seizure of marijuana and related items. Shamaeizadeh brought a § 1983 action seeking damages for the illegal seizure of property, for the money he spent to defend the charges, and for the money he lost while defending the charges. Like Johnson, Shamaeizadeh's case was dismissed after the court determined the second and third warrantless searches of the downstairs apartment were invalid. Shamaeizadeh argued his § 1983 cause of action did not accrue until the criminal charges against him were dismissed and the Sixth Circuit agreed. The Sixth Circuit determined the reasoning of Heck applies pre-conviction and that a prisoner seeking to attack an alleged unconstitutional search and seizure in a § 1983 case must show that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalidity of his future conviction. The court further explained why holding that the statute of limitations accrued at the time of the search would not adequately resolve the issue.
We further conclude that holding that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the search, and requiring that a federal court stay any § 1983 action brought during, and related to, criminal proceedings would not adequately deal with this issue. To require a defendant in a criminal proceeding to file a civil action raising any potential § 1983 claims within one year of any alleged illegal search or other alleged violations of constitutional rights, claims which the federal court must then abstain from resolving until the disposition of the criminal proceedings, would misdirect the criminal defendant. Surely, just as a convicted prisoner must first seek relief through habeas corpus before his § 1983 action can accrue, so too should the defendant in a criminal proceeding focus on his primary mode of relief-mounting a viable defense to the charges against him-before turning to a civil claim under § 1983. Moreover, if the criminal defendant is eventually convicted, Heck would often require that a federal court then dismiss without prejudice any § 1983 claims that are filed because they have not yet accrued. We conclude that it is only appropriate that the statute of limitations not begin to run for criminal defendants seeking to file the same § 1983 claims until the disposition of any pending criminal proceedings.Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d at 399. Therefore, this reasoning provides the foundation for the proper resolution of the issue before this Court.
Since Johnson is challenging his arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution on the grounds that the arrest warrant lacked probable cause, if Johnson had filed this action while his criminal charges were pending, this Court would not have been able to determine whether a decision on Johnson's claim would imply the invalidity of his future conviction without deciding issues common to the criminal action, i.e., whether there was probable cause to make a lawful arrest. If the criminal court found probable cause to arrest and Johnson had been convicted, under Heck no § 1983 claim would have been available. Under that scenario, this Court wouldnot have entertained a § 1983 action until the conviction had been determined to be invalid. Therefore, if Johnson had filed this complaint prior to the resolution of the criminal charges this Court would not have entertained the action. Accordingly, the Court determines the proper date of the accrual of the statute of limitations on the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution is the date of the dismissal of the criminal charges.
The criminal charges against Johnson were dismissed on January 3, 2002, and Johnson filed this § 1983 action on December 15, 2002. Therefore Johnson's § 1983 action was filed within Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are not time-barred.
C. Claims Against Ms. Blackburn
Johnson claims Ms. Blackburn issued the parole violation warrant which he alleges was based on false information. Blackburn claims she should be dismissed because, contrary to Johnson's allegations, she did not issue the parole violation warrant. The warrant clearly proves that defendant Blackburn did not issue the warrant [Court File No. 21, Exhibit 1]. The warrant plainly indicates it was issued by Odie Jones under the authority of Jimmy L. Cosby, Director of Probation and Parole. Accordingly, Johnson's claim against Ms. Blackburn is DISMISSED failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
D. Claims Against District Attorney William Cox. Jr.
Johnson has sued Hamilton County District Attorney William Cox, Jr., in his official and individual capacity. Defendant Cox contends that to the extent he is sued in his individual capacity he is absolutely immune from any claim for money damages for acts or omissions within his prosecutorial capacity.
Immunity defenses apply to individual capacity suits and they do not shield municipalities from § 1983 liability. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. at 166 ("Municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit — either absolute or qualified — under § 1983."); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) ("The only immunities that can be claimed in an official capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess such as the Eleventh Amendment.") Prosecutors sued in their individual capacities are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct relative to their decision on whether to prosecute a case regardless of the prosecutor's motives. See Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989).
Absolute prosecutorial immunity protects the acts falling within a prosecutor's role as advocate for the state. See Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 1998); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997). "Investigative acts under-taken in direct preparation of judicial proceedings, including the professional evaluation of evidence, warrant absolute immunity[.]" Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1445. "Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for `initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the state's case." Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 1998), quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). This immunity extends to all decisions to prosecute except those "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, " Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), none of which Johnson has alleged.
Hence, District Attorney Cox is absolutely immune from suit in his individual capacity. Regardless of defendant Cox's motives for the prosecution, absolute immunity provides complete protection from judicial scrutiny. See Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1447. Accordingly, Cox's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on absolute immunity is GRANTED, and Johnson's claims against Cox in his individual capacity are DISMISSED because Cox is absolutely immune.
Johnson also brought suit against Cox in his official capacity. Since Cox was sued in his official capacity, the Court must proceed as if Johnson has in fact sued the State of Tennessee. However, a county prosecutor, as an officer of the court which is an arm of the state, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1993).
Suing a state officer in his official capacity for damages is equivalent to suing the state itself which is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars such suit unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v. Texas Dept. Of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion), or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. Will v. Michigan Dept. Of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Johnson has not shown, nor does this Court find, that the State has waived its immunity or that Congress has exercised it power to override that immunity in this situation. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983. Id. at 71. Thus federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over causes of actions against officers of a state being sued in their official capacity for damages. See Cummings v. Wilkerson, 134 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1998) (unpublished table decision), available in 1998 WL 30803, at *1, citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593. Accordingly, the claims against Cox in his official capacity are DISMISSED. Hence, all claims against Cox are DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Cox's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is GRANTED.
E. Claims Against Dotson
Johnson has sued Dotson in his individual and official capacities presumably for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. There are no facts alleged in the complaint against Dotson. The only reference to Dotson in the complaint other than the paragraph identifying him as a defendant being sued in his individual and official capacity is the following: "Defendant Dotson violated plaintiff's right in the same manner by enforcing and teaching and condoning such practices as defendant Crowe, and policies [sic]." [Court File No. 1, at 7]. Johnson has not alleged any specific unconstitutional conduct by Dotson. Johnson presumably relies in part on the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose liability on this defendant.
It is well settled that a defendant cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). The right to direct or control employees is, by itself, insufficient to impose liability upon a defendant for the unconstitutional acts of subordinates. Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983 against a defendant for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege a direct causal link between the acts of the subordinate and the supervisory defendant. Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Sixth Circuit has defined the parameters of supervisory liability as follows:
Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.Taylor v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995) ( quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984).
Under the Sixth Circuit's test, a supervisor may be held liable if he participated in or encouraged the specific instance of misconduct, or authorized or approved an unconstitutional act or procedure that resulted in a specific instance of misconduct by a subordinate. See Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that an official may be held liable for failure to supervise and control subordinates even though the official was not directly involved in the specific incident of misconduct). The Sixth Circuit has not limited supervisory liability to situations where the supervisor has actual knowledge of the specific constitutional deprivation. Liability under § 1983 may be imposed on a supervisor regardless of knowledge of the specific incident of misconduct, where the supervisor fails to discharge a duty or adopts a policy that results in a constitutional violation. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81 (holding that issue of fact existed where prison warden was charged with abandoning duty of adopting and implementing transfer procedure identifying inmates at risk for sexual assault); Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that supervisory officials are susceptible to liability under § 1983 for failing to discharge supervisory duties). Johnson has failed to allege any conduct by Dotson which would make him liable for Crowe's actions.
To the extent Johnson alleges Dotson failed to properly train and supervise his employees, he has failed to state a claim. Johnson has done nothing more than make a factually unsupported claim. The Supreme Court has determined "that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The complaint fails to allege any deliberate indifference on the part of Dotson. In addition, there is no allegation that Dotson had a policy or custom of allowing police officers to arrest or prosecute citizens without probable cause to do so. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Accordingly, Johnson's claim against Dotson for failure to properly train and supervise his employees is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.
Johnson has not alleged that Dotson was aware of his situation or in any way acquiesced or participated in any of the alleged unconstitutional conduct. Johnson does not allege that Dotson had Crowe arrest him, or was involved personally in his prosecution, or that there was a policy of arresting citizens under the circumstances of this case. Johnson does not allege that Dotson encouraged the alleged misconduct, or authorized or approved an unconstitutional act or procedure that resulted in the alleged misconduct. Nor does Johnson allege Dotson failed to discharge a duty or adopted a policy that resulted in a constitutional violation. Johnson has not alleged any acts committed by Dotson. Accordingly, Dotson's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [Court File No. 13] is GRANTED pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Johnson's complaint is DISMISSED as to Dotson for failure to state a cognizable claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
F. Claims Against Crowe and Anthonisen
Johnson has brought claims against Crowe and Anthonisen in their individual and official capacities for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. A claim against these defendants in their official capacities is treated as being an action against the City of Chattanooga and the State of Tennessee respectively. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1992).
Johnson brings claims against Crowe in his official and individual capacity. A claim against this defendant in his official capacity is treated as being an action against the City of Chattanooga. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1992). To the extent Crowe was sued in his official capacity as an officer of the Chattanooga Police Department, the Court must proceed as if the plaintiff has in fact sued the City. Therefore, in order to prevail plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged violation of his constitutional rights resulted from acts representing official policy or custom adopted by the City. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. at 690-91; Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).
In order to prevail in an action against a defendant in his official capacity, a plaintiff must show, first, that he has suffered harm because of a constitutional violation and second, that a policy or custom of the entity — in this case, the City of Chattanooga — caused harm. See Collins v. Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120(1992). Johnson must identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself, and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy; all of which Johnson has failed to do. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dept. 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994) (citation omitted).
In his complaint, Johnson does not allege that the violation of his rights by Crowe resulted from any policy or custom on the part of the City of Chattanooga. Consequently, Crowe is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims brought against him in his official capacity. Accordingly, the claims brought against Crowe in his official capacity are DISMISSED and his motion to dismiss [Court File No. 13] is GRANTED IN PART, only to the extent that the claims against Crowe in his official capacity are dismissed.
Anthoisen is a state parole officer. Suing a state officer in his official capacity for damages is equivalent to suing the state itself which is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. See Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suit unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v. Texas Dept. Of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion), or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. Will v. Michigan Dept. Of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
Johnson has not shown, nor does this Court find, that the State has waived its immunity or that Congress has exercised it power to override that immunity in this situation. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983. Id. at 71. Thus federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over causes of actions against officers of a state being sued in their official capacity for damages. See Cummings v. Wilkerson, 134 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1998) (unpublished table decision), available in 1998 WL 30803, at *1, citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593. Accordingly, the claims against Anthonisen in his official capacity are DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Anthonisen's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment [Court File No. 20] is GRANTED IN PART, only to the extent that the claims against him in his official capacity are dismissed.
TENN. CODE ANNO. § 29-20-205 provides for immunity for false imprisonment pursuant to a court mittimus. The record does not indicate that the false imprisonment was not pursuant to a court mittimus.
Johnson also brings a claim against Crowe in his individual capacity for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Johnson asserts Crowe caused a warrant to issue without probable cause which resulted in his false arrest, false incarceration, and malicious prosecution of him for the offense of theft and burglary. Johnson avers that although his father made the call to the police, once Crowe arrived he was informed that Johnson's father did not reside at that address and that Johnson lived at 2514 Dodson Avenue. Johnson alleges Crowe fabricated the report when he wrote that Johnson's father said Johnson admitted he committed the offense. According to Johnson, it was this false arrest warrant that lead to Johnson's false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
Crowe submits that the complaint should be dismissed against him because his involvement in this matter ended on or about September 13, 2001, when he issued the warrant which was based on the sworn testimony of Johnson's father. Interestingly, Crowe fails to cite any case which provides these claims against him accrued on the date of his action of issuing the warrant. Crowe asserts the statute of limitations for any of his alleged wrongs began running on September 13, 2001, thus these claims should be dismissed against him. Crowe did not submit a copy of the warrant and alleged sworn testimony of Johnson's father. The Court's understanding of Johnson's allegation is that Crowe swore out the warrant which started the process of the alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Johnson had no knowledge of the warrant on September 13, 2001. As previously explained in this memorandum, the first date on which Johnson could have maintained a cause of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against Crowe was the date the criminal charges were dismissed, January 3, 2002, and it was on that date that Johnson's cause of action accrued and the Tennessee statute of limitations began to run. Accordingly, Johnson's cause of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution will proceed and Crowe's motion to dismiss these claims against him in his individual capacity is DENIED [Court File No. 13].
Johnson claims Anthonisen violated his Fourth Amendment and due process rights when he requested a parole violation warrant and submitted false facts. Johnson contends Anthonisen had him unlawfully arrested, unlawfully imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted him. Johnson declares Anthonisen knew Johnson was a lawful tenant of the residence he was accused of burglarizing and that Johnson's father did not reside at that residence. Johnson also asserts Anthonisen obtained the parole violation warrant on the false information that Johnson failed to show his parole identification card to the arresting officer and that Johnson failed to report the arrest. According to Johnson, during the parole revocation hearing Anthonisen admitted the arresting officer told him Johnson displayed his parole identification card and he further admitted Johnson's mother called on his behalf to notify him Johnson had been arrested.
During the parole violation hearing Johnson contends he testified he attempted to call Anthoisen from jail but the parole office had pressed #6 on the telephone restricting all calls from the jail. Johnson claims that during the parole revocation hearing the hearing officer personally called the parole office using the jail phone and the operator informed him the number was restricted.
According to Johnson, these claims along with the criminal charge were dismissed and no probable cause was shown. Johnson charges that Anthonisen maliciously failed to withdraw the warrant for six days which resulted in Johnson remaining incarcerated and being sent to the Tennessee Department of Corrections on January 10, 2002, for two hours. It appears the date the parole violation charges were dismissed is the date on which Johnson's cause of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution accrued against Anthonisen.
In the instant case all charges brought by Crowe against Johnson were dismissed on January 3, 2002, and less than one year later Johnson filed this complaint, thus, it is not barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations. All charges brought by Anthonisen against Johnson were presumably dismissed on January 3, 2002, or at some later date. Thus, it appears those claims are not barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations. Johnson claims his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because neither Office Crowe or Anthoisen had probable cause to obtain the warrant. An arrest without probable cause clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 260 (6th Cir. 2003). Liability for false imprisonment attaches if a person is arrested without probable cause. See McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1988). To proceed under § 1983 on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must at least show there was a lack of probable cause to justify his arrest and prosecution. See Thacker, 328 F.3d at 258.
"An investigator may be held liable under § 1983 for making material false statements either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth to establish probable cause for an arrest." Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003). "To overcome an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity . . . a plaintiff must establish . . . the defendant stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth and . . . that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause." Id. (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court gives officials broad qualified immunity protection in the context of arrest warrants. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The Court uses an "objective reasonableness" test to determine whether Crowe and Anthonisen are immune from suit. Crowe and Anthonisen will not be immune if it is objectively obvious "that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issues; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized." Id. Even if a probable cause determination is incorrect, it is not actionable if such determination passes the test of reasonableness. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1449. Hence, the question this Court must answer is whether a reasonably competent officer armed with Crowe's and Anthonisen's knowledge would have acted as Crowe and Anthonisen acted in this situation.
The record does not reveal what proof Anthonisen relied on to obtain his warrant other than the allegations Johnson made that Anthonisen's request for a parole violation warrant was based on false representations that Johnson burglarized his own residence, failed to show the arresting officer his parole identification card, and failed to notify Anthonisen of his arrest. According to Johnson, all of these charges were determined to unfounded and the parole violation warrant was dismissed.
Given the alleged fact that both officer's had knowledge that Johnson was a resident of where the alleged burglary took place and the fact that Johnson's father, the alleged complainant, did not reside at the residence of the alleged burglary, it is possible that a fact finder could conclude that a reasonably competent officer would have conducted further investigation prior to obtaining a warrant. There is no indication in the record as it stands that either officer conducted a further investigation prior to obtaining a warrant. Although a law enforcement officer is entitled to rely on eyewitness identification to establish adequate probable cause with which to support an arrest, Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999), there is no proof in the record that either officer had eyewitness testimony.
Based on the record before it, this Court cannot determine that these officers are not liable for requesting warrants which led to Johnson's arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution, nor can this Court determine that these officers did not act with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to investigate the allegations. "[C]ommon rumor or report, suspicion, or even `strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959). Arrest on mere suspicion is not probable cause. "Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary. On the other hand, good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough. Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Id. at 102 (citations omitted). Accordingly, at this time the claims against Crowe and Anthonisen in their individual capacities for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution remain for adjudication.
V. Conclusion
Remaining for adjudication is the claim against Sheriff Cupp in his individual and official capacities for false imprisonment. Also remaining are the false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims against Crowe in his individual capacity and against Anthonisen in his individual capacity. All claims against Crowe and Anthonisen in their official capacities are DISMISSED. All claims against Dotson, Blackburn, Cox, and John Doe are DISMISSED.
A separate order will enter setting the remaining claims for trial.