Opinion
Case No. 04 CV 0279 JM (JMA).
March 7, 2006
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because he was deprived of outdoor exercise. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment violation and that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. On January 25, 2006, United States Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler issued a Report and Recommendation ("RR") recommending that this court deny Defendants' motion to dismiss. On February 14, 2006, Defendants filed objections to the conclusions in the RR, both with respect to whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment and as to whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. On February 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' objections. For the reasons set forth below, the court wholly adopts the conclusions and findings contained in the RR incorporated by reference herein.
The duties of the district court in connection with a Magistrate Judge's RR are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. The district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made, and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).
Eighth Amendment
Defendants argue in their objections that the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint establish that he was placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit ("ASU") on February 24, 2002, and was, therefore, the court must disregard Plaintiff's contradictory claims. Although the vast majority of the exhibits indicate that Plaintiff was placed in ASU on February 24, 2002, there is one indication that Plaintiff was placed in ASU on February 12, 2002. See Pl. FAC Ex. B ("On Tuesday, February 12, 2002 [Plaintiff is] being placed on Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) Status. . . .). On a motion to dismiss, the court does not weigh the evidence or the likelihood of a plaintiff's success. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Because there is some evidence that Plaintiff was placed in ASU prior to February 24, 2002, the court does not, as Defendant urges, accept as true that Plaintiff was only deprived of outdoor exercise for 39 days.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's alleged deprivation of outdoor exercise due to his own misbehavior does not satisfy the objective element of the test for cruel and unusual punishment. Courts have not applied a bright-line rule for measuring when a deprivation of outdoor exercise becomes a constitutional violation. Compare Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding allegations of deprivation of outdoor exercise for six weeks to be a constitutional violation) with Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that there was no violation of the Eighth Amendment where outdoor exercise was restored after one month). Nor have the reasons for the inmate's confinement been held to be dispositive on whether a deprivation of outdoor exercise meets the objective component of the test. See Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088 ("Although [the defendant] was placed in [a secure housing unit] because of disciplinary infractions . . . [he] did not lose his exercise privileges based on a determination by prison officials that he presented a `grave security risk when outside his cell' . . ."). Finally, Plaintiff is not required to show that he could exercise indoors, because it is the need to exercise outdoors that "is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of the inmates." Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
Defendants also object to the conclusion that Plaintiff has sufficiently plead the subjective element of the test for cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants maintain that they were not given actual notice that Plaintiff had been deprived of outdoor exercise during the time when Plaintiff was under their control. Defendants assert that Plaintiff must allege that Defendants had the ability to transfer him out of ASU housing in order to plead deliberate indifference. They rely on the Supreme Court's statement that prison officials will not be liable under the Eighth Amendment "solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). However, Plaintiff is not required to allege how Defendants can overcome logistical difficulties, particularly when logistical difficulties do not, as a matter of law, justify a constitutional deprivation. See Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088. InFarmer, the Supreme Court declined to impose liability on prison officials "solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions," because it believed deliberate indifference required a subjective state of mind. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. For the reasons set forth in the RR, Plaintiff has adequately alleged deliberate indifference. Moreover, Defendants reliance on exhibits attached to Plaintiff's original complaint, but not to his First Amended Complaint, is unavailing. On a motion to dismiss, the court considers only the sufficiency of the complaint before the court. Defendants have not shown that the exhibits attached to the original complaint have been incorporated by reference into the First Amended Complaint, nor have they requested that the court take judicial notice of the exhibits.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that it is not clearly established that 39 days without outdoor exercise, when there is no secure exercise area available, violates the Eighth Amendment. Allen provided fair warning, however, to Defendants that security-related logistical difficulties do not necessarily justify a deprivation of outdoor exercise for five and a half weeks. See Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088 ("A rational fact-finder after hearing the evidence might determine that the defendants acted with at least deliberate indifference to [plaintiff's] basic human needs . . . by placing inconsequential logistical concerns that might be no more than matters of convenience above [plaintiff's] need for exercise.").
Conclusion
The court finds that the RR thorough and sound analysis of whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim under the Eighth Amendment and whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the court concludes that Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied for the reasons set forth in the RR. For the foregoing reasons, the court adopts the findings and conclusion contained in the Report and Recommendation, which is incorporated herein by reference. Accordingly, the court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.