Opinion
HHDCV145038461S
06-16-2016
Francisco Jimenez v. William Melendez
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#105)
Sheila A. Huddleston, J.
The plaintiff, Francisco Jimenez, an inmate at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the action of the defendant, William Melendez, a correctional officer who allegedly confiscated certain items of the plaintiff's property. The defendant has moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for any violation of the federal constitution. The plaintiff objected, arguing generally that he has properly alleged claims of retaliation and discrimination.
On February 26, 2015, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend the writ, summons, and complaint to correct the defendant's first name, asserting that the defendant's first name is Luis, not William. No action has been taken following the request, and the defendant's motion to strike is filed on behalf of " Correction Officer Melendez.
A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint and requires no factual findings by the trial court. Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). Pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, not narrowly and technically. Id. " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). " A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The self-represented plaintiff's complaint contains eleven paragraphs, each of which is separately labeled a " count." The separate " counts, " however, do not individually contain allegations necessary to state any claim. Each individual count is incorporated into the following counts. The court, mindful of the latitude afforded to self-represented parties and that complaints must be construed broadly and realistically, construes the complaint to contain the following allegations:
The plaintiff is an inmate at MacDougall. The defendant is a correctional officer who, on or about July 22, 2014, worked as a property officer at MacDougall. While the defendant was assigned to the K-9 unit, he and the plaintiff had a verbal confrontation. In retaliation for that confrontation, the defendant fabricated facts to his colleagues, the grievance coordinator and the warden of the institution, and during a " property matrix, " the defendant confiscated a television set that the plaintiff had purchased through the prison commissary and a gold chain that the plaintiff had possessed since entering the prison system fifteen years earlier. The plaintiff alleges that these actions were willful and malicious and done with the specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of his rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, freedom from racial discrimination, freedom of association, and liberty, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages.
On May 6, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint and a supporting memorandum of law. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the facts alleged do not state a claim under the federal constitution. On June 17, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, arguing generally that his claim of retaliatory action states a claim under the federal constitution. The matter was heard at short calendar on February 22, 2016.
DISCUSSION
Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part: " Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress . . ." " To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under [the] color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). " These two elements denote two separate areas of inquiry: the plaintiff must prove a constitutional or statutory violation and that violation must have been committed by the defendant acting under color of law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Hryniewicz, 38 Conn.App. 715, 720, 663 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 918, 665 A.2d 610 (1995).
A
Due Process & Deprivation of Liberty Claims
The first issue is whether the plaintiff's factual allegations are legally sufficient to state claims for the denial of due process and the deprivation of liberty. The defendant argues that the court should strike the due process and deprivation of liberty claims because the allegations that the defendant confiscated the plaintiff's television and gold chain do not establish constitutional violations under the United States Supreme Court decision of Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), because Connecticut affords inmates an adequate post-deprivation remedy for property losses.
The plaintiff's conclusory allegation of " deprivation of liberty" is not further explained in his complaint, and other than the seizure of his television and gold chain, there are no factual allegations discussing any impact on his liberty. The court therefore concludes that, as far as it can discern, the deprivation of liberty claim is the same as the deprivation of property claim, and its analysis considers these claims jointly as claims of deprivation of property and liberty without due process of law.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: " No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This protection applies to prisoners who " may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Notwithstanding these statements, " an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy." (Footnote omitted.) Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. 533.
In Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. 519, as in this case, the plaintiff was a prison inmate and the defendant was a correctional officer. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had brought false charges against the plaintiff and had intentionally destroyed certain of his noncontraband personal property. Id., 520. The district court dismissed the action, holding that the intentional and wrongful destruction of the plaintiff's property did not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Id. The Supreme Court agreed. Id., 533.
In light of Hudson, the question in this case is whether Connecticut law affords the plaintiff an adequate post-deprivation remedy. The court concludes that it does. General Statutes § 18-81y establishes a lost property board within the Department of Correction to hear and decide claims for lost or damaged personal property. Claims that are denied by the board may then be presented to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with General Statutes § 4-147. This postdeprivation remedy available to the plaintiff " satisfies the due process clause." Gaetano v. Manley, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-14-5009244-S, (February 27, 2015, Ozalis, J.). The remedy is also " conterminous with all due process imperatives." Day v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-4027999-S, (February 11, 2008, Bellis, J.). In the complaint, the plaintiff has not alleged that he has pursued his remedy through the lost property board and the Claims Commissioner. The plaintiff has failed to state legally sufficient due process and deprivation of liberty claims under Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. 533 and Gaetano v. Manley, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-5009244-S, . Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted as to the due process and deprivation of liberty claims.
General Statutes § 18-81y provides in relevant part: " The Commissioner of Correction shall establish a lost property board within the Department of Correction to hear and determine any claim by an inmate of a correctional facility who seeks compensation not exceeding three thousand five hundred dollars for lost or damaged personal property. The board shall hear and determine each such claim and may, if it determines the claim is one which in equity and justice the state should pay, award damages. If the board denies a claim in whole or in part, the inmate may, not later than sixty days after such decision, present the claim to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with [General Statutes § 4-147]. The filing of a claim with the lost property board shall toll the time limit for presenting a claim to the Claims Commissioner pursuant to [General Statutes § 4-148]."
B
Equal Protection and Racial Discrimination Claims
The next question presented is whether the plaintiff has adequately alleged facts that suffice to show racial discrimination and violation of equal protection. The defendant argues that the equal protection and discrimination claims are legally insufficient because the plaintiff has not pleaded that he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that the basis for such treatment was based on an impermissible consideration such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. The plaintiff does not address the defendant's argument directly, but generally argues that he has stated claims upon which relief may be granted, and he cites authority that he has a right not to be discriminated against by a state actor or treated differently from similarly situated prisoners. He does not, however, identify any inmates who have been treated differently.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: " No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." " [The statement] is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn. 280, 300, 984 A.2d 658 (2009). To establish a violation of the equal protection clause, a " plaintiff must prove that the state discriminated against him based on an impermissible, invidious classification." Id. " Put another way, the plaintiff must establish that he, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated . . . and . . . that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " [When a plaintiff] does not allege selective treatment based upon his race, religion or any intentional effort by [the defendant] to punish him for exercising his constitutional rights, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that [the defendant] maliciously signaled [him] out . . . with the intent to injure him." (Citation omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 393, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S.Ct. 1239, 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (2000). " [T]he analytical predicate [of an equal protection claim] is a determination of who are the persons . . . similarly situated." Broadnax v. New Haven, supra, 294 Conn. 301. " Although the prototypical equal protection claim involves discrimination against people based on their membership in a vulnerable class . . . the equal protection guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination in the hands of government officials . . . The [United States] Supreme Court [has] affirmed the validity of such class of one claims [when] the plaintiff alleges that [he] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for difference in treatment." (Citation omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 206 n.11, 9 A.3d 347 (2010); see Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). Moreover, " [the] plaintiff must also allege facts that would permit a finding that his treatment was not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. [See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)]." Mercer v. Champion, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-07-4014911-S, (July 12, 2010, Pittman, J.), aff'd, 139 Conn.App. 216, 55 A.3d 772 (2012).
Connecticut is a fact pleading state. Mercer v. Champion, 139 Conn.App. 216, 229, 55 A.3d 772 (2012). Practice Book § 10-1 provides in relevant part: " Each pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material fact upon which the pleader relies . . ." " A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992). " Under either the prototypical equal protection or class of one analysis, the plaintiff's [complaint] must identify and relate specific factual instances in which persons similarly situated were treated differently." Mercer v. Champion, supra, 139 Conn.App. 238.
In this case, the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support his equal protection and racial discrimination claims. The plaintiff raises the issue of racial discrimination in his complaint, but he does not identify his race or allege that the defendant's actions had a discriminatory affect or were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. The plaintiff also has not alleged facts to demonstrate that his treatment was not related to a legitimate penological interest. See Mercer v. Champion, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-07-4014911-S. The plaintiff " presents only the conclusory allegation that he [was] being treated differently, " but does not " identify and relate specific factual instances in which persons similarly situated were treated differently." Mercer v. Champion, supra, 139 Conn.App. 238. " Such conclusory statements without factual support are not enough" to allow the plaintiff's claims " to survive the defendant's motion to strike." Id. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted as to the equal protection and discrimination claims.
C
Freedom of Association Claim
The next question is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts in support of a claim that the defendant's action violated the plaintiff's right to free association. The defendant argues that the court should strike the freedom of association claims because the plaintiff has not pleaded any facts indicating how the defendant or a department of correction employee violated his freedom of association rights. The plaintiff does not address this argument.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: " Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . ." " The Supreme Court has held that there are two kinds of freedom of association claims that are constitutionally protected: intimate association and expressive association. The Court summarized these two forms of associational freedom in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984): In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment--speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind of an indispensable means of protecting other individual liberties." Commissioned II Love v . Yarbrough, 621 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1321-22, (S.D.G.A. 2007). Despite the foregoing statements, " [a]n inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration" and " freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003). " Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison context." Id.
" A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005).
The plaintiff's only factual allegation is that the defendant confiscated the plaintiff's television set and gold chain in retaliation for a verbal confrontation. This does not support of a freedom of association claim. The plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating that the defendant prohibited the plaintiff from intimately associating with his family, or associating in prison for purpose of engaging in speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, or exercise of religion. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. 617-18. The plaintiff has also not alleged that the defendant's confiscation of his property occurred pursuant to a prison regulation or that such prison regulation was unreasonable in light of his freedom of association rights. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Furthermore, the plaintiff has not pleaded that the defendant's actions were not rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. See id., 89-90. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to state a legally sufficient freedom of association claim. The motion to strike is granted as to the freedom of association claim.
D
Eighth Amendment Claim
The last question is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a violation of his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that prison officials failed to provide for his basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, reasonable safety and basic hygiene. The plaintiff does not address the defendant's argument directly, but generally argues that he has stated claims upon which relief may be granted.
The eighth amendment to the United States constitution provides: " Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." " The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment . . . In its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners . . . The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under Farmer, a prison official violates the eighth amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be " objectively, sufficiently serious, " and second, the prison official must have a " sufficiently culpable state of mind, " one of " deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, supra, 511 U.S. 834.
In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant confiscated his television set and gold chain in retaliation for a verbal confrontation. He has not pleaded that the defendant deprived him of adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, or acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety. Thus, the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state an eighth amendment violation under Farmer . The motion to strike is therefore granted as to the eighth amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike the complaint is granted.